The international law and diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war

Front matter

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

liNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. SAN DIEGO

LA JOLLA. CALIFORNIA

Preface

In view of the importance of the issues involved and the general interest manifested in the subject, perhaps no apology is needed for the appearance of a volume which aims to be a fairly complete history, from the point of view of International Law and Diplomacy, of the Russo- Japanese War.

This great conflict not only aided in the solution of many disputed questions in International Law, but it also gave rise to a number of new precedents and controversies which will materially affect the future conduct of international affairs. It furnished a particularly interesting and important field for the application of those principles governing the rights and duties of neutrals, which are of comparatively recent origin, and to the growth of which the United States has largely contributed. Certain of the rules or customs based upon these principles are still in process of formation, or have not as yet been fully established by the general practice of nations ; others are perhaps no longer observed, and are, therefore, of doubtful or waning validity.

International Law is in a state of constant growth and decay. Its rules are the result of international practice which, although based upon fundamental principles, vary in different times and under different circumstances. Tlie usages observed during the Russo-Japanese War may serve to strengthen such customs as are in a stage of imperfect development, or to weaken still further such as are in a state of decay. In any case, they are an index to the present condition of international morality.

VIU PREFACE

It is hoped that this treatment of the subject may have interest for the general reader as well as for the specialist, and that it may be regarded as a contribution to history as well as to International Law. To this end the material has been cast, wherever practicable, in narrative form. Each chapter, though a separate study, is strictly subordinated to the proportions of the work as a whole.

The present volume has grown out of a series of eight articles contributed to The Green Bag, from May to December, inclusive, 1904. These have, however, been recast and enlarged, and a number of chapters, entirely new, have been added. Chapter 12 is (with slight changes) identical with a paper which may be found in Vol. II of the Proceedings of the American Political Science Association

The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the many publicists whose works have been consulted in the preparation of this volume. The extent of his obligations may be seen in the numerous footnotes. To these footnotes points of minor interest and importance have been relegated, together with references to documents and authorities. They contain fairly complete bibliographies bearing on important principles and controversies, and it may be noted that these bibliographies include references to Continental as well as to Anglo-Saxon authorities.

Two excellent and important works, which appeared during the course of the war, have been of such exceptional service that special mention should here be made of them. These are the "Russo-Japanese Conflict," by K. Asakawa, and "War and Neutrality in the Far East," by T. J. Lawrence.

In conclusion, the author wishes to make public acknowl-

PREFACE ix

edgment of his great indebtedness to his friend and colleague, Professor Samuel Bannister Harding, whose advice and assistance in the preparation of this volume have been invaluable ; and to Dr. Dudley Odell McGovney, who kindly read the manuscript and offered a number of helpful suggestions.

Bloomington, Indiana, Nov. 17, 1906.

Contents

PAGB

Preface vii

INTRODUCTORY Causes of the War i

CHAPTER I The Outbreak of War and the Alleged Violation of Korean Neutrality 62

CHAPTER H

The Conduct of the United States in Respect to its Neutral Rights and Duties 78

CHAPTER HI

The Construction, Sale, and Exportation by Neutrals of Warships, Submarine Boats, and other Vessels Intended for Belligerent Service 91

CHAPTER IV

War Correspondents, Wireless Telegraphy, and Submarine

Mines 115 '

CHAPTER V

Russian Seizures of Neutral Merchantmen — the Right of Visit and Search and the Alleged Right of Sinking Neutral Prizes 136

CHAPTER VI Questions Relating to Contraband of War 160

CHAPTER VII

The Voyage of the Baltic Fleet, and the Rights and Privileges of Belligerent Armed Vessels in Neutral Ports and Waters 188

Xll CONTENTS

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE

CHAPTER IX The Hay Note and Chinese Neutrality 246

CHAPTER X Russian and Japanese Rules of Warfare 269

CHAPTER XI The Relations of the Belligerents with Each Other 295

CHAPTER XII

The Relations between England and the United States as Affected by the Far Eastern Question and the War 325

