Germany and its evolution in modern times

Introduction

Religious and scientific mental outlook — The development of rationalism — Modern antagonism between religion and science — Repugnance of Germany to radical solutions . xiii-xxv

Book I Economic Evolution The Development Of The System Of Capitalistic Enterprise

Beginnings of the capitahstic system in Germany — The ideal of sustenance — Development of free enterprise — Economic emancipation of Prussia after Jena .... pp. 3-7

Stages in the development of capitalism — Germany at the beginning of the century — Period between 1800 and 1848 — Economic stride after 1848 — Speculative madness after 1870 — The triumphs of German industry at the end of the century ........ pp. 7-17

THE EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF ENTERPRISE UPON THE OLD FORMS OF INDUSTRY

I. Domestic industry — Disappearance of domestic work among

the peasantry — The domestic industry of the country districts

— The great domestic industries of the towns . pp. 18-22

II. The trades — Their ancient organisation — Gradual dissolution of

V vi CONTENTS

the guild system — The craftsman's work menaced by the competition of great industries — Economic and social decadence of the artisan class . . . . . • PP- 22-27

THE EFFECT OF CAPITALISTIC ENTERPRISE UPON AGRICULTURE

Agrarian evolution — Increase of production during tlie century — The law of the concentration of capital not applicable to agriculture — Substitution of private exploitation for collective exploitation — Liquidation of feudal property — Its results for the large landowners and for the peasantry — Evolution of customs in the rural class .... pp. 28-36

The Agrarian crisis — Its causes : competition of new countries, the debt on landed property — Its effects on the nobility and the peasantry — Diminution of the importance of agriculture in the life of the nation ..... pp. 36-47

Social effects of the system of enterprise — The old classes : the nobility, the middle class, the people — The modern classes : the aristocracy of enterprise and the army of labour — Formation and evolution of the proletariat in Germany pp. 48-57

General results of the economic evolution — The good and evil of the system of enterprise — Signs of a reaction against tho system of um-estricted competition . . . pp. 57-61

Book II Political Evolution The Problem Of German Liberty And

UNITY

1 . Weakness of Germany at the beginning of the century — Absence

of unity and hberal institutions . . . pp. 65-72

II. Austria — Metternich's policy of stability — Austria hostile to

the movement toward unity and Liberalism . pp. 72-76

CONTENTS vii

III. Pnissia — Prussian power — Sympathy of Prussia with the desire for unity — The Prussian monarchy and Liberal aspirations : its evolution towards a constitutional system — Reforms of Stein and Hardenberg — The divided state of Germany . pp. 7G-85

THE IDEALISTIC STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND UNITY

I. The beginnings of Liberalism — Its original idealistic character — The " organic " evolution of political institutions in Prussia — The " inorganic " character of the political evolution of the southern states of Germany .... pp. 86-101

II. The evolution of Liberalism — Nationalistic tendencies — Radical tendencies ...... pp. 101-104

III. The Revolution of 1848-49 — Its explosion in Germany — The Parliament of Frankfort — Its impotence against the German princes — The futility of its efforts to realise German unity— The reasons for this failure . . . . pp. 105-113

THE FOUNDATION OF GERMAN UNITY

I. The new turn of mind — The development of the realistic and positive spirit — Bismarck the typical representative of the realistic era : his will to power ; his intellectual lucidity ; his nervous sensitiveness ..... pp. 114-120

II. The realisation of German unity — The conquest of Germany by Prussia — The Zollverein — Failure of the Union — The reaction in Germany and in Prussia — The restoration of Prussian power — The struggle for supremacy with Austria : Sadowa — The war of 1870: its causes; responsibility for it of France and Germany respectively — The restoration of the German Empire ..... pp. 120-137

THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND HER FOREIGN POLICY

I. European policy of Germany — Its pacific tendencies — The necessity for developing the power of Germany — France and viii CONTENTS

Germany after 1870 — The German army — Germany's alliances — Armed peace ...... pp. 138-148

II. Universal policy — " Greater Germany " — Germans outside Germany— German interests abroad — Constitution of a colonial

empire PP- 149-157

III. German imperialism — Nationalism and imperialism — The conflicting interests of agriculture and industry in Germany — The Government as arbitrator . . . pp. 157-165

