Italy and the Jugoslavs

Front matter

BY EDWARD JAMES WOODHOUSE

oj the Department of History and Government in Smith College; sometime of the Department of History in Yale College

AND CHASE GOING WOODHOUSE

Preface

The Adriatic problem is to-day the most dangerous part of the Balkan situation and one of the two or three greatest dangers to the peace of Europe and hence to the peace of the whole world. It involves not merely the economic and political freedom of Jugoslavia but also the economic and political stability of Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and South Germany. All of these countries must seek avenues of trade with the outside world through the Adriatic ports and they are vitally concerned in the question as to whether one power is to have exclusive control of the whole Adriatic and to levy toll on all commerce through its ports or whether those ports are to be under different national controls and in fair competition for the trade of Central Europe. Shut in upon themselves and strangled by an Adriatic tariff wall, the Central Europeans would find it impossible to reorganize and stabilize their governments and would fall easy prey to Bolshevism and other forms of social unrest.

Other disputes, such as the boundaries between Rumania and Jugoslavia, between Bulgaria, Greece and Jugoslavia and between Bulgaria and Rumania, are in process of settlement, and with seemingly good prospects. But the Italian and the Jugoslav claims are so fundamentally inconsistent, and the two nations seem so determined upon them that there is no possibility of satisfying fully the demands of either nation and slight probability of arriving at a compromise that will not strengthen and keep alive for many years the present antagonism between them. Ever since the armistice there has been the possibility that some clash or other incident, unimportant in itself, might plunge Italy vi Preface

and Jugoslavia into war, drain still further the resources of these two nations, already distressed by the burdens of the World War, and, at the expense of the masses, give further advantage to the imperialist and militarist elements in both.

The Adriatic question was among the most difficult problems before the Peace Conference, especially difficult because it involved the secret Pact of London. President Wilson and the American delegation stood alone against Italy's demands for what she had been promised by the Treaty, but the British and ultimately the French refused to give Fiume in addition to the promised territory. The course of the negotiations in the Peace Conference and afterwards in the Supreme Council, up to the Italian parliamentary election of November, 1919, has been followed in the chapters of this book. The election showed little but the indifference of the middle classes, the activity of the Roman Catholics and of the Socialists and the almost total lack of political consciousness of the Italian peasants. The Official or antiwar Socialists have 156 members of the 508 already elected and can reasonably expect more from Trieste when the elections are held in the redeemed districts. The Catholics have 101 and will doubtless gain a few more from the Trentino. The acknowledged followers of Giolitti were defeated almost to a man, but "the Boss" himself was elected. Over 300 new men have seats in the Chamber and among these are some workingmen who bring first-hand knowledge of working class conditions in place of the made-in-Germany socialistic theories previously expounded in the Italian Parliament. The Socialists received their increase of votes largely not from adherents to socialistic tenets but from people who are discontented with present conditions and weary of war and intrigue. Nitti, who retains the Premiership, counts upon 259 Constitutional Deputies representing moderate tendencies and upon the Catholics, two of whom are members of his Cabinet. He has continued and strength-

Preface vii

ened the alliance with the Catholics and the Vatican begun by Giolitti in the election of 1904.

The Nitti Ministry inherited many difficulties from the Orlando-Sonnino Ministry. There is no doubt that the latter Ministry had encouraged the demand for Fiume in order to divert the attention of the people from the pressing domestic problems — the old, old political game of trying to make the people forget their sufferings at home by pointing to national glories won or to be won abroad. The Orlando-Sonnino Ministry did not at any time bring before the Italian people the bearing upon Italy's claims of President Wilson's repudiation of all secret treaties. Long before the Peace Conference met at Paris it was known that Wilson did not support the Italian position in its entirety. Tittoni has said quite frankly in the Italian Chamber of Deputies that Europe was dependent upon America and that Wilson was the Arbiter almost as soon as the United States had entered the War and still more certainly at Paris. He has blamed Orlando for not making this fact clear to the Italians.

