Lessons of war as taught by the great masters and others; selected and arranged from the various operations of war

Preface

MILITARY literature embraces so extensive a range of subjects, and in many cases, is so burdened by technical and uninteresting detail, as to require even of the professional 'reader, much time, patience, and thought, ere its real gist is seen, and a proper conception of facts arrived at.

In the valuable and voluminous works of Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Napier, Hamley, Chesney, &c., and other noted military writers, the greater operations of war are illustrated and diffused ; while a knowledge of the minor operations may be also gleaned from numerous professional works. Such works, however, are in many cases unattainable, through the impracticability of having always at hand a library of reference.

It has often occurred to me, that no work exists of convenient size and condensed into reasonable limits, amply treating on the various subjects embraced by both these branches of the Art of War. To make selections from some of the most important military works, and arrange them in a lucid manner, has been the object aimed at in this publication.

iv PREFACE.

While consulting authorities and writers, I have adhered as a rule to the actual text, and have endeavoured to show briefly the leading principles, -by which the campaigns of Great Commanders have been governed. Pretending to no merits of composition or originality, I have merely attempted by the aid of such an analysis to place in an intelligible form, the materials obtained. These it is hoped may be found adapted and sufficiently comprehensive, for the general requirements of each Arm. To the general reader, seeking some knowledge of the Science and Art of War, a summary brought together within a convenient compass, may be acceptable.

Where authorities have differed, those views have been preferred, which appeared to be most in accordance with the best received ideas of the present time ; although on some important points, the separate opinions held have been given.

The indulgence of the reader is solicited to imperfections and short comings, which may be descried ; the labour of the task and the continued attention needed in its accomplishment, having been considerable. A list of the various Works and Authors consulted, is appended : should some have been at times, too deeply drawn upon, their acknowledged merits and attractions must be pleaded in extenuation.

F. J. S.

Contents

PAET I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Section I. Pab- Vaoe

WAR AND ITS PROGRESS 1_8

1. Six distinct parts of the Art of War - ... 1

Knowledge of all the parts, for a General or Staff Officer.

2. Frequent applications and an observant mind necessary - 1

3. Organizing an army, withoiit an establishment or military system - - 2

4. Wars of opinion, national and civil • -2

Their fearful nature.

In national wars, the country should be occupied.

5. Study of the Peninsula war - - - - 2 G. General principles, for conduct of armies - . 2

7. The greatest mind incapable of embracing all combinations - - 3

The greatest generals commit blunders.

Napoleon's foresight.

8. Turenne, as to the liability of generals to mistakes ... 3

9. Progress of the art of War - ... 3

Disorders amongst troops, in the 18th Century. Advancement of the art, under Frederick the Great.

10. The Prussian system copied . 4

11. Progress of tactics, in the British army .' 4

Regular system adopted throughout.

Improvements in artillery, by Sir William Cougreve.

12. Field artillery, in the time of Charles I. - - 5

13. First example of combined operations, by the Archduke Charles - - 5

14. True school of instruction for generals - - 5

15. Preparation for war - - 6

16. Changes in warfare, foreseen by Prussia - - G

17. Education of armies - 6

18. Utilising camps of instruction ... .7 yi CONTENTS.

PAR.

19. Cultivation of a military spirit in nations -

The grandeur and fall of the Roman Empire.

The wealth of the tax-gatherer and gambler, standing high in public estimation.

Section II. The Command Op Armies - 8-19

1. Marshal Saint Cyr's conversation with Napoleon - 8

Napoleon's statement, as to learning the art of war. Napoleon's first campaign, considered as his clitf d'ceuvre.

2. Turenne's opinion as to learning the art of war - - 9

Napoleon's officers, not having time to acquire the knowledge. Inspiration in war.

3. Mastering strategical combinations, and tactical handling of troops - 10

4. Dissimilarity in qualifications, as a strategist and tactician - 10

5. Experience and study of strategy - ... H

6. Formation of a great commander ...... 11

7. A campaign, the exemplification of some general theory - 1 1

Study the first condition of practical success.

8. First qualification for a general-in-chief - 12

9. The morale of war, for the general ... 13

Discipline and organization.

10. The command-in-chief, and subordinate commands - 13

11. The greatest generals, possessed the highest intellect - - 13

12. Essential qualities for a general - - - - 13

Long experience, or as an officer of the staff.

13. Character needed for a great general ..... 15

14. The aid of experience requisite for war - - - - - 15

15. Reputation of the Archduke Charles, formed by study ... 15

Study of strategy, might be confined to recent wars.