CHAPTER V

THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND HER HOME POLICY

I. The internal hfe of Germany — Increasingly realistic conception of the idea of party : conflict of principles changed to conflict of classes and interests .... pp. 166-169

II. The Sociahst Party — Utopian Socialism — Evolution towards an increasingly' practical activity — Revolutionaries and reformers— Syndicalism .... pp. 169-175

III. The Liberal Party — Its idealistic beginnings — It becomes the middle-class party — Evolution of the National Liberal Party : it becomes the poUtical organ of the great industries pp. 175-179

IV. The Conservative Party — Its behef in authority and its particularism— Positive ambitions of the Conservatives — Their reconciliation with Bismarck — They constitute themselves the defenders of agricultural interests : the Bund der Landwirte ....... pp. 179-184

V. The Cathohc Centre Party. ... pp. 184-185

VI. General results of the evolution of parties — Decadence of

parliamentary hfe — Disappearance of all political idealism —

The parties and the Emperor . . . pp. 186-190

CHAPTER VI

I. Education poUcy — Gradual secularisation of public instruction — Nevertheless, the Church keeps some influence over teaching — Increasingly realistic and democratic character of modern teaching ....... pp. 191-199

II. Social poHcy — Social associations and protection of workmen — Intervention of the German State in the social question — Social pohcy of Bismarck : the social insurance laws — Accession of William II : era of reforms and subsequently of reaction — Renewal of social idealism in the Germany of . to-day pp. 199-210

CONTENTS ix

Book III The Evolution Of Religious And Philosophical Thought

THE RENAISSANCE OF CATHOLICISM IN GERMANY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I. The development of scientific rationalism transforms the " religion " of the modern man . . . pp. 213-2M II. The decline and revival of Roman Catholicism at the beginning of the nineteenth century — Reformed Catholicism — Apparent decUne of Roman Catholicism — Reaction towards positive forms in religion — The alliance between the Throne and the Altar against the Revolution — The struggle for Catholic " liberty " — The decline of reformed Catholicism — The romanticist movement favoiu-s the progress of Catholicism among the elite — Progress of CathoHcism in the lowest layers of the nation ; the Catholic associations .... pp. 2I4-23G

THE PROGRESS OF CATHOLICISM DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I. The triumph of Roman Catholicism over reformed Catholicism — Hermesianism — The " German Catholic " movement — The

" Old CathoHcs " pp. 237-240

II. Conflicts between the Church and the State — The gradual emancipation of Catholicism during the first sixty-five years of the nineteenth century — The conflict between the power of the Pope and the new German Empire — The Kulturkampf — The reconciliation between the Centre and the Government — The Centre as a government party — William TI. and Catholicism—" PoUtical " and " ideahstic " Catholicism pp. 240-250

X CONTENTS

I. Fundamental tendencies of Protestantism — Catholic " semi-rationalism " and Protestant " irrationalism " — Protestantism proclaims the independence of reason and faith — It tends to conciUate science and rehgion — Definition of the domains of rehgion, metaphysics, and morality . . pp. 251-258

II. Protestant mysticism — The mystic element in the religion of Luther — Pietism : its fundamental characteristics — Its evolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — The awakening — Modern and contemporary pietism pp. 259-268

III. Protestant subjectivism — Gradual crumbling away of dogma ; radical subjectivism of Schleiermacher — Gradual elimination of the historical elements from Christianity ; the rationalism of the eighteenth century — the mythical interpretation of the Bible stories — Religion stripped of its absolute character pp. 268-279

IV. Attempts to reconcile science and rehgion — The rationahsm of the eighteenth century — The idealism of the nineteenth century — Kantianism ; modern evolution of idealis tic philosophy-— Contemporary Protestant idealism . pp. 279-290

I. Protestant orthodoxy — Restoration of the idea of orthodoxy — Orthodoxy and pietism in the nineteenth century — Conflict between the "positive" tendency and the "negative" tendency pp. 291-297

