Intervention and non-intervention; or, The foreign policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865

Preface

I BEGAN this work more than two years and a half ago, and the larger portion of it was in Mr. Murray's hands some time before the death of Lord Palmerston. The great amount of popularity which that statesman acquired during the latter years of his career, and the skill with which for the most part during those years he conducted the internal affairs of this country, will make the vast majority of the British public unwilling to scan too closely any defects, if defects there were, in his management of our foreign relations.

If I were not deeply impressed with the conviction that the consequences of those defects are still making themselves seriously felt throughout the world — and if I did not conscientiously believe that it is of the utmost importance to my country that their nature should be clearly understood, this book would never have seen the light.

It is no pleasant task to find fault witli one wlio has passed away, and, with few sympathizers, to run vi PREFACE.

counter to a strong public opinion. But I know that these pages contain the truth, and nothing but the truth : and I am encouraged to their pubhcation by the following passage written by Dr. Stanley, the present Dean of Westminster :

' A single mind, loving the truth only, has before now ' brought the whole mind of a nation round to itself. ' . . . A single voice raised honestly in behalf of truth, ' justice, and mercy, has ruined for ever practices which ' were once universal.'

A. G. S.

Warbrook, eversley : Jan. 1866.

CHAPTER I. International Law . . . . . . . .157

CHAPTER 11.

The War in Affghanistan 163

CHAPTER HI.

India — Lord Dalhotisie's Policy — The Mutiny . . . 170

CHAPTER IV.

China — Lord Napier — Opiiun Hostilities — Treaty of Nankin 193

CHAPTER V.

Hostilities at Canton, followed by general Hostilities against China — Peace of Tiensin — Third Series of general Hostilities against the Chinese Empire — Cajjtui-e of Pekin — Restoration of Peace . 216

CHAPTER VI.

Burmah — Persia — Siuni — Japan ...... 242

CHAPTER V. Fast Day Letter, 1857

P A E T I.

EUROPE.

NON-INTERVENTION

• VERSUS

INTERVENTION.

cJOic

CHAPTEB I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The laws which regulate the external intercourse of nations differ in one all-important respect from those which regulate their internal relations. Both are professedly founded on the eternal principles of justice ; but the difference between them is this — in the case of the internal relations of an independent State there exists some supreme authority within it to determine what is, or what shall be the law of the land; whilst in the case of the external intercourse between independent States, there exists no supreme authority to decide, in disputed cases, what is or what shall be tlie law of nations.

There are certainly many rules of international law which are generally recognised as obhgatory ; but it may be doubted whether there be any one distinct principle laid down by the most celebrated writers on

B 2 the subject, the binding authority of which, at some time or another, has not been called in question and denied by some one Power amongst those which compose the great family of nations.

For instance, the most opposite doctrines have been maintained at one and the same time by some of the most powerful States on the principle, or the law known in maritime warfare under the title of ' Free ships, free goods.' In the arguments which have been used respecting it, all parties take the high ground, that the view of each is dictated by strict principles of right. Still, since there is no supreme authority, to which all nations must bow, authoritatively to decide, the natural consequence follows — each claims to be in the right, and each acts on its own opinion.

Whatever may be the inconvenience arising out of this uncertainty, it is in the nature of things impossible to devise for it any complete remedy. And it may therefore happen, and in point of fact it does often happen, that Governments set up, as principles of international law, dogmas suited to tlieir own convenience at the moment, but which are not really founded on the dictates of truth and justice.

Now, the only check which can be placed on this mode of proceeding — the only test which can be apphed to try the sincerity and honesty of a State which lays down a principle of law as one which ought to regulate the intercourse of nations, is this — that when the time comes, however powerful the State may be, it shall submit to having applied to itself the same rule which it has applied to others. If such submission be refused.

CH. I.] NON-INTERVENTION. 5

then is it certain that selfish interests, and not the love of fair play and justice, have been the motives in which have originated its previous enunciation and enforcement.

If then a nation be desirous of holding a high place in the estimation of surrounding countries — if it wish to exercise a powerful, salutary, and healing influence over the afiairs of foreign nations, it must be indeed careful what principles it proclaims as those of international law ; but when it has proclaimed them, and when it has acted upon them for a course of years — when it has (almost unanimously) condemned other Governments for their violation, it behoves that nation, if it have any regard for its own honour, credit, and consistency, through good report and through e\dl report, whether adherence to it be advantageous or disadvantageous in the particular matter to which it is applicable, to adhere to it with righteous tenacity, and proudly to submit to any evils which adherence to it may entail.

