The moral and political philosophy of John Locke

Preface

The following study of the moral and political philosophy of John Locke aims to supply a lack in the existing discussions of the subject. Only one previous monograph on Locke's ethics has appeared — Professor M. M. Curtis's Outline of Locke's Ethical Philosophy, Leipzig, 1890 — which contains much helpful material. The present essay, in addition to differing widely from some of Professor Curtis's conclusions, attempts to view Locke more closely in his relations to his predecessors and contemporaries. Hence a rather full exposition has been given both of the traditions in moral and political philosophy from Hooker to Locke, and of the controversies into which Locke was himself drawn on certain points of ethical theory. Not only does such a study throw further light on Locke's epistemology, that aspect of his thought which usually attracts the most attention, but also it should have considerable interest in itself.

The bibliography which is appended in no way pretends to be an exhaustive list of even the most important works which bear upon Locke's moral and political philosophy. It includes only those books which have been mentioned in the course of the discussion and is designed to indicate the editions which have been used and to assist in the verification of references. Wherever possible the references to the works of Locke and the other writers have been to chapters and sections rather than to pages. Where that procedure has been impossible, the fact has been distinctly noted.

I wish to express my great indebtedness to Professor John Dewey. I received special help from him in writing Chapter I of Book II, but profited throughout by his general advice and wise counsel. I found it a constant pleasure to work under his inspiring instruction. Also I wish to thank Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, both for the light he has frequently thrown for me on this period in the history of philosophy and for his personal services in reading the proof and editing the dissertation.

Chapter I . Early Writers on the Law of Nature 9

1 . Locke's relation to these writers 9

2. The meaning of "the law of nature" 10 (a) Rational 10 (6) Immutable. 11

(c) Universal 12

(d) Applicable to all situations 13

(e) Social 14

3. Attempted proofs of the law of nature 14

(a) From universal consent 15

(b) From innate imprints 15

4. Philosophy of the state 1 7

(a) The need for the state 17

(b) The origin of the state 1 8

(c) The extent of the power of the ruler 19

(d) The supremacy of the state 19

(e) The denial of the right of revolution 19

5. Critical comment 21

Chapter II. The Deists of the Seventeenth Century 22

1. Locke's relation to the deistic movement 22

2. Subordination of ethics to theology 24

3. Rationalism 24

4. Rejection of the Scriptural sanction 25

5. The natural goodness of man 26

6. Obedience to the will of God 27

7. Hedonistic elements . 28

8. Critical comments 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter IV. 3°

© Locke's knowledge of Hobbes's work

2. Hobbes's psychology and its implications for ethics

3. The state of nature

4. The law of nature

5. The state of civil society

6. Critical comment

Filmer

1. Locke's relations to Filmer

2. Filmer's attacks on Grotius and on Hobbes

3. The patriarchal theory of the state

4. Critical comment

Chapter I . Locke's Theory of Knowledge 49

1. Locke's general epistemological position 49

2. The origin of ideas 50

3. The kinds of ideas 52

4. The nature of ideas 53 (a) As the sole objects of the mind in knowledge 54

(6) As the instruments for knowledge of extra-mental things 57

5. The faculty of reason 60

6. Knowledge and probability 63

Chapter II. Locke's Treatment of Reason as the Ethical Faculty 65

1 . Locke's view of the faculty of reason 65

2. The rejection of innate practical principles 66

3. The mathematical demonstrability of mo-

rality 68

4. The controversy with Lowde concerning innate

ideas 70

5. The controversy with Burnet concerning:

(a) The innate faculty of reason 72

(6) The nature of conscience 73

Chapter III. The Content of Locke's Rationalistic Ethics 75

1 . The theory of morality based on "mixed modes" 75

2. Criticism of this theory 78

3. The theory of morality based on the law of nature 79

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VII

4. The theory of morality based on the idea of

God 83

5. Criticism of these theories 85

6. Summary 87

Chapter IV. Hedonistic Elements in Locke's Ethics 89

1 . The definition of good in terms of pleasure 89

2. The distinction between natural and moral

good 90

3. The three commonly used sanctions 92

4. The function of reason in an hedonistic ethics 96

5. The problem of human freedom 98

6. Summary 101

Chapter V. The Relation between the Rationalistic and the Hedonistic Elements in Locke 103