Tittoni has represented a party of compromise on the Adriatic question. A proposition drawn by him was presented in Washington last October. It suggested the creation of a buffer state consisting of Fiume and the surrounding territory and connected with the Trieste district by Italian possession of Eastern Istria. President Wilson found himself unable to accept this proposition and made a counter proposal. This was announced by Scialoia, who had become Foreign Minister upon the resignation of Tittoni shortly after the election, to be unacceptable to the Italians because it would not fully neutralize Dalmatia and would leave Sebenico and Cattaro to Jugoslavia without sufficient guarantee for the safety of the Italian coast.

Nitti has constantly professed his willingness and eagerness to arrive at a settlement of the Adriatic question but has just as constantly refused to concede any substantial viii Preface

change beyond the Tittoni proposals. He and Scialoia have led their countrymen to hope that the British and the French would secure from the Americans concessions for Italy though Scialoia admitted in December that sentiment in England and in France was against serious concessions to Italy in the Adriatic without the consent of the United States. This news gave new life to the cry "Italy stands alone," which had been raised when Orlando withdrew from the Conference. This feeling has done much toward uniting Italy in support of Nitti but it has also had the effect of strengthening the influences working for the revival of Italo- German relations.

Italy has accepted a settlement of the Adriatic question as drawn up by Lloyd George and Clemenceau making Fiume an autonomous city under the League. The Italians insisted upon having incorporated in the plan the granting to Italy of territorial connection with the city. Nitti announced this as Italy's last effort at compromise and the only alternative to demanding the enforcement of the Treaty of London, which would give the whole of Dalmatia to Italy. This proposal as amended and accepted by Italy was forwarded to Belgrade. The Jugoslavs have refused to accept it. They object to Italy's having territorial connection with Fiume, and especially by possession of Eastern Istria or Volosca with its almost purely Slavic population. They state that they are willing to accept the proposals of President Wilson but that officially they know nothing of the Treaty of London, mentioned by Italy as the only alternative to the proposal. The question now rests with the French and the British as to whether the Treaty of London shall be carried out immediately or whether eff'orts at compromise shall be renewed.

Nitti has been playing for time, hoping that meanwhile Italy would become tired of D'Annunzio's play in Fiume and would become more amenable to cooler leadership. In spite of the predictions that his ministry would last but

Preface ix

a short time he has steadily grown stronger with the Italians. His efforts have been directed toward the improvement of internal conditions, the rebuilding of the devastated provinces, the decreasing of unemployment, the handling of strikes and other measures of reconstruction.

The United States had, before its entry into the war, a very grave responsibility in this and in other European questions involving the peace of Europe and of the world. That responsibility for guarding and for advancing the international ideals of justice has grown with the growth of the part taken by our nation in the war. The responsibility of this world leadership has been scarcely recognized by the American people and since the armistice we have been drifting back into the old time spirit of isolation and remoteness. The promised land of world leadership in idealism, in the protection of small nations, in the education and advancement of backward peoples and in the great general task of sustaining the burdens of the world, that promised land pointed out by the President and by his words and deeds preempted for the United States, has failed to wean the American people from the hope of enjoying the old traditional isolation and selfish commercialism.

This book has been written with the hope of helping in some small degree to improve the quality of American thinking on international questions and especially on the Adriatic problem. It is intended to present as much as possible of the material available in this country on the historical background of this problem and on its development during and since the war. The American position on the question has been too much treated as if it were the personal position of Mr. Wilson. The problem is still unsolved and it needs the careful thought of Americans. The lack of understanding and of definite opinion in this country has hindered, to our shame, the settlement of this and other international difficulties.

Even in arranging and presenting in a way as impartial

X Preface

as has been herein attempted the positions and arguments of the two nations most concerned, the writers have been unable to avoid expressing some preference of their own. It is hoped and believed that such inclination or decision is not partisan but the natural and inevitable result of investigation. The making of this study has strengthened the conviction in the minds of the writers that most peoples are poorly served, badly misled, and sadly misrepresented by their governments. Mr. Seton-Watson voiced this feeling when he said recently, "Serbia owes the recovery of her independence and the achievement of Jugoslav unity — next to the Grand Alliance — to the moral endurance of the nation in arms and to the sterling qualities of the Serbian peasant, not to the politicians to whose exploitation he has too long submitted." Italy likewise, through the moral strength and sterling worth of her peasants and workmen, has survived many mistakes and misdeeds at the hands of her politicians. She is still paying for those mistakes and misdeeds and must continue to pay for many a year as the cost is great. But she is now entering upon better days.

