On Future Warfare

Front matter

ON FUTURE WARFARE.

I a Sy

. x

Contents

. THE PRINcIPLES OF DEFENSIVE WARFARE - . THe Reien or THE BULLET - - - ~ . Tactics oF PENETRATION - = ee

. Svrarecican Paratysis aS THE OBJEOT oF THE DecisivE ATTACK - - ~-

FARE ON LAND - - - - - -

Preface

I can understand the Quaker spirit, the Crusader spirit, and the Mercenary spirit. I can understand aman detesting war, glorying in war, looking upon it as good business. But I cannot understand anyone wishing to repeat the last war. I doubt much whether such a man could be found, a man who, having experienced the squalor of the Somme and of Ypres, could honestly say: “I loved it.” Frankly, the last war was a horrible affair, and had it not been for the heroism of the millions who took part in it, it would have been utterly bestial. A tragedy in itself, it has given birth to a greater tragedy—what have we learnt from it? If another war were to engulf the world to-morrow, it would be the Great War over again, with its trenches, and its wire, and its mud. As to this there can be no question, since the armies of to-day are still the armies of 1914; masses of men who cannot face fire, but who can deliver it in such overwhelming strength that the art of war expires in ‘slaughter and in universal ruin. Yet all this can be changed by half an inch of steel.

This, then, is the central problem of my book— ‘half an inch of steel to cancel out half an ounce of lead. It will not abolish war, but it will refine its grossness. It will once again make the offensive ‘stronger than the defensive, it will reinstate war ee vi

as an art, and exalt mind over body. It will reduce the size of armies; render wars, especially between the smaller powers, less frequent; will shorten the length of battles, and reduce cost, casualties and destruction. If wars are to continue, seeing what the last war has to teach us, surely it is wiser to fight behind armour than in woollen jackets.

I saw this quite clearly when I joined the Tank Corps in 1916, for the vision, if you will, stood out like a silhouette against the gloomy background of the battle of Beaumont Hamel, surely one of the most terrible ever fought. I saw in the tank a reincarnation of the Merrimac and the Monitor, and, knowing something of naval history, I also saw the ultimate end—mechanised warfare on land, just as these two old ironclads led to mechanised warfare at sea.

Shortly after the battle of Hampton Roads, in 1862, the Iondon Times said: ‘ Whereas we had available for immediate purposes one hundred and forty-nine first-class warships, we have now two, these two being the Warrior and her sister Ironside: There is not now a ship in the English navy, apart from these two, that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor.”

In 1918, battle after battle was won by the tank, and the Allied plan for 1919 was a campaign almost entirely founded on this machine. After the war every army went back to an infantry basis, yet curiously enough the Germans were forbidden to build tanks. In 1862, “ England and all other maritime powers immediately proceeded vii to reconstruct their navies, and the old-fashioned three and four-decker line-of-battle ships were condemned as useless.” In 1927, we still have an infantry army; yet, history is going to repeat itself; the end is certain; this is not the problem, which is: Shall we attain it in time to mitigate slaughter? Loss of money does not matter much, but unnecessary loss of life is horrible.

This then has been my object since 1916—to persuade the Army to do ‘what the Navy has already done. For just on eleven years I have written and lectured on this subject, not that it has been a profitable task; but, I think, it has been a worthy one; and, still believing it to be so, I have collected together in this book seventeen lectures and articles out of five to six times that number, and have set them together so as to form a continuous narrative. I have not attempted to bring them up to date; unfortunately, in my opinion, none have as yet reached obsolesence. Here and there I have cut out such over-lappings as would be tedious to the reader, and have corrected such errors as I have discovered. I thank the Editors of the following Reviews and Journals for their courtesy in allowing me to publish these studies — I'he Royal Engineers Journal, The Fighting Forces, The Journal of the Royal Artillery, The Nineteenth Century and After, The Army Quarterly, and The Journal of the United Service Institution of India. Also I wish to thank Mr. A. J. Sifton for so kindly reading through the proofs.

vi

That there is room for this book I believe, since military journals are seldom read by the public, but what persuaded me most of all that a book of this nature may help a worthy cause is a story told me a few weeks ago by a friend. It was as follows :

Junior Staff Officer: “ Sir, a proposal has been made to mechanise the X Company YZ.”

