The law of love and love as a law; or, Christian ethics

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Preface

In the preface to the first edition of " The Law of Love and Love as a Law," reasons were given for the publication of that work in addition to the Lectures on Moral Science." To the third edition a second preface was added, and of that the larger part is here given.

In publishing a third edition of the following work some notice of the discussions to which it has given rise seems called for. In these it has apparently been forgotten by many how entirely the work is an exposition of that cardinal precept of Christian philosophy, ' Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself.' As imperative there is in that precept Law; and the one thing required by that law is Love. This gives us ' The Law of Love,' and the law practically carried out gives us ' Love as a Law.' With this the doctrine of ends as stated in the ' Lectures on Moral Science ' is coincident, since the end of Love, so far as there is choice in it, and so morality, must be the good of the person loved.

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" But while the cardinal principle of Christian philosophy is as stated above, that of the prevalent philosophy is, ' Do right for the sake of the right.' Are these identical ? If so, those that hold to the doctrine of an ultimate right may spare their attacks, for I am substantially agreed with them. If not, it is for them to reconcile their acceptance of the precept with their acceptance of Christianity as a philosophy. What we need is a Christian philosophy. Not that philosophy is to be received on the basis of revelation. To be philosophy it must be received on the basis of reason. But if a revelation really from God teach or imply a philosophy, it must coincide with that taught by reason, and ought to be seen thus to coincide. If Christendom is ever to be a fair exponent of Christianity, its Moral Philosophy must be that of Christianity.

" We need also a philosophy in which the practical shall be drawn from the theoretical part, so that they shall not stand, as in most treatises, like the two sides of the Yosemite Valley, with a deep gulf between them. If, as Dr. Wayland says in the opening of his ' Practical Ethics,' the whole Moral Law is contained in the single word ' Love,' it would seem self-evident that the theoretical part, the philosophy, must consist of an exposition of Law and Love as they are in themselves, and as related to each other. Such an exposition Dr. Wayland did not attempt, nor can it be

PREFACE.

vii successfully attempted by any one of his school, or of the school of Right, except as it can be shown that the two precepts above given are identical.

" That those precepts can be made identical I do not believe. To me they seem to differ both in their sphere and object. The sphere of the one is choice, and its object good. To choose the good of beings capable of good, disinterestedly and as valuable in itself, is the love required. Here the sphere is choice without volition or outward action, and the obligation to choose thus is afBrmed in view of good as valuable in itself, and with no intervention of the idea of right as distinguished from that of obligation. The sphere of the other is volition and outward action, and its object is right, or the right. As commonly defined, and in its only intelligible sense, right is the quality of an action. This makes the right to be an abstraction, a mere intellection, as it is acknowledged to be, which can become a motive to action only as an element is ' surreptitiously ' borrowed from the Bensibility to combine with it and make it obligation.

" But if the two precepts can be made identical in their material, the whole form and pressure of a system of duty will be different as the one or the other shall be made prominent. The Ptolemaic and Copernican systems differ, not in material, but in what they made central ; and yet the riii

PREFACE.

transition from the one to the other was one of the great steps of progress. And so it is here. Let Love be made central, so that in testing actions men shall be compelled to inquire whether they proceed from Love, and the moral heavens would come into order as a system, and order in society would be the result. The idea of right I accept ; I believe in it as obligatory from its relation to good. As thus related, and so only, it loses that affinity for fanaticism so conspicuous in its history, and which has made religious wars and persecutions more virulent and cruel than any others. The persecuting Sauls and assassinating Balthazars of all ages have ' verily thought that they ought to do ' what they have done, and the step now needed is to preclude, as far as possible, such mistakes by making good and Love central, and the ' Law of Love ' the test of right.

" We also need, in practical morals, to see the guidance which Love may find from the distinction between the susceptibilities and the powers ; and from the whole constitution of nature and of man through the unifying relation of conditioning and conditioned forces and faculties, and the Law of Limitation based on that. Whoever will be at the pains to trace this out will, I hope, find a system consistent with itself and in harmony with nature on the one hand, and with the Scriptures on the other.

" For the readier apprehension of the system,

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ix which involves the step above mentioned, I ask attention to the following propositions which contain its principal points : —

(1.) Moral philosophy regards man only as choosing and acting from choice.

(2.) " Moral action is rational, as distinguished from instinctive action.

(3.) " Rational action implies a recognized end.

(4.) " There can be no conception of an end as a ground of rational action except through a sensibility.