CHAPTER XIII The Treaty of Portsmouth 340

Index 361

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY

OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

INTRODUCTORY

In his history of the HannibaHc War, Polybius carefully distinguishes between the real or fundamental causes of the struggle and the overt acts or events leading up to that great conflict. He justly remarks that we should look for real causes in the "motives which suggested such action and the policy which dictated it."^ But in order to explain fully the fundamental causes of the Russo-Japanese War, it would be necessary to analyze carefully ^he foreign policies of Russia and Japan and to investigate the motives which suggested these policies. This would involve an exposition of Russian and Japanese political and economic aims and ambitions as illustrated by a complete history of Russian and Japanese expansion, more particularly of the Russian advance to the Pacific and the repeated efforts of Japan to obtain a preponderance of influence in, if not a positive control over, the affairs of Korea. For such an exhaustive discussion the writer has neither the requisite knowledge nor sufficient space at his disposal. The reader of this volume must, therefore, be content with a brief sketch or outline of the underlying issues at stake between Japan and Russia.

^Polybius (Shuckburgh's trans.) Ill, 6.

For Japan, except possibly in Korea, these issues appear to be economic rather than poHtical in their nature. They are to be found in the "enormous increase of her population" ; the "immense growth of her trade and industries" ; the slow progress of her agriculture, which is "no longer able either to support her increased population or to produce enough raw articles for her manufactures" ; the consequent need of new sources of supply, as well as an outlet or field of colonization and economic enterprise for her surplus population; and finally, the need of "an increased importation of raw material and foodstuffs and an increased exportation of manufactures."^

Japan's interests in China — probably the most important stake in this war — also seem to be primarily economic rather than political.'' They are apparently based on a desire for trade advantages, the gaining of which involves, under present conditions, the maintenance of the principle of the open door in China, or the policy of equal economic opportunity for all nations. This in turn involves, as a means to that end, the preservation of the territorial sovereignty or integrity of China; for if that country be dismembered or partitioned into "spheres of interest" or "influence," it might eventually fall a prey to the systematic commercial exploitation and exclusive protective systems of the several Powers exercising political influence or control in the regions acquired by them.

The interests of Russia in the Far East, on the other hand, appear to be primarily political rather than economic, and are, therefore, less vital than those of Japan. Russia is still

* The above citations are from the Introduction to Dr. Asakawa's excellent work entitled The Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. i-8, passim.

* They are probably political only in a negative sense, i. e., as opposed to aggressive political designs on the part of any other Power.

essentially in the agricultural stage of her development, and, in an economic sense, she is largely sufficient unto herself. Speaking broadly, it may be said that she produces what she consumes and consumes what she produces. Her "economic interests are, even in Manchuria, rather for her glory as a great expanding empire than for any imperative need of trade and emigration in that particular part of her Asiatic dominion; while similar interests of Japan, primarily in Korea and secondarily in Manchuria, are vital, as they are essential for her own life and development as a nation."^

A mere glance at the globe will suffice to show how greatly the history of Russian expansion has been influenced by her geographical situation. Ever since the days of Peter the Great, who first discerned the possibilities of the future, the foreign policy of Russia has been largely controlled by a desire to obtain access to the sea in four directions, viz. — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific Ocean. Her desire for the control of the Baltic Sea has been but partially realized, owing to the maritime rivalry of England, Germany, and Sweden ; after several failures she finally secured a foothold on the Black Sea, but her successive attempts to obtain control of Constantinople and the passageway of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean have been frustrated by the interference of the Powers, more particularly of England, who has also restrained her from ob-

*Asakawa, op. cit., p. 48. The truth of the former part of the above statement is shown by the fact that, while Russia's vested interests in Manchuria are enormous, her commercial success there has been remarkably small. Such apparent success as she obtained in Manchuria was due to the protective and exclusive policy of the Russian Government and to the artificial stimulus which was furnished by the building of railways and the activity of the Russo-Chinese Bank. See recent works on Manchuria, especially Weale, Manchu and Muscovite, passim.

taining a foothold on the Persian Gulf; and her recent attempt to become the dominant power on the Pacific has been defeated by Japan, the England of the Far East.^

