Operations of the german engineers and technical troops during the franco-german war of 1870-71

Front matter

OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN |

ENGINEERS AND TECHNICAL ~~ TROOPS DURING THE FRANCO-

GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71 |

Contents

Position at Féves, Semécourt, Maizitres, and Amelange.

Description of the Ground.

Occupation.

Introduction

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND ‘TECHNICAL TROOPS.’

THE Prussian Corps of Engineers in July 1870 consisted altogether of about 440 officers, some of whom were appointed to the Staff, Fortifications, Military Schools, etc., and some to service with the Pioneer battalions. Ona general average each officer got a change of employment every three or four years.

The existing 12 Pioneer battalions were so organized, that each battalion in time of peace consisted of four companies, viz. :— 1 Pontoon-company, 2 Sapper-companies, and 1 Miner-company, in which the technical instruction was carried on with a view to their special duties, and accordingly the 1st company was principally exercised in forming military bridges, while the other three companies were especially instructed in siege-works, so that only a short time could be devoted to the general duties of Pioneers and Miners.

Besides these 12 Pioneer battalions a cadre was maintained on the peace establishment for the Torpedo detachment.

On the order to mobilize, the officers of the Engineer corps, as well as the Landwehr Pioneer officers, were distributed among

@ There is no equivalent in the English service for “chnische Truppen. These troops are trained in technical Engineer duties, although incorporated with the battalions of the Guards, Line, and Landwehr. —( 7ranslator’s Note.) A the different armies and bodies of troops, and those detachments of technical troops, which are given more in detail in the Appendix, were mobilized.

The Pioneer battalion of the Guards furnished 3 Field companies, besides the Reserve company, and together with No. 4 Pioneer battalion made up the 12 Telegraph divisions.

Each line battalion furnished 1 reserve company as well as 3 Field Pioneer and 3 Garrison Pioneer companies.

The ratio of the different sections in the service companies was arranged by the interchange of the men, so that in the Pontoon

company there were 8 corporal’s sections (Korporal-schaften) of

Pontoneers, 3 of Sappers and 1 of Miners; in the Sapper companies, 10 sections of Sappers, 1 of Pontoneers, and 1 of Miners. The garrison Pioneer companies were, as far as practicable, to be made up according to their special duties: thus the 1st (Pontoon) company was to have an establishment of 100 Pontoneers, 75 Sappers, and 25 Miners; the 2d (Sappers) company to have 175 Sappers and 25 Miners; finally, the 3d (Miners) company was to have 200 Miners. However, many changes had to be made.

The cadres of the garrison companies were principally supplied from No. 4 (Miners) company, which was broken up by the mobilization. The greater part of the men belonged to the Landwehr. The total establishment, exclusive of reserves, was as follows :-—

36 Field Pioneer companies.

33 Garrison Pioneer companies. 7 Field-Telegraph detachments. 5 Etappen Field-Telegraph detachments. 5 Railway Field-Telegraph detachments. 1 Torpedo detachment. 1 Balloon detachment. 1 Field Photographic detachment.

General total, 89 companies and detachments, with 12 Pontoon columns. 12 Light field bridge-trains (Birago’s materials). 12 Entrenching-tool trains.

Simultaneously with the mobilization, orders were issued for the immediate arming of the following coast fortresses :-— Stralsund, Swinemunde, Memel, Dantzig (including Neufuhr-

Introduction. 3 wasser and Weichselmunde), Pillau, the works at Riigen, Friedrichsort, Sonderburg, Diippel, the fortresses on the Elbe and mouth of. the Weser, Wilhelmshaven.

The following inland fortresses were armed :—

Magdeburg, Minden, Wesel, Cologne, Coblentz, Mayence, Saarlouis, and Rastadt (conjointly with Baden). Preparations were also made for the eventual arming of the Silesian fortresses of Glatz and Neisse, but this was never fully completed.

As a great part of the officers doing duty on the fortifications had to be ordered off to the different staffs and newly formed bodies of troops, there remained behind in the fortresses only a small number of officers, who however zealously devoted themselves to duties which in a successful war could bring but small reward, but which would have been of the utmost importance had the tide of success swept in the other direction.

The Bavarian Engineer Corps.—The organization of the technical troops was so far different from the Prussian system, that the field Pioneers were, even in time of peace, completely separated from the garrison Pioneers.

