Italy in North Africa : an account of the Tripoli enterprise

Preface

This book is an attempt to give a reasonably full and fair account of the Tripoli enterprise.

I have thought it unnecessary to burden the narrative of events with the details of my own experiences : the public must be weary of the stressed personal note. It seems enough to say that I arrived in Tripoli on November 19, 1911, and left on April 1, 1912 ; that during the nineteen weeks of my stay I was given all possible liberty of movement and investigation within the area occupied by the Italians, and that I availed myself fully of the freedom permitted. In describing those operations which took place outside the radius and period of my own experience I have relied, in the first place, upon the private official reports of the Italian military authorities, and, in the second place, upon the accounts of numerous eyewitnesses and participants, given to me in writing or in conversation. That all errors in detail have been avoided is unlikely ; but I believe that in every case the general picture is substantially correct.

The three large maps are reproduced from maps compiled by the military authorities in Tripolitania during the war, and my thanks are due to General Spingardi, the Italian Minister of War, and to General Caneva, late Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Tripolitania, for their kindness in supplying me with copies of these maps and allowing me to make use of them. The maps are sketch maps, and only approximately accurate : a new series, a2 vi ITALY IN NORTH AFRICA

recently compiled, corrects a number of minor errors. These errors, however, are not so important as to detract from the illustrative value of the maps. For the sketch maps of Benghazi and Derna, which face pp. 56 and 204 respectively, I am indebted to the courtesy of Signor Antonio Albertini, of the Corriere delta Sera.

I am indebted also to the Marquis Imperiali, Italian Ambassador in London, and to Colonel Ugo Bagnani, Military Attache, for permission to make use of the official reports supplied to the Embassy.

I have to thank the Editor of The Times for permission to republish matter contributed to The Times during the war.

To my friends, Captain Armando Mola, of the Italian General Staff, Count Giuseppe Delia Gherardesca, Count Aldobrandino Malvezzi dei Medici, and Mr. W. F. Riley, I am much indebted for the photographs with which I have been able to supplement those taken by myself ; and my acknowledgments are due to the firm of Comerio, Milan, for permission to publish photographs taken by them. I am specially indebted to Mr. Riley and Mr. G. Brown for the unique photograph which represents the first shell of the bombardment striking the Spanish Fort, and to Captain Scelsi, of the Italian Airship Battalion, for the photographs taken from airships.

In conclusion, I would express my thanks to those officers of the Italian Army, of all ranks, far too numerous to mention by name, of whose unfailing kindness and hospitality I have the warmest°memory.

Contents

PREFACE

I. A RETROSPECT

II. THE DECLARATION OF WAR

Chapter I

It was scarcely to be expected that the sudden accomplishment of Italy's long-threatened descent upon Tripolitania should meet with a warm welcome from the public opinion of Europe. To Italy, as far as can be ascertained, the moment of her action seemed specially opportune ; and in a sense it was so. For, if she had not seized the chance that seemed to present itself, there is more than a probability that it would never have recurred. On the other hand, the declaration of war came at a time when the nerves of Europe were still stretched and quivering with the tension of a crisis barely overpast ; and this fact rendered all but impossible a judicial estimate of the Italian move. A press and a public which for weeks had been rendered uneasy by the menace of a disastrous war were not likely to look with patience or coolness upon any breach of the world's peace, however justified. And the Tripoli enterprise threatened (as always when Turkey is concerned) to open up further complications, and to disturb the hardly preserved adjustment of various delicate questions.

In the circumstances, it is not a matter for surprise that the action of Italy was regarded with alarm, and criticised with obvious irritation by many of the organs which form, or at least guide, the public opinion of Europe. The

A accusation of ' brigandage/ so widely levelled against Italy, is the patent offspring of ill-temper and anxiety. For it is not seriously to be supposed that the greater portion of the European Press was actually so ignorant of the Italo-Turkish situation as its accents would lead us to infer. The presumption is legitimate that the factors of the Tripolitan problem had passed temporarily out of mind under the stress of other and more clamorous interests. Otherwise it would be difficult to account satisfactorily for the lack of fairness displayed in the general tone of comment upon Italian action. The true explanation may be found in the fact that the public memory is short — and convenient. When Italy stretched out her hand to pluck an over ripe fruit, interest and circumstance urged Europe to an attitude at once forgetful and hypocritical.