II. The Protestant Church — The idea of a Church in the Middle Ages — Protestantism replaces the institution of an ecclesiastical hierarchy by the notion of universal priesthood — The Protestant Church under the rule of the State — Necessary rupture between Church and State — The official Church and the Free Churches — Divorce between the official Chiu-ch and the Protestant spirit — Antagonism between Protestant subjectivism and the idea of a Church . . pp. 297-312

CHAPTER V

I. Materialism — Its diffusion in the nineteenth century — The causes of its progress — The real discredit of materialism among the cultured minority .... pp. 313-323

CONTENTS xi

II. Positivism — It springs up in opposition to metaphysical dogmatism— Its diffusion in the nineteenth century pp. 323-328

III. Pessimism — Formation of the doctrine of pessimism — Its diffusion in the second half of the century — Reaction against pessimism ....•• PP- 328-334

IV. Naturalism— The Nihilism of Nietzsche — The transvaluation of all values and Dionysianism — Nietzsche is one of the typical representatives of the modern mind pp. 334-342

V. Contemporary tendencies — The hatred encountered by Nietzschean Radicalism in Germany — Contemporary aspirations to a new classicism; the "return to Goethe " . pp. 342-347

Book IV Evolution In Art

I. The cult of art — Classic conception of art ; the neo-Hellenism of Goethe — The glorification of art among the romanticists — Diffusion of the cult of art in the nineteenth century pp. 351-362

II. Reaction against the cult of art — Art and culture considered as

the products of industry — Progress of utihtarian realism — Art subordinated to science — Ai't in the service of life — Democratic art — The desire of the people for art . . pp. 362-378

ROMANTICISM, REALISM, AND IMPRESSIONISM

I. Romanticism — At first a continuation of classicism — Its characteristics : Subjectivism — Lyricism — Evolution of romanticism towards a national and popular art . . pp. 379-392

II. Realism — Dissolution of romanticism — Diffusion of realistic tendencies pp. 392-396

III. Impressionism — Gradual refinement of nervous sensitiveness in the nineteenth century — Development of impressionism in music — Impressionism in painting and poetry — Impressionism and " decadence "..... pp. 397-406 xii CONTENTS

I. The synthetic work of art in the domain of poetry and music — Correspondence of sensations — Wagner's musical drama — ■ Criticism of Wagnerism . . . . pp. 407-414

II. The synthetic work of art in the domain of the plastic arts — Search for a new style — Period of imitating the old styles — The tendencies of contemporary art industries pp. 414-419

Conclusion

Will to power and solidarity — The development of German power — The instinct for order and discipline — Change from a combative to a solidaristic idea of life . . . pp. 420-430

INTRODUCTION

The great fact which strikes us when we compare the present day with the ages that have preceded it is the enormous growth in human power which took place during the course of the last century. It is possible to have some doubts about the " progress " of humanity, in the sense that it is very far from certain that the man of to-day is happier, wiser, or even in a safer position than he was formerly. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that the sum-total of human power in the face of nature has increased enormously. The conquest and subjugation of elemental forces by the intelligence of man made a tremendous stride during the nineteenth century. Man no longer regards the Universe in the same way or with the same feelings as he once did. Even his mental outlook has been profoundly modified, and, to use an expression which is continually recurring in the works of German critics, it has developed in the direction of " subjectivity." The Middle Ages were filled above all with a deep sense of our helplessness in the face of forces far more powerful than ourselves. If we examine the state of mind which prevailed, even towards the beginning of the fifteenth century, we find that the most fundamental difference between ourselves and the men of that period was the fact that they had no conception

