The origins of art : a psychological & sociological inquiry

Preface

The aim and scope of this book is sufficiently indicated by its title. I have endeavoured throughout to restrict my attention to questions connected with the origins of art. Points of history and criticism have been touched upon only in so far as they appeared to contribute towards the elucidation of this purely psychological and sociological problem. In order to save space as well as to spare the readers attention, the descriptive parts have been concentrated as much as possible. As a rule, only one ethnological example, which has been selected as typical, is described in the text, while the corroborating examples are represented by references in the footnotes. And even of these references only such are adduced as have been considered especially significant. Only in one matter have I aimed at completeness, viz. that of reference to authors from whom I have borrowed facts or observations. And whenever in earlier literature I have found theories which have appeared similar to the views advanced in this book, these similarities have been pointed out in the footnotes.

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There is one point, however, to which the readers attention should be called in this Preface. When treating of the art -impulse I have — especially in the tenth chapter — mentioned in the footnotes some modern writers on aesthetic, who, although starting from different assumptions, have arrived at a conception of art which in many points may be compared to the one advanced in this book. This comparison, however, has not been carried out in the text. Considerations of space account for this omission; but it has a further ground in the circumstances under which the present work has originated. A part of it, containing the examination of feeling and its expression, and the chapter on “ Animal Display,” was published in Swedish as early as 1896 1 — that is, before the above-mentioned authors had made their theories known. This is not mentioned in order to raise any futile questions of priority, but only as a justification of the way in which my conclusions have been presented.

It has appeared to me that the continuity of the argument could not but have been broken if, instead of proceeding from my original starting-point, I had based my conclusions upon a critical examination of modern aesthetic doctrines. And I trust' that the differences between the thesis of this book and other emotionalistic explanations will appear with sufficient this

Mill , ZOO-Z3D.

PREFACE

Vll clearness to the attentive reader even if they have not been expressly pointed out in the text.

There are, no doubt, many points, a fuller treatment of which might have been to the advantage of the book. The force of circumstances has compelled me to aim at brevity before anything. But even if it had been possible to give this study a far greater comprehensiveness, the difficulties of expressing myself in a foreign Itongue would have withheld me from any avoidable amplification. I have constantly been conscious of my audacity in appearing before the English public without sufficiently mastering the English language, and I have been anxious not to make my offence greater by any number of pages than it already is.

That it has been possible at all to publish this research in English is only a result of the kind assistance which I have received from my English friends. I am indebted to Mr. G. G. Berry in Oxford, and Mr. Leonard Pomeroy in London, who have revised parts of the manuscript. And I am further indebted to my publishers for procuring me the assistance of Mr. Stephen jGwynn in preparing the book for the press. He has | helped me to avoid needlessly technical expressions, and in other ways has given the work a more readable style. But he has not restricted himself to these emendations. He has assisted me with valuable sug-

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gestions as well as with information. The improvement which the work has derived from his collaboration can be sufficiently appreciated only by its author.

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In purely scientific matters I have benefited much from discussions with students of psychology and sociology in my own country as well as in England. My thanks are due to all of them, but especially to my j old friends, Dr. Edward Westermarck and Dr. Richard ! Wallaschek.

The “ List of Authorities quoted ” and the Indexes have been compiled by my wife. This is, however, only the least important part of the assistance which throughout the book has been rendered to me by the constant collaborator in all my researches.

Y. H.

Helsingfors, August 1900.

Chapter I 54

When, one hundred and fifty years ago, Baumgarten wrote the treatise to which he gave the name Aestlietica , and which he described as a <{ theory of liberal arts and 3 beautiful thinking,” it seemed to him needful to apologise for attracting attention to a field of inquiry so low and sensuous as that province of philosophy to which he then affixed a name. Many, he thought, might regard '* art and beauty, which appeal primarily to the senses, j as subjects beneath the dignity of philosophers.1 Yet | the theories and the ideas which were first brought together as an organised body of thought in Baumgarten’s short manual had so deeply influenced the speculations of his age that, a generation later, the most important questions of life came to be treated as . j aesthetic problems. The philosophy of art, far from ; needing to justify its existence, dominated all philosophy — ethics, metaphysics, and even cosmogony. Imagination was treated as the ruling faculty in all creation, and beauty was referred to as the criterion, not only in art, but in morality. Yet the importance thus given to aesthetic speculation was transitory, and the period during which philosophers were concerned, not only to find a

1 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, pp. 1, 3, 6 sq.

