Morocco in diplomacy

Front matter

UNIVERSITY UFORNIA

BERKELEY 4, CALIFORNIA

By the Same Author.

Preface

An explanatory word or two regarding the construction of this volume may prove useful to the reader as a guide.

To clarify the masses of documentary evidence accumulated round a problem which has kept Europe on tenterhooks for seven years, and to bring out the issues clearly, I have sought to rivet the reader's attention to the main lines of the story.

Hence I have divided it into a number of sections each as self-contained as the nature of the subject allowed.

In the first section the reader is asked to cast a backward glance at the attitude towards, and the interests in, Morocco of the four Powers chiefly concerned (Britain, France, Spain and Germany), during what may be termed the normal period of Morocco's modern relations with the Powers, i.e. before French, British and Spanish diplomacy entered upon those secret courses which were destined to slay Morocco's independence and narrowly to avoid involving Europe in a great war.

With a brusqueness which I trust may be forgiven him, the author opens the second section by introducing the reader to a small German gunboat anchored off the South Atlantic coast of Morocco, sent thither by Germany as an intimation that she does not propose to acquiesce in the change which has come over the international position of Morocco. The author then explains what the viii PREFACE

Public Law of Europe concerning Morocco was at the time Germany took that step, and shows, very briefly, how it had been infringed without Germany, who was primarily instrumental in getting that Public Law framed, having given her consent to its infringement.

In section three the author bids the reader plunge with him into the labyrinth of secret diplomacy preceding the elaboration of that Public Law, in order to be shown how the French and Spanish Governments had arranged, with the concurrence of the British Government, to absorb Morocco on the first convenient opportunity; when Germany, stepping in, had arrested the process even then begun, by insisting upon the elaboration of a Public Law, drawn up by the Powers, to preserve Moroccan independence and integrity.

That carries us to section four, in which, after inviting the reader to agree that this first intervention of Germany's was fully justified, the author proceeds to describe in detail how France and Spain — always with British concurrence— started destroying the Public Law they had participated in framing, and how they went on doing so until not even the bones and the beak of Moroccan integrity and independence were left.

And so, the author brings his reader back again to the little Panther rolling and tossing in that heavy Atlantic swell, and at this point he utters a plea for the reader's concentrated attention. He does so with trepidation, because he is about to steer the latter in and out of as tangled a skein as he might wish to see. And not only that. For the reader will be asked to abandon some of his most cherished beliefs — amongst them, that Germany did a very shocking thing in sending that miniscullar war- vessel to Agadir ; amongst them, that his own Foreign Office, which, like all respectable people, he

PREFACE ix

doubtless reveres, handled his affairs at that time with calmness, discretion and wisdom; amongst them, that German resentment is the unreasonable phenomenon he has been so often and so emphatically assured. And even then the reader has not come to an end of his trials, for the author will conclude by putting a number of things before him — bald things, naked things, plain things, ugly, uncomfortable, inconvenient things which polite persons do not usually trouble him about, but, on the contrary, take care to conceal from him in order not to disturb his digestion, or his prejudices.

And to crown all the author will wind up by appealing to his reader — and with that, take leave of him.

E. D. M.

February, 1912.

Contents

PACK

Preface . vii

Introduction xv

Part I

EXPLANATORY OF THE RESPECTIVE ATTI- TUDE TOWARDS MOROCCO OF THE FOUR INTERESTED POWERS— BRITAIN, FRANCE, SPAIN, AND GERMANY— PRIOR TO THE EVENTS OF THE PAST DECADE

CHAPTER

I. Britain and Morocco 3

II. France and Morocco 10

III. Spain and Morocco 14

IV. Germany and Morocco 16

Part II

THE PUBLIC LAW OF EUROPE REGULA- TING THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF MOROCCO, AND ITS VIOLATION

V. The Act of Algeciras 27

VI. The Crucial Article of the Act of Algeciras . 36

VII. The Progressive Violation of the Act of Algeciras

— in brief 40 xii CONTENTS

Part III The Antecedents Of The Act Of Algecikas Chapter Page

VIII. French Policy towards the Moorish Government, 1900-1903 51

IX. M. Delcasse's attempt to partition Morocco

X. The Anglo-French Declaration of April, 1904,

and its Secret Articles 61

XI. The Franco Spanish Declaration of October, 1904, and the Secret Convention attached

THERETO 68

XII. Summary of the Events of 1900-1904, and

Reflections thereon 71

Part IV Germany's First Intervention (1905)