1. The relation of pleasure to virtue 103

2. The relation of God's will to the moral law 105

3. Burnet's criticism of Locke's theological hedon-

ism 108

Chapter VI. The Springs of Action in Locke's Ethics no

1. Locke's inconsistencies no

2. Ideas as the springs of action in

3. Pleasures as the springs of action 112

4. Uneasiness as the spring of action 113

5. Some Thoughts concerning Education 115 (a) The child's original nature 115 (6) The educational value of pleasures and

pains 116

(c) The importance of training the reason 117

6. Summary 117

BOOK III. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE Chapter li Locke's Theory of the State of Nature 121

1. Dependence of Locke's social and political

philosophy upon his rationalistic ethics 121

2. The state of nature 121

(a) Natural rights 122

(b) Social relationships 122

(c) Validity of the law of nature 122

VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. Social institutions in the pre-political state 123

(a) Property 123

(b) Money 125

(c) The fgmjly 125

4. The state 01 war 127

5. The question of slavery 128

6. Motive for leaving the state of nature 129

7. Critical summary 130

Chapter II. Locke's Theory of Political Society 133

1. The differences between the state of nature and

the state of political society 133

2. The basis of government in the consent of

the governed 136

3. The forms of government for a commonwealth 138

4. The right of revolution 142

5. The dissolution of government 146

6. Critical summary 147

Chapter III. Locke's Theories of Toleration and Punishment 152

1. Locke's theory of toleration 152

(a) The separate functions of state and church 153

(b) The nature and limits of toleration 154

(c) The claims of the individual conscience 156

(d) Locke's controversy with Proast 157

2. Locke's theory of a comprehensive church 160

3. Locke's theory of punishment . 161

(a) The meaning of personal identity 161

(b) The basis of punishment 162

(c) The purpose of punishment 162

(d) The difficulty in the theory 163

(e) Future punishments 163

4. Critical summary 164

Appendix

Bibliography 165

INTRODUCTION

I. Locke has always held an important place in all histories of modern philosophy, and his wide influence on the development of thought since his day has been generally recognized. But it has been his epistemology to which attention has been chiefly directed; and his moral theories, and to some extent his political theories, have been correspondingly neglected. Such disproportionate emphasis upon one phase of his contribution to philosophy is not altogether surprising. Epistemological problems have been the storm center of controversy both in England and Germany ever since the Essay concerning Human Understanding precipitated them in so striking a form. Indeed philosophy has often been treated as if it were synonymous with epistemology; and ethics has been relegated, even where it has been mentioned at all, to an appendix. Recently, however, a reaction has undoubtedly been going on against too exclusive an absorption in epistemological matters, and moral and political questions are regaining the importance which they once held in philosophical discussions. It seems desirable, therefore, to consider more fully than has yet been done the ethics of Locke and the relation of his ethics to the development of thought in his century.

The sources for information concerning the ethics of Locke are not as plentiful as the historian might well desire. Various phases of his social and political philosophy he discussed in his Letters for Toleration, Treatises of Government, and Thoughts concerning Education. But nowhere did he present a systematic statement of his general ethical position, of the fundamental ethical principles upon which all social and political principles must rest. He was repeatedly urged to write a treatise on morality by his friend Molyneux, 1 whose expectations he had stimulated by his repeated assertions in the Essay that ethics should be classed with mathematics among the demonstrable sciences. 2 Molyneux insisted that such a task as a treatise on morality would be "worthy of your consideration,' - and well suited to "so clear and distinct a thinker as you are.'' Locke humbly replied that "though I

•C/. Molyneux's letters to Locke: Works, Vol. IX, pp. 291, 299, 329. The same request was repeated by others of his admirers, e. s„ Mrs. Katherine Trotter Cockburn in the introductory letter to her Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay in 1702.