xiii xiv INTRODUCTION

of causality. We live under the firm conviction that every circumstance, without exception, can be explained as the effect of one or more causes. We admit the existence of an inexorable bond of causation between all phenomena — a rule which admits of no exceptions ; and we force ourselves throughout the whole range of our experience to grasp clearly the chain of cause and effect. Even when we cannot find this relation, we are convinced that it exists and that greater scientific knowledge would enable us to discover it. It is this fundamental conviction which was above all lacking in the man of the Middle Ages. His knowledge of the outside world was still very limited in range, and, unlike his modern brother, he had not got at his disposal an enormous number of systematised experiences, which had been classified and organised. His intelligence in the presence of every fact and event did not imperatively demand a causal explanation. In order to get his bearings and to find his way in the midst of the chaos of phenomena, he was content at every turn to reason by analogies which were more or less haphazard and superficial, and not to pursue a course of rigorous induction. It is not surprising, therefore, that in addition to a very restricted group of phenomena, in which experience had taught him to trace a certain regularity, he gladly postulated the existence in our very midst of a far vaster realm of miracles, which was independent of natural laws, and which, at any moment could break the normal chain of events. Nor is it surprising, either, that, in the absence of firmly established positive science, and by reason of the insignificant sum of experience that can be acquired by a single individual, the traditional wisdom bequeathed from the past should have

INTRODUCTION xv

exercised powerful authority over him. Indeed, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that a rehgion founded on a behef in miracles and based on the authority of long tradition should have dominated the spirits and imposed itself with irresistible force upon men's intelligence as well as their will.

How different is the mental attitude of the modern man!

Whilst the intellect of the Middle Ages bowed willingly before the authority of tradition, and saw miracles in everything, and the hidden, arbitrary, mysterious influence of superior powers in the world of phenomena, modern thought becomes ever more resolutely self-reliant. The intellectual horizon of mankind spreads to vast distances ; the sum-total of human experience, classified and docketed, grows greater every day. Science and the scientific instinct developed along parallel lines. Belief in the absolute determinism of phenomena has slowly taken the place of faith in the supernatural ; rigorous inductive reasoning has supplanted reasoning by analogy. At the same time, there has sprung up, chiefly during the last three centuries, a wider and more complete knowledge of the universe based upon reason and experiment. Through the great discoveries of Simon Stevin, Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Leibnitz, Euler, d'Alembert, and Laplace, mathematics and mechanics were placed upon a firm basis during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the empirical sciences in their turn leave the stage of blind groping. Lavoisier inaugurated the era of modern chemistrj^ Galvani and Volta that of electricity. And during the nineteenth century a vast conception of the mechanistic unity of the world was xvi INTRODUCTION

gradually elaborated. Human intelligence learnt to consider all the physical forces of nature in turn — mechanical processes, heat, light, sound, and electricity— as so many different expressions for one and the same fundamental power which manifests itself in every natural phenomenon, but remains unchanged in essence. It thus proved the unity of the forces of nature, and established the fact that everywhere and in every shape force obeys a fundamental cosmic law — the law of the conservation of energy and of the constancy of force and matter in the universe. Pushing its conquests yet further afield, it attempted at last to extend these laws to organic nature. In one of the simple, elementary substances — carbon — it unveiled the marvellous material which determines the formation of an infinite variety of organic bodies, and which, consequently, represents the chemical basis of life (Haeckel) ; it finds in the simple, solitary cell, the elementary organism which by successive combinations gives birth to all the tissues composing vegetable or animal organisms. With the theory of evolution, prophetically foreshadowed by Goethe at the end of the eighteenth century and scientifically formulated in 1859 by Darwin, it extended the mechanistic theory to the realm of biology and proclaimed that the universe as a whole was nothing more than an eternal evolution of matter.

But reason did not rest satisfied with postulating an explanation of the universe based upon the principle of causality ; it was not content with theory alone — it became practical, it acted, it created. In proportion as it acquired a sounder knowledge of the laws which govern phenomena, it learnt to subdue the forces of nature, to train them and make them

INTRODUCTION xvii

work for its own profit. At the same time as it founded science, it also instituted a rational method of dealing with technical processes.

These, in the old days, were essentially empirical. The artisan knew, through having learnt it from his predecessors, how to set about obtaining a given result or product. His master had transmitted to him, through the channel of practical work, the knowledge gained by experience and the various processes by means of which a certain article was produced. And, in his ignorance of the laws of nature, he applied these formulae without knowing, as a rule, how or why they gave the desired results. Sometimes a lucky fluke provided him with a clue to a new process by which he could gain his end with greater speed and certainty, and in such a case he enriched by some new rule the technical code, which he bequeathed to the generation to follow. But this code still remained a collection of empirical formulae fortuitously discovered and not a well-coordinated body of reasoned and scientifically correct knowledge.