XIII. The German Emperor's Visit to Tangier, and

its Effects upon British Public Opinion . 81

XIV. The German Case in 1905 93

XV. How France (with British concurrence) tore up the Act of Algeciras, and how Spain followed suit 109

Part V

GERMANY'S SECOND INTERVENTION (1911), AND THE ENSUING ANGLO-GERMAN CRISIS

XVI. Was Germany justified in sending the Panther

to Agadir? 125

XVII. How the Despatch of the Panther to Agadir

was greeted in Paris and London respectively 138

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER PAGB

XVIII. Further Light upon the British Official

Attitude from July 1 to July 12 . . . 149

XIX. The Story of an Announcement, an Interview,

and a Speech 159

XX. An Analysis of the Events of July 20 and

21 in the Light of Facts now established . 169

XXI. The Aftermath of the Events of July 20

XXII. The Franco-German Settlement and its Effects

upon British Interests 185

XXIII. An Appeal from Prejudice to Reason . . 196

Appendices 221

Index 355

MAPS

At End of Text

[These Maps have been specially drawn for publication in this volume.]

I. Map* of Morocco, showing Towns and Districts mentioned in the Text.

II. Map of Morocco Illustrating the Sphere recognized to Spain under the Franco- Spanish Secret Convention of October, 1904, which remained secret until published in the Paris Matin, in November, 1911.

III. Map of part of West-Central Africa, showing the Area affected by the Franco-German Negotiations of June — November, 1911 ; and the Neighbouring Dependencies.

IV. The Same indicating the Area which formed at one time in the Franco-German Negotiations, the subject of special discussion.

V. The Same showing (A) Area ceded by France to Germany under the convention of november 4, 1911 j (b) Area ceded by Germany to France under the same Convention.

Introduction

Perhaps I should preface this volume by a brief profession of faith which is rny justification — to myself — for having written it.

I believe that the greatest national interest of the British people is at this moment, and will continue increasingly to be, the establishment and maintenance of friendly relations with Germany; a full and frank examination by responsible statesmen in both countries of the national problems peculiar to each in their relations with one another, leading to an appreciation of their respective national necessities, and to a mutual adjustment of the same with the sacrifice neither of honour, nor prestige, nor legitimate needs on either side.

I believe that no greater disaster could befall both peoples, and all that is most worthy of preservation in modern civilization, than a war between them.

I reject the theories, based for the most part upon faulty and inapplicable historic similitudes, pointing to the inevitableness of such war.

In common with every Briton of ordinary intelligence, I perceive that in the early part of last year the relations of the two peoples which, after passing through a period of recurrent crises, were beginning to show visible signs of steady advance towards the old friendly feeling, have received a deplorable set-back.

xvi INTRODUCTION

The information which reaches me accords with that which persons of weight declare to be such as they themselves are in receipt of, viz. that not one school of thought only, but the whole German nation, is seething with an absolutely genuine sense of grievance against the British Government.

In common with every Briton of ordinary intelligence, I am aware that this set-back in Anglo-German relations is due to the view taken in Germany of the attitude adopted by the British Foreign Office, endorsed by a considerable section of the British Press, towards Germany last summer in the course of the negotiations between that Power and France relating to the question of Morocco — a question which had already given rise to considerable friction in 1905.

Moreover, it is now no secret — it has been publicly vouched for by several members of Parliament and naval officers — that the British Government had fully determined to support, if necessary, the French case against the German by force of arms, and had, indeed, undertaken naval and military preparations to that end.1

1 Recent Ministerial statements have been concerned in denying that the British Government meditated a gratuitous attack upon Germany last summer. This denial may have been necessary to calm German opinion. It was not required to convince home opinion of the inaccuracy of the allegation. The denial does not, from the British national standpoint, touch the kernel of the question. The incontestable facts remain : (1) that the British Government assured France last summer that France could count upon British naval and military support in the event of war arising out of a Franco-German rupture over Morocco, and had taken elaborate preparations to that end ; (2) that this assurance went beyond any British national commitment, then or now avowed, towards the French Republic ; (3) that the French Government's case was intrinsically bad since it reposed upon the violation by France of an International Treaty ; (4) that this violation was committed with the approval of the British Foreign Office, and arose out of secret arrangements between the British, French

INTRODUCTION xvii

Holding the beliefs stated above, it seemed to me that the German view was deserving of careful study in the light of facts publicly accessible in order to ascertain whether it reposed upon any sort of foundation.

