Outlines of cosmic philosophy;

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PART I. PROLEGOMENA (Condnued) CHAPrm PAGB

Vin. ORGANIZATION OF THE SCIENCES . • 3

IX. PHILOSOPHY AS AN ORGANON . . 7'

* X. COSMISM AND POSITIVISM . . . . loa

XI. THE QUESTION STATED . . . . "7

Part II. Synthesis

I. MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE . . .137

II. RHYTHM 163

III. EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION . . .187

IV. THE LAW OF EVOLUTION ... 204 V. PLANETARY EVOLUTION . . . .249

VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EARTH . . ^l^

VII. THE SOURCES OF TERRESTRIAL ENERGY • 315

VIU. THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE ... 342

IX. SPECIAL CREATION OR DERIVATION ? . . 37*

OUTLINES OF COSMIC PHILOSOPHY

PART I

PROLEGOMENA (^continued)

CHAPTER VIII

THE results obtained in the course of the preceding inquiry have added depth and precision to our conception of the Scope of Philosophy. In coming to look upon all phenomena as manifestations of a Power unknowable in itself, yet knowable in the order of its phenomenal manifestations, we have virtually come to declare that the true business of philosophy is the determination of the order of the phenomena in which this omnipresent Power is manifested. And thus we arrive by another road at the very same definition of Philosophy which was previously given ; and -we see that the progress of deanthropomorphization, while leaving the religious attitude of philosophy entirely unchanged, has at the same time precisely limited its scope in making it the Synthesis of the general truths of science into a system of universal truth. We have next to inquire, as preliminary to the construction of such a Synthesis, into the manner in which the different orders of scien- * [Sec Introduction, § 14.]

tific truths are to be grouped for the purposes of our philosophic construction. In short, we are brought face to face with the problem which also occupied Comte next in order after the question of deanthropomorphization ; we have to deal with the classification of the sciences. And as in the preceding chapter, we shall endeavour, while adversely criticising the Comtean theory, to elicit results which are both true and available for our subsequent inquiries.

Comte begins by distinguishing two kinds of natural sciences — the one kind abstract and general, having for their object the discovery of the laws to which the various orders of phenomena conform, in all conceivable cases ; the other kind concrete, special, descriptive, consisting in the application of general laws to the natural history of the various objects actually existing in the present or past. There is nothing difficult, or even novel, in this distinction, since it corresponds very nearly with that which is ordinarily drawn in scientific treatises between dogmatic physics and natural history. We shall see the difference very clearly by comparing general physiology on the one hand with zoology and botany on the other. The one formulates the general laws of life, whether considered in equilibrium or in the process of development; the other merely enumerates the conditions and mode of existence of each particular species of living bodies. Similar is the contrast between chemistry and mineralogy, of which the latter science is evidently founded upon the former. In chemistry we consider all possible combinations of heterogeneous molecules, in all imaginable circumstances ; in mineralogy we consider only the particular combinations which are found realized in the actual past or present constitution of the terrestrial globe, under the influence of special sets of conditions. A circumstance which well illustrates the difference between the chemical and the mineralogical point of view, although the two sciences deal with the same objects, is, that a large proportion of the facts contemplated in chemistry have only an artificial or experimental existence. So that, for example, a body like chlorine or potassium may possess great importance in chemistry by reason of the extent and energy of its reactions and its affinities ; while in mineralogy, on the other hand, it may be of little importance, because it is but sel* dom concerned in producing the natural rearrangements of molecules which it is the business of mineralogy to explain. And conversely, some such compound as granite or feldspar, which fills a great place in mineralogy, may be of little interest from the chemical point of view.

Of these two kinds of sciences, according to

Comte, manifestly it is the first kind which first needs to be classified and systematically studied in its doctrines and methods. The scientific study of concrete physics presupposes the scientific study of abstract physics. For example, the study of the geologic development of the earth, when prosecuted in the most comprehensive manner, requires not only the previous study of physics and chemistry, but also some previous knowledge of astronomy and physiology. And similarly the scientific study of oceanic and atmospheric currents — which, in the present chaotic state of our nomenclature, we characterize variously as meteorology, or climatology, or include under physical geography — demands a preliminary acquaintance not only with mechanics, chemistry, and all the branches of molecular physics, but also with astronomy, since climatic rhythms depend upon the inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of the ecliptic, and more remotely upon the variations in that inclination known as precession and nutation. It is for this reason that concrete physics has made so little progress down to the present day, since it could begin to be rationally studied only after all the branches of abstract physics had assumed a distinctively scientific character. While, conversely, as soon as abstract physics has been completely organized, the study of concrete physics becomes merely the detailed application of general principles already established.