In preparing these pages The New Europe has been invaluable. It has added to the debt owed by the writers and by other students of Balkan affairs to Mr. Seton- Watson. The New York Times, the New York Times Current History and the Christian Science Monitor have supplied much valuable material.

Mr. Henry Rood, Director of the Italian Bureau of Public Information in New York, very courteously placed the resources of his office at the disposal of the writers and supplied the Italian Memorandum to the Peace Conference and other material. Mr. V. R. Savic has supplied material which has been of great assistance. It is a pleasure to thank these gentlemen for their courtesy. Our thanks are also due to Miss Laura Ley of Smith College for her generous help in the preparation of the manuscript.

Contents

CHAPTKB PAOB

I Italy and the Thiple Alliance 16

II Italy's Entrance into the War 28

Appendix

I The Pact of London 817

II The Russian Secret Documents 323

III The Italian Claims on the Alps and in the Adriatic . . . 331

rV Memorandum on the Dalmatian Question 367

V Memorandum Regarding the City of Rijeka (Fiume) . . . 867

Bibliography 377

Index 881

Chapter I Italy And The Triple Alliance

ONE of the greatest proofs of the democratization of the war aims of the Allies is to be found in the attitude with which many people are regarding the controversy between the government of Italy and the people whose national aspirations lead them to claim the eastern coast of the Adriatic. The policies of President Wilson, of the British Labour party and of the early Russian Revolution are transforming the foreign policies of Europe, that is, the Europe of the Allies, and we may hope that the influence will later be felt by the Central Powers.

Italy has had a hard task in this war and perhaps we have not always appreciated her difficulties and given her due credit for what she has accomplished and suffered. In 1914 when the war broke out, her army was in a state of disorganization and public funds were far from plentiful. Foreign policy is, as a rule, a matter of business and not of sentiment. We must remember that Italian unity is a comparatively recent achievement and not firmly cemented. The population is poor and has a larger percentage of illiterates than any other country of Western Europe. The Italian peasants are hard working and frugal but too poor and too conservative to apply scientific methods to farming. Many agricultural cooperative societies established by the Socialists and by the Catholics have endeavoured to remedy conditions by establishing rural banks and by introducing

16 "•'••:.; /•/ '^tid^.iind the Jugoslavs be.(^r:^i6ttiio<fs'<>f"liteft^*and marketing. The North is

more industrialized than the South but its prosperity, as we

now know, was based largely on German banks and German

business, controlled and directed by German managers even

though there was relatively little German capital invested

in Italy.

The lack of coal and iron hampers the industrial life of Italy, though the lack of coal is being made good by the use of the many streams to generate electric power. The taxes are heavy and the brunt is borne by the poorer classes, as taxes are laid upon necessities such as bread and sugar and salt. Until the reforms in the finances of 1905-06 were made by Luigi Luzzatti, the national treasury showed a yearly deficit. Of course, Italy has had her share of increasing prosperity in the last few years and there are evidences of prosperity in her growing merchant marine. In Tunis, in Egypt, and in Asia Minor there are flourishing Italian colonies and the Italians have established very considerable trading interests in the Egyptian hinterland, and in Abyssinia, in Somaliland and in Tripoli. But the pressure of population is still felt. There has arisen the curious phenomenon of seasonal emigration to South America and practically one-seventh of the Italian people are living under foreign flags. In 1914, Italy had not recovered from the strain of the Turkish war. Lombardy and Romagna were experiencing economic difficulties; industrial unrest was showing itself in revolutionary outbreaks and strikes, and, as we shall see, many felt that peace was the thing that was most needed.