Though hypocrisy and forgetfulness form a poor foundation for an impartial verdict upon any event, there are natural and compelling reasons why this basis of opinion was inevitable. To do more than indicate these reasons lies outside the scope of this chapter, or of this book ; but a rough indication seems essential to its purpose. One reason has already been outlined : the tense condition of European nerves, due to the long weeks of the Morocco crisis, was the first effective cause of European ill-humour. A second has been hinted at — the natural fear of Balkan complications ; and a third, not less powerful than the two first, reveals itself in the financial interests involved. The situation recalls a once famous sentence in the Report of the War Stores Commission. Behind the strutting, gesticulating stage-figures who mouthed reproaches and ranted accusations, there looms the gigantic shadow of the international financier, struck to the heart that he wears in his pocket by the dangers which threatened to weaken Turkey. Attacking Turkey, Italy laid a desecrating hand upon the most sacred treasure-house of international finance. The nicely balanced complex of financial interests may remain stable under the threat, or even the shock, of a struggle between two great Powers. But Turkey has been the Ark of the Covenant, that might not be touched.

Perhaps Italy scarcely realised the magnitude of the interests she was assailing, or failed at least to understand that in face of these interests an ordinary, reasonable case could hardly expect to win general acceptance. It must be admitted that her case was further prejudiced, partly by unavoidable circumstance, partly by her own action. The Italian Government was at pains to justify the declaration of war by the publication of a brief which did not, and could not, set forth its whole case. It was rewarded by the assumption, on the part of a large section of public opinion, that no further justification was possible ; and, granting the assumption, there is excuse for an unsympathetic and critical attitude. While the list of grievances published in October 1911 was sufficient indication of an intolerable position, that list, taken by itself, scarcely answered the suggestion that the difficulties between Italy and Turkey might reasonably have been adjusted otherwise than by the occupation of Tripolitania. We have to look farther than to the bare enunciation of the incidents which constituted the casus belli — farther back and farther forward.

A remarkable feature of much foreign comment upon the situation is to be found in the suggestion that the Tripoli enterprise is the result of a sudden, unreasoning landhunger — a greed for ' colonies ' and ' empire ' — which has recently beset the Italian nation. Nothing could be wider of the mark, and it is difficult to understand, or to regard with patience, the assumption that the question of Italy's demands in regard to Tripoli is a new question, suddenly sprung upon a startled and unsuspecting Europe. Such a contention rests upon a complete disregard of recent history. Nor is ' recent ' a wholly suitable adjective, for Italian aspirations in North Africa date back three-quarters of a century.

It was in 1838 that Mazzini claimed North Africa for Italy — for the Italy that was not yet in being ; and ever since the idea has lain at the back of every Italian statesman's mind. At first it was no more than an idea, a mighty dream of empire that looked forward to a day when the re-born Italy should resume the African provinces of Rome. Yet even in the early years Italian statesmen did not lack outside encouragement for their scarcely formulated aspirations. In 1866, when the dream had been already curtailed by the French occupation of Algeria, Bismarck wrote to Mazzini : ' The empire of the Mediterranean must be the constant thought of Italy, the objective of her ministers, the fundamental thought of the Cabinet at Florence.5 While Bismarck's own objective, less obvious at the time, is clear as daylight now, with other examples to illuminate the truth, the correspondence shows at least, and the fact is important, that close upon fifty years ago Mazzini' s early dream had crystallised into a definite, discussed, political aim. The aim persisted, though no Italian statesman was found able or willing to translate it into action, till the French descent upon Tunis, and the British occupation of Egypt, awoke Italy to the fact that the North African littoral was falling into readier hands. Egypt had scarcely formed the object of a practical ambition, though it had been embraced in the earlier dream, but Tunis had been for years the definite centre of Italian hopes. The informed opinion of Italy, if not the Italian Government, had come to regard Tunis as a legitimate sphere of influence, and the lesson of French action in 1881 has never been forgotten. The dream was shattered, and the sentiment which had gone to its making concentrated slowly into a determination that the last remnant of Roman Africa open to Italian ambition (Morocco lay outside the radius of Italian aim) should be assured to Italy.

