Moral values and the idea of God : the Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1914 and 1915

Front matter

MORAL VALUES AND THE IDEA OF GOD

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS C. F. CLAY, Manager LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C 4

NEW YORK : G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS BOMBAY )

Preface

I have quoted some sentences from the remarkable document which instituted the Gifford Lectureships, for it contains matter of permanent interest. Lord Gifford was deeply convinced that the knowledge which he sought to promote was of importance for human well-being; he wished to make it accessible to those outside, as well as to those within, academic circles ; he had confidence in reason and left his lecturers free to follow whithersoever the argument might lead; and he himself gave a description of the kind of knowledge which he had in view. In this description he coupled "the true foundations of all ethics and morals" with "the true knowledge of God." The present work is concerned with the relation between these two topics. The point of view from which that relation is regarded is not the most common one ; but neither is it by any means novel. Many philosophers have held that ethical ideas have a bearing on the view of the universe which we are justified in forming, and they have allowed their thinking to be influenced by these ideas. Since Kant proclaimed the primacy of the practical reason in a certain regard, this point of view has been adopted by thinkers of different schools, and reasons have been urged in its support.

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But a systematic investigation of the validity of the procedure is still lacking. We must ask, What is the justification for using ethical ideas, or other ideas of value, in philosophical construction ? In what way, if at all, can they be used legitimately? And what effect have they upon our final view of the world ? A systematic investigation of these questions has been attempted in the present volume.

The lectures of which the book consists were delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the summer terms of 19 14 and 191 5. Although nearly a year elapsed between the tenth lecture and the eleventh, the whole is intended to be a continuous argument. In carrying out this argument, no attempt has been made to give a critical survey of contemporary thinking on the topics which arise for discussion. To have done so would have been to extend unduly the length of the book. And a survey of this kind has now been rendered unnecessary by the work of my friend and predecessor in the Gifford Lectureship, Professor Pringle-Pattison. Through criticism of recent philosophy he has elicited a view akin to that which I have reached in another way. Both the similarity and the difference are indicated by the title of my book.

A few days before my appointment to the Gifford Lectureship, I was honoured with an invitation to give a course of Hibbert Lectures on Metaphysics at Manchester College, Oxford. These lectures were delivered

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in the winter of 191 3-14, and for them the greater portion of the material now published was first drafted. This material was revised and enlarged before it was given at Aberdeen ; and the whole has been again revised, with additions in some places and omissions in others, in preparation for the press. In present circumstances it is perhaps unnecessary to apologise for the delay in its appearance.

My obligations to other writers — not least to those from whom I differ — are too numerous to mention, and they are inadequately acknowledged in footnotes. In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the Senatus of the University of Aberdeen for re-calling me to the University as a Gifford Lecturer. To many old friends in Aberdeen, and especially to Dr Davidson and Dr Baillie, the professors of philosophy, my thanks are due for much kindness and encouragement.

August 1 918.

W. R. S.

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Preface . . . , - . ix

I. The Problem ^

The problem of the bearing of ethical ideas upon the theory of ultimate

reality i

Criticism of the traditional methods of deriving ethics from a metaphysical

theory 8

1. The method of rationalism 10

and that of naturalism 14

2. The dialectic method . . . 15

The need of an independent enquiry into moral values as a preliminary

towards forming a view of ultimate reality 20

II. Values

The attitude of science and the attitude of valuation . . . . 23 The kinds of value distinguished by their objects or ideals . . . .26

2. Intellectual Value, or Truth 30

3. Aesthetic Value, or Beauty . . . . . . . 31

4. Moral Value, or Goodness ........ 35

Formal distinctions between values . . . . . . . -36

1. Intrinsic and Instrumental 36

Moral and economic values . -37

2. Permanent and Transient 42

3. Catholic and Exclusive . . . . . . . . -45

The material conditions of value . 46

4. Higher and Lower ......... 50

The Scale of Values and the System of Values . . . 51

III. The Meaning of Value

The psychological analysis of the moral consciousness as affecting its objective significance . . • • 54

1. The reduction of the moral consciousness to pleasure-pain . . 58

2. Its reduction to desire . . . . . . . .61 xiv Contents

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The social history of the moral consciousness as affecting its objective significance f • • • . . .64

The facts of mental and social history and the question of validity . . 68 Comparison of the appreciation of value with the scientific description of an

1. The view that value consists in the relation of an object to the state

of the subject . 73

1. The view that it is a relation between objects .... 74 3. The view that it is a quality of an object — a ' tertiary quality' . 75 Value as a unique predicate with a definite bearing upon existence . 76