From these considerations Comte concluded that his Positive Philosophy might be founded upon a thorough organization of the doctrines and methods of the abstract sciences alone. The problem first in order was to arrange these sciences in a natural series. The end to be kept in view, in this encyclopaedic labour, is to ar-* range the sciences in the order of their natural succession and mutual interdependence; so that we may study and expound them one after the other, without ever being led into a zigzag or circular course of study and exposition. It should be mentioned here at the outset, that Comte did not regard such an end as strictly attainable in all its rigorous precision. He tells us expressly that however natural and however Jogically serviceable such a classification may be, it must always and necessarily contain something that is arbitrary, or at least artificial, in its arrangements. This, as he clearly saw, must ever result from the very richness and complexity of Nature, which refuses to be analyzed and partitioned off into distinct provinces, save provisionally for convenience of study. In his Introduction he reminds us that so few as six fundamental sciences will admit of seven hundred and twenty different arrangements ; and that in behalf of each of these arrangements very likely something might be said, since even in the various classifications already proposed, the same science which one places at the beginning of the scale is by another placed at the end.^ Nevertheless there is one series which is clearly indicated by the decreasing generality and simplicity of the phenomena with which the respective sciences are concerned. And this is the order which Comte adopts, primarily on account of its logical convenience. He begins with the most simple and general phenomena, to proceed step by step to those which are most complex and special.

Proceeding upon this principle, we are confronted at once by two grand divisions of phenomena, inorganic and organic. There is no difficulty in deciding which of these to study first. The more general and simple phenomena of weight, heat, light, electricity, and chemism, are manifested alike by not-living and by living bodies ; whereas the more special and complex phenomena of life are manifested, of course, only by the latter. Therefore the science of inorganic phenomena must precede the other. We can study thermal radiations and chemical reactions without taking vital forces into the

* Later in life Comte, no doubt, came to look upon his classification as complete and final. And so it appears to be regarded by his disciples, who arc deaf to all the considerations which impeach it.

account ; but we cannot study living organisms without appealing to physics and chemistry at every step.

In the science of inorganic phenomena a somewhat less obvious principle of division next presents itself. Inorganic physics may be divided into celestial and terrestrial physics ; of which the first treats only of gravitative force as manifested in the relatively simple phenomena of the mutual attractions of the heavenly bodies; while the second treats not only of gravitative force as manifested throughout relatively complex terrestrial phenomena, but also of the molecular forces, cohesion and chemism, and of the modes of undulatory motion called sound, heat, light, magnetism, and electricity. This second division may be again subdivided into physics proper and chemistry. The first treats of those changes in which the relative positions of the molecules of matter are altered homogeneously, resulting in increase or decrease of volume, or other change of physical state; while the second treats of those changes in which the relative positions of molecules are altered heterogeneously, resulting in the production of new compounds and new affinities. Of these two sciences, manifestly physics should be first studied. We can to a certain extent generalize the laws of reflection and refraction, condensation and rarefaction, without help from chemistry; but we cannot proceed a step in chemistry without appealing to physics.

Turning now to organic phenomena, we perceive that living beings may be studied either individually or collectively. In the first case we generalize the laws of nutrition and reproduction, of muscular contractility and nervous sensibility. This is the province of biology, a science which according to Comte is of itself competent to include all the phenomena presented by vegetables and by the lower animals, as well as all those presented by individual man. But in the case of man, the aggregation of individuals gives rise to an entirely new class of phenomena produced by the reaction of individuals upon each other. To generalize the laws of this class of phenomena is the business of sociology, which is thus manifestly the most complex and special of the sciences.

According to Comte, this disposes of all the fundamental abstract sciences except mathematics. This science he places first of all, the phenomena of number and form being universal, and capable of generalization without reference to other phenomena.

Thus we have the hierarchy of the positive sciences arranged in the following order : — I. Mathematics.

II. Astronomy.

III. Physics.

lO

IV. Chemistry.

V. Biology.

VI. Sociology.

In each of these sciences there are several subdivisions, which Comte endeavours to arrange, whenever it is possible, according to the same general principle of convenience. In mathematics he places algebra before geometry, on the ground that we can study number by itself, but in order to study form we must make use of sundry laws of number ; and for a similar reason, mechanics, which involves time and motion, is placed subsequent to the other two. In physics, barology, or the general doctrine of weight and pressure, is placed first, as nearest akin to astronomy ; and electrology is placed last, as nearest akin to chemistry. The intermediate branches, acoustics, optics, and thermology, would now be ranked in the order in which I have named them ; but Comte ranked thermology first, probably because of the enthusiasm aroused in him by his friend Fourier's achievement in bringing the general doctrine of thermal expansion and contraction so thoroughly under the sway of mathematical analysis. In biology, anatomy, or the study of structure, is placed before physiology, or the study of function ; and the study of the vegetal or nutritive functions precedes that of the animal or nervo-muscular functions. In socio-