'Cf. below. Book II, Chapter II, g 3.

saw that morality might be demonstratively made out, yet whether I am able so to make it out, is another question." 3 He promised indeed to employ his leisure hours in thinking of the matter, and may possibly have designed a short fragment among his papers entitled 0/ Ethics in General* in answer to Molyneux's request. Yet he never actually published any work dealing directly with ethical theory. Had he ventured to do so, his exact position on certain questions would not be so difficult to determine to-day, and some of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in his theories might have been removed. As such a treatise was not framed, the historian's evidence for an outline of his thoughts on ethics consists mainly of the various isolated passages in the Essay in which he dealt with moral problems, and a number of brief selections from his Journals and Common-place Books printed by his biographers, together with the assumptions upon which his discussions of social and political matters seem to have rested.

2. The reasons which deterred Locke from publishing a treatise on the principles of morality are probably two. In the first place, he came to be more and more absorbed in controversial writings in defending the Essay, The Reasonableness of Christianity, and the first Letter concerning Toleration against the attacks of Stillingfleet, Edwards, and Proast respectively. He was so vitally interested in the issues involved in those controversies that he gave over to wearisome, and at times petty, refutation the leisure which might otherwise have been employed on more constructive tasks. In the second place, he had a simple religious trust in the complete adequacy of the revelation of moral principles in Scripture. He was to be sure a confident rationalist, insisting that revelation can never contradict the sure results of reason, and will not even, especially where the revelation is traditional instead of original, carry the same conviction which reason carries. 5 He granted that, because of the imperfections of language, the written revelation in Scripture is exposed to misunderstanding; and he drew the lesson therefrom that men should be "more careful and diligent" in using their powers of reason, and less "magisterial, positive, and imperious'' in interpreting revealed truths. 6 Yet though he was fond of proclaiming the glory of reason in general, he often fell back upon revelation when any particular, concrete point needed to be proved. All through The Reasonableness of Christianity he emphasized the insufficiency of natural religion, 7 and of "natural morality'' also, as morality established by reason might be called. "It would seem, by

1 Locke: Works, Vol. IX. pp. 204-295.

« King: Life of Locke, pp. 308-313- Cf. below, Book II, Chapter V, Section 2.

* Essay IV. 18, *-*. Cf. Works, Vol. VII, p. 142. (In this and similar references to Locke and other authors, Roman numerals indicate the book, Arabic numerals the chapters, and superior figures the section.)

• Essay III, 9, n .

INTRv ,CTION 3

the little that has hitherto been done in it, that it is too hard a task for unassisted reason to establish morality in all its parts, upon its true foundation, with a clear and convincing light; and it is at least a surer and shorter way, to the apprehensions of the vulgar and the mass of mankind, that one manifestly sent from God, and coming with visible authority from Him, should, as a king and lawgiver, tell them their duties, and require their obedience, than leave it to the long and sometimes intricate deductions of reason, to be made out to them." 8 Therefore, as he concluded, revelation is a better basis for morality than reason, at least for most men, for "the day-laborers and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairy-maids," who "want leisure or capacity for demonstration." 9 There was no satisfactory body of ethics "before our Saviour's time;" 10 and all the wise men since Christ have not been able by reason to equal in any way the teachings of the New Testament. Men not only are feeble in intellectual grasp and vigor, but also are swept away by passions and vices. If revelation did not furnish them with an indubitable knowledge of true morality, they might not ever gain such knowledge at all. Thus in spite of his respect for reason, Locke came to the position that "the gospel contains so perfect a body of ethics that reason may be excused from that inquiry ." "

3. Nevertheless, though Locke in replying to one of his critics had to acknowledge that he had not demonstrated morality, 12 certainly the dominant interest and underlying motive in his work were practical rather than speculative, ethical rather than epistemological. He explicitly stated that his purpose in writing the Treatises of Government was "to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William," 13 i. e., to justify the democratic principles involved in the Revolution of 1688 rather than to develop a scientific set of ideas. Likewise he disclosed that he wrote the Thoughts concerning Education in order to help in the proper education of the son of one of his friends, and that he published them in the hope that still others might derive benefit therefrom. 14 Certainly he had no other aim in the Letters for Toleration than to promote that ideal cause which throughout his life he had deeply at heart, and mocked at those who placed ceremonial purity ahead of true morality. 15 Even in his most abstract work, the Essay concerning Human Understanding, the primary motive was practical. Locke wrote in the Epistle to the Reader le that the epis-

■ ldtm. Vol. VII, p. 130.