The field Engineer regiment consisted, in peace-time, of 6 companies, whose education in field duties was throughout uniform. In time of mobilization it was composed (not counting 2 reserve companies) of 2 field Engineer divisions of 3 companies, of whom the two first were intended chiefly for the Pioneer service, and the third for the Pontoon service. The Pontoon companies had, however, a considerable deficiency in men, so that, as a rule, they had to apply for the assistance of the other companies in the construction of large bridges. :

Moreover, the field Engineer regiment furnished 2 field Telegraph detachments and 1 Etappen Telegraph detachment, as well as a railway company.

The four garrison Engineer companies, which were distributed among the different fortresses in peace-time, were, at the beginning or during the course of the campaign, formed into 1 Etappen Engineer company, 1 independent garrison Engineer company, and 1 garrison Engineer division of 2 companies. Accordingly, exclusive of reserved troops, the total number mobilized were 14 companies and sections, with.6 sets of bridge equipment, 7 Pioneer and 3 Sapper and Miner equipments. .

The distribution of the officers and detachments can be seen in the Appendix, and it only remains here to note that the Infantry Pioneers belonging to each Infantry regiment of a division might have been formed into companies, and could then, if required, have been employed on large technical works under the Engineer officers attached to the division.

All the Bavarian fortresses were armed at the beginning of the mobilization, viz., Ingoldstadt, Germersheim, Landau, and Ulm (the latter with aid of Wiirtemberg).

The Kingdom of Saxony possessed in peace-time 1 Pioneer battalion, which, in all important respects, was organized on the Prussian system, and which, at the mobilization, supplied 1 Reserve and 3 Field companies.

The Kingdom of Wiirtemberg furnished for the campaign, on mobilization, 2 field Pioneer companies, 1 garrison Engineer company, 1 field Telegraph detachment, and 1 Bridge-train (Birago’s pattern).

The Grand Duchy of Baden (on the Prussian model),’furnished 4 Pontoon column (Kolonne), 1 Field Pioneer company, 1 garrison Pioneer company, 1 Light Field Bridge-train, and 1 Entrenching-tool column. .

The Grand Duchy of Hesse furnished 1 Pioneer company, with Light Field Bridge-train.

There were thus, exclusive of reserves—

88 Field and Garrison Pioneer companies. 16 Telegraph detachments. 6 Railway detachments, 3 Special detachments.

Total available, 113

These were independent bodies* of technical troops, with about 525 waggons, which, among other things, were loaded with material for about 4500 paces of bridge-way, with about 30,000 entrenching tools, and 585 miles (English*) of telegraph wires.

* 44 English miles = 1 German mile nearly.

All distances given in this translation are to be understood as being English measurement.—( Zranslator’s note.)

Chapter I. - ’

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND ARMIES UP TO THE PASSAGE ACROSS THE MOSELLE.

The First Army.

THE First Army formed the right wing of the German forces. At the commencement of the operations, this army consisted of the VIL and vill. Army Corps, and the 3d Division of Cavalry. At the beginning of August it was reinforced by the 1. Army Corps and the ist Division of Cavalry.

The army had originally got orders to march on the line from Merzig to Saarlouis. The vu. Army Corps was to assemble on the 3d of August at Merzig and Beckingen, and the mass of the vill. Corps in the neighbourhood of Saarlouis.

Both corps were to cross over to the left bank of the Saar with a portion of the troops. The fortress of Saarlouis was to have been ' completely armed and provided with a war-garrison of 6000 men, and would then have served as a point of support to the army, so that the latter would have been in a position to offer resistance even to very superior forces until the arrival of the Second Army.

The vil. Army Corps had crossed the Eifel mountains by forced marches, concentrating about Trier on the 31st July, so that the greater part of the Corps reached the position assigned to them on the Saar by the 3d of August. On this day the 1st Field Pioneer company constructed a bridge near Mettlach, which was used for crossing the river by a portion of the two divisions.