IV. The Criteria of Moral Value

Comparison of value-judgments with scientific judgments as regards their

reference to existence 80

The moral consciousness as one aspect of the consciousness of

reality . . . .86

The universal in morality, and the nature of moral intuition ... 88 Results of the objectivity of moral judgments 92

1. That they are universally valid, even although they may not be re-

cognised 93

2. That they can be systematised ....... 96

3. That different systems may be compared in respect of their com-

prehensiveness . .100

Applications of the criterion of comprehensiveness . . .102 The permanent factor in morality .106

V. Value and Personality

The individual as the subject of value

Distinction of intellectual interests according as they are centred in the universal or in the individual

Value and the unique

The question whether intrinsic value belongs to things which are not persons The value of the moment and the value of the whole life .... How far independent value belongs to the community of persons

VI. Relative and Absolute Value

Relativity (that is, relation to the subject) not a characteristic of the moral

judgment any more than of the scientific judgment .... 133

Relativity (that is, relatedness within the objective whole) a characteristic of

the moral judgment as a judgment about reality 139 xv

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Reasons for this view :

1. What is called good exists or is assumed to exist . . . . 139

2. The assertion of goodness refers to the person's attitude to his

environment . . . 141

Hence (a) diversity in applied morality 142

and {b) unity of principle or spirit in morality . . . . 144

The nature of this unity : the unconditional in morality . . • 147

3. The system of moral values as connected with the system of exist-

ing things 152

The ethical absolute and the absolute reality 157

VII. The Conservation of Value

The conditions of the realisation of values . . . . . . . 159

The discovery of values . .161

The idea of value consequent upon experience of value . . .161

The development of moral ideas . . . . . . .164

The production or realisation of values as the fundamental postulate of the

moral life 167

The attitude of science and the attitude of morality . . .168

The conservation of values 170

How far this postulate may be valid apart from the postulate that the

existing world is a moral order 171

(1) The law of compensation in nature 172

(2) The objective validity of values . . . . . .174

(3) The independence of values 175

The increase of values . . . .178

The mystical way and the way of practical morality . . . .181

* VIII. Value and Reality

The connexion of the moral order with existence 183

(1) Ethical ideas as facts of the personal consciousness which determine character and modify the environment . . . . . .185

(2) Ethical ideas as valid for reality ....... 189

Comparison of the validity of ethical ideas with that of physical principles . 191 The question thus raised concerning the knowledge of reality : Preliminary

propositions 192

(1) That existence is given in the fact of knowledge . . . . 195

(2) That knowledge implies an object distinguished from the subject . 196

(3) That the object is not an isolated unit or collection of isolated

(4) That things and relations between things have equal objectivity in

(5) That knowledge of an object implies the possibility of knowledge

of self 201 xvi

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Supplementary Note on certain terms 207

E. Existence 207

2. Being 212

4. Relations 215

IX. The Division of Reality

The portions of reality which appear to have separate individuality . . 219

1. The individuality of selves 219

2. The individuality of material things 222

Modified view of the constituents of existing reality ..... 227

The status of relations in reality .229

The status of values in reality . . . . . . . . . 233

The reference in value to personal life . . . . . . -234

X. The Unity of Reality

The connectedness of apparently independent things ..... 242 The problem of cognising reality as a whole ...... 243

The method of analysis and synthesis 243

Limits of analysis 244

The knowledge of a whole, or synopsis 251

Illustration from the method of art . 254

Attitude of philosophers to the question ..... 2^6 Bergson's opposition of intuition to intellect . . . -258

Vision and argument 261

Examples of synopsis . .262

The intuition of self 262

The knowledge of other selves . -265

The view of reality as a whole 270

XI. The Interpretation of Reality

The distinction between description, explanation, and interpretation . -273

Interpretation as a translation of meaning into better known terms . .276 Berkeley's theory of visual language and of meaning in nature . .278 This meaning not dependent on the absence of connexion, whether causal

or by way of similarity, between the sign and the thing signified . 281

The discovery of meaning in the world, . . . . . . .285

and the finding of this meaning in its values ..... 287

The criteria for testing an interpretation of this kind . . . .288

The objections taken to this method of interpretation 293

(1) owing to its use of imagination 293

(2) owing to the difficulty of verification 295 xvii

XII. The Theistic Arguments

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The reasons for the disfavour into which these arguments have fallen . -301 The historical origin of the idea of God, and the acceptance of that idea by

philosophers 302

The philosophical problem (to find the idea through which reality is intelligible) altered in the arguments to the question whether existence may be predicated of a given idea 307