'Idem, Vol. VII, p. 146. '• Idem. Vol. VII, p. 141.

11 In a letter to Molyneux. Idem, Vol. IX, p. 377. » Works, Vol. IV. p. 187. ls Preface. Works, Vol. V, p. 209. » The Epistle Dedicatory. >' Cf. Works, Vol. VI, pp. 7. 23. w Essay; Epistle to the Reader *.

temological problems of the Essay were forced upon his consideration by difficulties which arose in a discussion with some friends; and Tyrrell explained that this discussion was ''about the principles of morality and revealed religion." " It was in order to reach a sound foundation upon which morality and religion could be based, therefore, that Locke entered upon the task of examining the origin and limits of human knowledge. This task proved to be a greater one than he had at first supposed it would be, and consumed large portions of his time over a period of twenty years before his results were published in the bulky Essay. Yet never in all this time did Locke forget the practical motive with which he began. He said in 1677 that painstaking study is important because ''we can make little further progress in doing than we do in knowing." 18 And he made the prior importance of conduct to mere thinking still more emphatic in a passage at the outset of the Essay itself: "If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge."" Thus even in the most abstruse and abstract of Locke's writings, the practical and ethical interest predominated.

4. The extent to which Locke was dependent upon the work of his predecessors has been a disputed point. Most critics have maintained that he was the originator of a wholly new tradition, building up his philosophy without so much as consulting the writings of others. This view of Locke's rather complete independence from historical relations to earlier thinkers is doubtless a misunderstanding, and can be explained as due to three causes.

In the first place, Locke was prone to insist in an exaggerated fashion that he had spun his philosophy out of his own "coarse thoughts," 20 and emphasized the difference between his own direct and fresh observation of factsandthehide-bound traditionalism of theSchools. But he thereby simply intended to express his strong feelings of revolt against the type of philosophy current in the universities of his day, in which the method and subject matter of medieval thought were still employed. He was quite willing to acknowledge his great debt to Descartes 21 and others for the emancipation which they brought him from the narrow channels of academic teaching at Oxford. And it was only because he was aware of the important novelties which in the Essay he was introducing into epistemological theory, that he modestly gave expres-

17 This information is derived from a marginal note made by Tyrrell in his own copy of the Essay which is now preserved in the British Museum. Cf. Bourne, Life of Locke, Vol. I, p. 249. Also Fraser's edition of the Essay, Vol. 1, p. 9, note 2.

" King: Life of Locke, p. 93.

lf Essay; Introduction ».

M Essay: Epistle to the Reader 1 .

INTRODUCTION 5

sion to what has been to many of his readers a misleading emphasis. The controversy which he had with Stillingfleet led him further to explain what he meant by writing out of his own "coarse thoughts. 1 ' Stillingfleet accused him both of trying to invent ''a new way of certainty by ideas," and also of merely reiterating what everyone knew quite well before the Essay appeared. He retorted to this charge with delightful irony that he was unfortunately not "as well read as your lordship'' in the literature of the subject, and then added in a more serious way on the next page that he had come to regard his own theory as original with himself only after he "had in vain hunted for it in the books of others." 22 The discrepancy between these two comments on his relation to other writers is only apparent, and can be explained even aside from pointing out the ironical quality of the first of the two remarks. He had indeed hunted in the works of others such as Descartes ; and not having found there what satisfied him as being a correct view of human knowledge, he then turned to observation of his own mind in order to frame his theory. When, however, Stillingfleet asserted that his theory was only a repetition of an established view, he could not deny the charge categorically; for he was but slightly familiar with the writings of the medieval schoolmen and ecclesiastics to whom Stillingfleet was referring- He was none the less acquainted with other writers of the more modern period, and wrote his Essay to supply what seemed to him the deficiencies in them.