This is the duty of an upright and honourable State — a duty to be performed at whatever cost, because it is a duty.

Not but what in the long run it is the soundest policy. For, as Lord Macaulay sagaciously remarks, ' the greatest advantage a Government can possess is ' to be the one trustworthy Government in the midst of * Governments which no one can trust.'

A nation which possesses this moral influence, especially if it be physically one of the most powerfid on earth, stands as a beacon before the world — its word is accepted : other States, its equal in physical power.

6 EUKOPE. [part i.

quail before it, and find themselves yielding to its influence, they hardly know how or why. This results from the majesty of law — from a sense of right, before which, in spite of themselves, the would-be wrongdoers bow : a standard of right has been set up, by which to measure ; and those who fain would grovel, find themselves compelled to be guided by the disinterested example which is placed before them.

Of all the principles in the code of international law, the most important- — the one on which the independent existence of all weaker States must depend — is this : no State has a right forcibly to interfere in the internal concerns of another State, unless there exists a casus belli against it. For, if every powerful State has a right at its pleasure forcibly to interfere with the internal affairs of its weaker neighbours, it is obvious no weak State can be really independent. The constant and general violation of this law would be, in fact, to establish the law of the strongest.

This principle as here laid down is the true principle of ' non-intervention.' But, by leaving out the word forcible, and by then applying it, without hmitation or explanation, much confusion respecting it has arisen.

It is essential therefore that it should be correctly defined ; for, taking it in the broad sense in which it is sometimes taken, as forbidding all kinds of intervention in the internal affairs of neighbouring States, it is neither defensible in theory nor harmless in practice.

Misconceptions on this head are frequent. For example : an able and intelhgent member of Parhament, late Finance Minister for India, congratulated his con-

CH. I.] NON-INTERVENTION. 7

stitueiits* on what lie called 'the final establishment ' of the great principle of" non-intervention" as a maxim ' of our future policy.' For examples of the application of this principle by the British Government he cited three instances : ' Poland, Denmark, and America.' It is true that the phrase ' non-intervention ' will cover these three cases ; but, since they all three, in their nature, differ essentially from each other, you cannot go one step further in explaining the meaning of this ' non-intervention principle ' without discovering that when explained so as to adapt it to each case, it has essentially different significations. Thus, non-intervention, as bearing on Poland, means, in Mr. Laing's view, abstinence from exercising the right of war to avenge the violation of treaties ; secondly, as bearing on Denmark, it means abstinence from exercising the right of war arising, first from the violation of treaty, second from an unjust war which confers on all States the right of resisting the aggressors ; thirdly, as bearing on the United States of North America, it means abstinence from forcible interference in the internal concerns of an independent State against which Great Britain has no casus belli. That the principle, as applicable to cases like the United States, shoidd be finally established as a maxim of our future ' policy,' would be indeed a matter of congratulation ; but that it should be other than a matter of disgrace and shame to tliis nation ' finally to estabhsh as a maxim of our future policy ' that Great Britain is henceforth on every occasion

Mr. Laing, vido Times, Sept. 24, 1864,

8 EUROPE. [PAET I.

humbly to submit to having the treaties which she has made with other States trampled under foot — that slie is never to exercise her right of war to redress wrong, when an unjust war is being carried on, however flagrant may be the conduct of the oppressor — would be to degrade her in the scale of nations, and to falsify all the glories of her past history.

Much confusion, too, arises from enunciating this principle, omitting the essential word forcible ; for the omission of that word extracts the sting. Even celebrated statesmen have fallen into this error, men of whom it might least be expected ; for instance, at the close of the session of 1849, Lord Brougham moved three resolutions on the subject of our foreign policy : the second resolution was as follows : —

' That it is inconsistent with the general interests and ' duty of this country to interfere in the concerns of ' foreign nations, as between their Governments and ' their subjects.'

Now the principle set forth in this resolution is not the true principle of non-intervention. For assuredly it is not inconsistent with the interests and the duty of England to interfere in the concerns of foreign nations, and certainly it never has been contrary to her practice. Whenever the interests of this country demand it, or whenever there is a reasonable prospect of benefiting a people, it is the duty of this country, and it is in perfect accordance with the sound principles of international law, to interfere by advice and by exhortation, provided no attempt is made by force to compel the adoption of that advice.

CH. I.] NON-INTERVENTION. 9

To abstain would be to tlirovv away the best means which a powerful State possesses of being extensivelyuseful, whilst it would be leaving to any Governments, little scrupulous as to their means, the opportunity of embroiling those affairs which it is fitting that a just and powerful State should control by its influence, and influence by its example.