(5.) The end which man ought to choose is indicated by his moral nature, which affirms obligation to choose it ; but it is in his power to reject it.

(6.) " This end is the good of all beings capable of good, his own included.

(7.) " This good has value in itself, absolute value, which makes it an object of rational choice for its own sake.

(8.) " The choice of this good as the supremo end is.thej^ve required by the Law ; and hence, a in Love, known as Law, wisdom and virtue are identified. As obedience to moral law, it is virtue ; as the choice of good, it is wisdom.

(9.) " When an act of choice alone is required without volition or the use of means, as in Love or good-willing, obligation is affirmed at once without the intervention of the idea of right, and

PREFACE.

with no place for it unless it be regarded as syn« onomous with obligation.

(10.) " The choice of good being thus virtue, action from this choice is virtuous action. The good tree makes the fruit good.

(11.) " Action that would naturally tend to promote this good is right action, and is obligatory from that tendency.

(12.) " The rejection of the end, indicated by the moral nature, and any form of choice incompatible with that end, is lawlessness and wickedness.

"Identifying as above, wisdom and virtue in Love known as Law, we find a ground of harmony between teleological and intuitive systems. It has not been sufficiently observed, that the moral imperative, in which I believe fully, the affirmation of obligation to love, can be' legitimately given forth only in the apprehension of that very good, which wisdom would choose for its own sake. This imperative is not the product of will. It is not, therefore, as the advocates of the theory of right persistently assert, a part of virtue. It is no more a part of virtue than it is of vice, since there could be neither without it. It is the voice of our moral nature made possible and rational by the rational apprehension of good, and can become Law only as that good is the good of all beings capable of good, or at least is compatible with that. In this view of it, that ' Good

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xi

Dess of will,' of wMcli Kant speaks as ' the one absolute good,' is not a good at all. It is goodness — goodness because it is tlie choice of good, and without the idea of that, the very idea of goodness had not been possible.

" It is to be added that if the good be disinterestedly chosen, the fact that it is a good can never make the system utilitarian. That the system is one of Love, the very Love commanded and made Law by God, would, it might have been supposed, be a bar to the charge of utilitarianism. Love cannot be utilitarian."

The above is thus far retained, partly to show that in rewriting, as I have now done, the theoretical part of the work, the system is not changed. My objects in rewriting were two. Of these, one was to bring the present work into closer relation to the " Outline Study of Man." It is really a continuation of that from the point where upbuilding was completed, and would naturally follow that in a course of study ; but as this was written before that, the points of connection were less numerous and less obvious than I could wish. I wished also to carry over into moral science the method of teaching by diagrams. For this there is less scope here than in mental science, but it is hoped that what has been done may not be without benefit.

Another object I had in view was, by giving the system more unity, to state it so that it might

PREFACE, be more readily apprehended. In attempting this, I have started from a new definition, have carried the subject of the science back from conduct, where it is placed by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, to man himself as choosing and acting from choice, and have sought to keep closely to an exposition of the definition. It should be said, howevei\ that a subject so complex as this, and involving so much of mental science, cannot be understood without careful study.

The system advocated in the following work differs radically from that commonly received. Some of the differences have been already mentioned, but as the interest of truth requires that they should be clearly seen, the following propositions are stated. In common with most other systems, it makes choice the moral act. It then differs from them —

(1.) In making the ultimate object of choice always a good as furnished by the sensibility, and not right, or the right as furnished by the moral nature.

(2.) In making the sensibility a condition for moral ideas, while it holds to their origin as necessary, and from the moral reason. That they are conditioned on a sensibility no more affects their character as rational, than the fact that the ideas of personal identity and resemblance are conditioned on the idea of being affects their character as rational.

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xiii

(3.) In making the idea of rights and of obligation, as belonging to the person, the primary product of the moral reason, instead of the idea of right as the quality of an action, or of the right as an abstraction.

(4.) In making the idea of obligation in view of a higher good to be chosen, independent of that of right.

(5.) In the place and office now necessarily given to the conscience as behind the will, and as privy councilor in guiding its choices.

(6.) In the identity of choice, and also of vrisdom and virtue, with Love.

(7.) In the ability we thus gain to reconcile, as in no other way, teleological and intuitive, scriptural and rational systems.

(8.) In bringing into moral science the law of the conditioning and the conditioned, and the law of limitation based upon that.

Other points might be mentioned, and are, in the preface to the first edition, but these are sufficient.