Senior Staff Officer: ““What! another unit to be mechanised, why, soon we shall have no army at all.”

20th November, 1927.

Chapter I. The Principles Of Defensive Warfare.()

Before the outbreak of the last War, all armies were organised for mobile warfare, and many soldiers considered that the war would be rapid and short. To-day, for similar reasons, all armies are organising for a war of movement, and the greatest surprise of the last war, namely, its static nature, is not only being forgotten, but to mention its recurrence is to risk being classed as a heretic. In 1914, as M. Bloch had foreseen twenty years earlier, it was fire-power and human nature which were the parents of the trench. Since 1914, human nature has not changed, but whilst then an infantry division was equipped with 24 automatic weapons, to-day it passesses over S00. In 1914, the maximum (aimed) fire-power of a division in §.A.A., was about 55,000 rounds a minute, to-day it is 155,000. Thus far the conclusion is, that if a great war broke out to-morrow, unless armies possess large numbers of tanks, it will be a war of trenches, for, if they do not, it will take at least a year ta produce them in any quantity.

1. The Foundations of the Defensive.

Tue following theory is based on the experiences of history; therefore to discard it is an act both dangerous and foolish :— (i) The offensive should be assumed on all occasions when circumstances permit.

(ii) Offensive action should spring from a strong defensive base.

(iii) The defensive should be so organised as to permit of it changing into an offensive at the shortest possible notice.

(iv) The offensive cannot be too strong in reserves, therefore the defensive should not employ a weapon beyond the minimum necessary to establish security.

(!) Royal Engineers Journal, June, 1925. 1 B

4!

The following, drawn from the past, are errors worth remembering :—

(i) The offensive languishes on that side which is least prepared to wage war, and which

. is, through ignorance of the principles of war, blinded by the belief that the enemy must be held back at all points, and that, consequently, it is necessary to be everywhere equally strong in men, and superlatively strong in defences.

(ii) The unreality of peace teaching. generally leads to the creation of “ impregnable positions,” in place of such preparations as will aid a rapid assumption of the offensive.

(iii) The all but total depletion of a reserve, that is, a striking force, on account of the stringing out of troops for purely defensive tactics, such as the passive holding of trenches, villages and fortified positions, renders a sustained offensive impossible.

\iv) The general demoralisation and disorganisation of all ranks by the incessant creation of new defences, and the repair of old ones, detrimentally affects training and leadership, and, consequently, lowers the offensive spirit of all concerned.

I will now briefly consider the principles of war in their defensive aspect. Bearing in mind that there is no hard and fast dividing line between the offensive and defensive in warfare, we find that the object is the same. Shielding does not consist solely in preserving our own existence, but in preserving it in order that we may the more economically destroy the enemy; consequently, a defensive battle should be based on an offensive plan, which through force of circumstances cannot at once be put into operation.

Superiority of weapons at the decisive point means superiority of offensive power, and the lack of this superiority is frequently the direct cause of defensive action. If men are squandered in attempts to avoid blows they will never be in a position to give them, and not giving them, they allow their enemy to reduce his defensive strength to a minimum, and to increase his striking force in proportion. It was against this type of warfare that Napoleon inveighed when he wrote to his - brother, the King of Spain, saying: “ The cordon system is only good against smugglers,” yet, for over three years, the grand tactics of the Great War on the Western Front were based on this system.