During the advance the vil. Corps had the whole course of the Moselle, from Coblenz to Trier, reconnoitred by the Engineer Staff, in order to be able to make preparations for such passages across the river as might become necessary.

ra

The 1st Field Pioneer company had got ready a bridge for the passage of the 14th Division of Infantry at Schweig (100 metres in length), out of improvised materials. A similar bridge was laid at Berncastel by the pioneers of the vil. Corps. The First Army had, however, in the meantime got orders not to cross the line from Saarburg to Wadern, and the army accordingly assembled on the 3d of August in the line from Wadern to Losheim, and on the same day portions of the Second Army reached Alzey. On the 4th of August the army took up the position from Lebach by Ottweiler to Tholey, and sent out strong reconnoitring parties to the front, past Saarlouis, on the roads to Thionville, Metz, and St. Avold.

As, however, in the meantime the road to St. Wendel, Ottweiler, and Neunkirchen was given up to the Second Army, the First concentrated N.W. of Saarbriick, and commenced their advance towards the line of the Saar on the 6th of August.

The vii. Army Corps got orders to advance on the Lebach road, and to push out advanced guards in the directions of Saarbriick and Volklingen, while the vi1I. Corps moved on until west of Sulzbach. The 3d Division of Cavalry covered the right wing, and the 1. Army Corps concentrated near Lebach.

The 14th Division of Infantry advancing on Saarbriick came about noon into collision with the retiring enemy, and moved therefore at once on to the attack. The enemy, however, brought up considerable reinforcements, and made a most obstinate resistance on the top of the Galgen-Hiigel, so that the action came to © a stand-still until the arrival of portions of the 11. and 111. Corps ot the Second Army, when the enemy was forced to give up all his positions,

The 13th Division of Infantry had meantime, in accordance with orders from the General commanding the vil. Army Corps, crossed the Saar at Volklingen, where the massive bridge had been left intact, and had advanced against, the strongly fortified position of the enemy, at the same time threatening his line of retreat.

At the approach of dark the conflict was broken off on the part of the 13th Division, who occupied Forbach on the following morning, and took possession of the abandoned camp of the French. At Forbach, besides a considerable amount of stores, an unhorsed pontoon-train of 42 waggons was captured.

Operations of the First and Second Armies. ed

On the 7th of August the First Army concentrated at Forbach and Saarbriick.. The vii. Corps took up a position near Spicheren, Etzling, and Behren.

On the 8th of August information was received that the enemy would take the offensive, and accordingly the defences were strengthened by forming emplacements for batteries on the north of Spicheren, placing abattis on the borders of the Spicheren woods, and entrenching the village of Etzling. These works were executed by the 1st and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the v1. Army Corps in the course of the 8th of August; but not completed, as the enemy continued their retreat in the direction of Saargemiinde.

The First Army made use of the road from Volklingen through Ludweiler on their advance to St. Avold, while the Second Army moved forward on the Forbach road.

On the oth of August it became known that the enemy had abandoned St. Avold, and had retired with the bulk of his forces as far as the French Nied.

As it appeared not improbable that the enemy intended to defend the line of the Nied, arrangements were made for drawing the armies closer together. Accordingly the First Army was concentrated at Boulay, Marange, and Bouckeborn, while the two divisions of Cavalry were pushed forward as far as Fouligny and Bettange. The right wing of the Second Army was at Faulkemont, and had orders to remain in a position intended to be prepared for defence until the proposed wheel to the right should have been completed.

In the meantime, the news that had arrived at the principal headquarters on the 12th of August made it appear as beyond doubt that the main forces of the enemy were in retreat on Metz.

In consequence, the First Army continued on the 13th of August its advance against Metz; the 1. Army Corps moving towards Courcelles, Chaussy, and Landonvilliers; the vil. Corps towards Courcelles and Pange. Both Corps pushed their advanced guards over the French Nied. The vil. Corps remained in reserve, while the 1st Division of Cavalry maintained the connexion with the Second Army. The 3d Division of Cavalry had instructions, if possible, to cross the Moselle below Metz. The Second Army intended on the same day to push forward the 5th Division of Cavalry up to the road between Metz and Verdun.

As for the proposed passage of the 3d Division of Cavalry over the Moselle, it is to be remarked that there are no permanent bridges between Metz and Thionville. According to the reconnaissances made by Captain von der Groeben, of the Engineers, the river was crossed by ferry-boats drawn by ropes, with good roads leading to them on both banks at the following places, viz. :— Hauconcourt, Hagondange, Blettange, and Illange. It had also been ascertained by the reconnaissance that a passage in force across the Moselle, especially at Blettange, would be comparatively easy, as the heights on the right bank offered excellent, commanding positions for artillery, and on the left bank there was ready to hand an enclosure surrounded by high walls which could be used as a bridge-head.