II logy, the study of equilibrium, or the conditions essential to order, is ranked before the study of the laws of progress as generalized from history.^

It will be observed that in this scheme no special place is assigned to psychology. This is an omission quite in keeping with Comte's general conception of the scope of philosophic inquiry, from which the observation and analysis of states of consciousness are purposely omitted altogether. This omission will best be criticised and characterized later on, when in the course of our philosophic synthesis we shall have arrived at the discussion of the relations of the phenomena of mind to the phenomena of life.^ Meanwhile, merely noting this serious omission, we may observe that the classification just sketched is so fascinating in its simplicity, and so manifestly convenient for many practical purposes of research, that at first it seems almost a pity for criticism to invalidate it. Its leading features appear to speak for themselves, to carry their own recommendation with them,

^ In a future chapter, it will appear that the proper arrangement b just the reverse of this, no sound theory of social equilibrium being attainable until Ae laws of progress have been generalized from history, with the aid of biology and psychology. Here, as in many other cases, Comte's error was due to his imperfect comprehension of the principle of Evolution.

* See below. Part II. chap. xiv. 12 to characterize this classification as the best which, with our present resources, it is possible to frame. And, indeed, if we compare it with some of the most ambitious preceding classifications, such as those of Oken and Hegel, or even with the less pretentious but more useful systems of D'Alembert, Stewart, Ampere, GeofFroy St. Hilaire, and Cournot, its superiority is at once apparent. The arrangement seems so natural and obvious that it has not unfrequently been characterized by able critics as "just the sort of classification that would naturally arise in any reflecting mind on a review of the subject." We should not forget, however, that it never had arisen in any of the reflecting minds which reviewed the subject previous to Comte.

But Comte, who viewed everything in a historical light, intended that his classification should be something more than a convenient plan for arriving at philosophic generality through the study of the separate abstract sciences. He regarded it also as a kind of philosophic tableau or conspectus of the progress of the human mind from anthropomorphic toward scientific conceptions of natural phenomena. According to him, the order in which he arranged the sciences was the order in which they had respectively been constituted as sciences, — in which they had passed from the theological or metaphysical into the scientific stage. Thus mathematics, he tells us, has been a science, in the strict sense of the word, from time immemorial ; but he omits to tell us that pure mathematics, dealing solely with number and form, and not involving conceptions of force, could never have been in the theological stage. It was only the phenomena of force which to primitive men must have seemed to require an anthropomorphic explanation. The action of the human will, by the analogy of which external events were explained, may be a mechanical, but it is not a geometrical or algebraic phenomenon. When we come to mechanics, there is room to construct volitional explanations. Nevertheless in mechanics there are so few traces of such explanations, since the dawn of history, that Comte thinks it may have always been a positive science; and he quotes approvingly Adam Smith's remark that nowhere do we ever hear of a god of Weight. Such a god, however, had there ever been one, would have been a generalized deity, belonging to a comparatively advanced system of polytheism ; and though we are entitled to infer from this that the earliest generalization of the phenomena of weight was a scientific and not a theological generalization, we are not entitled to infer that in the primeval fetishistic period, before the phenomena had been generalized at all, they were not supposed to be due to volition. It is one of the unfortunate results of Comte's use of the term " theological " to characterize this primitive philosophy, that we are apt to think it necessary to seek for signs of a deity when examining the so-called theologic epoch. The idea of a god distinct from the phenomenon was, however, a polytheistic, not a fetishistic idea : it was the result of much abstraction and generalization. Fetishism endowed the particular object itself with volition. And such being the case, I am inclined to believe that many even of the simplest mechanical phenomena may have been originally explained as due to the free will of the objects concerned.^ However this may be, there can be no doubt that mechanical conceptions ceased to be anthropomorphic at a very early date, and that statics, one branch of mechanics, is the oldest of the sciences, outside of pure mathematics.