Infringing the principle of concentration, the cordon system simultaneously infringes economy of force. The defensive becoming the main object, a time arrives when the offensive becomes inoperative, not through lack of weapons, but through the impossibility of massing them. Garrisons must be in proportion to the trenches they occupy, and if trenches are over large, garrisons cannot be relieved without seriously weakening them. ‘Ten men will hold a blockhouse, and a blockhouse may delay a brigade; ten men will not hold a fortress; therefore, in our defensive plans, do not let us build fortresses when blockhouses suffice. The strength of defences does not rest in their size, Be but in harmony between their size and the strength of their garrisons.

Besides the danger of weakening established forces in order to build up a strong reserve, another danger presents itself, namely, excessive immobility due to over extension, which leads to an infringement of the principle of mobility.

Consequently, before we plan our defences, we should carefully consider the following © maxims:

(i) When from a state of defence the offensive is assumed, this act should in no way disorganise the existing defensive arrangements.

(ii) Any delay in the assumption of the offensive

from the defensive may prove fatal to both operations.

(iii) In offensive action, moral weakens in pro-

portion as improvisation increases.

The first is a violation of the principle of security, the second of mobility, and the third of co-operation.

The principle of surprise finds an al]l but unlimited application in the defensive. I will take one small instance as an example—the siting of wire entanglements. In the Great War, the tactical effect of wire was immense, but the use made of it during the first two years of the war was beneath contempt. The true use of wire does not lie in fencing off areas of ground as British, French or German, which was so frequently done; but of so increasing the offensive power of weapons that their numbers can be reduced in defensive positions. For instance, in trench warfare, great risk was taken in placing a little wire in front of the front line fire trenches, which, more fvrequently than not, were a target for the enemy’s guns. Instead, entanglements should be constructed behind these trenches, where acres can be set up in a single night. In front of the fire trenches, ground, for this purpose, is normally limited, in the rear of them, unlimited, and being so obviously the place for wire, is frequently overlooked. This error is mainly due to the spell of the cordon system, which aims at holding ground, as if ground were the object of battle; it is not, for its object is the destruction of the enemy’s fighting strength.

To avoid the excessive use of men for purely defensive work, we have recourse to a very simple arrangement known as outposts. ‘These perform two duties: the first, watching for the enemy; the second, delaying his advance so that the troops in rear may assume the offensive before the enemy can surprise them.

If in field warfare it has been found that seldom more than one-eighth of a force is required for protective duties, a greater number should be unnecessary in trench warfare, where defences and obstacles abound. ‘True, in trench warfare, the opposing forces may often be as many yards apart as in field warfare they are miles; but military spaces are not measured with a foot rule, but by the obstacles they contain, and the time taken in crossing them.

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In order to obviate the inherent disadvantages and vices of the cordon system of defence: first, the line of resistance must be chosen from the point of view of the grand offensive; and, secondly, from that of the decisive counter attack. The line of resistance should be a fortified line, and the ground behind it should be prepared :

(i) To aid the offensive forward of this line.

(ii) To assist the defence of the line itself.

In front of the line of resistance should be constructed a line of observation, consisting of a continuous trench line, or a line of posts. Between this line of observation and the line of resistance should be constructed a line of strong works, the tactical object of which is:

(i) To protect the observation posts if they are

attacked.

(ii) To break up, like groins, an enemy’s attack should it sweep through the observation posts, so that a counter-attack, from the line of resistance, may find before it a morcelated and demoralised force.

The ground between the observation line and

the line of resistance should be prepared :

(i) To facilitate our own defensive.

(ii) To hinder the enemy’s offensive.

Masses of trenches should be avoided, they deplete military endurance and also the national exchequer. ‘

We now come to our last principle, the principle of co-operation. Before the outbreak of the Great War, the doctrine of the offensive, due to Jack of

ON FUTURE WARFARE. — Y logical thinking, grew top heavy through the defensive being ignored; during the war, the result of this was a chaos of defensive actions.