In the second place, Locke did not state his position in the Essay in a well-balanced form. He took occasion to deal only with the new features which he was aiming to contribute to a theory of knowledge. He did not think it worth while or necessary to specify those other matters upon which he was in entire agreement with current and commonly accepted views. He seems to have taken it for granted that his readers would understand that he assented to that part of the established tradition which he did not deny. 23 Only when Stillingfleet began to attack him as a dangerous innovator did he explain his position more adequately. His three lengthy letters to Stillingfleet disclose much more than does the Essay the extent to which he was familiar with earlier writers. However, just as his method of including little but his original ideas in the Essay misled Stillingfleet, it has misled others since. Nevertheless he was not in all respects an innovator, but built largely on the work of his predecessors.

In the third place, Locke's Essay shows fewer traces of his familiarity with the writings of earlier thinkers than any of his other works. And the Essay is also that one of his works which is most read, even, in too

* The new and old elements in Locke's epistemology are distinguished and discussed below, Cf. Book II, Chapter I.

many cases, which is exclusively read. Generalizing from the Essay, many critics have thus been led to suppose that he was unfamiliar with his predecessors. Yet the Treatises of Government, the Thoughts concerning Education, and many allusions in his Journals and Commonplace Books show quite conclusively that he did not escape theinfluence of the intellectual inheritance of his time. He explicitly mentioned the names of numerous men to whom he was indebted for instruction or from whom he greatly differed. One of his biographers goes so far as to claim that he never ventured to write until "he had acquainted himself with nearly every work of importance that had been offered to the world" on the subject he was considering. 24 And though this estimate is guilty of overstatement of the extent of Locke's reading, it is certainly correct in maintaining that Locke was familiar with many of the great philosophers of the past. He did scorn the medieval period as being one of barren and futile disputations; but he used to great profit some of the leading authors both of classical antiquity 25 and, more especially, of his own century. As the particular authors whom he knew best and followed most will be discussed in the next four chapters, they need not, however, be reviewed here.

An insistence upon Locke's dependence on his predecessors is even more important in a discussion of his moral and political philosophy than in an account of his epistemology. For, though his theory of knowledge has frequently been misunderstood through failure to appreciate its relations to the rationalism of the seventeenth century, 26 yet in many ways Locke, even more than Descartes or Hobbes, stands at the threshold of a new era in epistemological speculation. He opened up new paths of inquiry and formulated new problems for his successors to examine. His connections with subsequent developments are probably more important than his connections to earlier situations. But in ethics almost the opposite is the case. Here he represents rather the conclusion of a period. His moral and political philosophy may well be viewed as the summation of the best thought of the seventeenth century. Though he added new ideas of his own and developed the old ideas which he took over from others, he is rather the ripe fulfilment of the past than the herald of the future. Consequently his historical antecedents are important for an understanding of the significance of his ethical position.

** Bourne: Life of Locke, Vol. I, p. 72.

" As Locke's relation to classical antiquity will not be dealt with elsewhere, it may be mentioned briefly here. In his Thoughts concerning Education, Locke spoke of a knowledge of Latin as 'absolutely necessary to a gentleman" (55 163-168), and said that "no man can pass for a scholar that is ignorant of the Greek tongue" (§ 195). Among the Greeks he evidently thought most highly of AristoUe, especially of the Politics. Cj. Works, Vol. X, pp. 306-307. He also claimed acquaintance with Plato and others. Cf. King: Life of Locke, pp. 297-298. His knowledge of Latin authors seems to have been of the more literary men rather than of the philosophers. His admiration for Cicero will be referred to in the next chapter.

» Cf. below, Book II, Chapter I.