The Russian advance across the Ural Mountains into Siberia was begun in the latter part of the sixteenth century under the leadership of the Stroganoffs, a rich and powerful corporation of merchants, which flourished during the reign of Ivan IV. In 1581 the Cossack robber outlaw Yermak announced to the Czar the conquest of a new "Siberian Kingdom." In the latter part of the sixteenth century was begun the construction of a line of towns across Siberia, which finally reached the Pacific at Okhotsk in 1638. This place was too far north, however, to make a really serviceable port, and the control of the Amur River next became the object of Russian ambition. In the seventeenth century the repeated clashing of the Cossacks and Manchus in this region led to diplomatic negotiations between the Muscovite and the Chinese Governments which resulted in 1681 in the Treaty of Nerchinsk. By this treaty the Russians were excluded from the region of the Amur ; and the Argun River and the Stanovoi Mountains were fixed upon as the boundary line between the Empires of China and Muscovy.®

More than a century and a half passed before another attempt was made to reach the Amur. In 1847 Count Nikolas Muravieff (later known as Count of the Amur or Muraviejff Amursky) became Governor of Eastern Siberia. His success in provisioning the Russian Pacific fleet by way of the Amur River during the Crimean War (1854-1861), the re-

* For a good general sketch or outline of the history of the "Expansion of Russia," see Rambaud, The Case of Russia.

' For the main provisions of this treaty, see Weale, Manchu and Muscovite, pp. 40-41. For the text, see De Martens, Nouveau recueil generate, t. XVII, 2nd part, p. 173.

i pulse of the allied Anglo-French squadron by this Russian fleet in 1854-55, and the defeat of Russian policy in the nearer East as the result of the Crimean War, together with the personal appeals of Count Muravieff, seem to have furnished the arguments which convinced the Russian Government of the importance of the Amur to the interests of Russia, and that the line of least resistance to the realization of Russian dreams of expansion lay in the direction of the Pacific. In 1857 Count Muravieff, armed with full discretionary powers as the result of a visit to St. Petersburg, began a systematic advance which resulted in the Treaty of Aigun'' in May. 1858. China being then at war with England and France, the Chinese frontier authorities consented to the cession to Russia of the left bank of the Amur, or the vast territory north of this river as far as the Ussuri, and of both banks from thence to its mouth. The Treaty of Aigun, which had not been signed by the Chinese Central Government, was replaced by the Treaty of Peking in November, 1860.^ This important treaty, the terms of which were highly favorable to Russia, was secured by the skillful diplomacy of General Ignatieff, who had won the favor of the Chinese Government by acting as mediator between China and the allies. It fixed the bounrlaries of Manchuria as they nominally existed at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia thus acquired, in addition to the left bank of the Amur, the region on the Pacific lying east of the Ussuri and the Amur rivers bordering on the Sea of Japan and extending as far south as Korea.'' Russia had obtained ix)ssession of Maritime Manchuria, which was to furnish her with

'De Martens, op. cit., t. XVII, ist pt., p. i. 'De Martens, op. cit., 2nd pt., p. 181. •For details, see Weale, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

a port on the Pacific (Vladivostok) in a much more temperate region than any she had hitherto occupied, and had also completely shut China off from direct access to the Sea of Japan. In 1861 a Russian man-of-war took possession of the Japanese islands of Tsushima in the Korean straits, but it was obliged to withdraw at the instance of the British Minister. In 1875 the long island of Sakhalin, for many years (since 1852) the subject of controversy between Japan and Russia, was formally surrendered to Russia by Japan in return for the sterile Kurile islands.

The period between i860 and 1890 was devoted to colonization and the promotion of commerce in these newlyacquired provinces — Amur and Primorsk. The visit of the Czarevitch in the Far East in 1891 seems to have had a very important influence upon the course of subsequent events. It brought St. Petersburg to a specific knowledge of conditions in the Far East ; led to a realization, on the part of the Russian Home Government, of the rising importance of Japan as a Pacific power; and created a conviction of the necessity for Russia to increase and consolidate her power in the Far East if she desired to maintain and strengthen her position in that quarter of the globe. The Czarevitch also in 1 89 1 cut the first sod, near Vladivostok, for the great Trans- Siberian Railway.