Among the above I ask special. attention to the second, in which the relation of a good in the sensibility to moral ideas is affirmed. I hold to obligation as strongly as any one. I hold to a moral nature, through which rights and obligation are immediately and necessarily affirmed ; but I hold that obligation is obligation to choose, and because I hold further, that it is obligation to choose a xiv

PREFACE.

good rather than the quality of an action, or an abstract quality, I am regarded by some as a utilitarian. Utility is a good thing in its place, but that place is not at the basis of a moral system. I would choose a good, not for its utility, for it has none. It is the only thing I know of that neither has, nor can have, utility. I would choose*) it for its own sake, and also as under obligation to\ choose it, and that behest of moral law would, or< should, lead me to adhere to the choice of tJiei' good, and of the good of others, which is love,^. under every extremity. A system which thus recognizes a moral nature, and the sacredness of obligation, is not what I understand a system of utility or of expediency to be. Nor is it a blending of any two systems, but a statement of the relation of the sensibility and the moral nature to the will, of virtue to a good, and thus the solution, or at least an attempted solution, of the most difficult problem in theoretical morals.

In the rewriting, I have given more prominence than heretofore to Rights, making the idea of them, in its necessary connection with that of obligation, the primary moral idea, and also making them, in connection with the desires, active principles. I have also placed the moral affections among the active principles. «

As the doctrines of the work have not been changed, the correspondence with Dr. McCosli is retained, tliouf^li witli some want, not important, of accuracy in the references.^ * See Appendix.

CHAPTER I. The Moral Nature 73 CHAPTER II

Moral Law 79

DIVISION V.

The Person 85

DIVISION VI.

Eight and Wrong • • 87

DIVISION VII.

MAN CHOOSING.

CHAPTER I.

Alternatives and Law 95

CHAPTER n.

Wickedness • • • « 108

DIVISION vin.

Conscience Ill

Part II. Practical

LOVE AS A LAW.

MAN ACTING FEOM CHOICE UNDER MORAL LAW.

CHAPTER 1.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

Love as a Law distinguished from the Law of Love . . . 119

CONTENTS. XVii CHAPTER n.

Classification of Duties. •••••••• 123

CLASS L

DUTIES TO OURSELVES.

Classification • • • • 127

DIVISION L

The Securing of our Rights • . 127

DIVISION n.

The Supply of our Wants 129

DIVISION III.

THE PERFECTING OF OUR POWERS.

CHAPTER I.

Perfection as related to Direct Action for others: of the Body of the Mind 130

Chapter II

Perfection as related to Unconscious Influence • • • • 143 CHAPTER IH.

Perfection as related to Complacency 145 CHAPTER IV.

Perfection as related to the glory of God • • * • • 147 CHAPTER V.

Perfection as related to Self-love . •«•••• 148 CHAPTER VI.

Habits 149

b xviii

CONTENTS.

CLASS n.

DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW-MEN.

PRELIMINARY.

PAQ]

Self-love and the Love of others . . . • • • .155 FIRST GREAT DIVISION.

DUTIES TO MEN AS MEN.

DIVISION I.

DUTIES REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS.

CHAPTER I.

Of Rights 157

CHAPTER II.

Personal Rights : Life and Liberty 166

CHAPTER in.

Right to Property 169

CHAPTER V. Eight to Truth 186

DIVISION II.

DUTIES REGARDING THE WANTS OP OTHERS. CHAPTER I.

Justice and Benevolence . . . . • . . . . 189 CHAPTER II.

Supply of the Wants of others 194

CONTENTS,

DIVISION in.

PBBFECTING AND DIRECTING THE POWERS OF OTHERS. CHAPTER I.

PAGB

Duty of Influence from the Relation of Character to "Well-being. — Obstacles to Change of Intellectual State and of Charac* ter 198

CHAPTER II.

Spheres of Effort: Who may labor in them 208

SECOND GREAT DIVISION.

DUTIES FROM SPECIAL RELATIONS.

Introduction

DIFFERENT THEORIES.

Morality regards man as active. Hence moral science must imply a systematic knowledge of those powers in man which tend to, or regulate action, as those powers are related to each other, and to the objects that excite their action. These powers are related to each other as a system capable of harmonious action, and of securing through such action the highest good of the individual and of the whole.

Into the conception of a system of active powers the idea of order, subordination, and of a supreme controlling powder must enter ; and that action of such a system which would secure the highest good of the individual and of the whole is right action Such action must be rational. It presupposes an end good in itself, and known to be good ; but it tan be moral only as we have a moral nature affirming obligation to such action.