The strength of Italy's feeling in regard to the Mediterranean, and, specifically, in regard to the North African littoral, is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the French seizure of Tunis, and the prospect of further French activity, were the determining factors in the formation of the Triple Alliance. It has been argued often, and it is argued still, that the alliance of Italy with the Germanic Powers is altogether unnatural. But Italy saw clearly that the French occupation of Tunis, in her despite, arose directly from her weakness and isolation ; and she believed that if the interests which she considered vital were to receive consideration in the future, she was bound to assure herself of definite support from other Powers. Yet in all probability her ambitions in regard to Tripoli might have been realised more than thirty years ago, if at that time her attention had not been specially fixed upon Tunis. The publication of Crispi's Memoirs throws a clear light upon various points which have been the subject of debate, and though the pertinent passages have already been widely quoted, they cannot well be omitted in a review of the Tripoli question.

In the first place, it seems to be established beyond any doubt that Tripoli entered into the discussions which took place during the Congress of Berlin. An account of these discussions was published in the Standard in May 1881, after the occupation of Tunis, but in an erroneous form, which drew a denial from Count Corti, the senior Italian representative at the Congress. Questions followed in Parliament, and Sir Charles Dilke, then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, responded in the official manner which may sometimes be held to warrant an inference : —

' All the information which Her Majesty's Government is in a position to furnish is contained in the documents which have been placed on the table of the House, and I am unwilling to allow myself to be drawn into a discussion of this matter by answering my hon. friend's question.' 1

On the previous day Sir Charles Dilke had informed General Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador, that i he was greatly surprised by Count Corti's denial, as proofs or documents of some kind really did exist at the Foreign Office in which the conversation in question was referred to.' 2

General Menabrea relates that he l waited upon Lord Granville, with a request for a clear statement of the case in order that all doubt might be removed concerning a fact which had been publicly denied.' Lord Granville was non-committal, and while he stated that ' there had been no correspondence between the two Governments in regard to Tripoli, and that no official documents existed dealing with this subject,' he would answer no further questions and give no further information.3 The deduction was obvious, and General Menabrea reported to his Government that ' these events have left me with the impression that at the Foreign Office they believe the question of the

1 Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, vol. ii. p. 116.

2 Id. ibid. 3 Id. ibid.

cession of Tripoli to Italy as a compensation was ventilated in the course of conversation at the Berlin Congress.' 1

A further quotation from Crispi's Memoirs gives the exact truth of the matter : —

' General Menabrea's impression was correct. The question of the cession of Tripoli was indeed ventilated at Berlin in the course of conversation which took place between Lord Salisbury and the second delegate to the Congress, Count de Launay, who had reported on this subject on August 11, 1878. Were they not in the habit of reading official communications at the Consulta ?

' De Launay had written : —

' " . . . I have recently had a conference with my English colleague on this subject. I mentioned to him the conversations I had had with Lord Salisbury during the last days of the Congress, and said that I had expressed my regret to him that the English Government should not, at least, have spared us the surprise of learning through the newspapers of the convention regarding the Island of Cyprus. The head of the Foreign Office did his best to explain the circumstance, and allowed me to infer from his veiled utterances, that Italy might dream of expansion in the direction of Tripoli or Tunis, I was not authorised to enter upon a discussion on this point."

1 It is, therefore, an indisputable fact that Lord Salisbury felt that compensation was due to Italy, and if his opinion was expressed in such a manner as partially to hide his meaning from De Launay — naturally the English Minister could not reveal the understanding

1 Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, vol. ii. p. 117.