When war broke out in August, 1914, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance. How did it happen that she was in this position.? From 1848 until 1870, Italy was engaged in the task of achieving national unity. On the whole, she was left to accomplish this through her own eff'orts. England, it is true, lent spasmodic patronage but gave no material aid. Austria was actively opposed to

Italy and the Triple Alliance Vt

the movement. Louis Napoleon helped Italy to get Lombardy in 1859 but either discouraged or positively vetoed the acquisition of Venetia, Central Italy and Rome, and gained Savoy for himself. Through aiding Prussia in the war of 1866, Italy gained Venetia but the Trentino and Istria were left within the Austrian Empire. The Franco- Prussian war changed conditions in France, stopped her interfering in favor of the Vatican, and enabled Italy to make Rome her capital. After 1871, France gave her chief attention to internal affairs. Her foreign policy was extremely cautious. It was no secret that, in Austria, in Germany, and also in France, many advocated restoration of the temporal power of the Pope and were willing to use force to gain their end. Italy constantly feared the advent to power of the Clerical party in Paris and was also suspicious of the Mediterranean ambitions of France. In 1872, an alliance was formed between Germany, Austria and Russia. It had no firm basis for it was against the interests of Russia to allow France to be crushed; and, between Austria and Russia, there was always the question of the Near East. Since the loss of Venetia, Austria had become more interested in the Balkans. The military authorities constantly advised the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An uprising in these two provinces in 1875 against the Turkish administration was the immediate cause of general Balkan disturbances which culminated in war between Russia and Turkey and led to the Congress of Berlin. Austria obtained from the Congress the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina and also to occupy the district of Novibazar. Russia obtained some few concessions but left the Congress enraged at her treatment. The alliance could not last. Neither Russia nor Germany was ready to grant the other a perfectly free hand against France and Austria respectively. Bismarck knew that Russia would never support him against France, and, in spite of the preference of the old Emperor WiUiam for

Russia, the Austro-German Alliance was signed October 7, 1879. It was purely defensive in character but was really a dam against Pan-Slavism and had the effect of isolating France.

Italy also had left the Congress disappointed. She had not dared to oppose the gains of Austria nor to ask any compensation for herself, though she was anxious to secure Tunis. But France also desired Tunis. When her representative, Waddington, on learning of the Cyprus Convention, threatened to leave the Congress, Lord Salisbury told him that England would have no objection to a French occupation of Tunis and Bismarck conveyed the same impression in regard to the attitude of Germany. In 1881, taking advantage of the violation of Algerian territory by an unruly Tunisian tribe, France dispatched a punitive force into Tunis and, on May 12, of that year, the Bey was forced to sign a treaty which made Tunis a French protectorate. Naturally, this did not improve the feeling of Italy towards France, but Italy was not strong enough to protest.

Crispi had toured the European capitals in 1877 and had returned feeling that Bismarck was the only friend upon whom Italy could rely. The English policy was against contracting continental obligations. Austria was an old enemy. There was only Germany as a possible ally. The growing feeling that the Irredenta must be regained was heightened by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But this feeling was rather a literary than a political one. Crispi was eager to see Italy a world power and he had a boundless admiration for Bismarck. In the Chamber he denounced the irredentist agitation as detrimental to the best interests of Italy. When Germany was approached on the subject of an alliance, it was suggested that the way to Berlin lay through Vienna. King Humbert visited Vienna in October, 1881. Negotiations moved slowly. Italy asked for two things, first, a guarantee of the

Italy and the Triple AlUa/nce 19

integrity of her territory which should put an end to all dangers of foreign intervention in behalf of the Papacy, and second, support for her ambitions in the Mediterranean. The latter was refused by both Vienna and Berlin. Austria was hostile to an increase of Italian influence in the Adriatic. All Italy could get was a vague promise that the Allies would support each other within the limits of their own interests and that the status quo would be maintained in the Balkans. The treaty was operative only when one ally was attacked by two foreign powers. It was to run for five years and was to be secret. This was agreed between Austria and Italy. An identical treaty, minus the Balkan clause, was signed between Germany and Italy. Both were signed May 22, 1882, in Vienna.

The treaty was not supported unanimously in Italy when the fact of its existence was disclosed in 1883. For Austria, it meant that the Italian army would be on the French frontier in case of war, and, for Italy, it meant at least benevolent neutrality in her colonial enterprises. The French occupation of Tunis was not the sole determining cause of the entry of Italy into the Alliance. The Roman question also caused Italy the greatest anxiety and made her feel the imperative need for allies.