At an early stage in the investigation, I acquired the conviction that Germany's action in despatching the small gun-boat Panther, of 1000 tons 1 burthen and an equipment of 125 men, to anchor off an open roadstead on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, had been grossly misinterpreted ; the step being an incident in a series of inter-connected circumstances extending over a period of nearly ten years, in the course of which Germany had had legitimate causes of complaint at her treatment by French and British diplomacy.

To this conviction I have already given utterance.2

But as more and more light was thrown upon the subject, as disclosures of secret arrangements, unknown to the British people, negotiated by the British Foreign Office with the Foreign Offices of France and Spain, assumed precision; as successive revelations in France showed both the inadequacy, and, in several important respects, the inaccuracy of the statement explanatory of the British official attitude given by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on November 27 last, the necessity of a fuller treatment became apparent.

and Spanish Governments contracted in 1904, and of which the British people, and the world, knew nothing until November, 1911 ; (5) that the attitude of the British Foreign Office in the early, and most critical, stage in the Franco-German negotiations was such as gravely to increase the possibilities of a Franco-German rupture.

1 With two guns, calibre 10*5 cm., and six machine guns.

2 Vide The Nineteenth Century and After, for November, 1911, and February 1912; a series of letters entitled " How Wars are Made," in The Daily Neivs in October, 1911, etc.

xviii INTRODUCTION

It was increasingly obvious that the policy recommended in distinguished quarters of attempting to soothe German feelings by homeopathic doses in the shape of friendly speeches of a general character, combined with a studious avoidance of the source of the trouble, was somewhat lacking in courage^ and, perhaps, not quite dignified. From another point of view, too, this policy was not one which, so it appeared to the author, could be regarded as adequate. It is of vital moment the nation should realise that in this matter it has been led blindfold to the very brink of war, as the outcome of liabilities secretly contracted by its diplomatists without its authority. Also that, in the final resort, the existence of these secret liabilities has only been acknowledged by the Foreign Office subsequent to their publication in a couple of Parisian newspapers.1 To write Finis over the Morocco controversy, assuming that to do so were in other respects wise or even possible, would be, under these circumstances, for the nation to admit that it is prepared to assent to such treatment being meted out to it in the future, and for my part I cannot bring myself

1 The existence, and in part the actual substance of Secret Articles attached to the Anglo-French Declaration over Morocco was revealed in Le Temps of November 11, 1911. A question was then put in the House of Commons ; Sir E. Grey admitted in reply the existence of Secret Articles, and they were subsequently communicated to Parliament. The Secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October, 1904, was published in Le Matin of November 9, 1911, reproduced in Le Temps of the same evening, and afterwards published in a British White Book together with the Exchange of Notes between Lord Lansdowne and the French Ambassador concerning it. The effect of these two Treaties — the second arose out of the first and was, indeed, imposed upon France by the British Government — was to involve this country in approval and diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and thereby, to inevitable conflict with Germany, as explained in this volume. That is not the expression of an opinion : but a bald statement of fact.

INTRODUCTION xix

to believe in so humiliating a confession of national impotence.