B i chap a general criterion of beauty for the arts, but also to applj that criterion far beyond the sphere of art, has been succeeded by an age which neglects speculation on art ft and beauty for other tasks which are regarded as far more important. Such rapid changes within a few] generations appear almost incomprehensible. But they can easily be explained if we take into account the intimate connection which always exists between aesthetic speculation and prevailing currents of thought.

In Mr. Bosanquet’s History of A Esthetic it has been pointed out with great clearness to what extent the earlier prosperity of aesthetic studies was caused by the general philosophical situation. The theory of aesthetic, as set forth in Baumgarten’s chapter on cognitio sensitiva and further developed in Kant’s Kritik dev Urtheilskraft, dealt, as is well known, with a form of judgment which is neither purely rational nor purely sensual.1 In metaphysics, for philosophers who had to struggle with wha seemed to them an irreconcilable opposition between reason and the senses, this conception of a mediative faculty must have satisfied a most urgent needi Similarly we may suppose that the ethical observer felt himself emancipated from the narrow antagonism between body and spirit by looking at our actions in the aesthetic way. In proportion, however, as general science has been able to do away with the old dualism ofl higher and lower faculties, the judgment of taste hasj necessarily lost importance. In the development of monistic philosophy and monistic morals we may thus see one important factor, by the influence of which aesthetic has been ousted from its central position.

The evolution of modern art has been still more mjuiious to aesthetic speculation than the progress oj Bosanquet, History of Esthetic, pp. 173, 187.

THE PROBLEM STxlTED science. In the palmy days of art-philosophy conditions tfi vere eminently favourable to universal generalisations, ar The great periods of art, classical antiquity and the Renaissance, were so remote that only their simplest and l nost salient features were discerned. Nor did the art ie; if the period exhibit the bewildering multiplicity of a iti 'ertile age, — least of all in Germany, the home and centre ti )f aesthetic inquiry. The formative arts were less im- Dortant than ever before ; music, which was so soon to *i eclipse all other arts, had not yet awakened the interest iii of philosophers. The crafts were at a low ebb ; landscape-gardening is indeed the only kind of applied art that we hear about at this time. Beauty, art, the ideal — these and all other general notions must have been suggested with unsurpassable simplicity by this uniform and monotonous artistic output. It is easy to understand the eagerness and the delight with which the earlier writers on aesthetic, once the impulse given, drew conclusions, made comparisons, and laid down laws. But it is equally evident that speculative zeal was bound to fall off as soon as the province of art was enlarged and its products differentiated.

Even the more intimate knowledge of classical culture which was subsequently gained, necessitated important corrections in aesthetic dogmas. The artistic activities of savage tribes, which have been practically unknown to aesthetic writers until recent years, display many features that cannot be harmonised with the general laws. And in a yet higher degree contemporary art defies the generalisations of a uniform theory. With greater mastery over materials and technique, the different arts have been able to produce more and more specialised forms of beauty. The painters ideal can no longer be confused with that of the poet or the story-teller,

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nor the sculptors with that of the actor. Pure music, pure poetry, pure painting, thus develop into isolated, ; independent arts, of which each one establishes its own laws and conditions for itself. The critic who, in spite of this evolution, tries to apply a narrow aesthetic standard of beauty to all the various arts may indeed — according to his influence — delay the public appreciation of modem works, and thus indirectly impede artistic development. But no amount of theorising will enable him to arrest the growth of artistic forms whose very existence contradicts the generalisations of the old systems. And he is equally powerless to stop such violations of the supposed frontiers of the different arts as continually occur, for instance, in descriptive music, or in poetry like that of Gautier, which aims at producing a pictorial impression by means of words.