Thus Mr. Canning sent Lord Fitzroy Somerset in 1823 to endeavour to obtain from the Spanish Government such modifications of the new constitution as, by satisfying the demands of France — demands which he nevertheless disapproved — would avert the threatened invasion.

And in 1836 the Duke of Wellington sent Lord Eliot to Don Carlos, who was then contending for the succession to the throne of Spain, to negotiate the merciful convention which still bears the name of the negotiator— a convention which, from the skill with which he accomplished a most difiicult task, wiU ever entitle him to the gratitude of the Spanish people.

Sound and friendly advice, or measures even evincing marked displeasure — such as the cessation of diplomatic intercourse — are therefore perfectly compatible with the most complete respect for the rights of an independent nation. It is only when that advice is forcibly imposed upon a weak and unwilling State by its more powerful neighbour that its independent rights are attacked, and that the law of nations, as for a long series of years it was proclaimed, interpreted, and fought for by England, is set at nought and outraged.

Of course the propriety of giving any advice must

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depend on the fitness of the opportunity and the character of the advice. For the abstract right of amicable interference is one thing, its judicious exercise another.

Again, Lord Eussell, in the preface to the new edition of his ' Essay on the British Constitution,' * in complaining 'of the obscurity which prevails in the ' minds of men as to the principles by which British ' policy has been guided in the past, and will be guided ' in the future,' wholly misses the point which occasions the confusion. He says that the obscurity ' arises from ' the double sense which is attached to the term " inter- ' vention," ' which term he thus explains :

' The usual and more proper meaning of the term " intervention " is interference in the internal affairs of ' other nations,

' The neiv and less accurate application of the term ' is to all interference in the disputes of independent ' nations.'

After citing two cases, (1) French intervention in Spain in 1823, (2) Enghsh intervention in Portugal in 1826, which he describes as examples of the two kinds of interference which he has thus defined, and after correctly pointing out that ' great confusion must arise ' from using the same term and applying the same argu- ' ment to these two kinds of interference,' because they were based on wholly different grounds, he observes : ' The first kind of interference should as a rule be forbidden and avoided.' Now this remark would have been just, if he had qualified the rule by the word forcible, coupled with absence of offence ; but the I'ule

* Introduction^ p. 81.

CH. I.] NON-INTERVENTION, 11

as he has laid it down exchides all interference, amicable as well as forcible, even in cases where offence has been given. The omission of these quahfications therefore only serves to intensify the obscurity whicli creates the confusion which he deplores.

Lord Eussell further remarks : ' It is true that France

* has interfered in the internal affairs of Mexico and ' Eome, and that England has interfered in the internal ' affairs of China, but in these instances it has been ' declared that the intervention was exceptional and ' temporary, and was contrary to the general principles ' on which the foreign policy of England and France ' was founded'

The appropriateness of the assertion that ' interven- ' tion is contrary to the general principles on which the ' foreign policy of England is founded,' will be better appreciated when the reader has arrived at the conclusion of this work. But when Lord Eussell describes France as having ' interfered in the internal affairs of Mexico and Eome,' as if the interference was undertaken on the same grounds in both cases, it is evident that he does not rightly apprehend the principle which he undertakes not only to lay down, but to explain.

Lord Eussell truly says that ' all pubhc writers have

* declared that a nation has a right to settle its own form ' of government, provided that it does not injure other ' nations in its mode of doincf so.'

Now the forcible interference of France in the inter nal affairs of Eome was never attempted to be justified by the French Government on the ground of France having received any injury from Eome ; on the contrary, the Prince President distinctly stated that it was decided on because it was ' necessary in order to maintain the pohtical influence of France,' — a plea which is most unjust. But the forcible interference in Mexico was defended on the just and legitimate grounds, that France had received such provocation from the Mexican Government and people as gave her a right of war against them, and these provocations were such as gave France a right to interfere for the establishment of such a Government in Mexico as would secure her from a repetition of them.

In the case of Eome, therefore, the interference was a gross violation of the true rule of non-intervention. In the case of Mexico, the rule, whether correctly or incorrectly laid down, is not applicable. A larger question was at issue — viz. a question as to the right of war against an offending State : acquire that right, and it of course must contain the minor right of forcible internal interference.

Therefore thus to confound the cases of Mexico and Eome by placing them in the same category, serves only to obscure and confuse as to the true principles of the law of nations.