The unexpected outcome of the Chino- Japanese War in 1894-95 afforded Russia an opportunity of at once administering a severe blow to Japan and of ingratiating herself with China. The Treaty of Shimonoseki^" between these

"For the text of the treaty, see U. S. House Documents, 54th Congress, I St session, Vol. I, pp. 200-203. It is also printed in the Appendix to Beveridge, Russian Advance. For the French text, see Appendix to La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, by N. Ariga.

two belligerents, signed on April 17, if^95. pnjvided, among other things, for the absolute independence of Korea, the cession to Japan of the Liao-tung Peninsula, Formosa, the Pescadores, and an indemnity of JOO,ooo,cx)0 taels. The Japanese control of the Liao-tung Peninsula and Port Arthur (the key to Peking), Manchuria, and Korea, meant a death blow to Russia's hopes of expansion southward and of thus obtaining one or more ice- free ports on the Pacific. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that Russia acceded to Li- Hung Chang's appeal for intervention, although the motives of France and Germany in joining that intervention are less clearly discernible. The result of the interchange of views between Russia. (Germany, PVance. and England which followed was that the Russian, French, and German representatives at Tokio joined, in the latter part of April, in a "friendly recommendation" to the Japanese Government, to the effect that the "contemplated possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan would not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but would also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East." Accordingly, "in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan," they counselled the Japanese Government "to renounce the definitive i)ossession of the Liao-tung Peninsula."**

Meanwhile, the three intervening Powers, by the augmentation and concentration of their I'astern tleets, made a display of overwhelming force, "Russia going even so far as to prepare the army contingents in the Amur region for quick mobilization."'*' The Japanese Goveninimt in \ iew of the

" From the Russian note to the Jap.incsc CiuvcriiiiKiit. Reprinted by Lawrence. H'ar and Neutrality in the I-'ar Last (itid cd. ), p. ll. " Asakawa. p. 73.

exhaustion of its resources, and being urged by the British Minister "to make to the susceptibilities of Europe all concessions compatible with the dignity and permanent interests" of Japan, ^^ decided, early in May, to relinquish, for an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels from China, all of the Liao-tung Peninsula. On May 10, 1895, the Mikado issued an Imperial Rescript, countersigned by all his ministers, announcing that, "out of regard for peace" and a disinclination to cause suffering to his people, or "to impede the progress of the national destiny by embroiling the Empire in new complications," he had decided to accept "the advice of the friendly Powers," and had commanded his government "to negotiate with the Chinese Government respecting all arrangements for the return of the particular districts."^* In accordance with this proclamation, a convention between China and Japan for the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula was signed at Peking on November 8, 1895, j^st six months after the exchange of the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki/^

The retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula to China, although bitter medicine at the time, proved for Japan a blessing in disguise. It marks a turning point in her history, more particularly in her relations with Russia. Although it can hardly be considered a fundamental cause of the Russo-Japanese War (which was sooner or later inevitable,

" M. de Blowitz to the London Times, May 3, 1895, p. 5. Cited by Asakawa, p. 76.

" This proclamation is printed in full in Hosie, Manchuria, pp. 41-42, and by Beveridge, Appendix. For the French text, see Ariga, La Guerre Sino-Japonaise, Appendix VI.

"Japan made a strong effort to secure from China a promise that under no circumstances would the latter voluntarily cede the Liao-tung Peninsula or any part thereof to any other Power; but this attempt is said to have been defeated by the action of the three allies.

in any case), yet it brought Russia face to face with Japan in Korea and {^^reatly liastened tlie outbreak of the struggle. If Japan had entertained any delusions regarding the ultimate designs of Russia or the real character of European diplomacy, these illusions now vanished forever, and Japan realized, as she never had before, the necessity of straining every nerve to increase and strengthen her naval and military arms to the utmost, if she desired to assume a leading role in the affairs of the Orient, or perhaps even to maintain her independence. As Dr. Asakawa testifies:'" "Japan suddenly awoke to an absorbing desire which left her little room for the question of revenge. It became to her as clear as daylight that the new position she had acquired in the Orient by her victory over China could be maintained, and even her indei)endence must be guarded, only by an armament powerful enough to give her a voice among the first Powers of the world. If she would not retire within herself, and finally cease to e.xist. she must c<>nii)ete with the greatest nations, not only in the arts of peace, but also in those of war. Moreover, a far vaster conflict than she had ever known in her history, excepting the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, was seen to be awaiting her." From this time on. the budgets of the Japanese Government show a great increase in army and naval expenditures.'' Subseqtient events only tended to make the Jaj)anese Government and people more resolute in their efforts in this direction.