Now the distinguishing feature of modern technical processes is precisely the gradual substitution of rational knowledge for empiricism and of scientific methods for traditional formulae. Thus scientific knowledge has, as its corollary, a profound modification of all technical processes, which gradually assume an entirely new complexion. What is the goal towards which natural science is tending ? It is essentially directed towards reducing differences of quality to difference of quantity, towards finding a mathematical formula for giving an adequate explanation of some natural fact, and finally towards bringing down all the phenomena of organic life to b xviii INTRODUCTION

the increasingly complex movements of primordial elements, which, in essence, are the same as those which constitute inorganic bodies. Similarly, modern technical processes in all their various forms — mechanics, thermophysics, chemistry, electricity, etc. ^-tend everywhere to eliminate living agents and to substitute dead elements in their stead ; to replace, for instance, human or animal motive power by steam or electricity, workers made of flesh and bone by instruments of iron and steel and by machinery ; natural organic products such as wood, vegetable colours, and manure, by artificial inorganic products like coal and iron, aniline dyes, and chemical manures. Thus technical processes become ever more exact, impersonal and independent of time and space ; they no longer depend upon capacity, whether natural or acquired — manual dexterity, keensightedness, hearing, taste, or smell — among various classes of men ; they operate with the rigorous, impartial, unswerving accuracy of a machine ; they are not obliged to submit to conditions of time and place, to which the natural growth of animal or vegetable organisms is subject, but produce the results they wish to obtain by means of an artificial combination of elements and forces which are always at their disposal. They are no longer more or less delicate arts, whose secrets it would be possible to lose, but definite acquisitions, for all time and all nations, of the knowledge common to all mankind.

Thus the development of science and of technical processes based upon reason increased the power of man and his dominion over nature to inordinate proportions. And under these circumstances we also find a profound change in his entire attitude towards life and the world.

INTRODUCTION xix

In the ]Middle Ages, as we saw, man felt himself essentially a dependent creature. In all the departments of his material or spiritual life he obeyed either God or tradition. In the domain of religion, the Bible or the Church gave him for all great metaphysical problems a definite and complete solution inspired by God Himself, which he was expected to accept without reservation or discussion. Morality was imposed upon him as a divine ordinance which he should humbly obey. The organisation of society, founded upon ancient tradition, was also invested with a semi-sacred character. In all the important acts of his life, man obeyed a command given by a power whose will was infinitely above his own, and to whom a humble and resigned submissiveness was the only possible attitude.

Now, it is precisely this submissive attitude towards an outside authority which is modified as man gains consciousness of his own power. For centuries Christianity provided men of the western world with a cosmology— an explanation of historic evolution, an interpretation of the meaning of life and a rule of conduct ; for centuries they had inscribed Faith at the head of their Table of Values. But as rational knowledge grew, together with the power of organisation which such knowledge confers, man learned self-confidence. Science now rose up as a rival to Faith. Proud of her magnificent victories, Reason aspired to usurp the place of Religion in all departments of human life. She in her turn raised her eyes towards the first place upon the Table of Values. Since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rationalistic movement has resulted in gigantic synthetic constructions, such as the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, in which Reason,

XX INTRODUCTION

elevated to the tribunal of the supreme judge of truth, sets herself the task of constructing, by the light of her own illumination alone, and independent of all authority, of all tradition and all revelation, an order of the Universe. At the beginning of the modern era, German thought, in the persons of Kant and Fichte, announced, with no uncertain voice, the great principle of Free Will. This disturbed the connection which was hitherto regarded as existing between religion and morality. The old order of ethics, which attributed the principles of morality to the Divine Will and curbed the human will by the ordinances of God, was, for Kant, a heteronomous morality, founded upon the principle of authority, which he repulsed with all the force at his command. In maintaining that " Pure Will," or will determined by pure Reason, and swayed exclusively by the law she lays down for herself, is the principle of all true morality, and by proclaiming that there is no authority in the world which can command human Liberty, that man is his own lawgiver, and that in obeying the moral law it is the voice of his own Reason to which he listens, Kant accomplished, in the domain of ethics, a task which in its bearings was truly colossal and inaugurated a new era in the history of moral consciousness. Through him the human race became definitely conscious of its autonomy.