As the 3d Division of Cavalry moved on to the Moselle, it turned out that all the rope-ferries had been removed ; accordingly a few men crossed the river in a boat at Rauconcourt, and found no enemies’ troops there. As no bridge equipment was at the disposal of the Division, and as, besides, a passage across the Moselle north of Metz in force would probably not have met the intentions of the higher authorities, the 3d Cavalry Division had to give it up. Nor could the proposed destruction of the railroad between Metz and Thionville be executed, as the enemy had assembled there in such force, that a surprise seemed highly improbable. As soon as the First Army had reached the French Nied, a greater number of passages across the river, here about 25 paces broad, were at once provided,

The Pioneers of the 1. Army Corps threw 4 bridges across in the neighbourhood of Les Etangs, while the vu. Corps, with its three Pioneer companies, provided 5 bridges out of extemporized materials at Pange and Courcelles, so that, including the existing bridges not destroyed by the enemy in front of the First Army, there were altogether 15 bridges available, which would have been sufficient for all emergencies.

As decided on the 13th of August at headquarters, the First Army was to remain in its position on the French Nied on the 14th of August, and observe the enemy by advanced guards pushed well tothe front. Two corps of the Second Army (the III. and 1x.), moved up to the heights of Pagny and Buchy respectively, with instructions to support the First Army in case of an attack by the enemy; while the main body of the Second Army was to continue its advance on the Moselle in the direction of Pont-4-Mousson and Marbach.

Operations of the First and Second Armies. 9.

Battle of Courcelles on the 14th of August.

As it was announced from all sides on the afternoon of the 14th of August that the enemy had begun to cross over to the left bank of the Moselle with his main body, and (apparently to secure his retreat) had attacked the advanced guard of the 1. Army Corps, the vil. Corps advanced to the attack of the retreating enemy, and induced him again to show a front. A desperate fight ensued, which finished only with the approach of darkness, after the enemy had retreated into prepared positions under the guns of Forts Julien and Les Bottes. The 3d Division of Cavalry had covered the right wing of the 1. Army Corps, while the rst Division of Cavalry, as well as the 18th Division of Infantry, had shown on the left wing of the vil. Corps.

As regards the technical troops, a detachment of the 1st Field Pioneer company of the 1. Army Corps (Lieut. Zarnke), as also the 2d and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the vil. Corps (Capts. Goetze and Cleinow), came into action. The first-named detachment fought in combination with the 44th Regiment of Infantry on the right wing of the army, which towards evening the enemy sought to overwhelm with superior forces. The contest only ceased with the approach of darkness, after the repulse of the enemy’s attack. :

The 2d and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the vil. Army Corps, which at the commencement of the action were formed into a half battalion by Captain Goetze, and had followed the 13th Division of Infantry up to La Planchette, were here brought up to the support of the hard-pressed infantry in the first line of battle, and on . the night of the 14th of August took over the out-post duties of the 13th Division of Infantry on the field of battle they had won.

Reconnaissance of Thionville.

While the main body of the First Army was engaged before Metz, an expedition against the fortress of Thionville was undertaken by a portion of it.

On the 13th of August patrols of the 3d Division of Cavalry had ridden up to the gates of the bridge-head of Thionville, and had brought such reports of the numbers and condition of the garrison of the fortress that the General commanding the First Army had considered a coup-de-main against the fortress as feasible.

The statements of a man of the Prussian Cavalry Reserve, who at the outbreak of the war had been forced to take part in the work of the arming of the fortress, confirmed the General commanding in his view that it might easily be taken. These statements referred specially to the insufficient defensive power of the ill-guarded works on the left bank of the Moselle, as also to the facilities for crossing that river above the fortress by means of an easy ford.

Accordingly, the 31st Brigade of Infantry, under the command of General Count Gneisenau, was commissioned to execute this coup-de-main. He was reinforced by a light field battery, one squadron, and the 3d Field Pioneer company of the vill. Army Corps (Captain Richter). Major von Giese of the Engineer Staff of the First Army, who many years before had reconnoitred the fortress, was placed at the disposal of the Commandant of the detachment.