One system, even if an unsound one, is safer than a score of brilliant ones simultaneously attempted, because the former means unity of action, whilst the latter spells dispersion of force. We cannot afford ‘to regulate our defences on guerilla lines. Given a doctrine, given a definite system of defence, based on the proved principles of war, this system should be applied to the whole of a defensive line, whether this line is five hundred yards or five hundred miles in length. This is sound generalship. Whatever the length of the line may be, it should be looked upon as an unit. that is, as one zone of possible attack. It shculd be viewed from an offensive as well as a defensive point of view, the ‘frontage of ultimate attack should be selected in accordance with the objective, and its holding and decisive attacking forces distributed according to the principles of concentration and economy of force. Once viewed as an unit, it should be divided into sections, the extent of each being arrived at after a careful tactical study of the ground. Further, each section should, when possible, bear a direct relationship to the larger tactical units—divisions, corps and armies, and all sections should be placed under the command of their own generals and their respective staffs; and, as long as the line is held, these should be its permanent officials. The garrisons may come and go, but the staffs should remain; they form if the skeleton of the whole defensive system, the garrisons being the changing tissues.

In trench or siege warfare, until each section is organised under its own fortress commander, and ceases to be a mere tactical ‘ doss-house,” the offensive will languish, for it cannot be carried out effectively on the maxims of partisan warfare— each unit undertaking separate operations, or hesitating to do so for want of faith in the commanders on its flanks.

To sum up:

(i) The objective must be decided upon.

(ii) The plan of defence for the whole front

must be worked out.

(iii) The entire defences of the front must be

placed under one comamnder.

(iv) The front must be divided into sections. v) The sections must be divided into sub-

sections. vi) The sections and sub-sections must have their own commanders.

(vii) The requisite garrisons must be placed under the orders of these officers.

(viii) The remaining troops must be kept in reserve under their own commanders and trained for offensive warfare.

In one word, “ organise.” The trenches must be looked upon as defended barracks, to and from which units may come and go without altering rules, structure and accommodation; and not as mere camping grounds where each unit selects its own pitch. This will lead to co-operation in its highest sense, for not only will all know what they have to do, but all will know that, as they are part of one organisation, those on their flanks will equally know it, and that all will act together according to one plan (and not a hundred and one), irrespective of reliefs, irrespective of changes.

2. The Tactics of Trench Warfare.

General Dragomirov once wrote, with reference to field defences: ‘‘ Make the firing line at right angles to the direction you want to command, and see that the enemy is unable to enfilade this line. All fortification is contained in these two principles.” Though this is correct, it is necessary somewhat to amplify this statement as follows:

(i) Trench systems must be planned so as to enable the offensive to be assumed from them.

(ii) Troops must be distributed so as to possess complete liberty of manceuvre behind the front held; for an attack is generally more easily frustrated by attacking the enemy in some other quarter. Frequently to meet it directly is to play into the enemy’s hands.

(iii) Defensive lines must be planned with the idea of counter-attack, especially the rear lines, and the troops must be distributed in accordance with this idea. This means that all reserves—men, munitions, guns, etc.—are ready for immediate action, are mobile, and that the men are in a high state of training.

(iv) Minor attacks must be made in order to

ON FUTURE WARFARE.

ee create a favourable opportunity for decisive action. A definite policy must unite them, so that they may improve the possibility of an eventual offensive.

(v) The defence must never be content with warding off the enemy’s blows, for the object, the destruction of the enemy, forbids this.

(vi) Trench warfare must be looked upon as subsidiary to the ultimate destruction of the enemy’s field armies. This being so, trenches must be garrisoned so as to enable sufficient men to be trained in field warfare.

(vii) Trench warfare must be based on the maxim that “the offensive is the soul of the defence ”’; trenches, in themselves, being merely a temporary protection.

‘iii) Defensive positions must be selected in view of economising personnel so that the power of the offensive may be increased. Consequently, before ordering new trenches to be dug, it should be remembered that every extra yard or two may mean one man less wherewith to strike a blow at the enemy.

(ix) Defensive frontages must be considered with reference to the offensive. At least half the total force should remain in hand for decisive action.