16. Knowledge of the features of the country, and of the field of operations - 15

17. Wellington's practice of daily study ..... 16

18. His steady observance of rules ...... 16

19. Napoleon's exhortation for acquiring the secret of the art of war • 16

20. A General experienced, but unversed in strategy - - - - 17

21. Undivided command of an army ...... 17

22. The command in one individual, the first security for success - - 17

23. Jomini as to prejudices respecting the principles of war - - 18

24. Sphere of strategy, will be more enlarged and bolder - - - 18

25. Responsibility of a General-in-chief, when the operations are distant - 18

26. Vital questions of war, to States - ... 19

Proper understanding between a Minister and General-in-chief.

CONTENTS. VH

Section III. Councils Of Wak- 19-22

1. Councils of war, how they terminate ... - 19

2. Opinion of Prince Eugene and Marshal Villars, as to them - - 20

Consulting generals of experience.

3. Certain arrangements depend on the general - 20

4. Councils when concurring with the Commander - - - - 20

Organizing the staff, in default of a general. Blucher aided by an efficient staff.

5. A good strategist, as chief of the staff ..... 21

6. Qualities which a general should possess - - - - 21

Council seldom summoned by Napoleon.

7. Some personal qualities of a great general ----- 21

Marlborough's secrecy. •

8. Importance of secrecy of plans ...... 22

Secrecy in Frederick's time.

Vlll

PAKT II.

STRATEGY.

CHAPTER I.

Section I. Page

*' AIM AND PRINCIPLES -

OQ

1. The art of strategy -

QO

2. Its double purpose

3. Distinction between strategy and tactics •

4. An example of the science, by Turenne •

5. What strategy teaches ...-••

6. The genius of Napoleon for strategy

7. Certain principles should govern all wars

8. Knowledge of political matters and Military Geography

9. Strategy past and present

Theatre should be limited.

10. What is requisite in the plan of a campaign

11. Strategy and tactics, when not in concord

12. Strategical points -

Section II. Base Of Operations - 26-33

1. Connection of an army with its base ------ 26

2. Base, usually for supply • ..... 26

3. Its relation to dep6ts of supplies - .... 27

4. A frontier when suitable as a base, or a line of defence ... 27

Direction of bases.

On a broad and rapid river.

An extended base.

5. Fortified points and an extended base .... 28

6. Its proportion to its distance from the objective - - 28

7. Lateral extent of base - ...... 28

Advantage of the extent of Federal base.

Maritime powers based on harbours.

Depots behind the flanks.

CONTENTS. IX

8. Advantageous direction of bases - - 29"

Influence of the configuration of the theatre of war. French armies in Westphalia, from 1757 to 1762. Napoleon on the Saale, in 1806.

Art of selecting lines of operations.

Bohemia as a base in 1813.

Perpendicular base of the Russians, in 1813.

Napoleon in 1806, with the double base of the Rhine. Change of strategic front, in default of a double base. Bases on the sea coast. .

Wellington's base at Lisbon.

Principles in establishing a base, by a continental power and by an

insular and naval power.

Russian and Turkish war of 1828 and 1829.

10. Maritime power selecting a base on a coast frontier • 33

Section III. Decisive Points - 34-36

' 1. Decisive points of the theatre of war ... 34

2. When strategical points are fortified, in preference to the capital 34

3. Accidental points of manoeuvre - - 34

Mack at Ulm in 1805, and Kray in 1800.

Operating upon an enemy's flank, to cut him off. When the enemy's forces are divided.

4. Possessing the points of junction of roads 35

5. Napoleon's movement towards the junction point of the cross-road, leading

to Brussels ........ 35

Section IV. Objective Points - 36-38

1. Aim of a strategical combination • ... 36

Selection of the objective.

2. Determination of the objective ...... 36

3. Possession of Richmond, when desired by the Federal government - 37

Objects of France, if at war with Austria or Spain.

4. First object of the British expedition to Egypt - 37

Section V. Lines Of Operations - 38-51

1. Line to be preserved - - 38

2. Directing the line of operation - . 38

Influence of a river over the direction.

x CONTENTS.

3. When the Hue of the river is short -

4. Dep6ts and magazines, for supplies

Limits of distance from base.

5. Covering depOts, by lines of operations

6. Principal and secondary depOts -

Intervening distances.

Arrangements for troops and communications.

Wellington's want of magazines, experienced after Talavcra 40

Position and security of dep6ts - 40

Strategical position of an army, undertaking the conquest of a country - 41

Direction of the lines of operation.

Post for depOts of supplies.