The Brigade was marched off on the 13th of August on the road between Boulay and Thionville, and had orders to push forward on the evening of the 14th into the neighbourhood of the town ; during the night to take up a covered position, and on the following morning early to make an attempt at taking the place by surprise. The brigade carried out the advance against Thionville as ordered, observing all requisite measures for keeping the operations a secret. Arrangements were made for a portion of the infantry, with the artillery and cavalry, to take up a position in reserve on the right bank of the Moselle, opposite the bridge-head; while three columns of assault, each with a Pioneer detachment at its head, were directed respectively against the fortifications of the town, the Moselle gorge and the railway station on the south side of the fortress, where they were to destroy the communication with Metz.

The Pioneers were furnished with the necessary scaling-ladders, petards, etc. .

The 1st column, after crossing the ford, was to break the telegraph wires leading towards Metz, and then to make the railway impassable for a long time, by destroying the bridges leading over the little Miihlbach.

The 2d column got instructions to cross the ford and force their way through the Metz gate. To carry this out, it would have been necessary to remove a barrier-gate in the Place d’Armes of

Operations of the First and Second Armies. Il the covered way, as well as the sally port-gates of the counter guard, of the ravelin, and enceinte ; also to demolish two drawbridges,— an undertaking which, with the insufficient means available, could not have had a prospect of success, unless the enemy were entirely taken by surprise.

The 3d column, after crossing the ford, was to reach the gorge of the fortress by the tow-path on the left bank of the Moselle, and scale the gorge walls. ‘

About 3 o'clock in the morning the columns debouched out of the Yutz-wood, about 2000 paces distant from the bridge-head, but received a pretty smart fire as soon as the heads of the columns arrived in the neighbourhood of the works of the fortress,.which showed that their approach was noticed. As the above-named ‘Prussian reserve man, who had been taken as a guide, declared that the ford was no longer passable in consequence of a considerable rise in the water-level, and as in the meanwhile other parts of the fortress had opened fire, the idea of a coup-de-main was given up, and no doubt with good reason, as an escalade of the strong Moselle gorge, with walls from 9 to Io metres high would pro-' bably have had as little success as the attempt to force the wellsecured Metz gate.

The First Army remained for the most part in their old position on the 15th of August. The vil. Corps was, however, sent in the direction of Chesny, to prolong the left wing, so that the army occupied the section of country from the Seille to St. Barbe.

On the 16th of August the main body of the army took up a position between the Seille and Moselle, on the line from Pommerieux to Arry, while the I. Army Corps moved towards Courcelles-sur-Nied, with instructions to remain there until the arrival of the three reserve Divisions then marching from Saarlouis in order to enclose Metz on both banks of the Moselle. <A portion of the vir. Army Corps had already crossed the Moselle on the 16th of August, and took part in the fights at Rezonville.

The Pioneer companies of the v11.and vil. Army Corps received orders on the 16th of August to move towards the Moselle and to replace the necessary bridges for the eventual passage of the First

rmy. oars companies arrived before daybreak with their bridge-trains, and at once began the necessary preparatory works ; as, according to the orders left by the General commanding, the VII. and VIII.

Army Corps were to be ready to cross over the next morning at 9 o'clock.

‘ Bombardment of the East Forts of Metz on the 17th of August.

In order to divert the attention of the enemy from the great operations of the First and Second Armies in course of execution on the left bank of the Moselle, the 1. Army Corps undertook to open fire on the east forts of Metz on the 17th of August.

Accordingly, a position for the whole of the field artillery was taken up on the heights from La Grange-aux-bois to the telegraph of Mercy, after the necessary emplacements had been constructed by the 2d and 3d Field Pioneer company, making a use of the French rifle-pits and batteries.

The distance of the artillery position from Fort Queuleu was about 4000 paces, and the fire was principally directed against this fort. The enemy answered the fire on this side in general feebly, as the artillery armament of the forts was not yet completed. A coup-

.dée-main on the 17th or 18th of August against the as yet unfinished

forts Queuleu and Les Bottes, with sufficient forces, might have succeeded ;* yet it is doubtful if the forts could possibly have been maintained on the following days. The army of the Rhine, thrown back towards Metz, would in any case have staked all on the recapture of the forts, the maintenance of which would have been exceedingly difficult in the absence of extended communications to the rear.