In 1 89 1 Russia had begun, at a tremendous cost, the construction of the great Trans- Asiatic Railroad across Siberia to Vladivo.st()k. I'.ut the route from L-ike r.aikal to \'ladivostok through the .\mur province north of the .Amur River

" The I\ussi>-Jaf>ancsr Conflict, pp. 79-80. " See tabic in Asakawa, p. 80.

proving well-nigh impossible, it was resolved to run the railway through Manchuria by a more direct and practicable route. By her successful intervention in the Chino-Japanese War, Russia had placed China under a debt of fear and gratitude, and this debt was greatly increased by the guarantee by the Russian Government of a 4 per cent, loan to China, on very liberal terms, ^** of 400,000,000 francs, the interest of which was guaranteed by the Russian Government without security. Ostensibly to facilitate the execution of this loan, but really to promote Russian commercial and political designs in Eastern Asia, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized, in 1895, with Prince Uktomsky as President. The Chinese Government was induced to contribute 5,000,000 taels toward the capital of the bank, and by the end of the year 1896 Prince Uktomsky had obtained valuable concessions or privileges from China in the way of important railway and telegraph franchises, the receipt of tax returns, management of local finances, coining privileges, etc.^"

In the meantime, Russian diplomacy appears to have been active through its regular official channels. On September 30, 1896, the so-called "Cassini Convention" was ratified at Peking. This secret agreement, which has been the subject of considerable controversy (its existence having been officially denied by the Russian Government), conceded to Russia privileges of the most important nature "as a re-

" This loan was issued principally from Paris in July, 1895, and was intended to cover one-half of China's indemnity to Japan. It was issued at 94%, bore 4 per cent, interest, and was payable in thirty-six years. The other half (£16,000,000) was supplied by British and German capitalists at 5 per cent, interest. See Asakawa, pp. 83-84.

"On the Russo-Chinese Bank, see Cordier, III, pp. 310-312, and Asakawa, p. 85.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR II

sponse to the loyal aid given by Russia in the retrocession of the Liao-tiing and its dependencies." These included : ( I ) The right to prolong the Siberian Railway into Chinese territory across the northern part of Manchuria to Vladivostok. The control of all railways built by Russia in northern Manchuria was to be placed in the hands of Russia for thirty years, at the end of which time China was to be allowed to redeem them, although the manner of such redemption was to be "left for future consideration." (2) If China should find it "inconvenient" to build the railroad in contemplation from Niu-chwang to Mukden, she was to allow Russia t<» provide the necessary funds, but was to be allowed to redeem this road at the end of ten years. (3) The Russian railways in Manchuria were to be "protected" by the Chinese local, civil, and military authorities; but, "owing to the fact that the said railways will pass, for the greater part, through barren and sparsely inhabited territory, in which it will be difficult for the Chinese authorities to be always able to grant the necessary protection and aid, Russia shall be allowed to place special battalions of horse and foot soldiers at the various important stations for the better protection of the railway property." (4) Russians as well as Chinese were to be permitted hereafter to exploit and open any of the mines in northern Manchuria. (5) Should China desire to reform her army organization in the said province in accordance with the Western system, she was to be permitted to engage Russian military officers for that j)urpose. (6) Since "Russia has never jjossessed a seai)ort in .\sia which is free from ice and open the year round," and since if "there should suddenly arise military operations on this Continent, it will naturally be difficult for the Russian I^astern Seas and Pacific Fleets to move about freely antl at pleasure," China declared herself "willing to lease temporarily to Russia the port of Kiao-chau in the province of Shan-tung, the period of such lease being limited to fifteen years. . . .