Of the nature and foundation of moral obligation which I suppose to be thus affirmed, different i

INTRODUCTION, accounts have been given. This has arisen in part from the ambiguity of language, but more from a partial apprehension and wrong adjustment of the facts and principles of our complex nature. A striking fact, as of association, or a powerful principle, as of self-love or sympathy, is seized upon and made to account for everything. It becomes the centre of a system having in it, perhaps, much tha is plausible, and much truth in its details, but as a system wholly false. Such systems are not useless. They insure a careftil examination of the facts made central ; the incidental truth involved, as in the treatise of Adam Smith, is often of much value ; and something is done in limiting and exhausting the possibilities of error.

And not only are different systems produced from Different abovc causcs, but the moral problem

the^t^oraf ^^^^^^ differently stated. By some it is problem. made an inquiry concerning the moral nature ; by some, concerning the nature of virtue ; by some, concerning the source and nature of right ; by some, after an ultimate rule ; and by some, afler the nature and foundation, or ground, of obligation. This last I think preferable. In the fact of obligation all are agreed. All are agreed that all mankind are under obligation to do some acts and to abstain from others. Without obligation there *,an be no morality and no law, and a statement of the ground and conditions and limitations of obligation, would be a statement of the theory of morals

INTRODUCTION.

As I propose to use the term, a ground of obligation for us must presuppose a moral nature in as ; and the question what that nature is, is entirely different from any that may respect the ultimate ground or reason for its activity. The nature and constitution of the eye are one thing, the nature and constitution of light, without which the function of the eye could not be performed are another. The eye and light are related to each other, and each is so indispensable to vision that either might be said to be at its andation. But the questions in optics respecting the eye, and those respecting light, are entirely distinct ; and if the powers of the eye were regarded by one man as the foundation of the faculty of sight, and if the properties of hght were so regarded by another, and if, because they were using the same word, they were to go on under the delusion that they were treating of the same thing, it is easy to see the confusion that must ensue. In the same way the intellect, with its capacities and laws, is one thing, and truth, the object of the intellect, is another. These so imply each other that without truth the intellect could not act, and either might be said to be the foundation of mental activity. Here, also, there would be the same confusion if men were to mistake one for the other, or, without being aware of the transition, were to apply the same terms to both.

But this is precisely what has happened in specu lations on morals. Men have sometimes spoken of mT^ODUCTION.

the various faculties and powers mvolved in the moral nature, such as conscience and free will, as lying at the foundation of obligation; sometimes they have spoken of that ultimate ground or reason in view of which alone the moral nature can legitimately act, and sometimes they have included both. The fact of this confusion is said hy Sir James Mcintosh to have been a great, and indeed the main reason of the confusion there has been in the perplexed speculation'^' on the subject of morals. Speaking of the difference c^^tween the *' Theory of Moral Sentiment," and the " Criterion of Morality," he says : " The discrimination has seldom been made by moral philosophers ; the difference between the two problems has never been uniformly observed by any of them ; and it will appear in the sequel, that they have been not rarely altogether confounded by very eminent men, to the destruction of all just conception and of all correct reasoning in this most important, and perhaps most difficult, of sciences."

But this confusion will not surprise us if we observe how the speculations on these different subjects imply and almost necessarily run into each other. If we would understand optics, we must understand both the eye and light, and that not merely as they are in themselves, but as they are related to each other. If we would understand moral science, we must understand both the faculties which 8ct and thai in view of which they act

INTRODUCTION.

but we must be careful to keep our speculations on the one subject distinct from those on the other.

If I say that self-interest is the ground of obh'gation I mean that it is that in view of which obligation is affirmed by a moral agent fully constituted. If, on the other hand, I say that free will is the ground of obligation, I do not mean that it is that in view of which obligation is affirmed, but that it is a power essential to a moral agent, a necessary condition of the affirmation of obhgation by such an agent.

If, again, it be said that self-interest is the ground of obhgation, and we would controvert that, we need to know what other possible grounds there may be ; if there may be what are called a prion grounds we must know that, and be able to state them, and this will involve the question of a 'priori knowledge and principles of action, and a decision of some of the highest and most disputed problems ")f mental science.