It is only natural that, in times so inopportune, general speculations on art and beauty have been more and more abandoned in favour of detailed studies in the technicalities of art, historical researches in which works of art are considered chiefly as documents bearing on culture, and experiments on the physiology and psychology of aesthetic perception. For art itself and its development it would perhaps be unimportant if a science which has never exercised any great positive and direct influence on artistic production should completely disappear. But from the theoretical point of view it w’ould be matter for regret if artistic activities ceased to be considered as a whole. And so also would it be if aesthetic feelings, judgments of taste, and ideals of beauty came to be treated only in appendices to works on psychology. It is true that all these notions have irremediably lost their former metaphysical and philosophical importance. But in compensation, art and

I beauty have for modern thinking acquired a social and psychological significance. To determine the part which the production and the enjoyment of works of art play in their relation to the other factors of individual and social life — that is indeed a task which is momentous enough to be treated in a science of its own. Modern aesthetic, therefore, has still its own ends, which, if not so ambitious as those of the former speculative science of beauty, are nevertheless of no small importance. These ends, however, can no longer be attained by the procedure of the old aesthetic systems. As the problems have changed with changing conditions, so too the methods must be brought into line with the general scientific development. Historical and psychological investigation must replace the dialectic treatment of the subject. Art can no longer be deduced from general, philosophical, and metaphysical principles ; it must be studied — by the methods of inductive psychology — as a human activity. Beauty cannot be considered as a semi-transcendental reality ; it must be interpreted as an object of human longing and a source of human enjoyment. In aesthetic proper, as well as in the

philosophy of art, every research must start, not from theoretical assumptions, but from the psychological and sociological data of the aesthetic life.

Such a procedure, however, is encumbered with difficulties, of which the writers on speculative aesthetic were scarcely aware. When theories of art and beauty were based on general a priori principles, there could not possibly be any doubt as to the point of departure in the several researches. But when we have no assumptions to start from, the very demarcation of the subject may become a matter of uncertainty. In the philosophy of art, to which department of aesthetic I

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wish to restrict my researches in the present work, this j difficulty of formulating the data and qucesita the facts which we have to go upon, and the facts which we wish to find out— constitutes the first, and by no means the least important, problem.

If we are to embark upon a scientific treatment of art without any preconceived definitions, the aim and conditions of such treatment can only be determined by examining the prevailing notions on the subject, as they are expressed in language and in literature. As an interpretation for general use and of general applicability, a theory of art can claim attention only if it conforms to the recognised usage of the principal aesthetic terms. In the various definitions of art which are contained in the different aesthetic systems, we must therefore try to find some point of unity from which to approach our subject. The difficulties of such a task are evident to any one who has gone through the discouraging experience of reading a history of aesthetic. The investigator who seeks an accurate demarcation of the whole area of art, as distinguished from other departments of life, meets with partial definitions which can be applied only to certain fixed forms of art. We need mention but a few of the most typical instances. Even an ardent admirer of Taine is compelled to admit that his generalisations are too exclusively derived from the study of poetry and the formative arts. In the same way it is only by laborious adjustments that the theory of Vischer can be applied to music and lyric poetry ; the aphorisms of Ruskin do not even pretend to apply to any but the formative arts; and Mr. Marshall’s /Esthetic Principles — to adduce one of the most recent attempts in general art-theory — are too obviously those oi an expert in architecture. In none of the modern

I systems has sufficient room been made for certain forms of art which, from the evolutionist’s standpoint, are of ; the highest importance : such as acting, danciug, and decoration. All the one-sided definitions are, moreover, so inconsistent with each other that it seems impossible to make up for their individual deficiencies by an eclectic combination. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if some writers on art, confused by the bewildering contradictions of aesthetic theories, have called in question the very existence of any universal art-criterion.1