10. Lines of operation open to the Italian general, in 18G6 41

11. Choice of the line, the fundamental idea - 42

Direction of the manoeuvre line.

Safe line of retreat, always to be ensured.

12. Napoleon's first resolve to fall back on Smolensko from Moscow - 43

Endeavour to turn the left of the Russians.

13. Junction of two armies, with separate lines of operation - 44

14. Isolation of the two Prussian armies, in 1866 45

Aid of the field telegraph.

15. Divergent bases, when armies can combine - - 45

16. Hanover and Hesse-Cassel invaded, in 1866 - 46

Superior numbers on the decisive point.

17. Independent armies on the same frontier - 46

Single and double lines of operation.

Interior and exterior lines.

Double line when applicable.

18. Divergent and convergent operations - 47

Concentric movements.

Concentric columns marching on the Mincio and on Brussels.

19. Interior and exterior lines ..... 45

20. Armies of France and Austria, in 1800, upon interior and exterior lines - 48

21. Multiple lines - ...... 49

22. Parallel lines - ...... 49

23. Changing the line of operation ...... 49

24. Changing the line, v«hen necessary ...... 50

Proposed change of line by Napoleon, if defeated at Austerlitz.

25. When useful and salutary to change ..... 50

Soult's line on Toulouse, after quitting the Adour.

26. Direction taken by Austrians, in 1794, when retreating from Fleurus - 50

Direction taken by the Prussians, in 1815, after Ligny.

SKCTION VI.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION - . . 51_GO

1. Principles of strategy, up to 1815 .... 51

2. Lines far removed, without communication ... 52

CONTENTS. XI

PAB. PAGE

3. Lateral communications 52

Austrians at Rivoli and at Lake Garcia.

4. Security of lines of communication - 53

5. Long lines of communication - 53

6. Corps without communication - 53

7. Cause of the loss of the battle of Hohenlinden 53

8. Base of operation and line of communication in Scinde, in 1842 - 54

9. Direction for lines of communication - - 54

10. Rendering an enemy's communications insecure - 54

11. Readiness to concentrate - 54

Methods of penetrating an enemy's front, or menacing his communications.

12. Napoleon's endeavour to intercept Sir John Moore's retreat from Spain* 55

13. Napoleon's flank menaced, by his march upon Madrid - 55

14. Direction of Sir John Moore's march - 56

Reason for selecting Corunna, as the new base.

15. Prussian occupation of Saxony, to preserve communications - 56

16. Campaign in Georgia - 57

Operating without communications.

17. Design of the Campaign 57

18. Operating with superior numbers 57

Arrangements for daily supplies.

Commencement of flank operations.

19. Task for the inferior army, of the Confederates 58

Turning the Confederate positions.

20. Lessons taught by Sherman's campaign - 58

21. Course to pursue, when aiming at an adversary's rear - 58

Step to be taken, by the intercepted army.

22. Rivers and hill ranges, when parallel to an advancing army's path - 59

23. Maxims of Napoleon, as to flanks and concentrating 59

Position occupied by the French army of Portugal, in 1811. Marmont rebuked by Napoleon.

Section I. Theatre Of War - 61-64

1. Description of a theatre of war ...... gl

Theatre of operations.

Each theatre to be complete.

2. Study of the theatre of war ...... §2

3. Limits of the theatre of operations 62

4. Theatre of German war, 1866 -....- 62

5. Theatre of war, in Italy, 1866 ..... 64

The Quadrilateral.

CONTENTS.

Section II. Fab Page

' ZONE OF OPERATIONS - 64-68

1. Number of Zones, in the theatre of operations 64

Subdivisions of each zone, &c.

2. Selecting a zone - 65

Choosing an objective of operations.

3. Taking the lead in operations - 65

Ascertaining the nature of the country and enemy's movements.

4. Fitness of the theatre, for the action of each of the three arms - 66

5. Selection of the Zone of operations - - 66

Direction of movement.

Theatre between the Khine and North Sea.

Section III. Strategical Positions

1. Positions, when strategic

Communications with lines of operations.

2. Adaptability for concentrating - 69

Tactical positions to be selected.

Extent of front, in camp or quarters. • Tactical point for rallying.

3. Strategic front and front of operations 70

4. Their direction - ..... 70

Change of strategic front.

Napoleon's change against the Russians.

Pivots of operations, at Warsaw and Thorn.

Napoleon's change of strategic front, in 1806.

Moreau's change.

Double strategic front.