S ITALY IN NORTH AFRICA

with France * — it should have become clear enough in 1881, when France had occupied Tunis.' 2

In point of fact, not only were Italian aspirations in regard to Tripoli acquiesced in by the other European Powers ; Italy's attention was deliberately guided in that direction. Though the distrust of France which followed upon the occupation of Tunis drove Italy into Germany's arms, there is good reason to doubt whether her fears of further French expansion were justified in fact ; if, at that time, she had been willing to undertake the responsibility of accepting the ' compensation ' offered. It had been indicated by England that the acquisition of Tripoli would be favourably regarded, and it was obviously to France's interest that the friction inevitably consequent upon her actions in Tunis should be minimised by the offer of a quid pro quo. The suggestion made by Freycinet to the Italian Ambassador, in July 1880, must have been perfectly sincere.

6 Why will you persist in thinking of Tunis, where your rivalry may one day cause a breach in our friendly relations ? Why not turn your attention to Tripoli, where you would have neither ourselves nor any one else to contend with ? ' 3

The Ambassador's comment is interesting : ' These words reminded me of a similar phrase which had once escaped the Due Decazes, and the conviction was forced upon me that there really exists a permanent and traditional plan concerning the Mediterranean coast of Africa, a plan which all parties not only respect but do their best to safeguard and develop.' 4

1 The understanding arrived at in Berlin, which assured British consent to the occupation of Tunis.

2 Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, vol. ii. pp. 117, 118.

Nor did Freycinet rest content with merely throwing out the suggestion. During this same interview he indicated with sufficient clearness that the French occupation of Tunis was a mere matter of time, and offered to support Italy in her natural desire for compensation.

1 The future is in God's hands, and it is not impossible that one day, without doubt, still far off, France might be led, by the force of circumstances, to occupy and annex Tunis. ... I can assure you that France has no intention whatsoever of occupying Tunis, but, as the future is in God's hands, and as it might possibly happen, sooner or later, that circumstances should force France into so doing, I wish to take this opportunity of assuring you that, in this event, Italy would be informed as long beforehand as possible, and would receive our most cordial support in obtaining adequate and worthy compensation in the basin of the Mediterranean, in order that equilibrium of power be maintained between us' 1

Here was a fair warning and a fair offer. Neither the one nor the other was adequately regarded by those who held the reins of power in Italy. They preferred to accept the letter of French assurances rather than the obvious hint underlying them and the evident trend of events. And, when the consummation they feared had actually come to pass, instead of accepting the proffered compensation, they turned too late to the alliance that might perhaps have preserved the status quo in Tunis. The lines of thought followed by the Cairoli Ministry and its two successors are difficult of comprehension, but two facts seem to reveal themselves : while Cairoli trusted France too much, Mancini trusted her too little.

The reaction was natural, but as a result Italy neglected

1 Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, vol. ii. p. 108.

two opportunities of strengthening her position in the Mediterranean : first, when she refused to avail herself of the compensation suggested by both France and England ; second, when she declined to co-operate with England in Egypt. The refusal to proceed to the acquisition of Tripoli was no doubt due, in part, to the inertia of the Cabinet, and to a reluctance to engage in commitments for which the country might not be ready, but another operative cause would seem to have lain in a deep distrust of France, in the feeling that as French declarations in regard to Tunis had proved worthless, so, too, French promises of support in Tripoli might be equally unworthy of credence. Perhaps the position was never stated so crudely ; in any event, the net result of French action in the Regency was that Italy felt herself impelled to consolidate her general position by the alliance with Germany and Austria. Other considerations were made subservient to the necessity of safeguarding herself against any further evidences of French hostility, and the practical certainty that France would have welcomed an Italian occupation of Tripoli was disregarded or disbelieved.