Those who adopt this attitude — which seems the more justified now that the arts have become widely differentiated — deny the possibility, not only of all general art-philosophy, but also of any sociological and psychological treatment of artistic activities as a whole. But even if all other hypotheses are banished, sesthetic research cannot possibly dispense with the fundamental assumption of the unity of art. And in point of fact there can be found in most systems, if we do not insist on too minute and positive demarcations, at least one common quality which is ascribed to all its different forms. Notwithstanding the mutual contradictions"

of art - theories, the believers in a general sesthetic can always appeal to the consent with which the majority of authors have upheld the negative criterion of art. Metaphysicians as well as psychologists,

Hegelians as well as Darwinians, all agree in declaring that a work, or performance, which can be proved to serve any utilitarian, non-sesthetic object must not be considered as a genuine work of art. True art has its one end in itself, and rejects every extraneous purpose : 4hat is the doctrine which, with more or less explicitness,

1 Cf. e.g. Hanslick, Vom musikalisch Schonen, p. 3.

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has been stated by Kant,1 Schiller,2 Spencer,3 Hennequin,4 Grosse,5 Grant Allen,6 and others. And popular opinion agrees in this respect with the conclusions of science. This distinctive quality of independence seems therefore to afford us a convenient starting-point for the treatment of art in general.

Owing to its negative character, this criterion does not give us much information as to the real qualities of art. But even the poorest definition is enough to begin with, if it only holds good with regard to all particular cases. Unfortunately, however, we need only apply the test of independence in the concrete instance to find that even the applicability of this single accepted criterion may be seriously disputed. There is scarcely any author, however he may formulate his general definitions of art, who would assess the relative value of art- works according to their degrees of disinterestedness. No candid man would, for instance, nowadays* contend that an arabesque composition is per se more aesthetically pure than a statue or a poem.7 But we may even go farther. We must question whether every work of art ought to be degraded from its aesthetic rank, if it can be convicted of having served any external utilitarian purpose. This strict conception of the aesthetic boundaries has been eloquently attacked by Guyau in his celebrated treatise, Le principe de Vart et de la poesie.h Though the ultimate conclusions of this

147, to be compared with Kant’s

1 Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskra/t. chapters on beauty.

2 Schiller, Uber die dsthetische Erziehung des Menschen, passim.

J Spencer, Principles of Psychology , ii. pp. 628, 632. Cf. also the extracts from a letter written by Mr. Spencer to M. Guyau, quoted in Les probUmes de l cst/utique contemporame , p. 18.

4 Hennequin, La critique scientifique , pp. 26-28.

5 Grosse, Die Anfdngc der Kunst, pp. 46, 47.

* Grant Allen, Physiological a Esthetics , pp. 32, 33. 7 Cf_ Kant u g6

Guyau, Us probUmes de Vesthttique conlempomine, livre i.

I

1 work are perhaps not so clear as might be desired, yet we do not see how his attitude in estimating concrete manifestations of art can be assailed. It would, to take an example, be absurd to contend that the singing of Taillefer lost in aesthetic value by contributing to the victory of Hastings. And however strictly we may insist upon the requirement that every genuine wTork of art should have been created purely for its own sake, we cannot possibly conceal the- fact that some of the world’s finest love lyrics were originally composed, not in aesthetic freedom, which is independent of all by-purposes, but with the express end of gaining the ear and the favour of a beloved woman. The influence which such foreign, non-aesthetic motives have exercised on art will also become more and more apparent with increased knowledge of the conditions of aesthetic production. The further the psychological biographer pushes his indiscreet researches into the private life of individual artists, the more often will he find that some form of interest — ; personal, political, ethical, religious — enters into the so-called disinterested aesthetic activity. Such instances must induce undogmatic authors to relax to some extent the strict application of this criterion. And even those philosophers who, in spite of the historical evidence, insist upon applying it will be compelled to admit that they have taken for works of genuine art productions which, from their philosophic standpoint, have no claim to the title.