Section I

1. Adhering to the offensive, when once assumed 72

2. First care of the commander, upon taking the field ... 72

Determination of strategical points, lines, &c.

3. Connection between points and lines ---... 73

4. Obstacles on the frontiers of states - .... 73

CONTENTS. Xlll

5. Rivers as lines of operations • 73

Mountains as barriers.

Partisan and regular warfare combined.

6. Striking at a flank - 73

Engaging the enemy's forces separately.

7. Intercepting an enemy, when the two armies are near 74

When the movement is commenced at a distance.

8. When threatened to be surrounded ... 75

9. Distant positions occupied by the British in Afghanistan 75

10. Errors of the British general, at Caubul - ... 75

11. Acting contrary to the desire of an enemy - 75

12. Wellington's skill in divining an enemy's designs -« 75

13. Causes, which determined Napoleon to receive battle on the ground at

Austerlitz - - 76

14. Opinions in the allied armies, as to the plan to be adopted 77

15. Collecting the whole force previous to a battle - 77

Napoleon's concentration, previous to Austerlitz.

16. Not detaching, on the eve of a battle - -78

17. Dividing the forces, and operating in different directions - - 78

18. Wunnser's detached column in 1796, menaced - - 78

Alvinzi's detached body, routed.

Napoleon's army in Italy, in 1800, divided.

Attack made by the Austrians, at Marengo.

19. Wellington's detached troops on the day of Waterloo - 79

20. Assailing a weak point with superior numbers - 80

Moment for assuming the initiative.

21. General Jackson operating against divided Federal forces - - - 81

22. Austria against Prussia and Italy combined, in 1866 - - 82

Retarding the advance of one enemy, and operating against the other.

Section II

1. Movements based upon calculation - - - 82

Superior genius for offensive warfare.

2. Strategical operations, on assuming the offensive - -83

Tactical movements of the attacking party.

3. The offensive and defensive considered - - 84

4. Power of concentration rests with the assailant - ... §4

Napoleon's superiority on first crossing into Belgium. Lines leading to Richmond, open to the Federals.

5. Plan for concentration of the allied armies, previous to Waterloo - - 85

Importance of the Fleurus triangle.

6. Disposal of the Russian forces, in 1812, along the frontier - 86

7. Extracts from Notes dictated by Napoleon, in 1808, on the affairs of Spain 86

8. Combinations and dispositions of Napoleon, when invading Spain - - 89

XJV CONTENTS.

9. ' Napoleon's dispositions for further operations, after the fall of Madrid -

10. Extent of country occupied by French, in Spain - 90

Central position, held by Wellington.

11. Wellington's opinion, respecting offensive operations in France, in 1815 91

Disposition of the troops.

12. Proposed operations of the Prussian armies, when invading Austria, in 1866 93

13. Movement of Russians on Constantinople, in 1829 - 94

14. Commencement of the Russian advance - - 95

Extent of the line.

15. Political elements, in the selection of a line, for invasion - - 96

Line of the Rhine, held by Austrian armies during the French Revolution. Line taken up by the Prussian army, during the Jena Campaign. First design of the Allies, in the late war with Russia.

16. Support of strategic fronts and lines of defence - 97

Pivots of operation.

Pivots of manoeuvre.

Length of the line of defence.

17. Operations entirely defensive - 97

18. Defensive warfare, passive or active - 97

The defensive-offensive.

19. Indirect defence • 98

Enduring the first shock of the assailants.

20. Denmark, in 1804, on the defensive - 99

21. Frederick in the Seven Years' War .... 99

Wellington in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium.

22. The defensive not adopted by the Spaniards during the French invasion 99

Progress of the French onwards to Lisbon.

23. Wellington's counsel, unheeded by the Spaniards

24. Wellington's warfare in Spain, Portugal, and South of France -

25. Defensive and offensive warfare of Wellington in the Peninsula

26. Frontier of Portugal, as a line of defence - -

27. Defence of Portugal, by the lines of Torres Vedras -

28. Openness of the frontiers of Portugal, to an invading army

29. Defence of the Spanish frontier ......

Passes through the Pyrennees.

30. The Balkan range : number of passes - - - - - 103

31. Defence of the country, against an invading army - - - 103

32. Defensive operations of the Austrian army, in 1866 - - - 104

Plan of operations.

33. Business of the advanced detachments, of the defenders - - - 105

Assembly of the main body.

34. Concentration of the Austrian army - - - - - 105

Benedek's retreat to Koniggriitz.

35. Commencement of Russian defensive movements in 1812 ... 106

Retreat and subsequent concentration.

Intrenched camp near Drissa.