When the treaty was renewed in 1887, equilibrium in the Mediterranean was guaranteed by an arrangement with Germany as to the status quo in Tripoli and a special convention with Austria guaranteed equilibrium in the Adriatic and in the Balkans. The Alliance was renewed in 1891 for at least six years and, if not renounced by one of the allies, for six more years, and renewed in 1902 and in 1912. Until 1912, there were three separate agreements but, in that year, a single treaty was signed, December 8, by the three allies.

Italy's open acknowledgment of her partnership in the Triple Alliance was one of the chief factors which brought about the formation of the Triple Entente. However,

Italy's relations with the countries of the Triple Entente have been of increasing cordiality. There has been practically no clash of interests between Italy and England in the Mediterranean. Great Britian invited Italy to join her in the occupation of Egypt in 1882 and encouraged Italy to establish a trading post on the Red Sea in 1885. In 1887 the two countries entered into an agreement to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans, and, if the latter were impossible, to obtain autonomy for the Balkan peoples. In the early part of 1914, there was some irritation in Italy when Sir Edward Grey endeavoured to induce Italy to evacuate the Dodecanese Islands, but, on the whole, relations between Italy and Great Britain have been friendly.

As has been said above, the attitude of the French Clerical party and the occupation of Tunis had engendered some ill-will between France and Italy. Then there was a commercial dispute which caused considerable economic loss to Italy, but this was closed by the commercial treaty of 1898. In 1896, the two countries came to an agreement in regard to Tunis, and, in 1900, the Italian interests in Tripoli and the French in Morocco were mutually recognized. There is some evidence that a secret convention was concluded in 1904 on the basis of Fez for Tripoli, one clause of which promised France that, in the event of her being attacked by Germany, Italy would not mobilize on the Alpine frontier and would remove her fleet from the western Mediterranean.^ At the Algeciras Conference, Italy was on the side of France, and it then became plain that Italy would pursue the policy which her best interests should dictate, regardless of the Triple Alliance. However, the relations between France and Italy were disturbed during the Tripoli expedition by regrettable incidents, which helped to arouse public opinion in Italy in favor of a renewal of the Triple Alliance.

*BainviIle, Jacques, "Italy and the War," pp. 164-165.

Italy and the Triple Alliance 21

As for Russia, the crisis of 1908 had detached her definitely from the Central Empires, and she had a common aim with Italy in keeping Austria from growing more powerful in the Balkans and especially from establishing herself more securely on the Adriatic.

Italy, in entering the Triple Alliance, had sacrificed her interests in the Adriatic in order to safeguard what she believed to be a more vital interest in the Mediterranean. On the Adriatic, the Italian coast is a slow-sloping, sandy beach with few harbors, and none of strategic value, while the opposite coast has many good harbors of great strategic value. The Congress of Berlin entrusted Austria with police duties in Montenegrin waters, and this gave the Austrian commercial fleet a great impetus. It was not to the interest of Italy to allow Austria to get control of the whole Eastern coast. In 1897, there was a verbal agreement between the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Goluchowski, and the Italian Minister, Visconti Venosta, as to Albanian aff'airs and, from that date, Adriatic aff^airs have acquired a separate individuality. Both parties agreed to refrain from acquiring any portion of Albania and agreed to favour the establishment of an autonomous Albania in case Turkey should disappear from the Balkans. This agreement was confirmed in 1899 and again in 1905. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, of course, a blow to Italy's plans. There was a great popular outburst, but Italy was in no position to fight, and, after prolonged negotiations, was able to obtain only the abolition of the privileges previously granted to Austria of policing Montenegrin waters and the promise of the establishment of an Italian University at Vienna. Italy later acted with Austria to compel the withdrawal of Greece from southern Albania and to compel Montenegro to evacuate Scutari. During the Turkish war, Austria used the Treaty of Alliance to hamper Italy. The appearance of part of the Italian fleet on the Albanian coast provoked a warm protest from Austria. Any action against the coast gg Italy and the Jugoslavs

of Turkey in Europe was declared to be a breach of the treaty. When an Italian squadron was bombarded by forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles and repHed, Count Berchtold announced that the treaty had been violated and stated that, if the Italian government desired its freedom of action, the Austrian government also would resume its freedom of action. Austria had the support of Germany. Salandra, speaking in the Italian Chamber June 3, 1915, said that it would be impossible to estimate how many Italian soldiers were wasted and how much treasure was expended because it was impossible for Italy to take direct action against Turkey and because, further, that country knew it was being protected by Italy's allies.