Book I

The Traditions in Moral and Political Philosophy Before the Time of Locke

Chapter I

I. The tradition which seems to have had the most outstanding effect upon Locke's ethical philosophy was that which based morality upon "the law of nature." This tradition was very old and widespread. It sprang from the teachings of the Roman stoics, dominated the thought of the medieval scholastics, and then found striking expression in several of the greatest moralists of the seventeenth century. Locke probably was not acquainted with the stoics except as their ideas were embodied in Cicero , whom he often quoted; 1 and he surely had slight contact with any of the scholastics. But he was familiar with some of those writers of the seventeenth century who, after the disintegrating and chaotic moral effect of Protestant sectarianism, revived the conception of the law of nature as a unifying and catholic principle. Among these writers there were two on the continent who stand out prominently, the Dutch jurist Grotiu s and the German jurist Pi if en - dorf. Both of these men Locke knew quite well and admired greatly, even recommending their works as an indispensable part of the education of a gentleman. 2 In England itself the writers who discussed the law of nature were quite numerous. In the last decade of the sixteenth century there had appeared the work of Richard Hooker, who not only antedated but prepared the way for Grotius. Locke was fond of quoting his words, usually adopting the current designation of him as "the judicious Hooker." i Then throughout the second half of the seventeenth century a group of less notable writers appeared. Culverwel and Cumberland used the law of nature as the basis of their replies to Hobbes. There is no direct evidence to indicate whether or not Locke was acquainted with their treatises. Yet it was an intimate friend of Locke, Tyrrell, who in 1692 published an abridgment of Cumberland's work. Also both Culverwel and Cumberland, as intellectual leaders, had many followers among the clergy, who - popularized their ideas and made their fundamental principle a common possession of most educated men. 4 Benjamin Whichcote,

1 Some Thoughts concerning Education, 55 184-186, 188-189. Also King: Life of Locke, pp. 5, 45, 130. Works, Vol. Ill, pp. 271-373. Vol. X, p. 306. Essay II, 28, ".

1 Some Thoughts concerning Education, 5 186. King: op. cit., p. 5- Also Works, Vol. Ill, p. 272; Vol. X, p. 308.

4 E. g., Samuel Parker: Demonstration of the Law of Nature and of the Christian Religion, 1681. Also the works of John Wilkins C11672), Henry More (ti687), and John Tillotson (ti694).

for example, who is said to have been Locke's favorite preacher, 5 spoke much of the law of nature, as his Discourses, printed long after his death, disclose. Locke recommended the sermons of Whichcote, Barrow, and Tillotson as "masterpieces." 6 Thus there is no doubt that Locke was very familiar with this whole tradition in moral and political philosophy.

2. The term "the law of nature'' on which morality was made to rest did not of course have the same meaning in the many discussions devoted to it through the centuries by its various adherents. But in those writers of the seventeenth century who have just been mentioned, it had come to have a fairly consistent signification. At least there were certain points of general agreement which were characteristic of the period before Locke.

\a) In the first place, the law of nature was said to be identical with the law of reason. This identification had been a traditional one through many centuries. But in the Middle Ages it had meant several different things. Sometimes the law of nature was a sort of impersonal cosmic force, regulating the ordered relations of all things, animate and inanimate alike; and the law of reason was identified with it because, according to the tradition of Greek philosophy, order of any kind is witness to the existence of reason. At other times the law of nature was a law common to all living beings (inanimate objects were here excluded); and the law of reason was identified with it because that with which nature had endowed all life was supposed to be noble and worthy of eulogy. 7 In the former case reason became an attribute of the universe in general; in the latter case it became a kind of animal instinct. But in the writers of the seventeenth century reason is thai? faculty of the human mind which sets man off, not only from inanimate nature, but also from the lower animals, — it is that divine faculty which man is supposed to share with God. Hence when the law of nature and the law of reason are identified, reason is proclaimed to be that which has been designed by nature and by God to be man's moral guide. Those creatures who do not possess the faculty of reason cannot comprehend what law means, and hence are not to be held responsible for obedience to any law: they are completely outside the realm of moral distinctions. Man, however, is endowed with reason; hence he can comprehend what law means, and especially can know that law which flows from the nature of his own being. "The law of nature is that law which is intrinsical and essential to a rational creature." 8 It is "the dictate

s Fraser'3 edition of Locke's Essay, Vol. I, p. xxiv. > Works, Vol. X, p. 306.

*Carlyle: A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Vol. I, pp. 37-40; Vol. II, pp. 30, 103-104.