(x) Trenches must be dug with the object of reducing the number of men required for the defensive in order to add to the general reserve, or striking force.

(xi) The trench garrisons, those troops represented by sentries, picquets, supports and reserves, should seldom, if ever, exceed one-quarter of the total troops allotted to any one section.

(xii) As trench warfare adds little to skill, better organisation, training and moral, every attempt should be made to reduce the number of men employed in it, so that more can be trained for offensive action.

To return once again to General Dragomirov’s maxim, for centuries past, in fact, from the earliest days of warfare, both his requirements have been met by disposing the defenders in such a way that they can take in flank an enemy’s attack directed against their front or flanks.

There are two means of doing this:

(i) By the use of weapons. (ii) By the use of barrier and deflecting obstacles.

To use weapons with the greatest effect, it is necessary to be shielded; therefore, in former times, walls or ramparts were built, and in order to enfilade an attack these walls were provided with bastions. In other words, a series of towers, or strong points, were linked up by curtain walls, and between these bastions were constructed sally ports, from which the offensive could be assumed. ‘The entire work was surrounded by a moat, or ditch, which not only constituted an obstacle, but a trap, which once entered, was difficult to escape from, on account of enfilade fire sweeping it from flanking works.

Throughout the history of war, whenever an improvement in artillery has rendered the cannon superior to the musket or rifle, fortresses and field defences have abounded; and, if we want to study the principles of these defences in detail, we cannot do better than go back to the days of Vauban, and substitute, in place of bastions, strong points; in place of curtains, narrow trenches; in place of moats swept by grape shot, wire and trenches swept by machine-gun fire.

Analysed, all these systems may be reduced to three tactical factors:

(i) The maintenance of an unbroken front.

(ii) The enfilading of a hostile attack.

(iii) The rapid assumption of the offensive.

I will consider these in turn.

The Maintenance of an Unbroken Front is generally dependent on the denial of flanks to an enemy’s attack. This may be accomplished by :

(i) A continuous system of trenches.

(ii) Detached works linked together by wire

entanglements.

If the enemy is to be attacked, the advantage of the first system needs no explanation, for a continuous line of trenches is a necessity as a jumping off line. If the enemy is simply to be withheld, the advantage of the second system is that it requires very few men for defensive work, consequently, it permits of the majority being relegated to the offensive reserves. Its disadvantage is that vast fields of entanglement, and the absence of lateral communications, seriously impede our own advance and assault.

Considering these points, there can be little doubt that for those sections of the front which have been selected for offensive operations, the system of the continuous line is best; and, as men are never unlimited in number, it will, consequently, be necessary to adopt the system of detached works for those sections of the line which are purely defensive. Unless this rule be strictly observed, the principles of concentration and economy of force will be violated.

If this contention ‘is correct, it follows that, whenever the conditions render the offensive either impossible or ruinously costly, it is only right to adopt the second system in place of the first, for, by so doing, endurance will be economised. The most important condition which regulates this adoption in Western Europe is weather; consequently, during the winter months, the system of detached posts should, when possible, be adopted.

What did the Great War teach us of entrenchments from the constructive point of view? This: that though it is possible to dig hundreds of miles of trenches in the summer, it is next to impossible to maintain hundreds of yards in the winter, unless these trenches are solidly revetted, and boarded, and carefully drained. When trench systems run into thousands of miles, seldom are material and labour sufficient to complete all the trenches dug during the summer, or to maintain them during the winter. The result is that, though in places the system of the continuous line is suitable during the summer-time, it is not only unsuitable during the winter, but a positive danger, for the more it is patched up the more it falls in. When once a trench is half-full of water, unless this water can be removed by drainage, and it often cannot be, nothing destroys it more than trying to clear it out and revet it; every soldier knows this.

