Philippines: the war and the people; a record of personal observations and experiences,

Contents

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Author’s Note 13

i Philippine History in Brief

II

A distinction between causes— The present war an outcome of former movements — Unique position of the monastic orders in the Philippines — The Cavite insurrection — Joseph Burgos — Secret societies — The Katipunan— Jose Rizal— Punishment and its results — Development of aspiration for independence — Rise of Emilio Aguinaldo — Growth of the insurrection— Demands made of the Filipinos by Spanish governors-general — Treaty of Biak-na-bato— Smouldering fires of insurrection.

IN any consideration of the conditions which have resulted in the present war in the Philippine Islands, it is necessary to make some distinction between immediate causes and root causes. The war was not a sudden and spontaneous outbreak resultant upon a given incident. Whether or not it was avoidable may be and is open to question. But it is not to be denied that war followed partly as a result of preexisting conditions. The root cause, I believe, will be found in the Filipino uprisings of 1872 and

1 In the making of this chap- now the standard work upon the ter, I have drawn to some ex- subject. For that which I have tent upon Mr. John Foreman’s taken, I beg Mr. Foreman’s parbook, “ The Philippine Islands,” don, and thank him. — A.G.R.

oo

1896. I believe also that these two are connected by a definite chain of events, the latter being but a revival, on larger scale, of its predecessor.

In 1872 there occurred what is known as the Cavite insurrection. Through all the term of Spanish occupation in the Philippine Islands, there have been heard the mutterings and there have arisen the storms of discontent among the people. The year 1872 marked the gathering of one of these storms. There was a focusing of that issue which is to-day the most important factor in the strife. In other chapters I shall review more fully the question of the place and influence of the monastic orders in the political life of the Philippine Islands. Here I shall only assert that the question of those orders lies at the bottom of the uprisings of 1872 and 1896 directly, and that, indirectly, it lies also at the bottom of the present trouble.

The monastic orders in the Roman Catholic Church have been defined as being “ like corporations in a civil government, having special exemptions and privileges.” With the exceptions of the Mohammedans of the southern Philippine Islands and the comparatively limited number of semi-savages of the interior, the religion of the islanders is that of the Roman Catholic Church. The Philippine Islands stand almost, if not quite, unique, in that the administration of the church, its preaching and its work, is wholly in the hands of monastic orders — the

Dominican, the Franciscan, the Austin, and the Recoletos. Secular priesthood, save in minor and subordinate posts, is virtually unknown. The ranks of these orders are filled from Spain. Protests against the abuses of the friars have again and again been followed by revolt. In many instances an outraged people, individually or collectively, have taken the law into their own hands, because the laws of the land gave them no protection against the friars, and have killed the incumbent of their district for his crimes.

The ground of the Cavite insurrection was the local opposition to the friars of the district. The outbreak failed through a mistaken signal, but it could hardly have succeeded in any case. Its leader, a Filipino, one Joseph Burgos, together with three other native priests, was executed upon the Luneta in Manila by the Spanish military authorities at the instigation of the friars. A number of others, native clergy and private citizens, were deported and their property confiscated. To-day the name of Joseph Burgos is one of reverence among the Filipino people as that of a martyr. Some of those who were expelled the country are still living. The memory of the event remains, a bitter and never-to-beforgotten story, in the minds of thousands. There, in reality, was the seed sown which developed in dim light and in darkness until it sprang into larger life in the revolt of 1896.

Of this time John Foreman says : “ No native,

TEE REVOLUTIONS OF 1872 AND 1896 25 at that period, dreamed of absolute independence.” The sole object of the uprising of 1872 was the expulsion of the friars. At about the same time the constitutional government in Spain, which followed the deposition of Queen Isabella II, promised various reforms in the Philippine Islands. The reforms were never carried out, but the germ of a new idea, dimly seen and but partly realized, was implanted in Filipino minds.

Secret societies were organized. Among these were La Liga Filipina and the mysterious Katipunan with its “ blood compact.” The aims and objects of these societies were not identical and not all of them were directed toward either ecclesiastical or political reform. One, at least, looked to the establishment of a trade combination in the various departments of the leading agricultural interests, for protection and defense against the avarice of foreign commission merchants who fixed the prices and terms of payment for the commodities.