1. The Ontological Argument 309

Anselm's argument and the criticism of it . . . . . -310 The significance of the argument 315

2. The Cosmological Argument . 316

Hume's objection 319

The force of the argument . 323

3. The Teleological Argument . . . 325

The objections to teleology 326

XIII. The Moral Argument

The insufficiency of the argument from morality alone . . . . 331

Conflicting attitudes of Hume and Kant to the argument .... 332

Conditions of a modified form of the argument 340

The validity of the argument dependent upon the kind of moral order supposed to be exhibited in the world, whether as

(1) a system for the production of greatest happiness . . . . 341

or (2) a system for distributing happiness according to merit . . . 345 or (3) a medium for the attainment and realisation of goodness by free

persons 346

The argument from the moral ideal itself : that it must exist somewhere . 351

Validity and existence . . . . . . . . . • 355

XIV. Pluralism

Pluralism as offering an explanation (alternative to theism) of the natural and moral orders '■ . -358

Different forms of pluralism 360

Spiritual pluralism 362

Tendency of the theory to solipsism, if interaction of monads excluded. 365

Its account of the order of nature, if interaction of monads admitted . 368

Its account of the order of values 377

Tendency of pluralism back to monism . i 381 xviii

XV. Monism

page

The explanation of nature and morality on the view that all reality is one . 382

Opposing tendencies to naturalism and to mysticism in monistic systems . 384

The distinction of degrees of reality among particular things . . . 387

The explanation of the moral order 391

The idea of purpose 393

The idea of freedom 398

The unfree world characterised 399

The religious side of monism 403

XVI. Purpose

The contrast of purpose and mechanism 405

Mechanism, as an abstract scheme . . 406

Its limitation to the quantitative aspect of phenomena. . . . 407 Mechanism, in the wider sense of the term, as including empirical knowledge of material processes 408

Its application to life and mind 410

Purpose and the idea of an end ..413

Unconscious purpose 416

the meaning of this conception 418

Conscious purpose . . .421

The conception of a universal purpose . 426

XVII. Freedom

Freedom and the causal law : different meanings of this law . . -429 (x) in its quantitative expression, not more relevant to free action than

to conscious action generally 432

(2) as meaning uniformity 437

(3) as meaning efficiency 438

The nature of conscious activity and the theories of determinism and in-

Kant's view of freedom 443

Conscious action and the time-span . . . . . 444

Finite freedom : its nature and limits ........ 446

XVIII. Theism

Theism as an interpretation of the world, implying purpose and freedom . 453 The theory of deism, as compared and contrasted with theism . . -457

The idea of a non-interfering God ....... 459

The nature of rationalism . . . . . . . . . 462

The world as interpreted by theism 464

The interpretation through values 465

The problem of evil 469

The unity of reality as an ethical unity . . . - . -473 xix

XIX. The Idea of God

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The two ways in which the idea of God is reached 476

The mutual influence of philosophical ideas and religious experience . . 479 Metaphysical difficulties in the idea of God which has been reached . .487