Lord Palmerston himself seems not to have had any clearer idea of the true principle of non-intervention than his noble colleague. For on the occasion of the debate on Chinese affairs (May 20, 1864) he observed : ' My honourable friend (Mr. Buxton) said that the ' principle on which the British Government ought to ' act is that of non-intervention in the affairs of other States ; a very plausible principle, and one which in

CH. I.] NON INTERVENTION. IS

' many cases ought to be strictly adhered to : but my ' honourable friend forgets that there are cases in which ' we have treaty rights, and there are cases in which ' we have national interests ; and if his doctrine were to ' be applied rigidly in every case, our treaty rights ' would be abandoned, and our national interests would ' be sacrificed.'

Now what is the principle which Lord Palmerston and his honourable friend were discussing ?

If it be the correct non-intervention principle, viz., ' abstinence from forcible interference in the internal ' concerns of an independent State which injures not its ' neighbours,' his remarks about treaty rights are obviously irrelevant. For the violation of treaty obhgations, if the State with whom the obligations are contracted requires their fulfilment, is an injury constituting a casus belli. To the abandonment or to the enforcement of treaty rights, the true non-intervention principle, to which the absence of injury is essential, is simply inapplicable.

Not so to what Lord Palmerston describes as ' the sacrifice of national interests ; ' because, if all that is necessary to justify forcible intervention be the promotion of national interests, and if each State has the rio-ht to judge of its own national interests, and to promote them at the expense of its neighbours, then the non-intervention principle, if so to be applied, is not even a ' plausible principle ; ' it is in fact no principle at all. For that maxim can neither be a 'fundamental truth, nor a tenet on which morality is founded,'* which on one day

• Vide Johnson's definition of ' Principle'

' ought to be strictly adhered to,' and on the next to be cast aside as ' a narrow-minded prejudice,' according as supposed national interests may require. When quoted by those who so use it, it is not even a specious pretext.

Here then is a first principle, on the breach or on the observance of which the whole intercourse of nations essentially depends. And yet the most confused and imperfect apprehension of it appears to prevail in quarters in which it could be least expected, and in which more particularly it is important for the safe, just, and consistent management of our foreign affairs that it should be rightly and clearly understood.

Doubtless it is a public misfortune that so it should be, but more or less it accounts for the fact that the British people, with regard to this principle, are for the most part dead to its real significance.

It has, however, been already stated that there are cases in which forcible interference with the internal concerns of an independent State is justifiable ; and those cases are when the condition of those internal concerns is the cause of external injury of sufficient gravity to justify war upon the State inflicting it. Such were the grounds of justification of the Greek treaty in 1827, into which the principle of applying force entered. For if one nation has a right of war against another for unredressed grievances, it has of course a right to adopt any measure, short of war, whereby redress may be obtained.

Every nation then has a right to manage its own concerns as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighcm I.] NON-INTERVENTION. 15

hours. This is the one great principle of international law on which, far more than on any other, depends the free and independent existence of all the less powerful States which form part of the great family of nations. It is one which every Government and every people having a proper sense of law and justice ought resolutely to maintain. Kepeated violations of it can only lead to the re-establishment of that law — if law it can be called — which marked the barbarous ages of the world, viz., the law of the strongest ; a law which, it has been proudly boasted, had been stamped out and extinguished by the united influences of Christianity and civilisation.

N'oTE. — When the Prince de Talleyrand was Ambassador at the court of St. James's, a lady asked him the meaning of non-intervention. He sarcastically replied: 'Madame, non-

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CHAPTEE II.

ADHERENCE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE NON-INTER- VENTION PRINCIPLE FROM THE BREAKING OUT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION IN 1790 TO THE SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE BY THE TREATIES OF VIENNA IN 1815.

Although, according to the principles of truth and justice, the non-intervention principle ought to be encrrossed in the code of international law, and to be acknowledged by all nations, yet it cannot be denied that certain European States have constantly refused to recognise its validity.

Such refusal, of course, increases the difficulty of enforcing this principle ; but it is a difficulty (as has been already shown) inherent to all international laws, no supreme authority existing to decide, in case of difference, what they are, or what they ought to be.

Much, however, may be done towards overcoming this difficulty. For a powerful State can do a great deal towards securing the general recognition of an international law which is really founded in right, by asserting it, and by adhering to it, in its dealings with other States ; and especially by submitting to it, whether advantageous or disadvantageous to its own interest, whenever the time may come that it shall be applicable to itself en. II.] NON-INTERVENTION. 17

With regard, then, to this principle of non-intervention. Great Britain has not always been of the number of those States which have refused to recognise its binding force. On the contrary, it was proclaimed by the Government of Mr. Pitt before this country mingled in the French revolutionary w^ars ; and for the long period of forty years it was resolutely maintained by the British Government, of whatever party it was composed.

To this principle, therefore, this nation was deeply pledged ; not only by affirming it and obeying it, but by denouncing those nations which dared to infringe it.

By this just and consistent conduct the British Government acquired that greatest of advantages whicli a Government can possess, viz. being the one ' trust- ' worthy Government in the midst of Governments ' which no one could trust.'

Those, then, who wish to comprehend the real nature of the position of England amongst foreign nations in the year of our Lord 1864, in the which Denmark was trampled on and despoiled by the two great German Powers — those, then, who wish to find out the causes in which originated that position, and who desire to understand why England had no influence with her German alhes — why her remonstrances were disregarded, and the fierce Parhamentary denunciations of her ministers against the injustice and atrocities which the German nations were perpetratmg on the Danes were treated with contempt, must go a long way further back than to the Danish treaty of 1852. If they would learn why it is that tlie Britisli Govern-

c meiit, which for a long period had been the one trustworthy Government in the midst of Governments which no one could trust, had fallen into the latter category, and become a Government which no one did trust — they must begin their historical retrospect from the breaking out of the French revolution at the beginning of the tenth decade of the eighteenth centuiy. They will then see that the v^ars of the world, since then, have mainly arisen in consequence of the disregard or the rejection, by the different Governments of Europe, of this non-intervention principle ; and that the great war, in which all Europe was involved from 1792 to 1815, originated in the defiance of it by the great German Powers. For, the first important foreign official document which touches on the great social changes in France openly sets at nought this principle. This document is known in history as ' the declaration of Pilnitz ; ' it bears date August 21, 1791. In that State paper the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia proclaimed their intention forcibly to interfere in the internal affairs of France ; for, in the words of the declaration, ' they invoked other Powers, conjointly * with themselves, to employ their forces in order to put ' the King of France in a situation to lay the foundation ' of a monarchical Government conformable ahke to the ' rights of sovereigns and the wellbeing of the French ' nation.' It is true that this declaration became a dead letter, subsequent events in France having created a temporary belief in the minds of the German monarchs, that the King of France might maintain himself at the head of a constitutional monarchy ; but no sooner had en. 11.] NON-INTERVENTION. 19

this liope passed away, than we find that tlie same intentions were again avowed : and the ultimatum (March 1792) offered by Austria to France, as the condition of abandoning liostile preparations, contained demands materially affecting the internal concerns of the latter kingdom, viz. (1) the re-estabhshment of the monarchy on a different footing from the one then existing, (2) the restitution to the clergy of their property of which they had been deprived. This ultimatum was at once rejected ; and its rejection was followed, in the succeeding month, by a declaration of war by France against Austria.

France justified this war to the world, on the grounds which Condorcet states in his celebrated defence of it. ' The French people,' he remarks, ' free to ' fix the form of their Government, can in no respect ' have injured, wdiile using this power, either the safety ' or the honour of foreign crowns. Are the rulers of ' other countries to include in the number of their pre- ' rogatives a right to oblige the French nation to give to ' the head of their Government the same power which ' they themselves exercise in their own dominions? <■ Because they have subjects, do they mean to prevent ' the existence of freemen elsewhere ? How is it that they ' do 7iot see that in allowing themselves to do everything '- for what they call the safety of crowns^ they declare law- '' ful everything that a nation can in like manner do for ' the liberty of another people ? '

It appears, therefore, that the commencement of a war which lasted nearly a quarter of a century mainly originated in the declared intention to violate this non-

c 2 interference principle by Austria and Prussia. For, although it cannot be denied that the mass of tlie French people at that time were eager for war, yet it is equally certain that the avowed intentions of foreign nations to interfere in their internal concerns materially increased their eagerness ; whilst at the same time it gave such strength to the war revolutionary party as enabled them to dethrone the King and to seize the government. Thus Brissot, in his well-known journal ('Patriote Frangais,' Sept. 22, 1792), boasted that ' without the ' war the revolution of the 10th of August never would ' have taken place, — without the war France never ' would have become a repubhc'

In July (1792) this policy was followed up by the celebrated manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, in which the same mientions forcibly to interfere were still more haughtily proclaimed. The dethronement and public execution of the unfortunate Monarch (on whose behalf the Allies were interfering), and the decree of the Convention (Nov. 19, 1792) declaring that ' the French ' nation would grant fraternity and assistance to all ' people who wish to recover their liberty,' followed up by orders to the French generals 'not to allow ' even a shadow of the ancient authorities to remain,' were the practical answers which the French nation returned to the Duke's manifesto.