Preeminent among the men of this period stands Jose Rizal y Mercado, author, physician and martyred patriot, whose tragic ending is one of the dark stains upon the pages of ecclesiastical history in the Philippines. He was a man of high culture and wide attainments. He was a graduate of the University of Madrid and qualified himself for the medical profession by continuing his studies in the schools of Paris and of Germany. During his stay in Europe he produced his now well-known story of Filipino life under the title of “Noli me T anger e, ” 1 and one of lesser fame, “ El Filibusterismo.” The former especially found a wide circulation among the Filipino people. Though nominally a novel, it was really an expose of the many offenses of the friars against the Filipino people. Chiefly because of these books their author incurred the bitter hatred of those friars against whom they were directed. The church forbade the reading of them, and it is asserted that even the ownership of them involved the risk of life. Rizal returned to Manila in 1893. He was at once arrested, at the instigation of the friars, upon a charge of sedition. Against the combination of church and state he was powerless. He was banished to one of the small coast villages of the island of Mindanao, where he remained until July, 1896. He was then, at his own request, granted permission to go to Cuba for enlistment as a surgeon in the Spanish army. He sailed for Spain early in the month of September, bearing letters of recommendation from General Blanco to Spanish cabinet officials. ■ Arriving in Spain, he was arrested, in response to cablegrams from Manila, and returned to the Philippines as a state prisoner. Rizal’s stay in Manila, prior to his departure for Spain, was

1 An adaptation of it has been published in America, by [Messrs. McClure, Phillips & Co., under the title of “An Eagle Flight.”

coincident with the outbreak of 1896. Although there was no evidence that he was in any way connected with the plots of that time, and in spite of the fact that he had been a Spanish prisoner in Mindanao during the three preceding years, he was charged with complicity in the affair, tried, condemned as guilty and shot as a traitor. The closing years of his young life were a martyrdom. His death was a tragedy.

Against the secret societies, and particularly against the mysterious Katipunan, the friars directed all their energies. Unable to fathom them, they denounced them as u masonic,” and consequently anti-Christian, prohibited by the church and by special papal bulls. Members and suspects were denounced by the hundred, and, at the instigation and through the influence of the friars, hundreds of people, whose only offense was that they were offensive to the friars, were banished from their homes, some to other lands, and some to the smaller and unpeopled islands of the archipelago. Their personal property was confiscated, their real estate was condemned and sold. Some of their holdings unquestionably fell into the hands of the various orders and now constitute a part of that immense possession of the friars, the title to which will yet furnish a great deal of complicated work for the law-courts. It is even asserted by some that the Cavite uprising was instigated and fomented by emissaries of the friars for the express purpose of implicating certain individuals wlio made themselves offensive to the church dignitaries. Be that as it may, the uprising came and was quelled with a strong and cruel hand, but the idea which lay behind it took new life. That which the friars hoped would prove a deadly poison proved to be a tonic, a stimulant. It roused the Filipinos to a closer union, a firmer purpose. The societies which were formed anew taught the Filipinos the value of organization and served as a nucleus for the insurrection of 1896.

The heart of this insurrection appears to have been the Katipunan. The word has no other meaning than “the league.” The movement failed in its first stroke. It is asserted that its plans were revealed by a woman in the confessional and were carried to the archbishop, the present incumbent, Nozaleda, whom Foreman styles “ the Bloodthirsty.”

The usual cooperation between the church and the military authorities led to the prompt arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of the native people, among them many of the best and wealthiest families. The banishment of the strongest supporters and wisest leaders, those who could and would give of their time, their money and their strength to the cause, only served to embitter the masses and to stimulate them to more active and determined revolt. It was evident that the motive was ecclesiastical rather than political reform. It has been alleged by some that even then there was no idea of a blow for independence. Much that I heard while in the islands leads me to a conviction that the idea of independence, though not yet an appreciable force among the masses, was even then a purpose of the leaders. But, even to them, independence as a nation was less an end than a means to an end— the expulsion of the friars. Their idea of independence was crude and almost chaotic. They understood little of its meaning, less of its responsibilities. How should they know anything of it ? Where in their past experience had there been that which would teach it them?

As Santiago province has been the hotbed of Cuban revolutions in the past, so has Cavite province, just southward of Manila, been the focal point of Filipino insurrection. In this movement of 1896 Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy first came into political and military prominence. He was then a young man of twenty-seven years of age, but little known outside his own province, — that of Cavite, — and far from specially notable there. He was a man of fair and respectable, though not prominent, social connection. He was well, but not unusually well, educated. By just what steps he attained leadership I do not know. It is a safe assumption that he rose as he did mainly through the operation of those little understood laws which, in time of stress and crisis, so often bring fitting men to the front. It is useless to sneer at him, to vilify him as a schemer and a trickster. For four years he has been the leader and the idol of his people. Schemers and tricksters may attain that height ; none but strong and forceful men can hold it through four years of national struggle. He has been lauded as a Washington and condemned as a knave. He probably is not the former, but he certainly is not the latter.