If now we consider the three great branches of inorganic physics, we find abundant records of a time when the heavenly bodies were supposed to be intelligent creatures, and were worshipped as such. Even in the enlightened age of Perikles, and in the most advanced community then existing, Anaxagoras came near losing his life for asserting that the moon was a mass

1 Sec Myths and Myth- Makers, chap, vii., "The Primeval Ghost World."

»5 of rocks and not a goddess. Long after mono* theism had overthrown these crude interpretations, the planets were still supposed to be the abode of controlling archangels. Even Kepler himself, early in the seventeenth century, was inclined to countenance this opinion, as may be seen from a remarkable passage in his " Harmonices Mundi " (p. 252). It was not until Newton that dynamical astronomy became a positive science. Similarly with the phenomena of terrestrial physics. The electric phenomena of storms, the thermal phenomena of congelation, the optical phenomena of the rainbow and the mirage, have, within the period known to history, been explained anthropomorphically ; and, as late as the time of Cardan, echoes were by the unlearned interpreted as the voices of mocking demons, and ignesfatui were regarded as malign spirits inhabiting marshes : while in chemistry, both the Arabian alchemists and their European successors — in manipulating some of the more powerful reagents, and especially in the use of explosive or highly combustible materials — believed themselves to be forcing unwilling supernatural agents to execute their purposes. Probably the name " spirits," as employed in modern pharmacy, has had some such anthropomorphic origin.^

* [The origin of this use of the term spirits is to be found in the Pneuma-doctrine of the later Greek physicians.]

Inorganic physics has by this time become almost entirely free from anthropomorphic conceptions. In the sciences which deal with organic phenomena, however, purely scientific conceptions do not yet reign supreme. Biology and sociology are still infected with metaphysical, and even to a certain extent with theological notions. In biology, for instance, we have the anthropomorphic conception of an archieus or vital principle, distinct from the organism, and controlling its molecular processes. Though such a theory would not, at the present day, be defended by any authoritative writer upon this subject, it is nevertheless vaguely present in the popular mind, and exerts a clandestine influence even upon scientific speculations. The metaphysical doctrine of stimulus, so ably criticised by Dr. Anstie in his treatise on " Stimulants and Narcotics," — the doctrine that stimulus is not an increase in the rate of nutrition of the nerves, but a goading of the organism, sure to be followed by a depressive reaction, — is founded mainly upon this antiquated a priori conception of a vital principle. To take another instance, colds, fevers, and other diseases are commonly spoken of as entities which " get into the system," and are to be driven out ; and imperfectly educated physicians are often heard reasoning upon this mythological assumption ; whereas a disease of any kind, scientific cally considered, is not an entity, but a disturbance of equilibrium among the interacting functions of the organism. A cancer, for instance, is a modification of structure resulting from a disturbance in the general process of nutrition. Molecules which should normally be deposited here and there throughout the various tissues begin to aggregate over a single limited area, forming a new abnormal tissue, of low vitality ; and this new tissue grows at the expense of the organism until death ensues from exhaustion, or, if the wall of a large blood-vessel happens to get encroached upon and disintegrated, death ensues from hemorrhage. So an ordinary fever, in which blood-poisoning does not occur, is the result of an ill-understood alteration in the molecular properties of the blood, one of the chief symptoms of which is the adherence of the blood-corpuscles to the walls of the capillaries. Yet so prevalent still is the personifying habit of thought, that cancers and fevers are spoken of and reasoned about as occult entities, as ugly Things which somehow or other "get into" the blood.

It is hardly necessary to insist upon the prevalence of the metaphysical habit in sociology, where final causes are still sought after, where the doctrine of the " freedom of the will " (or, as it might better be termed, of the " lawlessness of volition ") still maintains a precarious

i8 footing, and where practical conclusions are constantly based upon the a priori doctrine of inherent " rights." Here, too, as well as in biology, even the theological point of view not unfrequently appears. The late war between France and Germany was doubtless the occasion of many prayers to the " God of Battles." The same persons who, in the regular recurrence of the seasons, in the expansion of heated bodies, in the explosion of fulminating compounds, in the darkness caused by an eclipse, in short throughout the entire realm of inorganic phenomena, sec nothing but the operations of uniform forces, nevertheless explain diseases, famines, and political revolutions, upon the hypothesis of an overruling Providence extraneous to the Cosmos ; announcing, perhaps, the doctrine of a divine judgment upon sin, — which is indeed not a fiction, but the mythologic version of a scientific truth.

Not only (according to Comte) has deanthropomorphization proceeded more rapidly in the simpler sciences than in the more complex ones, but the generalization of causal agencies, of which deanthropomorphization is the result, took place earlier in the former than in the latter. This is to be seen by comparing the dates at which the sciences respectively ceased to be mere aggregations of empirical knowledge, and became founded as sciences, in the strict sense of the word. Thus astronomy, at least in its statical department, was a science in the days of Hipparchos. Physics became a science when Galileo discovered the law of falling bodies. Chemistry became a science, about a hundred and seventy years later, when Lavoisier overthrew the doctrine of phlogiston, and detected the true principles of combustion. Biology did not become a science until the very end of the eighteenth century, when Bichat pointed out the relations between the functions of organs and the properties of tissues. Finally sociology has hardly yet become a science; and many educated persons still regard historical events as happening in no determinate sequence, and stigmatize, as not only chimerical but even impious, any attempt to formulate the order of such events.