The idea of human autonomy was from that time forward proclaimed with ever-increasing strength. Humanity learned to believe ever more and more firmly that the thinking and active " subject " recognises no power above himself before whom he should bow. The modern man has a growing conviction that he should not obey, but command and organise. He resolutely faces the problem of the

INTRODUCTION xxi

rational exploitation of the universe, and he labours at the scientific organisation of life in all its aspects — moral, economic, social, and political.

In its most extreme and paradoxical form, the subjectivism of our day proclaims with Nietzsche that " God is dead," denies not only the transcendental deity of the theologian, but also the immanent God of the metaphysician, urges mankind to remain " faithful to this world," to put resolutely aside all interest in a Beyond, and to understand that he should be a " creator of values," that outside himself there is no " objective " truth, morality, or metaphysics to which he should submit, but that in all independence he should be a law unto himself. There is nothing in the world but centres of force in a state of perpetual evolution and of unceasing action and reaction upon each other. The Will to Power, to ever-increasing power, which subjects to its dominion an ever greater sum of energy, is the fundamental fact of the life of the universe. The severance from the point of view prevalent in the Middle Ages is complete. Then we had the believer who felt himself surrounded by mystery and miracle, and submitted meekly to the authority of tradition, whether religious, moral, or scientific. To-day we find the stern Titan, who no longer recognises any law or any master above him, but sees in the ceaseless Will to Power, the eternal destiny of man, mankind, and the whole world.

When I contrast the old belief in authority with modern subjectivism, I do not wish in any way to assert that either of these two conceptions of life is intrinsically superior to the other, or that one of them should necessarily supplant the other, or that history shows us a progressive evolution, continuous xxii INTRODUCTION

though indefinite, towards rationalistic subjectivism. All that I wish to say is this — that mankind during modern times, and especially during the nineteenth century, has felt within himself the tremendous growth of the belief in the organising power of the human intellect and will, that he has applied his energy with remarkable intensity to the conquest of " power," whether scientific or technical, economic or political, and that the effort to inaugurate the universal rule of scientific and free reason is, perhaps, the greatest fact of the nineteenth century. But it is also true that the " religious " instinct, which made the spirits of the Middle Ages bow before the mystery of God, which led them to reverence in tradition the manifestation of the Divine Will, which impelled them to adoration and submission to a universal order — in short, to an attitude, not of command, but of reverent humility before the riddle of the world — this instinct has not, even in our days, ceased from making its voice heard. The modern man works with all his might to conquer the world through intelligence and conscious will. And he has pride in his strength. But he also retains a consciousness of the strict limitation of his power over matter. He still reveres the terrible and infinite powers which close about him and upon which he feels his dependence. And, especially in Germany, he willingly esteems and respects, in addition to the rules of conduct dictated by reason, that unconscious wisdom which finds expression in great religious, moral, political, and social traditions.

The history of Germany in the nineteenth century is therefore doubly interesting. Of all the nations of Europe, the German people is one of those among whom scientific reason and organising will have dis-

INTRODUCTION xxiii

played the most extraordinary prowess and modern subjectivism has blossomed most luxuriantly. But it is also one among whom the " religious " spirit, respect for tradition and authority, has retained the greatest strength. German thought has been a powerful helper in the development of the positive sciences and in the elaboration of a rational explanation of the universe. German force has organised itself in a manner as methodical as it is formidable ; it has clung with incomparable energy to the conquest of power, both economic and political ; and it has made Germany, together with England and the United States, one of the most expansive nations of the world. German Reason, therefore, has proved herself a force of the first magnitude and a peerless instrument of power. But she has not posed as an absolute and intolerant sovereign, and has always sought to work as amiably as possible with the forces of the past. She has endeavoured, in the realm of religion, to make a compromise with traditional beliefs, to " fulfil " Christianity rather than fight it to the death. And in the domain of politics, instead of founding a uniformly rationalistic state, she has displayed great consideration for tradition, has shown a respect for monarchical authority, and has been careful not to violate vested interests, or to precipitate too hurriedly the evolutionary process which bears modern nations towards democracy.