The idea of infinity 488

The idea of the Absolute 493

The positive idea of God 495

Is it anthropomorphic? ......... 496

How far it is analogical ......... 498

The relation of God and man 499

XX. The Limits of Morality

Summary of the argument of the book ....... 505

1 . The distinction between knowledge of the individual and knowledge

of the universal ......... 505

1. The individual as the bearer of value ...... 506

3. The order of values and the causal order ..... 507

4. The objectivity of values . . . . . . . 507

5. The relation of persons to the moral ideal ..... 508

6. The factors in a synoptic view of reality ..... 509

7. The problem due to the divergence between the order of existence

and the moral order ........ 509

8. The inability of naturalism, pluralism, and monism to explain the

divergence 510

9. The conditions of a solution . . . . . . . - 512

10. The theistic conclusion . . . 513

The importance of the moral values in the argument . . . . -514

The interdependence of all values . . . . . -519

The connexion of morality with the time-process 521

Index 527

I

I

The purpose of the present work is to enquire into the bearing of ethical ideas upon the view of reality as a whole which we are justified in forming. The argument begins with a discussion of values and ends with the idea of God. In this way it reverses the traditional order of procedure which seeks first for an interpretation of reality, founded upon scientific generalisations or upon the conceptions involved in knowledge, and then goes on to draw out the ethical consequences of the view that has been reached. This traditional method has some advantage on the ground of simplicity. It concerns itself at first solely with what is and does not allow itself to be disturbed by the intrusion of the alien conception of value or of what ought to be. It is true also that the idea a man forms of the nature of things as a whole can hardly fail to affect his view as to what is of highest worth and thus lead on to ethical consequences. But, for this very reason, it is necessary that the basis of our theory of reality should be as broad and complete as possible; and it will lack breadth and completeness if moral facts and ideas have been excluded at the outset. The facts of morality as they appear in the world, and the ideas of good and evil found in man's consciousness, are among the data of experience. If we overlook them in constructing our theory of reality, we do so at the risk of leaving out something that is required for a view of the whole, and we shall probably find that our base is too narrow for the structure we build upon it. On this account it is desirable to fix attention on certain data which it has been customary to disregard in forming a philosophical theory and to enquire how far these data have a contribution to make towards determining our ultimate view of reality.

This way of approach is not altogether new. The impulse towards philosophy has often come from morality or religion rather than from science. In Plato's Republic, for instance, the argument rests upon an examination of ethical conceptions and terminates in the idea of the Good as the source of all reality and power. In most systems of philosophy, however, ethical enquiry has been postponed until the fundamental conceptions of reality have been fully elaborated ; and, even where this is not the case, ethical ideas have not been worked methodically into the structure of the system, but have remained suggestions merely or influences which in some degree modified its general character. There was novelty, therefore, in Kant's assertion of the primacy of the practical reason in dealing with the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. But his view was founded on a contrast between the speculative and the practical reason, which left the former free, or rather compelled, to disregard the data of moral experience as something which lay outside the range of its application, and made the practical reason simply its supplement and corrective. This characteristic has persisted with most of the thinkers who have been influenced by Kant's demand

Metaphysics and Ethics for a view of reality which will satisfy the moral consciousness. They have recognised ethical ideas as providing an additional test of the adequacy of a view of the world, not as forming an essential portion of the data from which such a view should be derived. Perhaps this holds even of Lotze, though, in a remarkable passage, he has formulated a doctrine which proclaims a complete break with the traditional method.

In the concluding section of his treatise on Metaphysic — the last book which he lived to write — Lotze repeats a dictum with which he had closed his first book — a book which bears the same title as his latest. " The true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics," he asserts. *T admit," he goes on to say, "that the expression is not exact; but I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which should be the ground of that which is." The reflexions on the world and human life contained in his Mikrokosmus show the importance of this thought for Lotze's philosophy. They give some indication, also, of the way in which ideas of worth or value, and, in particular, ethical ideas may be used in interpreting the world, and of the relations of this mode of interpretation to the account of the connexion of things arrived at by means of scientific conceptions. But he never worked out the system of ethical metaphysics which he adumbrated. He looked forward to a future occasion to justify his view against objections; but for this justification opportunity was denied him.

His expression of opinion has thus come down to us in questionable shape. It has all the impressiveness that belongs to a belief that, from first to last, informed the thinking" of a philosopher who was careful to respect and carry out the methods and results of science. But it has not been worked into his system, and his words remain the record of a personal belief whose logical position is uncertain. We may be tempted to ask whether we are to take them for nothing more than this — an expression of the author's individuality, which we may accept or reject as our subjective preferences dictate ? If this were all, it would be useless to pursue the matter further. Yet Lotze himself sometimes encourages us to take this view; and the connexion in which the dictum makes its appearance raises a question. His argument is over when he says that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics; and it was not from ethics that his own beginning was made. He began with the difficulties and contradictions that confront the thinker when he tries to understand the connexion of things ; and he overcame these difficulties by postulating an inner substantial unity of all reality which solves the contradiction of transeunt causation. It is only at the end of his work that he throws out the suggestion that the secret of reality can be revealed only by the ethical 'ought,' and that this should form the starting-point of a metaphysical enquiry.

The terms in which the dictum is stated seem precise enough ; but they do not pretend to be exact ; and, as Lotze himself has not worked out the doctrine, it is unnecessary to lay stress on his form of statement. The view which he indicates is opposed to the prevailing opinion of philosophers, but yet it is sufficiently familiar at the present day. It is, in short, this : that ethical ideas, or, more generally, ideas about value or worth, have a certain primacy for, or at least have an important and

Lotzes Dictum legitimate bearing upon, the interpretation of reality. This is the postulate expressed in its most general terms; but, as thus expressed, it might be used, and has been used, to cover various meanings.