In spite of the revelation of its plans and the rigid punishment of many who were supposed to be connected with it, the insurrection grew in strength and in extent. Spain increased her army and her navy in the Philippines. Governor-General Ramon Blanco, the same man who succeeded Weyler in Cuba, was not disposed to follow the brutal measures urged by Archbishop Nozaleda and some of the leading Spanish citizens. Probably at the instance of this group, Blanco was recalled, and Polavieja, a ready tool for the hands of the friars, was sent to succeed him. More reinforcements were sent out from Spain.

The first encounter between the Spaniards and the insurgents worthy to be called a battle occurred on Sunday, August 30, 1896, at the village of San Juan del Monte, some three or four miles outside the city of Manila. On that day martial law was proclaimed in Manila and throughout a considerable area of the surrounding country.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1872 ANI) 1896 31

The story of the ensuing months is too long for a place in this volume. Numerically the insurgents were in overwhelming force, but they lacked arms and ammunition, training and discipline. Their forces were little, if anything, better than a mob. At the time of their greatest strength the Spaniards numbered about twenty-seven thousand soldiers. Battles were fought with varying success and with severe losses upon both sides.

Few wars of civilized or semi-civilized peoples have been carried on with so much of utter brutality as that waged by Polavieja against the Filipinos. If, in our own struggle with them, there have been occasional instances of a savage inhumanity manifested by Filipinos, it is more than probable that they learned their lesson from Spanish butchers under the command of this chief butcher. In the spring of 1897 Polavieja asked to be recalled on the ground of broken health. He was succeeded by General Primo de Rivera.

The new governor-general inaugurated his rule by a proclamation of amnesty to all insurgents who would lay down their arms. It was a politic move. The war was virtually a deadlock. Neither side was strong enough to win within a calculable period. The Filipinos held much of the country and could not be defeated or suppressed by any force which the Spaniards could send against them. The Span-

TEE PEIL1PPIXES iards held Manila and some of the larger cities. Their dislodgment was beyond the powers of the Filipinos because of the native lack of suitable ordnance and small arms. A portion of the Filipino army adopted guerrilla methods and minor engagements were of more or less frequent occurrence.

A second edict issued by Primo de Rivera was followed by one issued from the Filipino side which bore no date and, unfortunately, no official signature. But it appears to have expressed in formal terms the demands of some portion of the Filipino people. A preamble is followed by the ensuing demands :

1. Expulsion of the friars, and restitution to the townships of the lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the episcopal sees, equally between Peninsular [Spanish] and Insular [Filipino] secular priests.

2. Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba, parliamentary representation, freedom of the press, toleration of all religious sects, laws common with hers, and administrative and economic autonomy.

3. Equality in treatment and pay between Peninsular and Insular civil servants.

4. Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or, in default of finding such owners, the state to put them up at public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all, payment to be made within four years, as in the case of the present state lands.

5. Abolition of the government’s authority to banish citizens, as well as of all unjust measures against Filipinos ; legal equality for all persons, whether Peninsular or Insular, under the civil as well as the penal code.

TEE REVOLUTIONS OF 1872 AND 1896 33

This was widely circulated during the month of July, 1897. Shortly afterward there appeared a manifiesto, signed by Emilio Aguinaldo. A portion of it reads as follows :

We aspire to the glory of obtaining the liberty, independence and honor of the country. ... We aspire to a government representing all the live forces of the country, in which the most able, the most worthy in virtue and talent, may take part, without distinction of birth, fortune or race. We desire that no monk nor friar shall sully the soil of any part of the archipelago, nor that there shall exist any convent, etc.

In view of certain allegations that it was only after the return of Aguinaldo to Manila in May, 1898, that any idea of a national independence was ever entertained, or even formed, the foregoing is not without interest. It was issued in the summer of 1897, and it will be noted that it contains a specific statement of Filipino aspiration for independence and a representative government.