It seemed, then, advisable, to place in the hands of the British public a connected narrative of the dealings of their own diplomacy and that of the three other Powers chiefly interested in Morocco — France, Spain and Germany— together with a comprehensive appendix, foot-notes and maps which should enable the reader, at any rate to a very great extent, to exercise a check upon the statements of facts in the body of the volume and upon the conclusions drawn from those facts by the author.1

His conclusions the author makes no attempt to conceal. They are that from first to last the British people have been systematically misled and misinformed as to the part played by Germany in the Morocco question. And for these reasons : first, because the genesis of German action has lain in the existence of secret conventions and arrangements between the British, French and Spanish Governments, withheld from the knowledge of the British people, who have, therefore, been induced to form their judgment upon incomplete data; secondly, because a concerted effort, inspired by certain influences connected with the British diplomatic machine, and conveyed to the British public through the medium of powerful newspapers, has been consistently pursued with the object of portraying German policy in the Morocco question in a uniformly sinister light. That effort, it is right to add, has been much assisted by a section of German chauvinists and German jingo newspapers, who have throughout striven to goad their Government into departing from the logical and

1 This collection of documents will in itself constitute a sort of political hand-book to a comprehension of the problem.

xx INTRODUCTION

straightforward, if sometimes clumsy, policy it appears to me to have steadily followed.1

The Morocco problem itself, and that of the Congo which (in another aspect than the one the public is familiar with) has now been grafted upon it, still contain numerous elements of international friction — possibly of very grave friction. As a French writer of repute has put it —

"The arrangement of 1911 is either the prelude to a real understanding between France and Germany, or it is the prelude to war."

In a considerable, it is not perhaps too much to say in a preponderating measure, the issue one way or another is on the knees of the British people and their Government.

If this book succeeds in carrying conviction to the mind of the Briton possessed of normal common-sense and sanity that, on the one hand, Germany's actions throughout this entire controversy have been misrepresented, and on the other hand, that the British and French peoples alike have been led to the verge of war with Germany, not because of alleged deep-rooted antagonisms or conflicts due to " elemental forces," but through the intrigues, the lack of straightforward dealing,

1 In the Economist of December 30, 1911, and January 8, 1912, will be found a "valuation of the leading newspapers of Germany" which may be commended to all who desire to appreciate the international significance attaching to the utterances of specific German Press organs. The writer of these interesting articles accentuates a circumstance to which sufficient importance has not been attached in this country, viz. That during almost the entire course of the Morocco crisis of last summer the German Government had a hostile Press, some papers attacking it for not claiming a portion of Morocco ; others because the French Congo was not regarded as worth the abandonment of the German diplomatic position in regard to Morocco, and — at one time — all of them because they believed the German Government had lacked firmness in its diplomatic dealings with Britain.

INTRODUCTION xxi

and the absence of foresight on the part of a diplomacy working in the dark and concealing its manoeuvres from the national gaze — the author will have achieved his purpose.

P.S. — This book was already in the printers' hands when Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin was announced. That visit has been followed by official expressions on either side of good augury for the future. Every one will rejoice at these first-fruits of a resolute public pressure upon Downing Street during the past four months. I am tempted to think that a detailed history of the Moroccan imbroglio, far from being less necessary, is now more than ever required. And for these reasons. If a genuine movement for an understanding has really begun in the official world as the result of public insistence, it is essential that the popular feeling provoked should be reinforced by additional arguments reposing not on admirable but more or less vague desires, but upon a study of concrete facts on the specific issue which has caused the ill-feeling it is proposed to attempt to remove. It is essential, too, for the durability of any understanding that may be reached, that the British public should thoroughly apprehend the reasons which have brought about a situation all now realise to be fraught with the gravest peril. Finally, the circumstance that so happy but so brusque a change in the British official attitude should be possible, and should be (again, happily) supported by influential British newspapers which only a few weeks ago were replete with sentiments completely at variance with those given utterance to in their columns to-day, constitutes in itself the most convincing of reasons why the nation should appreciate the events and the influences responsible for the opposite policy so long followed, and xxii INTRODUCTION

with which the nation — without altogether understanding it — is clearly out of sympathy. The welcome change indicated by Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin is a tribute, first and foremost, to the popular will in Britain. Let but the reflecting members of the community apply themselves to a comprehension of what preceded this change, and a lesson will have been learned, the outcome of which should serve to place Anglo- German relations upon a footing of permanent friendliness and security—^ to the inestimable advantage not of the present generation only but of generations to come.

The Morocco problem is not settled. In one sense it may be said to be only beginning. It will loom largely on the horizon during the lifetime of the present generation.

E. D. M.

29th February, 1912.