The danger of such mistakes is all the greater when one has to deal with the lower stages of artistic development. In point of fact recent ethnological researches have conclusively proved that it is not only difficult, but quite impossible, to apply the criterion of aesthetic independence to the productions of savage and barbarous

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tribes. It is true that the large province of primitive art has not as yet in its entirety been made the subject of systematic study. But, on the other hand, the results which have been arrived at with regard to decoration, its most typical form, amply bear out our view. In almost every case where the ornaments of a tribe have been closely examined, it has appeared that what to us seems a mere embellishment is for the natives in question full of practical, non-aesthetic significance. Carvings on weapons and implements, tattooings, woven and plaited patterns, all of which the uncritical observer is apt to take for purely artistic compositions, are now explained as religious symbols, owners’ marks, or ideograms. There is still room for discussion as to whether in certain individual interpretations the tendency to look for concealed meanings has not been carried too far. But there can be no doubt that the general principles which to many students seemed so fantastic when first formulated by Stolpe, Bead,1 and others, have derived additional support from every fresh inquiry into primitive systems of decoration.

The isolated researches which have been carried on within the department of primitive literature and drama all point in the same direction. Wherever ethnologists have the opportunity of gaining some insight into the inner life of a savage tribe, they are surprised at the religious or magical significance which lies concealed behind the most apparently trivial of amusements. And it is to be remarked that they have learned to appreciate

1 Cf. Stolpe, Utvecklingsfdreteelser i naturfolkens ornamentik, i.-ii. in Ymer, 1890-1891. An English translation by Mrs. H. C. March is published in Transactions of the Rochdale Literary and Scientific Society, 1891. Read, “On the Origin, etc., of Certain Ornaments of the S.E. Pacific,” in Journ. Antlir. Inst. xxi. Cf. also March, “Polynesian Ornament, a Mythography,” in Journ. Anthr. Inst. xxii.

I rthis esoteric meaning, not by a closer study of the Imanifestations themselves, but through information acquired by intercourse with the natives. There is often not a single feature in a savage dance which would I give the uninitiated any reason to suspect the non-sesthetic purpose. When North American Indians, Kaffirs, or Negroes perform a dance in which all the movements of the animals they hunt are imitated, we unavoidably see in their antics an instance of primitive but still purely artistic drama. It is only from the descriptions of Catlin, Lichtenstein, and ReadeHhat we learn that these pantomimes have in reality quite as practical a purpose as those imitations and representations of animals by which hunters all over the world try to entice their game within shooting distance. According to the doctrine of sympathetic magic, it is simply an axiomatic truth that the copy of a thing may at any distance influence the thing itself, and that thus a buffalo dance, even when it is performed in the camp, may compel the buffaloes to come within range of the hunters. But the deceptive appearance of disinterestedness, which in these cases might have led one to mistake a mere piece of hunting magic for a specimen of pure dramatic art, is apt to make us cautious about accepting as independently aesthetic any performance of primitive man.

In the songs and dances by which savages exhort themselves to work and regulate their exertions we find

1 Catlin, Illustrations , etc., i. pp. 127, 128, Mandan buffalo dance. A similar dance among the Iroquois has been described by Morgan ( Iroquois , p. 287), who does not, however, speak of any magical purpose. Although somewhat differently explained by Catlin, the Sioux bear dance ( l.c . i. p. 245) is no doubt as magical in its intention as the buffalo dance. The same interpretation holds good also, we believe, with regard to the gorilla dance of the Negroes (Reade, Savage Africa , pp. 195, 196) and the hunting pantomimics of the Koossa Kaffirs (Lichtenstein, Travels , i. p. 269).

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an aspect of utilitarian advantage which is real and not imaginary. Evidently also this advantage, and not any independent aesthetic pleasure, is — intentionally or unintentionally— aimed at in the war-pantomimes, the boating songs, dances, etc. And it is no doubt for this reason that music and dance have attained so surprising a development in the lower stages of culture. In trying, therefore, to explain the historical development of art, we are compelled to take into account that foreign purpose which is repudiated in art-theory.