One possible meaning may be mentioned, in the first place, which might be accepted without entailing any modification of the traditional data or method of philosophy. The function of ethical ideas in interpreting reality may be very real and important; but it may be in place only after some general view of the nature of the world has been established. It is a consequence of theism, for instance, that the cosmic process is regarded as expressing a divine and therefore good purpose, so that, in the further interpretation of that process, ethical ideas have a legitimate and necessary function. But the function of ethical ideas is, in this case,' secondary and consequential : their place and use depend on the prior establishment of theism — to be more precise, of an ethical theism. It would be incorrect to assert that this was all that Lotze meant by his dictum, though it is a view which is definitely suggested by the line of argument in the Metaphysic. But it was not his full meaning; and, if it had been, it would not have been of great significance. It does not put ethics at the beginning of metaphysics ; it would not require to be promulgated as marking a divergence from traditional methods ; and it would ignore all the difficulties which arise in attempting to establish an ethical theism without a previous enquiry into ethical facts and principles. It is simply to distinguish it from other and more important meanings of the same general statement that this possible meaning of it has to be referred to at all.

The principle, if it is to be significant of a type of philosophy, must mean that ethical ideas are not merely of importance in philosophical construction, but that they have a place at the basis of the structure — that our metaphysics must be founded on ethics, that in our idea of the 'ought' we are to discover at least a guide to a true idea of the 'is.'

This principle has sometimes been taken as implying or justifying what may be called a subjective ground for determining the nature of objective reality. Here, accordingly, we may distinguish a second meaning which has been put upon the dictum. Ethical ideas have a direct bearing upon practice. What we say ought to be becomes for us a demand that it shall be ; it is potentially an object of desire and determines our wishes and conduct. In this way the whole inner world not of obligation only but also of desire and wish combines to make a demand upon reality ; and no view of reality is accepted as one in which the whole consciousness can find rest unless it commend itself by satisfying this practical need as well as the demands of the reason. On this ground, it is sometimes held, reality must be not merely what we find it to be, or what our reason convinces us that it is, but also what we need or wish or very earnestly desire that it shall be. " Things," says William James1, "reveal themselves soonest to those who most passionately want them." The statement is true, and he has also given the true reason for it: "for our need sharpens our wit." Things are not what they are because we want them so to be ; but they are revealed to the man who has wit to discover them, and his wit 1 A Pluralistic Universe, p. 176.

Ethical Data in Metaphysics 7 is often sharpened by his need to know. To go further than this, and to say that reality must satisfy our wants, is to assume beforehand a whole view of the world and of its adaptation to human emotion and desire. It would be to beg the questions which we are setting out to discuss, and it would be to take the less stable factors in human nature as the standard of truth.

It is therefore important to point out that the dictum that ethics lies at the basis of metaphysics may be interpreted in a third way, which avoids the apparent subjectivity which attaches to the meaning just mentioned. It may be held that our final view of reality must be based upon experience; that this experience must be taken in its whole range, and must not be arbitrarily limited to the data of perception which intelligence works up into science ; that the appreciation of moral worth, or of value generally, is as true and immediate a part of our experience as the judgments of perception ; and that it, as well as they, forms a part of the data of metaphysics. Further, it may be contended that, just as the data of sense-experience are found to manifest certain regularities from which 'laws of nature/ as they are called, may be inferred, so also in our moral experience a certain law or order can be discovered, with a claim to be regarded as objective, which may be compared with the similar claim made on behalf of natural law. If we take experience as a whole, and do not arbitrarily restrict ourselves to that portion of it with which the physical and natural sciences have to do, then our interpretation of it must have ethical data at its basis and ethical laws in its structure. It is the validity and consequences of this view that I propose to discuss.

Before entering upon this enquiry it may be well to clear the way by a short review of the types of thought to which it is opposed and from which, historically, it is a re-action. Kant's doctrine has led to a number of views which differ from one another in detail and even in fundamental points. But all of them might be described, in his phrase, as asserting and depending upon the primacy, or at least fundamental importance, of the practical reason. In this respect they may be contrasted with the prevalent or orthodox tradition of most philosophical schools. These have attributed primacy to the theoretical reason, and to the practical reason they have assigned a secondary and subsidiary place. In general, the question of the relation of the practical to the theoretical reason has not been discussed. It has been assumed, as something too obvious for defence or even for statement, that we have first to find out the true nature of things, and that the rule and end for conduct and the meaning of value will then be plain. Reason is one, and the theory of reality is expected at the same time to be, or easily to lead to, a theory of goodness. This assumption is not peculiar to one school of philosophy, but is shared by various schools, though each may have a different way of putting the matter. What is common to them all is that an enquiry, which, in data as well as method, is purely theoretical, leads — somehow or other — to ethical results. In this way the ethical principles of Rationalism, of Idealism, and of Naturalism are often arrived at.