Little more than a year after the Treaty of Bardo the same distrust of France prevented Mancini from accepting England's invitation to joint action in Egypt. Lord Cromer sums up the situation as follows : —

' In view of the restless ambition displayed at times by the Italian Government, and their desire, which has frequently been manifested, to extend their influence in the Mediterranean, the refusal of Italy to co-operate with the British Government in Egypt appears at first sight strange. It is not probable that M. Mancini, who was then in power, could have attached much importance to Turkish promises, or that he could have believed to any great extent in the efficacy of Turkish assistance. The real reasons for Italian inaction must be sought elsewhere than in a desire to spare the susceptibilities of the Porte.1 Something may, without doubt, be attributed to a reluctance on the part of Italy to separate herself from the European concert. Something was also due to the fact that, from a naval and military point of view, the Italian Government was not ready to take prompt action. But the main reason was to be sought in the mistrust of France, which then existed in Italy, and in fear of ultimate collision with the French, which engendered a reluctance to co-operate with them ' 2

One glance at a map of the Mediterranean makes it evident why no Power looked with favour upon Italian aspirations in Tunis ; why France felt it imperative to forestall Italian action, and why England lent support to a French occupation. The possession of Tunis and Sicily by the same Power would have severed too abruptly and completely the eastern and western halves of the Mediterranean. A further look at the map shows as clearly why Italy could not resign herself to the possibility of Tripoli passing into other hands, more especially after the loss of Tunis. The occupation of Tripoli by another European Power would have hemmed her in fatally. The fact was well understood by France and England, and the inherent right of Italy to the reversion of Tripoli has long been recognised by both Powers.

1 Italy's declared reason for declining to co-operate was the tardy and insincere acquiescence of the Porte in the European demand for Turkish intervention in Egypt.

2 Modem Egypt, vol. i. pp. 308-309.

From 1882 onwards the eventual occupation of Tripolitania by Italy was, practically speaking, an axiom of Mediterranean politics, and only the resolve of the leading men in Italy to devote the energies and resources of their country to internal development put off till yesterday an event which had been foreseen and reckoned with for more than a generation. Even before the events in Tunis and Egypt which narrowed the scope of Italian ambition, there had been a section of opinion which centred upon Tripolitania the hope of territorial acquisition which was stirring in Italy. The widely quoted letter of Rohlfs, the famous explorer, which was published in the journal L'Esploratore at the beginning of 1880, had a profound effect upon the comparatively few men who had begun to translate vague dreams into definite aims. Writing of his explorations in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Rohlfs says : —

' These results have a special importance for Italy, since I am persuaded that in the course of a few years Tripolitania will be " once more " Italian. The expression " once more " I consider to be perfectly accurate, since the present-day sons of the Apennine peninsula must be considered the successors of the Romans and of the Italic race.

* Northward of Tokra begins a landscape so green that it might be in Italy ; it is a territory which Italy must reconquer. It is incomprehensible to me that Italy has not set more value upon her rights over Tripoli. Later, I shall take it upon myself to prove that he who possesses that country will be the master of the Sudan. For me, the possession of Tunis has not a tenth part the value of Tripoli.'

The judgment of Rohlfs must always have been open to question, and it is clearly inapplicable to the altered circumstances of to-day. But its publication in UEsploratore, the journal of the Milanese Societa d'Esplorazione Commerciale, is a matter of historical interest. This Milanese Society made the first organised attempt to secure and collate reliable information regarding Tripolitania, and in 1881 two expeditions were sent to Cyrenaica, to explore and report. Interesting commercial reports were furnished by Signor Camperio, the leader of the main expedition, and Signor Pietro Mamoli, who devoted himself specially to agricultural possibilities. An extract from one of Mamoli's reports published in L'Esploratore (1883, No. iv.) may be taken as exemplifying the trend of Italian opinion : —

' Our departure for Cyrenaica, which drew the nation's attention to that country, created desires and strong aspirations ; every one understood that in a future not distant that piece of coast would be our safety-valve.

1 To put it shortly, everybody knows that, especially in Italy, the national aspirations mark out a way or constitute a law for the Government ; and the Government, however embarrassed by the requirements of diplomacy, cannot cease to fix its eye upon that idea which, like a shining star, moves always before it.

' When I left Italy it was still disputable whether or no it was opportune for us to adopt the so-called " Colonial policy."