It would appear, therefore, that when once the offensive is brought to a standstill through the opposing forces going to earth, the defining of the zones of attack and defence should be a commander’s first consideration; and that, until these have been defined, no elaborate system of trenches should be dug, so that every board, every hurdle, every gabion may be economised in the purely defensive zones in order that the trenches in the offensive ones may be made to withstand the rigour of the winter and be in a fit condition to aid an early spring advance. Further, the less work required during the winter, the more men will the units, destined for the offensive, be able to train. We should rely on weapons as the best means of defending the offensive zones, and on obstacles for defending the defensive zones, because our own weapons are the _ best means of aiding our advance, whilst our obstacles often impede our movements as much as _ they impede the enemy’s. During the winter time it is generally feasible, temporarily, to convert such positions of the offensive zone, as are rendered unattackable on account of weather, into defensive ones; and though this may mean that many of the trenches necessary to an offensive will fall in, these can be more thoroughly repaired during the first fortnight of fine weather than during months of rainy.

In fact, the entire problem of defence is one of the most rudimentary common-sense; it may be summed up as follows:

(i) Trenches from which an offensive may be launched should be defended by missiles, consequently a continuous line is necessary.

(ii) Trenches which are purely defensive should be defended by obstacles flanked by fire, consequently detached posts (well hidden machine-gun blockhouses) are equally so.

(iii) During the’ summer an army should be prepared to assume, or repulse, an offensive.

(iv) During the winter an army should be prepared to assume an economical defensive, that is, one which will require as few weapons as possible so that a maximum number of men may be trained for offensive action during the following summer.

The Enfilading of a Hostile Attack.—The power of enfilade fire cannot be exaggerated in trench warfare; in the offensive it constitutes the chief * means of accelerating an attack, in the defensive of frustrating it. This is not usually observed on account of the obsession that parallel entrenchments are the surest means of defence. As the flank of an attack is the most vulnerable point, our tactics should aim at forcing an enemy, should he attack us, to offer us a flank in such positions as will cause him the greatest inconvenience and loss. If

= nature does not provide us with these positions, then, by the aid of obstacles, must we create them; we must so place our entanglements that they will not only come as a surprise to the enemy, but will force him to halt in such positions as will render his flank, or flanks, an easy target to our fire. ‘Take, for instance, the wire entanglement in front of a fire trench. If, instead of constructing it parallel to the trench it protects, it is constructed in a zig-zagged manner, it will not only form. a more difficult target to the enemy’s artillery fire, but it will enable an enfilade and cross fire to be directed along its salients. Again, if behind this entanglement we dig an observation trench, this also should consist of a series of salients or untraversed zig-zags, in principle much like the old pentagonal fortresses of two hundred years ago. Such a trench will not only flank the wire, but will, in itself, constitute an obstacle, for internally it can be flanked by rifle or machine-gun fire. Every trench dug should help the offensive. If lost, its existence should at once add to the strength of the defensive; this is the whole art of entrenchments. If between the lines of observation and resistance, an intermediate line of works is constructed, these works should be so sited as to cause the enemy, should he attack them, to form perpendicularly, or obliquely, to the line:of resistance, and so lay either one or both flanks open to counter-attack. Siting of wire and siting of fire trenches is simply a matter of common-sense, based on the simplest of simple maxims, namely: All obstacles and trenches should be so sited as to cause the enemy to offer a flank to our fire without compromising the advance of our counter-attack.

The Rapid Assumption of the Offensive-—The possibility of rapidly assuming the offensive depends on distribution, ground and observation. Should the front line be made the line of resistance, the offensive may be rapidly assumed from this line if our observation be good and the enemy’s bad; but, should reverse conditions prevail, it is probable that the garrison will be pounded to death before an offensive can be launched. If a rear line, not observable by the enemy, is chosen, then the ground between it and the front line must be sufficiently clear of obstacles to permit of a rapid advance. The chief reason why a rear position should be chosen for resistance is that whilst the front line is immediately restricted by the proximity of the enemy’s trenches, a rear line is not so affected, and the further back this rear line is dug the more room is there wherein to manceuvre entanglements.