Here it becomes desirable to pass from simple exposition to criticism. In the Comtean views above set forth we must of course recognize a large amount of historic truth. There can be no doubt that anthropomorphic conceptions soonest disappear from those departments of science which are earliest constituted and most rapidly developed. Nor can there be any doubt that in a vague and general way the Comtean arrangement represents, or at any rate suggests, the historic order of progression. No doubt mathematics is the oldest of the sci- 20 ences — as indeed its name curiously hints to us — and sociology the youngest. No doubt the movements of masses, of which astronomy and physics treat, were correctly formulated sooner than the combinations of heterogeneous molecules, which form the subject-matter of chemistry. And no doubt the science of inorganic phenomena as a whole is more complete than the science of organic phenomena. All this must be admitted. Yet if we examine more closely into the matter, we shall discover grave errors in this classification which looked so fair to us on a cursory inspection. We shall notice first that in many points of fundamental importance it does not faithfully represent the order of historic progression ; and when we come to inquire into the reason of this failure, we shall find that the classification errs from its very simplicity, that the facts to be arranged are too complex and heterogeneous to admit of any such facile linear arrangement.

In the first place the historical relations between astronomy and physics have been misstated by Comte, and he has marked out the province of physics after a fashion that is, at the present day, completely indefensible. To class together the science which treats of weight and pressure, and the sciences which treat of light, heat, and electricity, and to refer to the whole ander the general appellation of Physics, is to prepare the way for statements which are too general to be accurate. In contrasting physics with astronomy, however, Comte is careful to let us know that he intends to designate that physics which deals with the phenomena of moving masses ; for he tells us that while astronomy has been a science since the time of Hipparchos, physics first became a science in the days of Galileo. The slightest consideration will show us that this apparent confirmation of Comte's views rests upon a verbal ambiguity. For what portion of astronomical phenomena had been generalized as early as the time of Hipparchos ? Simply the statical or geometrical portion, namely, the apparent motions of the planets, the great achievement of Hipparchos having been the construction of the theory of epicycles and eccentrics, whereby to formulate these motions. It is needless to add that all the geometrical data used in making this generalization had been obtained from the previous observation of terrestrial phenomena. And what portion of physics was it which was not generalized till the time of Galileo? It was the dynamical portion, since statics had been erected into a science by Archimedes, who lived just a century before Hipparchos. By comparing the statical part of astronomy with the dynamical part of physics, Comte finds it quite easy to establish the precedence of the former. Unfortunately, such precedence is not what the argument requires, though it is all that can be established. If we compare like orders of phenomena, we shall see at once that it was physics which preceded astronomy. Dynamical astronomy became a science only with the discovery of the law of gravitation ; and this law was not discovered, nor could it have been discovered, until after the leading generalizations of terrestrial dynamics had been established. For, as Mr. Spencer observes, " What were the laws made use of by Newton in working out his grand discovery ? The law of falling bodies, disclosed by Galileo ; that of the composition of forces, also disclosed by Galileo ; and that of centrifugal force, found out by Huyghens — all of them generalizations of terrestrial physics. . . . Had M. Comte confined his attention to the things and disregarded the words, he would have seen that before mankind scientifically coordinated any one class of phenomena displayed in the heavens, they had previously coordinated a parallel class of phenomena displayed upon the surface of the earth." *

This criticism is a very incisive one. It destroys this part of Comte's classification not only from the historical, but also from the logical point of view. It shows that the study of

* Spencer's Essays ^ ist series, p. 179. [Library Edition Tol. ii. p. 22.]

astronomy depends upon that of terrestrial physics, and should therefore come after, and not before it. In fact the whole science of astronomy, as at present constituted, consists of two portions, — the theory of gravitation and the theory of nebular evolution. The first of these, as we have just seen, is a mere extension to celestial phenomena of certain laws of terrestrial physics. The second depends upon the study of terrestrial phenomena in a yet greater degree, since it involves the knowledge not only of gravitation, but also of radiant heat, and of the conditions of equilibrium of gases and liquids.^

If now we compare physics with chemistry, we shall find a similar ambiguity in Comte's results. It is easy to say that chemistry was not organized into a science until toward the close of the eighteenth century, while physics was organized at the beginning of the seven-