Part I

Explanatory of the respective attitude towards Morocco of the four interested Powers — Britain, France, Spain, and Germany — prior to the events of the past decade.

Chapter I Britain And Morocco

" I enclose for your confidential information the accompanying volumes of printed correspondence respecting the affairs of North Africa and Morocco. . . . You will observe that it has been the constant aim of Her Majesty's Government, and of your predecessors at Tangier, to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country. Unfortunately, their efforts in this direction have hitherto been unsuccessful, and herein lies the great danger of the situation, as the decease of the present Sultan will, in all probability, give rise to internal disturbances, the issue of which it is impossible to foresee."

(Extract from Lord Salisbury's general letter of instructions to Sir Charles Euan-Smith upon his appointment as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Morocco. May 16, 1891.) [C— 6815.]

The policy of Great Britain towards Morocco in what may be termed modern times was inspired, until the opening years of the present century, by the sentiment that the national interest required an inderjendent/7\ Morocco. The view dictating this policy was primarily^--' the strategic "one that were the_ coasts ofJVIediterranean anoTNorttAtTantic Morocco to fall into the hands~ofli Eu^p^an~TbweFrthe^olite to Thala~w^uTrT)e threatened^ and the British position in the Mediterranean compromised.

The larger policy, that of an independent Morocco, has now been wholly abandoned, although it was nominally revived by the Act of Algeciras in 1906, as will subsequently be explained. The strategical view has undergone a profound modification. Retained to the extent of excluding a first-class Power from occupying the sea-board referred to ; it has altered to the extent of allowing that occupation by a second-class Power under certain conditions. Those conditions are that no fortifications or strategic works shall be erected on the part of the aforesaid sea-board whence the security of the Straits of Gibraltar might conceivably be menaced. It does not appear beyond the bounds of possibility that 'the limits within which such menace was held to be possible in 1904, may be restricted as the result of the Franco- Spanish negotiations now proceeding with the cognisance of the British Government.

Whether these changes of policy were avoidable or unavoidable, wise or unwise, from the point of view of the national interest, it would be futile to discuss. The circumstances under which they have come about will appear as this narrative proceeds.

The_secondary but nevertheless^ extremely important consideration influencing British policy, until the opening years of theTpresent century, was that of our commercial interests in Morocco which were, and are, extensive. The desire to~preserve_Morocco as an open market for British trade, and to remove the numerous disabilities under which British_trade suffered at the hands of the Moorish Government, were matters regarded jis worthy of attention by~BKHsfr diplomats in the latter half of the nineteenth centuryT'Witri "these" unTtecl ends in view, Sir John Drummond Hay, the British representative at the Moorish court, laboured for many years : in the main successfully as regards the larger policy : with scant progress so far as

BRITAIN AND MOROCCO 5

inducing the Sultan to follow a more liberal line in his treatment of European commercial interests.

In 1891 Lord Salisbury decided to make a serious effort in this direction. He despatched a special Mission to Fez, attended by some pomp and circumstance,1 under Sir Charles Euan-Smith. The chief object of the Mission was the conclusion of a commercial Treaty; but it was arranged that the slavery question should be tentatively referred to, and also that if the Sultan showed a friendly disposition, the good offices of the British Government should be used with the other Powers to diminish the evils connected with the system then, and still, existing, whereby Moorish subjects shed their allegiance to the Sultan by becoming the " protected" subjects of this or that European Power.2 Lord Salisbury was at special pains to emphasise that the British Mission had no ulterior or secret motives, and impressed upon his envoy the necessity of so conducting himself that suspicions of British motives should not be aroused either in the mind of the Sultan or among the representatives of other European Powers.3

1 Sir C. Euan-Smith was accompanied by thrte members of the British legation, and by a military staff consisting of Colonel Hallam Parr, Major Monds, Surgeon-Captain Macpherson, Lieutenant Kirkpatrick, Lieutenant Wilson, and D. Beaufort, Esq. The Sultan deputed Kaid Harry Maclean to take charge of the Mission, which was received with military honours as it progressed towards the capital. Four ladies — members of Sir C. Euan-Smith's family — also accompanied the party.

2 The system had given rise to gross abuses, indeed to a species of blackmail at the expense of the Sultan, of which he justly complained.