The object of the cannonade on the forts had besides been fully attained, since the enemy (according to his own statements) expected an attempt at assault every moment, and felt therefore obliged to keep back larger forces on the right bank of the Moselle.

The Second Army.

The Second Army, consisting of the Corps of the Guards of the IIL, Ix., X., and x11. Army Corps, as well as the 5th and 6th Divisions of Cavalry, assembled near Mayence towards the end of July, and on the 30th of that month advanced to the boundary. The roads from Bingen to Volklingen were appointed for the right

® It should however be noted that, on the 17th and 18th of August, only one Army Corps was on the right bank of the Moselle.

Operations of the First and Second Armies. 13 wing of the army, while the centre, a day’s march in advance, pushed on to the Saar through Meisenheim, Cassel, Neunkirchen, and the left wing through Diirckheim, Kaiserslautern, and Bliescastel.

On the 3d of August the IIL, IV., and Ix. Corps stood in front of Alzey. The Corps of Guards, as well as the x. and x1I. Corps, closed up in rear, while the 5th and 6th Divisions of Cavalry followed by two infantry divisions of the 111. and 1v. Army Corps constituted the advanced guards.

The arrangements of the General commanding were so calculated that the 1st Division should take up the line from Neunkirchen to Zweibriicken on the 6th of August, and push its advanced guards as far to the front as possible.

The advanced guard of the First Army took the offensive on the afternoon of the 6th of August, and forced the enemy then in retreat from Saarbriick to show front ; on this the five Infantry Divisions, marching at the head of the Second Army, hastened to the assistance of the First Army, and contributed in an important measure to the success of the action.

The Second Army crossed the Saar partly on the bridges thrown over by the Pioneers of the 1x. and x. Corps, and on the following days continued its advance in closer communication with the First Army.

When it had been ascertained that St. Avold had been evacuated by the enemy, and as it was supposed at headquarters that _ the enemy had withdrawn himself behind the Moselle, the Second Army left the direct road from St. Avold to Metz, and took up a _ south-westerly direction, thereby regaining touch with the Third Army, and followed the road from Saarlouis to Dieuze.

On the 11th of August, however, it appeared not improbable at headquarters that an important portion of the enemy would attempt to show fight on the left bank of the French Nied in front of Metz.

The Second Army therefore received orders to make a wheel to the right, for which the 111. Army Corps at Faulquemont was to serve as pivot, and, with this object, to choose a defensive position to be strengthened by fortifications.

As, however, the enemy during the night of the roth of August had commenced the evacuation of his strong position, the Second Army was able to resume the former line of march, and accordingly on the 13th of August advanced to the line of Buchy and Ch&teau-

Salins, while the sth Cavalry Division had already been pushed forward as far as Pont-A-Mousson and Dieulouard the day before, and had had orders to advance to the road from Metz to Verdun. The x. Army Corps was also to cross the Moselle at Pont-a- Mousson on this day.

This corps had already, on the 10th of August, sent First-Lieutenant Neumeister, of the Engineer Staff, with a squadron of hussars from its headquarters at Helleiner, about 9 miles from Pont-a- Mousson, to Quesnois-sur-Seille, with instructions to destroy the telegraph-wires and railways at any place between Nancy and Pont-a-Mousson, under protection of a strong patrol.

This officer got on the same day as far as the railroad referred to, and the telegraph was soon demolished, but the attempt to destroy the railway was not successful, as the enemy’s infantry hurried up and opened fire, so that the detachment had to take measures for retreat. The result of the reconnaissance, besides temporarily interrupting the active movement of troops from Nancy to Ponta-Mousson, was to discover the permanent bridges across the Moselle south of Pont-a-Mousson, the existence of which was at. that time not generally known.

The Engineer Staff of the Commander-in-Chief had been already sent to Pont-d4-Mousson on the 13th August in order to reconnoitre the bridges at that place, which were found quite uninjured, and a few hours later the advanced guard of the x. Army Corps moved in.

In order, as far as possible, to secure the possession of Pont-a- Mousson, which might become of the greatest importance in the further operations of the campaign, the northern portion of the town was on the 14th of August prepared for defence by the 2d and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the x. Corps (Captains Meyer and Lindow). The works were completed by midday on the 15th August, with the assistance of 2 companies of infantry. They consisted principally in defensive arrangements of hedges and garden-walls, in the construction of several emplacements for artillery, and in clearing the field of view.