But, should there be no danger of military operations, Russia shall not enter immediately into possession of the said port, or hold the important points dominating the port, in order to obz'iate the chance of exciting the jealousy and suspicions of other Powers." (7) China was to properly fortify the Liao-tung ports of Port Arthur and Talien-wan "with all haste," "in order to provide against future dangers;" and Russia was to lend all necessary assistance "in helping to protect these two ports," and was not to "permit any foreign Power to encroach upon them." China, on her part, also bound herself "never to cede them to another country, but if, in future, the exigencies of the case require it, and Russia should find herself suddenly involved in a war," China consented "to allow Russia temporarily to concentrate her land and naval forces within the said ports, in order better to enable Russia to attack the enemy or to guard her own position." If, however, there was no danger of military operations, China was to retain entire control over the administration of these ports. ^^

^^ For the text of the "Cassini Convention," see the appendices to Weale, Re-Shaping of the Far East, and Beveridge, Russian Advance. As stated in the text, the existence of this Convention was denied by Russia and it is characterized by some writers as "apocryphal." The document may be unauthentic in some particulars, but its substantial truth appears now to be generally admitted and the fact of its existence seems to be borne out by subsequent events. For some convincing arguments on this head, see Asakawa, pp. 90 fif.

Earlier in the same year (1896) a secret treaty of alliance between China and Russia appears also to have been concluded. The Russian text has never been published, but Asakawa (pp. 85-87) gives the following abstract from a Japanese source: "It was agreed, in secrecy, that, if Russia should come into conflict with other Asiatic Powers, she

At about the same time (September, 1896) there was concluded an open agreement between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank providing for the construction of a railway through Manchuria connecting tlie Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri lines of the Siberian railwaysystem. This "Agreement," together with the "Statutes" of the Railway promulgated by the Czar, provided for the organization of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company under the management of a board whose nominal head was the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg, but whose real head, the vice-president, was under the supervision of the Russian Minister of Finance. The general terms of the "Agreement" were that the shareholders should be Russians and

should be allowed to make free use of any port or harbor on the Chinese coast, and, in case of urgent need, levy troops from among the Chinese people. If a protest should be made by other Powers, China should answer that she was powerless to resist Russian demands. . . . In view of the great disadvantages of the ice-bound naval harbors of Russia, China agreed to allow her in time of peace a free use of Port Arthur, or, if the other Powers should object, of Kiao-chau. If the latter should be found inadequate, Russia might choose any harbor on the coast of Kiang-su and Che-kiang. If, on the other hand. China should be at war with another Power, Russia should endeavor to effect a compromise between the belligerents, and. if the effort should fail, it should be the duty of Russia openly to assist China and thereby strengthen the alliance between the two Powers. . . . If a war should arise between Russia and Japan concerning Korea, China should allow Russia to send troops toward the Yalu, so as to enable them to attack the western boundary of Korea."

Cordicr (Hisloirc dcs relations dc la Chine avrc les f<uissiinccs occidentales. Ill, pp. 347-48) is of the opinion that the Cassini Convention can not be considered as an official or authentic docaiment. He thinks it is a hybrid which contains clauses borrowed from two documents : (i) the convention with the Russo-Chinese Bank relating to the Manchurian railway, signed in September. 1896; and (2) the secret treaty of alliance of March-April of the same year. This view is adoptc<l by M. Rey in the Rn-nc C.cnerale dc Droit International Public for 1005. p. 225.

Chinese only; that the railway should be begun within twelve months and completed within six years ; that, on the expiration of eighty years from the completion of the line, the railway, together with all its property, should pass, without payment, to the Chinese Government, which was not to be held responsible for any losses which the company might sustain during that period; and that the Chinese Government was to have the right, at the expiration of thirty-six years from its inauguration, to take over the railway on due payment, such payment to include the actual cost thereof, together with all interest thereon. The "Agreement" also contained a provision for the protection of the railway and its employees by the Chinese Government, and the "Statutes" provided for the policing of the lands assigned to the road and its appurtenances by "police agents appointed by the company."-^ "It was also provided that during the eighty years of Russian management, all commodities carried between China and Russia by the railway should pay in China duties one-third less than the ordinary import and export duties in that Empire, — a provision hardly reconcilable with the open door principle, and explicitly contrary to the principles proposed by the United States to the Powers two years later. ''^^