If every work of art were really an end in itself — a Selbstzweck — standing quite isolated from all the practical utilities of life, it wTould be nothing less than a miracle that art should be met with in tribes which have not yet learnt to satisfy, nor even to feel, the most elementary necessities of life. In such a case it is not music only which would, as Wallace thinks, have to be explained by supernatural causes : 1 primitive art in all its departments would baffle our attempts at rational interpretation. By studying, however, the artistic activities of savage and barbarous man in their connection with his non-aesthetic life, writers on evolutionary aesthetic have succeeded in solving this great crux of art- history. The dances, poems, and even the formative arts of the lower tribes possess indeed, as every ethnologist will admit, unquestionable aesthetic value. But this art is seldom free and disinterested ; it has generally a usefulness — real or supposed — and is often even a necessity of life.2

A historical conception of art is thus, it appears,

1 Wallace, Darwinism , pp. 467, 468.

For a direct opposition to Mr. Wallace’s views on this point see Wallaschek, Primitive Music, pp. 278, 279. Cf. also Ritchie, Darwinism and Politics, pp. 110-114. ** j> i THE PROBLEM STATED 13

ot incompatible with a strict maintenance of the aesthetic criterion. But it may still be asked whether we are Therefore compelled to join Guyau in abolishing all distinctions between art and other manifestations of human energy.1 By doing away with the only definition which is common to the majority of aesthetic systems, we should dissociate ourselves from all previous views on art. And it seems hard to believe that all dogmatic writers on aesthetic, one-sided as they may often seem, have founded their theories on a pure fiction. The independent aesthetic activity, which simply aims at its own satisfaction, cannot have been invented for the sake of the systems. The mere fact that so many theories have been proposed for its explanation furnishes, it seems to us, a sufficient proof that the conception of this activity corresponds to some psychological reality. Certainly the “ end in itself” has not played so important a part in the practice of artists as writers on aesthetic would have us believe ; and it 1 is impossible to distinguish its effects in concrete individual instances. But from all we know of the . life and work of artists, there appears to be a tendency . — more or less consciously followed, it is true, in j different cases — to make the work its own end. And e in the public we can in the same way notice an inclina- , tion — which grows with increasing culture — to regard c art as something which exists for its own sake, and { to contemplate its manifestations with independent s aesthetic attention. Whatever we may think about the genesis of particular pictures and poems, we. know that at least they need no utilitarian, non -aesthetic justification in order to be appreciated by us. And with as much assurance as we can ever feel in com-

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1 Cf. Guyau, Les probUmes de VestMtique contemporaine, pp. 15, 24.

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parative psychology we may take it for granted that the same way of looking at art has prevailed in other stages of culture as well. However cautious one may be in drawing conclusions from analogies between higher and lower forms, a closer study of primitive art must needs compel every one to admit that these dances, poems, and ornaments, even if they originally served practical, religious, or political aims, may at least have come by degrees to be enjoyed in the same way as we enjoy our art. By denying such subjective independence in the creation and enjoyment of art, we should be no less guilty of one-sidedness than those authors who deny that genuine art has ever been influenced by “ foreign purposes.” If it is presumptuous to adduce any particular works or manifestations in proof of free and independent production, it may be no less audacious to contend that even the most primitive form of art has flourished in tribes destitute of all aesthetic cravings. There is room for discussion on the degree of influence which “ autotelic” 1 artistic activity has exercised in particular works and manifestations. It may also be made an object of research to determine at which precise stage of development aesthetic attention becomes so emancipated as to entitle us to speak of a pure and free art -life. But it does not seem that such inquiries can ever lead to any positive result. The more one studies . art, especially primitive art, from a comparative and historical point of view, the more one is compelled to admit the impossibility of deciding where the non-aesthetic motives end and the aesthetic motives begin. The only result we can reach is the somewhat indefinite one that it is as impossible to explain away the artistic