Shall we then regard as the foundation of obligation those faculties which are necessary The ground to constitute us moral beings ; or that in ?Lun^vilw view of which, we being thus constituted, obSat^nis obligation is affirmed ? With given faculties I see a crow flying over my head. In view of that fact I feel no obligation. With the same faculties I see a man in danger of drowning. In "^iew of that fact I do feel under obligation to aid aim if I can. Here is a ground of difference, and

INTRODUCTION.

of obligation. What is that ground ? Is there any ground common to all cases? Without questioning what others have done, and simply desiring distinctness, I prefer to call that the ground of obligation in ^dew of which obligation is afBrmed. In seeking for this, however, we shall necessarily be drawn into an examination of those faculties and mental products on which moral agency is conditioned, for it must be remembered that that in view of which obligation is affirmed may itself, like the idea of right, be the product of mental agency.

Moral philosophers have indeed been divided in- Dependence classcs, as they have belonged to

on mental othcr of the two great schools

science. ^£ mcutal scicuce that have divided thinkers from the time of Plato and Aristotle — in reality, as they have settled in one way or another the great problem of the origin of knowledge. A sensationalist, believing that all our knowledge is from experience, that there are no necessary principles, or forms of knowledge given by the mind itself, can believe in no a priori principles of morality, and will, almost of course, adopt a low, fluctuating, and selfish system of morals. But one who finds in the mind itself as well as in the senses a source of primitive knowledge, given indeed, not without the senses, but on the occasion of them, oiay consistently, and will naturally, look ^to the same source for the principles, or elements, or prim- \tive facts, or ultimate ideas, or ground, or founda-

INTRODUCTION.

cion, or whatever he may please to call it, of morals. Hence, the great battle of scientific morality is to be foup-ht on the field of mental science.

On this field some, as those who so make the mind the product of organization as to bring it under the laws of matter and of necessity, and all, indeed, who deny the fact of liberty, so decide mental problems as to make morality impossible. Others necessitate a basis of self-interest, or of mere sentiment, while others still so solve these problems as to admit, in some form, of what may be called a rational system.

Nor, I may remark in passing, need it discourage those who have not studied mental science formally, that moral problems strike their roots so deeply into that, for on this class of subjects sound judgment is native to the common mind. It is even true that wjiere accurate statement is most difficult, intuition is most certain, and when such statements are maoc they commend themselves with great readiness to the common consciousness.

With this view of the ground of obligation and of the connection of mental with moral yarious science, we pass to consider some of the ^y^*^^™^- bystems respecting obligation and its ground which have been adopted by different philosophers.

Of these the first commonly mentioned, as it wag the first in point of time among modern First theory systems, is that of Hpbbes. By him the tjround of obligation was found in the authority of

INTRODUCTION.

the Civil Law. According to Hobbes, a regard to personal advantage is the only possible motive to human action. " Acknowledgment of power is called honor." Pity is the imagination of future calamity to ourselves." " Laughter is occasioned by sudden glory in our eminence, or in comparison with the infirmity of others." " Love is a concep* tion of his need of the one person desired." " Repentance is regret at having missed the way." There are no social affections, no sense of duty, no moral sentiments. As a desire for his own pleasure is supreme in every man, it will follow that the state of society is naturally one of war. But as nothing can so interfere with this supreme desire or end of man as war, it becomes obligatory on men to combine, by an expression of their common will in the form of law, for the preservation of peace : and as there is no other possible standard, it follows that men must be bound by the behests of law, whatever they may be,

A system resting on a view of our nature so low and partial, and thus favorable to arbitrary power, was not fitted for permanence among a free people, and had nearly passed from remembrance, except .n the schools, when an attempt was made to revive it in connection with the enforcement of the fugitive slave law. This attempt gave rise to the expression 10 prevalent for a time, of " the higher law ; " and it really seemed at one time that we had a party among us who denied the existence of any sucb law.

INTRODUCTION.

S

Of this system it has been well said, that it must either be right to obey the law and wrong to disobey it, or indifferent whether we obey it or not. [f it be morally indifferent whether we obey it or not, the law which may or may not be obeyed with equal virtue cannot be a source of virtue ; and if it be right to obey it, the very supposition that it is right implies a notion of right and wrong that is antecedent to the law, and gives it its moral efficacy.

A second theory of obligation is that it is based

on self-interest. Second the-

ory ; self*

Much might be said to show that this interest, was the system of Paley, whose work was formerly taught almost universally, both in England and in this country. Many things in his book are consistent with this theory only, while others would seem to imply that of general utility. Probably he did aot discriminate sharply between them.