' To-day, now that all the northern coast of Africa, with the exception of Tripolitania, has fallen into the hands of European Powers, justly or otherwise, can the matter be any longer in dispute ? '

The question of the occupation of Tripoli was fully ventilated in the Italian press during the next few years, and in Tripolitania itself the arrival of an Italian expedition was expected. But no action was taken, and the colonial party, not yet strong or influential, reproached the Government bitterly for its neglect. Brunialti, one of their spokesmen, writes with the utmost plainness :

' But the Italian Government let slip all opportunities, even those which seemed expressly designed to afford us a footing in the country.

' The possession of Tripoli, especially after the French occupation of Tunis, is not a question of greed for us, or of conquest in the true sense ; it is the means of providing for our safety and defence.

' In conclusion, we have never had the wit to acquire a dominating influence in Tripolitania ; we refused the offer of it when acceptance involved no danger ; we declined to take it when we had the strongest pretexts for doing so ; and we returned to Berlin in 1884-85, as we went in 1878, with clean hands.' x

The danger of being forestalled is accentuated, and a grave warning is addressed to those in power :

' Who will be responsible to the nation and to history for the dilemma in which Italy will find herself then, placed between an infinite risk and an infinite humiliation ? ' 2

Distrust of France continued, and almost unbroken friction, while it was gradually borne in upon Italy that the Triple Alliance did not afford sufficient guarantee for her position in the Mediterranean. Though Austria had declared herself ready to accept any arrangement that would ' advance the interests of Italy in regard to the Tunisian Question, and further the possible acquisition of Tripoli ' ; though Germany had seemed inevitably bound to support her ally against further French pretensions ; the position of Italy in the alliance was wholly unsatis-

1 Ultalia e la Questione Coloniale, A. Brunialti, Deputato al Parlamento, Published in 1885. 2 Id. ibid.

factory. While she had undertaken certain obligations, the object for which she had deliberately turned her back upon France was not yet assured to her. In Crispi's words, she ' still stood alone in the defence of her own interests.'

The natural result (a result, moreover, encouraged by Bismarck) was the attempt to establish an understanding with England, a comparatively simple matter in view of the traditional sympathy between the two countries, and the community of their interests in the Mediterranean. From 1887 onwards the British and Italian Governments acted in perfect accord over Mediterranean questions, until in 1902 the positions were still more clearly defined by the formal agreement which recognised the Tripolitan provinces as an Italian sphere of influence. Twelve years previously, in 1890, the rumour that France's grip upon Tunis was to be still further tightened by the conversion of the Protectorate into a complete sovereignty, caused an exchange of views between Crispi and Lord Salisbury. Crispi's claim to Tripoli was recognised fully by Lord Salisbury, who committed himself to the uncompromising opinion that ' on the day when the status quo in the Mediterranean shall suffer any alteration whatsoever, Italy's occupation of Tripoli will become an absolute necessity.' x On the other hand, he advised Italy to wait. He pointed out that ' an attack on Tripoli by Italy would be the signal for the dismemberment of Turkey, a fate to which she will indeed be forced to submit in the end, but for which neither the Great Powers nor public opinion in England is at present prepared.' 2

The recognition that the Germanic powers could not, or would not, give material support to their ally in Mediterranean questions, gave a new direction to Italian foreign

1 Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, vol. ii. p. 451. 2 Id., p. 452.

policy. A cordial understanding existed with England, but it began to be realised that for this understanding to bear the desired fruit, an understanding with France was also necessary. While England could give a general support to Italian aims, the many points at which French and English interests touched made the determined hostility of France and Italy a handicap to the Anglo-Italian accord. In 1900 Visconti Venosta succeeded in establishing a detente with France, and two years later Prinetti negotiated the agreement which gave Italy a free hand in Tripolitania in return for a recognition of French predominance in Morocco. Shortly afterwards the understanding with England was cemented by an agreement which formally recognised Italy's lien upon Tripolitania. Upon this recognition by the two chief Mediterranean powers, an expedition to Tripoli was actually planned, but a strong difference of opinion in the Italian Cabinet put a stop to preparations which had already made some progress.