During the month of August, 1897, steps were taken toward effecting a settlement of the difficulties between the islanders and the home government. A series of conferences resulted in a treaty, known as the Treaty of Biak-na-bato, on December 14, 1897.1

1 This is the treaty according to Aguinaldo (from his “True Version of the Philippine Revolution,” published in Tarlak,

September 23, 1899) :

“Don Pedro Alejandro Patemo (who was appointed by the Spanish governor-general sole mediator in the discussion of the terms of peace) visited Biak-na-bato several times to negotiate terms of the treaty,

The major portion of the terms of this treaty were virtually nullified by subsequent events and proceedings. A special interest centers around the clause which relates to the money payment to be made by Spain to the participants in the insurrection. This has been made the basis of many representations, or misrepresentations, reflecting upon the honor and the sincerity of Senor Aguinaldo. He has been charged with seeking only his own ends and with playing a

■which, after negotiations extending over five months, and careful consideration had been given to each clause, was finally completed and signed on December 1-1, 1897, the following being the principal conditions :

“ 1. That I would, and any of my associates who desired to go with me, be free to live in any foreign country. Having fixed upon Hongkong as my place of residence, it was agreed that payment of the indemnity of $800,000 (Mexican) should be made in three instalments ; namely, $400,000 when all the arms in Biak-na-bato were delivered to the Spanish authorities ; $200,000 when the arms surrendered amounted to eight hundred stands ; the final payment to be made when one thousand stands of arms shall have been handed over to the authorities and the Te Dcum sung in the Cathedral in Manila as thanksgiving for the restoration of peace. The latter part of February was fixed as the limit of time wherein the surrender of arms should be completed.

“ 2. The whole of the money was to be paid to me personally, leaving the disposal of the money to my discretion and knowledge of the understanding with myassociates and other insurgents.

“3. Prior to the remainder of the insurgent forces evacuating Biak-na-bato Captain-General Primo de Rivera should send to Biak-na-bat6 two generals of the Spanish army to be held as hostages by my associates who remained there until I and a few of my compatriots arrived in Hongkong and the first instalment of the money payment (namely, $400,000)was paid to me.

“4. It was also agreed that the religious corporations in the Philippines be expelled and an autonomous system of government, political and administrative, be established, though by special request of GeneralPrimo de Rivera these conditions were not insisted on in the drawing up of the treaty, the general contending that such concessions would subject the Spanish government to severe criticism and even ridicule.’7 shrewd game for the lining of his own pockets. He has been charged with “selling his country for Spanish gold.” The total amount payable was seventeen hundred thousand dollars, Mexican silver (equivalent practically to one half that sum in gold). But only four hundred thousand dollars (Mexican) of this was ever paid; and it is upon the receipt and alleged disposition of this amount that there rest the charges of greed and dishonesty on the part of Emilio Aguinaldo. The evidence in the case tends to show that Aguinaldo’s conduct was wholly honorable and conscientious.

Under the terms of this Treaty, Aguinaldo and his associates left for Hongkong on December 27, 1897. It was mutually hoped that the trouble was ended. But the friars could neither forget nor forgive. Former experiences were repeated. Persecution and execution followed, again creating unrest. In its issue of March 17, 1898, the “ Diario de Manila” published an article demanding autonomy and the carrying out of the reforms provided for by the Treaty of Biak-na-bato. Gfovernor- Gfeneral Rivera ordered the suspension of the paper. Recognizing more and more clearly that they had been tricked, the deported Filipino leaders established a more effective organization of La Junta Patriotica (the Patriotic Council) in Hongkong. This organization has continued up to the present time, working persistently in tlie interests of the Filipino people.

Yet the Spanish authorities appear to have regarded the troubles as over. Some of the Spanish troops were returned to the Peninsula. Prirno de Rivera was recalled and General Basilio Augusti was appointed to the governorship. On April 3 a wide-spread uprising occurred in Cebu. The rebellion revived actively in the northern provinces. The smouldering fires of protest sprang into new and stronger flame. This was the situation when Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila Bay.

Ill

The Junta Patriotica— Continuance of insurrection— Aguinaldo’s return and leadership— America’s first touch in the Philippines— The Singapore meeting— Aguinaldo sent to Manila— Proclamation by the Junta— Renewal of war in Luzon under General Aguinaldo— Declaration of Filipino desire for independence— American encouragement of the idea— The Filipino- American military alliance.

IT has been asserted that the revolution of 1896 was wholly suppressed, that it had terminated in the dispersion of the Filipino forces and the expatriation of the leaders. This assertion is not supported by the facts in the case. The Treaty of Biak-na-bato was effected on December 14, 1897, and Aguinaldo and his companions were sent to Hongkong in accordance with its terms. Whether or no the Filipinos lived strictly up to their part of the compact is perhaps a question, but there seems little doubt that Spain was unduly dilatory in fulfilling her part.