Movements upon Smolensko.

French progress, arrested at Mojaisk.

Junction of the corps of Bagration.

French attack upon Smolensko.

Position at Borodino, examined.

CONTENTS. XV

PAU. . PAGE

36. Retreat continued towards Moscow - - 108

Russian Council of war.

Flank position taken up by the Russians.

37. Places of refuge intermediate between the frontier and the capital - 109

38. Retreat of the Austrians on Olnriitz, after Koniggriitz 1 10

39. Movement of the Austrian army for the protection of the capital 110

Chapter IV. Section I

1. Absence of progress, in fortification - 111

2. Fortresses of the past and present - 111

3. ^ Purposes for which useful - - 111

4. Defence of frontiers - 111

5. Number and location .... Ill

6. Influence of the French and Belgian cordons in 1815- 112

7. Positions for fortresses - - 112

Unsuitability of mountains.

When placed on rivers.

8. When on mountains and rocks - - 113

9. Space between the fortress and river - 113

10. When near the flanks of operations - 113

Besieging and investing.

Opposite courses adopted by the Allies, in 1793 and in 1815.

11. Alexandria isolated by the British - - 114

12. Wellington's opinion as to the difficulty of defending the Netherlands - 115

13. The positions of the Austrians and French, in 1796, commented upon by

the Archduke Charles - - - 116

14. General Rogniat's application of more modern principles of defence - 116

15. Fortification of capitals - 116

Limit of the influence of fortresses.

16. Fortresses on a frontier with few issues - - 117

Fortifications of Paris.

Delaying the assailant, by frontier fortresses.

17. Proposal of the Archduke Charles, for the defence of the Danube valley - 118

Ulm and Ingolstadt, as strategical points.

18. Relations of fortresses to strategy - - 118

Jornini's views for locating fortified places.

19. Fortresses improperly located • 119

20. Inaccessibility of the fortresses of Konigstein - 119

21. Former opinion, as to the number of fortresses 120

Diminution in value.

Importance of holding the capital.

Austrian fortresses, in 1866, blocking the lines of railroads.

22. Protection for an open frontier - 123 xvi CONTENTS.

•> . PAGE

23. Conditions for a good system of defence

24. System of defence, for Great Britain

25. Dep6t in rear of the line of defence -

Project for fortifying London, in 1803.

26. Proposed defensive means for England - 125

SECTION II.

1. Decrease in the importance of fortresses - -126

Sieges diminished

2. Objects for undertaking a siege ------ 127

3. Consequences of Burgos not falling early - - 127

4. Causes for the third attempt to reduce Badajos - - 128

5. Objects in the siege of Sebastopol ... - 128

6. Earthworks of the defenders - - 129

7. Advantages possessed by the besieged 129

8. Obstacles against which the besiegers had to contend - 130

Reason of the siege being protracted.

9. Ensuring the success of a siege 131

Lines of contravallation and circumvallation. Position of the besieging force.

10. Position for a besieging force, inferior in numbers • 132

11. Napoleon when besieging Mantua ...... 132

12. Why Wellington did not besiege Ciudad Eodrigo, in 1811 132

13. Causes for the second siege of Badajos - - - 133

Section III. 134-143

1. Modern uses of intrenched camps - - - - - - 134

2. Their use, as shewn by Vauban - - - - - 134

3. Nature of works, requiring to be constructed .... 134

Objects for which needed.

4. Rules for the selection of ground --.-.. 134

5. Awaiting an enemy within lines - . . . - 135

6. Position for an intrenched camp ...... 135

7. Attack of intrenchments - - - --. . . 136

8. Frederick's intrenched camp at Buntzelwitz • • . . 136

The camps of Kehl and Dusseldorf.

The lines of Torres Vedras.

CONTENTS. XV11

9. Perilous position of Frederick at Buntzelwitz - - 136

10. Intrenched camps, which can be surrounded - - - - 137

Advantages of the Torres Vedras lines.

11. Dubious advantages of a system of lines - - 137

Lines of Soult, at Nivelle.

Time and labour necessary, for the works at Nivelle and Torres Vedras.

Part taken by the assailants and defenders.

12. Their distance from the base of operations - - 139

Suitability for covering places .

13. Occupation of camps by Napoleon - 139

14. Position and capabilities - - 140

Description of troops, to occupy them.

15. Heights and positions in England, suitable for field works - - 140

16. Lines at York Town - - 140

Natural and artificial defences.

The intrenchments besieged.

Their abandonment by the Confederates.

The works at Williamsburg, turned by the Federals.