After the Turko-Italian war, Italy renewed the Alliance because she saw that the whole Albanian coast would soon pass from Turkish rule and she feared it would all fall into Austrian hands. At the Conference of London, Italy obtained the support of her Allies, not only on the question of Epirus, but also on the Dodecanese. At Kiel, in 1913, King Victor and the German Emperor came to an agreement relative to concessions in Adalia which were to open the door for Italian penetration into Asia Minor. But relations with Austria were never really cordial. In 1913 Austria informed the Italian foreign office that she proposed to go to war with Serbia in order to defend herself and would expect the military support of her ally. The Marquis di San Giuliano refused such support. After the failure of this scheme, General Konrad von Hoetzendorf , with the aid of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, tried to persuade the Emperor to sanction a "preventive war" against Italy. But neither the Emperor nor Count Aehrenthal liked the scheme and it fell through. 2

* Dillon, "From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance," pp. 33-50.

CHAPTER II Italy's entrance into the wae

IN 1914, Signer Giolitti was the leader of the majority in Parliament as he had been since 1903. He was really the "boss" of Italy. He first entered Parliament in 1882 and Crispi brought him into the Cabinet as Finance Minister in 1889. The court clique helped make him Premier in 1892, but in 1893, on account of the Banca Romana scandal, his unpopularity was so great that he was obliged to retire. He was impeached for abuse of power but the supreme court declared the courts without power over ministerial acts. In 1900, he became Minister of the Interior in the Zanardelli cabinet. During the few years previous, the government had been persecuting the Socialists, the Republicans, and the Radicals and had taken active measures to put down the strikes which had been disturbing the country. Giolitti had been developing a personal policy of encouraging the Socialists and, when he came into power, changed the policy of the government accordingly. He allowed the first strikes which occurred after he took office to run their natural course, and, in certain cases, he even ordered the authorities to assume a benevolent attitude toward the strikers. His influence increased steadily. In 1903, when Zanardelli resigned on the plea of old age and ill health, Giolitti was intrusted with the formation of the new cabinet. In a large number of the electoral districts in Italy, party organization has been so weak that the candidates are chosen and supported by rival cliques quite unable to carry off victory without government support.

It is, therefore, possible for the Prime Minister in power at the time of a general election, especially if he be also the Minister of the Interior, to create a personal party which will return deputies whose only political program is to support him. The three general elections which have taken place during the reign of Victor Emmanuel III have been in Giolitti's terms of office as Premier and Minister of the Interior. His custom has been to resign a few months after a general election, as in the Spring of 1905, at the close of 1909, and in the Spring of 1914. The interim government was invariably weak and fell into general disfavour within a year or so, and then Giolitti's friends would bring about its fall, and he would be recalled, to form a new Cabinet. Two of the five years of the legal life of the Chamber having passed, Giolitti could threaten a general election and, with this weapon, was able to keep the Chamber tractable and to remain in power until after the next general election.^ There were five prominent parties in the Chamber, the Clerical, the Sonnino group, which may be called Conservative, the Republican, the Radical, and the Socialist. Each was too small to act alone and coalition has proved difficult. Giolitti did his utmost to conciliate everyone. He gave the Socialists the opportunity to turn the railroads into state concerns and to carry out other parts of their program, while at the same time granting the great industries all the privileges and protection they demanded, and guaranteeing the landed proprietors the duty on cereals. The salaries of the clergy were increased and clerical influence was favored in the schools though a Free Mason was chosen as Minister of Public Instruction. The term of military service was reduced to two years ; higher taxes were not imposed ; and the schemes for colonial expansion were given up to please the masses. To please the upper classes, the army and the navy were increased in size. Giolitti yielded always to public opinion and withdrew the concession the minute public attention was fixed elsewhere.^ It was in this way that he was