The expatriated leaders, convinced that they had been duped in this matter as they had on similar occasions in earlier days, organized in Hongkong and prepared, through the Junta Patriotica, for a resumption of the struggle. They were in active communication with their followers on the islands and to some extent directed movements there. That active military operations against the Spaniards had been resumed and were in process at the time of Admiral Dewey’s arrival at Manila is amply evidenced by the reports of the United States consul at Manila, Mr. Oscar F. Williams. During the month of February, 1898, Mr. Williams wrote to the department at Washington as follows :

Peace was proclaimed and, since my coming, festivities therefor were held ; but there is no peace, and has been none for about two years. Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and five dead left on the field.

During the month of March he again wrote :

Insurrection is rampant ; many killed, wounded and made prisoners on both sides. A battle-ship, the Don Juan de Austria, sent this week to the northern part of Luzon to cooperate with a land force of two thousand despatched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. Last night special squad of mounted police were scattered at danger-points to save Manila. . . . Rebellion never more threatening to Spain.

Around Manila, in northern Luzon and in some of the southern islands, the insurrection was still alive and active and fighting was still going on. Upon Aguinaldo’s arrival, on May 19, he reassumed the command of the insurgent forces. He resumed that place in their political life which he had held from the beginning of the outbreak, and which he holds to-day — that of acknowledged leader, guide and commander. It was no unwilling tribute and service which they rendered. He took his place by no act of a tyrannical usurper, but by the consent and with the support of his people, heartily accorded. Despite assertions to the contrary, the insurrection of 1896, though interrupted and declared by Spain to be at an end, was still in progress at the time of Dewey’s arrival.

I have no purpose to discuss here whether or not the Filipinos were or are capable of self-government ; whether a government of their own or a government by the United States would be the better for them and for the world at large. That is another and a different matter. The purpose of this chapter is the indication of some of the root causes of the war which followed between the Filipinos and the United States.

America’s first touch upon the Philippines appears on February 25, 1898, ten days after the destruction of the Maine in Havana harbor and one month before the declaration of war with Spain. On that date, Mr. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, then acting as Secretary, sent the following despatch to Commodore Dewey, commanding the Asiatic squadron of the United States navy:

Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.

On April 23 war was declared between Spain and the United States. Hongkong being a neutral port, the American squadron was obliged to withdraw from its harbor under the established international law covering such situations. It sailed to Mirs Bay, a few miles to the northward, in Chinese waters, China not being included in the international agreement. In the meantime Aguinaldo had gone to Singapore. It is at this point, practically, April 24, that there begins the much-disputed question of the encouragement given to Aguinaldo, by officials of the United States, concerning the future independence of the Philippine Islands. Charges and denials, allegations and contradictions, have followed and the matter is still in dispute. There would seem to be no question that a midnight meeting occurred, on the night of April 24, in Singapore, at the instance of Mr. Spencer Pratt, the American consul-general at that port. Seven people are said to have been present— Emilio Aguinaldo,

ROOT CA USES OF TEE WAR

Mr. Howard W. Bray, an Englishman long resident in the far East and closely affiliated with the Filipino Junta in Hongkong, American Consul Spencer Pratt, the editor of the Singapore “Free Press ” and three of Aguinaldo’s associates. As to the tenor and the results of this meeting, Mr. Pratt denies the statements made by the other parties. They assert the drawing up of a provisional agreement, of which the following were the terms :

1. Philippine independence to be proclaimed.

2. A federal republic to be established by vote of the rebels ; pending the taking of this vote, Aguinaldo to appoint the members of that government.

3. The federal republic to recognize a temporary intervention of American and European administrative commissions to be appointed by Commodore Dewey.

4. The American protectorate to be recognized on the same terms as those fixed for Cuba.

This was followed by ten other and general clauses, and a fifteenth clause provided that the agreement was subject to ratification (by telegraph) by Commodore Dewey and President McKinley.

Consul Pratt denies this agreement, and the others have produced no incontrovertible proof that it ever existed. The Junta in Hongkongassured me in emphatic terms that it was a fact. It appears to remain largely a question of personal veracity and I make no effort to determine which side has the rights of the matter. That pleasant relations existed at the time between

Messrs. Pratt and Aguinaldo, that Mr. Pratt’s sympathies were with the insurgents, and that he eagerly sought to make use of Aguinaldo as an ally of the United States, is clearly evidenced by Mr. Pratt’s telegram of April 28, four days subsequent to the meeting. This is reported in Senate Document No. 62, in the following form 1 :

Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, April 28, 1898.

On the evening of Saturday, the 23d instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. Howard W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years’ residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom I had previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands.

Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the 24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the general’s trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter. ... I telegraphed the commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong :