The great trial of the nineteenth century

Contents

Pago

Preface 5

Dedication 7

Preface

In the preface to his treatise on International Law, William E. Hall says : "Since it has come into existence, it has often been quietly ignored or brutally disregarded." The history of the world from the time of Grotius, "the father of International Law," to the present day proves this to be true. Nearly every great nation has violated that law, "quietly" or "brutally." Great Britain has perhaps been more guilty than any other nation. That the United States has been guilty of the same offense within the last two years is shown by the speeches in this book.

From about one to three pages of the speeches herein ascribed to Mr. Clay, Gen. Grant, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Madison, Count Tolstoi, and Bishop Simpson, respectively, are taken almost literally from their published works. And all of the sentiments and opinions ascribed to the twelve speakers are believed to be in harmony with their respective characters, and to correspond with what they have either done, said, or written.

The greater part of the book was written six months ago. Its completion and publication have been unavoidably delayed till the present time.

Dedication To Abraham Lincoln

In the summer of the year 1860, at my request and for me, you examined and corrected a biography of yourself which I wished to use in the pending presidential campaign.

Nothing in that book was of more interest and importance than that part ofyour speech in Springfield, on the 26th day of June, 18«i/in which you expressed your view of the meaning and object of that part of the Declaration of Independence which declares that "all men are created equal."

In this "view," as given by the. book in question, you made but one correction, substituting the preposition "in" for "with ." This was done three years after the speech was written and delivered. So that "view" is your well-considered and deliberate opinion of the most important question affecting the human race, outside of its eternal destiny.

Dedication to Abraham Lincoln. 9

But a great change lias taken place in this country within the last three years. The attempt which was made forty years ago to fritter away the Declaration, and to leave it no more, at most, than an interesting memorial of the dead past, shorn of its vitality and practical value, and left without the germ or even the suggestion of the individual rights of man in it, as described by you in the speech referred to, has been renewed by men professing to be your followers.

This book is written with the hope that it will tend to expose the folly and madness of this second attempt to destroy the great Declaration of the rights of man. If that hope should be realized, it will be a very great gratifieation.

The Author.

Conclusion

The speech of Bishop Simpson occupied nearly an hour in the delivery. I have given the substance of it, but very imperfectly. The presence and manner of the speaker added much to the effect of it, and the fact of his long and intimate personal and political friendship for Mr. Lincoln added more. He held the undivided attention of the entire audience and the effect of his address was evidently very great.

After the Bishop closed, Mr. Clay took the platform and offered a series of resolutions for adoption by the meeting— declaring that the war against the Filipinos was unjustly and unconstitutionally begun by the President — that they were the owners of their own country and had a right to freedom and independence and self-government, and that no nation had a right to force any form of government upon them against their own consent. And requesting Congress to put an immediate stop to the war, and the President to enter promptly into a treaty of peace with the Filipinos upon the basis of their freedom and independence.

He explained each resolution briefly, and then for a few minutes addressed the meeting, urging their unanimous adoption. It was the most eloquent speech I ever heard. His appeal to those who professed to be followers of Christ was irresistible. He stated that he was himself a member of a Christian church, and that he expected soon to stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, and there to meet the inhabitants of those islands, who had been persecuted so long by professedly Christian men.

He wished to meet them feeling that his garments were not stained with their blood. In that awful presence he wished to know that his robe was white and pure, and he appealed to all his hearers to so vote now and act hereafter that they could feel, in the presence of their final Judge, that they had done their whole duty to these unfortunate people and all others.

The effect of this speech was shown in the vote upon the resolutions. It seemed to be the unanimous voice of twenty thousand people. It seemed to pierce the roof of the building, and to reach the very throne of the Almighty Power before whom Mr. Clay had summoned his audience.

The noise awoke me from my long sleep. The great auditorium, the vast audience, the tall commanding form of the speaker, the sad earnest face of Mr. Lincoln, the benign countenance of Bishop Simpson, the majestic form of Washington— ^the whole wonderful scene in which I had been entranced for so many hours faded away and left nothing behind but the remembrance of a dream.

Appendix

Note to Bishop Simpson's sermon (talven from the Literary Digest for March, 1900).

a* * * Regret is expressed by several papers for the state of affairs pictured in a number of reports from the Philippines, which seem to agree that there is an immense amount of drunkenness among the Americans there. President Schurman, of the Philippine Commission, it will be remembered, said publicly soon after his return to this country: 'I regret that Americans have been allowed to establish saloons in the Philippines, for the Filipinos are a temperate people, and the sight of an intoxicated American dis gusts them. Nothing has done so much damage to the reputation of the American people as this.' Captain Frank M. Wells, chaplain of the First Regiment of Tennessee Volunteers, who describes himself as 'an Administration man clear through,' said in an address in Washington, February 11th, that 'before the American troops entered Manila there were only three saloons in the city, and that in each only soft drinks were sold; but that now there are four hundred saloons, selling whisky. And the drunkenness seems to be as bad afloat as ashore.' He said :

" 'While on board one of the transports to Cebu, I found that liquor-selling was the same as on the other transports. I tried to have it stopped, but failed. I took special care of the men in my regiment, with the determination that if I could not save their souls, I would at least get them to hell sober. I never saw so much liquor on a Mississippi steamboat, and I have traveled on a good many, as I saw on the transport Sheridan the last three days we were in Cebu,'

"Similar testimony was given a few weeks ago by Lieutenant E. Hearne, of the Fifty-first Iowa Volunteers, who had just returned from Manila. In an address in New York City he said :

u <rp]jg Filipinos, while pagans and semi-civilized, are moral and sober. They first learn of Christianity from the profane sailor, and when they see immense numbers of drunken, profane, and immoral soldiers representing this country, they have little respect for the religion they profess. 'If that is your religion,' they say, 'we prefer our own.' The soldier, when associated with others, loses his identity. Then his savage and lower nature displays itself. This is particularly true of the soldier in the Philippines, idle under a tropical sun. He loses all his religion. It is our duty first to send out Christian soldiers if we expect to make any sort of impression on the people there.'

"Mr, W. B. Miller, who has charge of the Army and Navy work of the Young Men's Christian Association, said in an address at the same meeting:

" 'So great was the effect of the drunkenness and irreverence of the American soldier in the Philippines that one man, writing to me from Manila, said that two missionaries gave up their work among the natives and went to work on the army. They realized the uselessness of their work when there was an immoral and drunken army representing this country on hand. One drunken soldier can do more evil than two missionaries can undo. The sending of whisky and questionable things to Manila is not a badge of honor for this country.'

"The latest report from Manila on this phase of expansion comes from Mr. H. Irving Hancock, Manila correspondent of Leslie's WeeMy, who says :

" *0f all the problems that confront us in the reconstruction of the Philippines, the gravest and wickedest is one of our own importation. The Manila saloons, taken collectively, are the worst possible kind of a blot on Uncle Sam's fair name. The city's air reeks with the odors of the worst of English liquors. And all this has come to pass since the 13th day of August, 1898! * * * * To-day there is no thoroughfare of length in Manila that has not its long line of saloons. The street-cars carry flaunting advertisements of this brand of whisky and that kind of gin. The local papers derive their main revenue from the displayed advertisements of firms and companies eager for their share of Manila's drink-money. The cit}^ presents to the new-comer a Saturnalia of alcoholism. * * *

" 'I do not mean this as a tirade against all saloons. It is only a much-needed protest against the worst features of the American saloon that have crept into Manila arm in arm with our boasted progress. There is nowhere in the world such an excessive amount of drinking, per capita, as among the few thousand Americans at present living in Manila. Nor does this mean that we have sent the worst dregs of Americanism there. Far from it ; some of the best American blood is represented in Manila. There are men of brains and attainment there, who would nobly hold up our name were it not for the saloon at every step. Gamblers and depraved women — in both classes the very dregs of this and other countries — have followed, and work hand in hand with their

124 TJie Great Trial of the

natural ally. These people are fast teaching the natives the depths of Caucasian wickedness, and the natives imagine it is Americanism. * « * *

" 'Chairman Schurman of the Philippine Commission voices his regret that the American saloon was ever permitted to make its advent in Manila. Well may he regret it, as may every other American too who has been in Manila during the past year. It is a great mistake to suppose that every officer, soldier, and sailor in the Philippines is drinking to excess, but some of them do, and the same is true of a great percentage of the civilians. The native is not discriminating, and attributes this vice to all Americans. If saloons were carefully and honestly restricted in number and put under the rigid regulations that decency requires, this shame of Uncle Sam would quickly vanish. It is the glaring opportunity for drunkenness that does so much harm.

" 'So far as my observation went, I found that the military authorities of Manila were not on record as having done anything to abate this crying disgrace. Indeed, one American officer, fairly high in the councils at the palace, is the putative head of the concern that is doing the most to encourage and supply the thirst of Manila. We tried to civilize the Indian, and incidentally wiped him off the earth by permitting disreputable white traders to supply him with ardent liquors. Are we to repeat this disgrace tenfold, as we at present seem fair to do, in the Philippines?' "

''A Crime Against a People. — The American soldiers, however, might drink themselves into death or idiocy, and it would be of less ultimate consequence than the simple fact of the introduction of the liquor traffic into the Philippine

Islands. In one respect, at least, the civilization of the Filipinos was superior to our own, and that was in the use of intoxicating drinks. All travelers have testified to their tem- I>erateness and their very slight use of intoxicants. Our first step has been to flood their towns and cities with whisky, and thus break down a conspicuous native virtue. For this liquor curse must remain in the Philippines long after the bulk of the American army has been withdrawn. It is the experience in all tropical countries that the whisky habit, once it secures a foot-hold, is difficult to extirpate. Whisky is a great decimater of tropical populations.

"The seriousness of the crime thus committed must be confessed by the Government itself, since, in its view, the Filipinos must be regarded as children. What would the world think of a nation that deliberately or heedlessly led millions of children into the liquor habit for the sake of profit? It is certainly remarkable that the Government, while regarding the Filipinos as children in their political capacity to govern themselves, should regard them as thoroughly mature in their capacity to govern their physical appetites. The Government has been extremely solicitous not to grant the Filipinos self-rule in political affairs, yet it has left them the prey of American rum-sellers in social affairs.

"One does not need to be a prohibitionist in the United States to believe that the sudden and unrestrained introduction of the liquor traffic into a country where it had never before existed was a crime against heaven and earth. The traffic could have been forbidden at the outset by one man; it could be forbidden to-day by one man, because the whole archipelago is under martial law." — The Springfield Republican.

Extract from a speech delivered at a great public dinner given to Mr. Webster at Philadelphia, on the 2d of Decf^mber, 1846, on the "War Power."

"* * * But the annexation was completed. The western boundary was a matter about which disputes existed or must arise. There was, as between us and Mexico, as there had been between Texas and Mexico, no ascertained and acknowledged western boundary.

"This was the state of things after the annexation of Texas, and when the President began military movements in that direction. Now, gentlemen, that I may misrepresent nobody, and say nothing which has not been clearly proved by official evidence, I will proceed to state to you three propositions, which, in my opinion, are fairly sustained by the correspondence of the government in its various branches and departments, as officially communicated to Congress.

"First — That the President directed the occupation of a territory by force of arms, to which the United States had no ascertained title; a territory which, if claimed by the United States, was also claimed by Mexico, and was at the time in her actual occupation and possession.

"The Texan convention was to assemble July 4, 1845, to pass upon the annexation. Before this date, to-wit, on the 28th day of May, General Taylor was ordered to move towards Texas ; and on the 15th day of June he was instructed by a letter from Mr. Bancroft to enter Texas and concentrate his forces on its 'western boundary,' and to select and occupy a position 'on or near the Rio Grande, to protect what, in the event of annexation, will be our western border.'

"That the United States had no ascertained title to the territory appears from Mr. Marcy's letter to General Taylor of July 30, 1845. General Taylor is there informed that what he is to 'occupy, defend, and protect' is 'the territory of Texas, to the extent that it has been occupied by the people of Texas.' It appears in the dispatch last quoted, that this territory had been occupied by Mexico.

"Mr. Marcy goes on to say : 'The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexation, or shortly before that event.'

"This makes it perfectly clear that the United States had neither an ascertained nor an apparent title to this territory ; for it admits that Texas only made a claim to it, Mexico having an adverse claim, and having also actual possession.

"Second — That as early as July, 1845, the President knew as well as others acquainted with the subject, that this territory was in the actual possession of Mexico; that it contained Mexican settlements, over which Texas had not exercised jurisdiction, up to the time of annexation.

"On the 8th of July the Secretary of War wrote to General Taylor that 'this department is informed that Mexico has some military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, which are, and for some time have been, in the actual occupancy of her troops.' On the 30th of July the Secretary wrote as already mentioned, directing General Taylor to except from his protection 'any posts on the eastern side thereof [of the Rio Grande] which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexation, or shortly before that event.'

"It manifestly appears to have been the intention of the President, from the 28th day of May down to the consummation of his purpose, to take possession of this territory by force of arms, however unwilling Mexico might be to yield it, or whatever might turn out on examination to be her right to retain it. He intended to extinguish the Mexican title by force; otherwise his acts and instructions are inexplicable.

"The government maintained from the first, that the Rio Grande was the western boundary of Texas, as appears from the letters to General Taylor of the 28th day of May and 15th day of June, 1845. On the 15th day of June, General Taylor was instructed to take such a position 'on or near the Rio Grande' as 'will be best to repel invasion and protect what, in the event of annexation, will be our western boundary.' In accordance with these are also the instructions of July 30th, to which I have already referred.

"On the 6th day of August the Secretary wrote to General Taylor; 'Although a state of war with Mexico or an invasion of Texas by her forces may not take place, it is, nevertheless, deemed proper and necessary that your force should be fully equal to nieet with certainty of success any crisis which may arise in Texas, and which would require you by force -of arms to carry out the instructions of the government.' He is then, in the same letter, authorized to procure volunteers from Texas. On the 23d day of August the Secretary instructed General Taylor thus: 'Should Mexico assemble a large body of troops on the Rio Grande, and cross it with a considerable force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of hostilities.' He is then instructed how to assemble a large force. On the 30th day of August he was instructed, in case any Mexican force crossed the Rio Grande, 'to drive all Mexican troops beyond it'; that any attempt by the Mexicans to cross the river with a considerable force would be regarded as an invasion; and that on such an event, namely, 'in case of war, either declared or made manifest by hostile acts,' he was not to confine his action within the territory of Texas. On the 16th day of October the Secretary wrote that 'the information which we have here renders it probable that no serious attempt will, at present, be made by Mexico to invade Texas.' But General Taylor is still instructed to hold the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. 'Previous instructions will have put you in possession of the views of the government of the United States, not only as to the extent of its territorial claims, but of its determination to assert them.'

"He is directed to put his troops into winter quarters, accordingly, as near the Rio Grande as circumstances will permit. Up to this time and to the 11th day of March, 1846, General Taylor was at Corpus Christi. The open and decided step was taken on the 13tli day of January. On that day the Secretary of War directed General Taylor to march to the Rio Grande and to take up a position opposite Matamoras. He is instructed, in so doing, in case Mexico should declare war, or commit any open act of hostility, not to act merely on the defensive. Throughout the correspondence it is plain that the intention was to extinguish the Mexican title to this territory by armed occupation; and the instructions are explicit, to treat every assertion of title or movement on the part of Mexico as an act of hostility and to proceed accordingly and resist it.

"To show how Gen. Taylor understood the instructions of his government, it may be observed that on the 2d day of March, thirty miles from Matamoras, at a stream called the Arroyo Colorado, he was met by a party of Mexicans, whose commanding officer informed him that if he crossed the stream, it would be deemed a declaration of war, and put into his hand a copy of General Mejias's proclamation to that effect. Notwithstanding this, General Taylor put his forces in order of battle, crossed the stream, and pushed on, the Mexicans retreating. He arrived on the Rio Grande, opposite Matamoras, on the 29th day of March.

"Let me now ask your attention to an extract from a letter from Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Slidell, of January 20, 1846. In this letter Mr. Buchanan says:

" 'In the mean time the President, in anticipation of the final refusal of the Mexican government to receive you, has ordered the Army of Texas to advance and take position on the left bank of the Rio Grande; and has directed that a strong fleet shall be immediately assembled in the Gulf of Mexico. He will thus be prepared to act with vigor and promptitude the moment that Congress shall give him the authority.'

"Now, if, by this advance of troops, possession would be taken on the extreme line claimed by us, what further vigorous action did the President expect Congress to authorize? Did he expect Congress to make a general declaration of war? Congress was then in session. Why not consult it? Why take a step not made necessary by any pressing danger, and which might naturally lead to war, without requiring the authority of Congress in advance? With Congress is the power of peace and war; to anticipate its decision by the adoption of measures leading to war is nothing less than an executive interference with the legislative power. Nothing but the necessity of self-defense could justify the sending of troops into a territory claimed and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed. And there was, I think, no case of such necessity of self-defence. Mr. Slidell replied to Mr. Buchanan on the 17th day of February, saying: The advance of General Taylor's force to the left bank of the Rio Grande and the strengthening of our squadron in the Gulf are wise measures, which may exercise a salutary influence upon the course of this government.'

"The army was thus ordered to the extreme limits of our claim; to our utmost boundary, as asserted by ourselves; and here it was to be prepared to act further, and to act with promptitude and vigor. Now, it is a very significant inquiry, 'Did the President mean by this to bring on, or to run the risk of bringing on, a general war?' Did he expect to be authorized by Congress to prosecute a general war of invasion and acquisition? I repeat the question, Why not take the opinion of Congress, it then being in session, before any Vi:r-like movement was made? Mr. Buchanan's letter is of t/:i' 20th day of January. The instructions to march to the I!io Grande had been given on the 13th. Congress was in stssion all this time; and why should, and why did, the executive take so important a step, not necessary for self-defence and leading to immediate war, without the authority of Congress? This is a grave question and well deserves an answer.

"Allow me to repeat, for it is a matter of history, that before and at the time when these troops were ordered to the left bank of the Rio Grande there was no danger of invasion by Mexico or apprehension of hostilities by her. This is perfectly evident from General Taylor's letters to the government through the preceding summer and down to the time the orders were given.

"I now refer to these letters.

"On the loth day of August, General Taylor writes : ^In regard to the force at other points on the Rio Grande, except the militia of the country, I have no information; nor do I hear that the reported concentration at Matamoras is for any purpose of invasion.' On the 20th day of August he says: 'Caravans of traders arrive occasionally from the Rio Grande, but bring no news of importance. They represent that there are no regular troops on that river except at Matamoras, and do not seem to be aware of any preparations for a demonstration on this bank of the river.' On the 6th day

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of September he writes thus: 'I have the honor to report that a confidential agent, despatched some days since to Matamoras, has returned and reports that no extraordinary preparations are going forward there ; that the garrison does not seem to have been increased, and that our consul is of the opinion that there will be no declaration of war.' On the 11th day of October he says: 'Recent arrivals from the Rio Grande bring no news or information of a different aspect from that which I reported in my last. The views expressed in previous communications relative to the pacific disposition of the border people on both sides of the river are continually confirmed.' This was the last dispatch, I presume, received by the War Department before giving the order of January 13th for the march of the army.

"A month after the order of march had been given all General Taylor's previous accounts were confirmed by him. On the 16th day of February he thus writes to the Adjutant- General at Washington : 'Many reports will doubtless reach the Department giving exaggerated accounts of Mexican preparations to resist our advance, if not indeed to attempt an invasion of Texas. Such reports have been circulated even at this place, and owe their origin to personal interests connected with the stay of the army here. I trust they will receive no attention at the War Department. From the best information I am able to obtain, and which I deem as authentic as any, I do not believe that our advance to the banks of the Rio Grande will be resisted. The army, however, will go fully prepared for a state of hostilities, should they unfortunately be provoked by the Mexicans.'

"This oflScial correspondence proves, I think, that there was no danger of invasion or of hostilities of any kind from Mexico at the time of the march of the army. It must, in fact, be plain to everybody that the ordering of the army to the Rio Grande was a step naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities and to bring on war. I shall use no inflammatory or exciting language, but it seems to me that this whole proceeding is against the spirit of the Constitution and the just limitations of the different departments of the government; an act pregnant with serious consequences and of dangerous precedent to the public liberties.

^'No power but Congress can declare war. But what is the value of this constitutional provision if the President of his own authority may make such military movements as must bring on war? If the war power be in Congress, then everything tending directly or naturally to bring on war should be referred to the discretion of Congress. Was this order of march given in the idle hope of coercing Mexico to treat? If so, idle it was, as the event proved. But it was something worse than a mistake or a blunder; it was, as it seems to me, an extension of executive authority of a very dangerous character. I see no necessity for it and no apology for it, since Congress was in session at the same moment at the other end of Pennsylvania iVvenue, and might have been consulted."

Extracts from a speech of Mr. Clay iu the House of Representatives March 24, 1818, on his motion providing for a minister to the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.

This speech contains the true, well-settled American doctrine, against which the United States is fighting in the Philippine Islands.

«*»♦«» ugy^ J j^^^Q ^ broader and a bolder position. I maintain that an oppressed people are authorized, whenever they can, to rise and to break their fetters. This was the great principle of the English Revolution. It was the great principle of our own. Vattel, if authority were wanting, expressly supports this right. We must pass sentence of condemnation upon the founders of our liberty, say that they were rebels, traitors, and that we are at this moment legislating without competent powers, before we can condemn the cause of Spanish America. Our Revolution was mainly directed against the mere theory of tyranny. We had suffered comparatively but little; we had, in some respects, been kindly treated; but our intrepid and intelligent fathers saw, in the usurpation of the power to levy an inconsiderable tax, the long train of oppressive acts that were to follow. They rose, they breasted the storm, they achieved our freedom. Spanish America for centuries has been doomed to the practical effects of an odious tyranny. If we were justified, she is more than justified."