3 Vide quotation at the head of the chapter. To Sir C. Euan- Smith's early request that he should be authorised to use vigorous language to the Sultan were the latter intractable, Lord Salisbury demurred : " I should wish you to abstain from anything in the nature of a menace, which would be doubly dangerous, because, if resisted, it might bring about a serious crisis, and, if successful, would place her

The Mission entirely failed. It was delayed for many weeks at Fez, while the Sultan tergiversated in the mosfe approved Eastern style. That the failure was partly due to Sir C. Euan-Smith's somewhat autocratic bearing, a perusal of the Despatches suggests. But the chief cause was unquestionably the misrepresentations which, as Lord Salisbury afterwards remarked, " attended the Mission from the first." 1 Nor is it possible to doubt whence came the numerous intrigues which wrecked the effort. Lord Salisbury, who acted throughout with the utmost straightforwardness towards the Powers, had communicated the draft commercial Treaty Sir C. Euan- Smith had drawn up for presentation to the Sultan, to the German, Italian, Spanish, French, and Austrian Governments,2 and had suggested to these Governments that their support for a measure calculated to serve the interests of all the Powers, and in no way aimed at securing " the slightest privilege in favour of England," would be welcome. The German,3 Italian, and Austrian

Majesty's Government in the position of having undertaken the protection of Morocco." (Despatch to Sir C. Euan-Smith, March 2, 1892.) 11 You should bear in mind the risk of leading other Powers to suppose that you are endeavouring to obtain exclusive advantanges for this country." (Despatch, March 28, 1892.) [C— 6815.] > C— 6821.

2 Yet so important a French paper as the Journal des Ddbats, which had openly accused the British Government of ulterior motives on July 21, actually stated on August 12 that Sir C. Euan-Smith's object was " to insert the thin end of the wedge which would force Morocco to accept her (Britain's) authority," adding that France intended to maintain Moroccan independence and integrity in spite of England. How passing strange it is to recall these utterances when contemplating present events I

3 The German and Italian ministers at Tangier showed themselves particularly anxious to assist the British Mission. (Sir C. Euan-Smith to Lord Salisbury, April 20, 1892.) The British Mission " was supported by the representatives of Germany, Austria, Spain, and Belgium." (Times Tangier Correspondent, July 18, 1892.)

BRITAIN AND MOROCCO 7

Governments had at once responded, the two former with marked cordiality. Spain, after slight delay, had followed suit. France alone had held aloof, M. Ribot contenting himself with the statement that the draft Treaty would be studied. A later request had met with the repetition of the former statement, accompanied by the expression of a doubt as to the Mission's intentions being confined to the subject-matter communicated. Meantime, the French Colonial press had started a fierce campaign against the British Mission, and throughout its stay at Fez, had published a series of untruthful rumours as to its proceedings, inspired by the French representatives at Fez and Tangier, and followed, on one occasion, by a visit to the Foreign Office on the part of the French Ambassador.1 At his last interview with the Sultan, Sir C. Euan-Smith was told by the latter that he " acknowledged to the full that he had made many promises regarding certain articles in the Treaty, and regarding the signing of the Treaty, which he had not fulfilled. He said that other people had advised him that the promises he had made would have evil results for himself, and, therefore, he could not act up to them." 2

2 u The action of the Moorish Government is attributed to French intrigue." (Eeuter's Agent at Tangier, July 18, 1892.) " French action in this matter is, apparently, purely selfish, if not vindictive, as their Mission is prepared to start for Fez in September, expecting to obtain credit for negotiating a treaty and other proposals on the same lines as the British envoy." (Times Special Correspondent with the Mission, Times, July 22.) " News from Fez states that the Moorish Ministers who prevented the Sultan from concluding the British Treaty have each received $10,000 from the French agent." (Times Tangier Correspondent, August 13.) (In this connection it is worthy of note that the Sultan offered Sir C. Euan-Smith £20,000 if he would drop certain clauses in the commercial Treaty, and when the offer was declined expressed surprise, seeing that he had often induced certain representatives of other Powers to withdraw objectionable requests by the simple method of squaring them in this way. C— 6815.)