The fundamentals of debate

Preface

As a teacher of argument and debate for more than a generation, I have long been convinced that these subjects are not so much an applied logic as an applied psychologic; that, indeed, there are other powers of the mind than the purely logical which are fundamental, and that the principles governing them are capable of a more thoroughly scientific exposition than has appeared in our manuals. I have thus endeavored to write a modern text-book on debating, grounded on psychology as well as on logic, and to set forth principles and methods tested by actual experience.

I have presented the material which I believe to be necessary to a full understanding of argument and debate in two parts, Logical Organization and The Presentation. In considering Logical Organization, I have retained the conventional view-point, dealing with Briefs and Brief-making, Argument, and Evidence, and have endeavored to weld them into a whole. Highly valuable to the student as the conventional stress upon the pure logic of the subject is, it has been found by the writer to be utterly inadequate even when followed later by a treatment of Persuasion.

The unique feature of the present text lies in the fact that it recognizes more fully than has hitherto been the case in text-books on argument the function of imagination in reasoning; that the unconscious association vi PREFACE

of images in the mind leads to new ideas and progress, and that, in presenting our ideas after they have been logically organized, they must be imaged suggestively on the minds of the audience. Part II, therefore, explains the elemental nature of Imagination, and treats the subject of what is usually called the Presentation as Imaginative Suggestion. Whenever this view-point and conception have been presented in the classroom, they have aroused interest by supplementing the formalism of the older treatises and by opening new avenues of thought and suggesting original ways of approach. For, after all, the debater and student of English composition m general should be free to act on his own initiative, to express his own individuality.

All students in this field will gladly acknowledge their indebtedness to the pioneer work of Professor George P. Baker, of Harvard, author of "The Principles of Argumentation" (1895), and also to Professor Walter Dill Scott, author of "The Psychology of Public Speaking" (1910).

I wish to express my especial obligation to Professor Howard C. Warren, of Princeton University, for his helpful criticism of the psychological foundations. To Doctor Theodore W. Hunt, for many years head of the EngHsh Department, now Professor Emeritus, I wish also to express my appreciation for his interest and encouragement.

Princeton University, June, 1918.

Contents

PAGE

Chapter I. Introductory i

The Fundamentals of Debate — Logic— Evidence — Rhetoric — Oratory — Psychology — Constructive Thinking — Minds, Issues, and Audiences: Two T3^es — Persuasion — The Debater Himself — Plan of the Book.

PART I. LOGICAL ORGANIZATION Chapter IL Briefs and Brief-Making 15

Need of a Plan— The Brief Defined— The Making of a Brief — The Process — Analysis — Classification — Arrangement — The Result — Unity — Logical Sequence — Proportion — Process and Result — Unity — Climax — Two Laws of Structure — Rules for Brief-Making — The Three Main Parts of a Brief — Specimen Brief.

Chapter III. Argument 39

The View-Point — Name — Effectiveness — Unity of Classification.

Classes of Argument — I. Association, Argument from Sign — Sign Argument Expounded — Force — Observation and Inference— Common Sources of Error.

II. Argument from Example^A. Resemblance (i) By Generalization— Illustrations in Law and in Parliamentary Debates^Further Analysis of the Process — Definition of Relevancy and Rules — The Fallacy, Begging the Question — Answering a Causal Example by Alleging a Different Cause — (2) By Analogy — Definitions— Uses — Illustrations.

B. Contrast — A Principle of Association — Uses in Debating — viii CONTENTS,

PAGE

Uses in Refutation — Types of Argument by Contrast — (i) Redtictio ad absurdmn — Definition and Illustrations — Manner of Treatment — How Answered — Its Special Value — (2) The Dilemma — Definition and Illustrations — Two Kinds — Its Use — How Answered — (3) The Method of the Residue — Definition and Illustrations.

Chapter IV. Argument (continued) 87

III. Argument from Causal Relation — Definition — Rule of Adequacy, Involving Parallelism or Difference, Other Competing or Co-operating Causes, Law of Progress — Illustrations— Causal Argument, and the Other Sources of Reasoning — Differences of View-Point.

IV. Inductive and Deductive Arguments — Induction — The Inevitable Assumption — The Inductive Formula — Induction, the Scientific Method of Investigation — Kinds of Induction.

Deduction, a Ready Mode of Reasoning — Deduction Supplemented by Induction — Deduction, a Method of Criticism — The Syllogism — The Enthymeme — The Chain of Reasoning — Two Classes of Fallacies — A Common Ground in Argument.

Refutation — Character — Preparation — An Important Limitation — Selection — Fundamental Criticism — Two General Methods of Refutation: Overthrowing the Supporting Argument and Proving the Contradictory.

Chapter V. Evidence 112

The Proof — Meaning of Term — The Need of Evidence— The Need of Assumptions — Classes of Evidence — Direct and Circumstantial— Jury Verdicts upon Circumstantial Evidence — Personal, Real, and Documentary Evidence — The Law of Evidence — Examining Testimony — Consistency — the One Great Test — (i) Internal — (2) External, General, or Particular.

The Use of Evidence Outside the Courts — The Debater's Chief Source of Evidence, Authority — Two Classes of Authority— Examining Evidence from Authority — Rules for the Interpretation of Documents — Suggestions for Reporting Evidence— The Reasonableness of an Opinion — ^The Danger of Partial Quotation — The Card System.

CONTENTS ix

Chapter VI. Imagination in Argument .... 150

The Need of Imagination in Argument — The Logical and the Psj'chological — Images Are a Psychological Inference— Mental Processes — The Creative Imagination — The Poverty of Mere Facts — The Vision of New Ideas — Anticipation Images — Perceptual Aspect of Imagery — Imaging a Concept— Imaging (i) an Analogy; (2) a Cause; (3) a Conclusion; (4) Affection and Desire; (5) in a Team Debate; (6) in General — The Advantage of the Conceptual View-Point to the Debater — Types of Imagery — Memory Images — Imagination Images of the Past, the Present, and the Future — Summary.

Chapter VII. Suggestion in Argument i88

Laws of Suggestion and Their Use in Debating — Avoiding and Removing Inhibitions — Hurtful Admissions as Inhibitions— Immediate Removal of Inhibitions Introduced by an Opponent — Logical Fallacies as Inhibitions — Removing an Inhibiting Wish by the Image ad Absurd um — Conclusions.

Instruments of Suggestion — Gesture Images as Instruments of Suggestion — Word Images as Instruments of Suggestion — Variability of Meanings, Due to the Speaker, Vocal Shadings — Due to the Listener, The Mental Level, The Psychological Moment — Imagery an Imperfect Means.

Chapter VIII. Instruments of Suggestion ... 212

Tonal Imagery— Illustrative Imagery — Avoiding Personalities— Subjective Images — Personal Adjectives — All the Parts of Speech — The Phrase — Sentence Forms — Climax — Repetition — Variety — Paraleipsis — Confidence — Interestedness — Avoiding Common Defects in Delivery — The Decision.

APPENDICES Appendix A

Specimen Briefs — The First Jiinius Letter — In Defense of Damay.

X CONTENTS

PAGE

Appendix B 255

Questions and Exercises : In General — On Specific Speeches — In Association-Reactions.

Appendix C 261

The Special Study of Imagery — Varied Imagery Appeals — Auditory Imagery and the Disagreeable — MLxed Imagery Types.

Appendix D 269

The Imagery of Argument and of Poetry.

Appendix E 272

Addresses : Premier Lloyd George's "Peace Founded on the Rock of Vindicated Justice" and President Wilson's "Force to the Utmost."

Appendix F 283

Bibliography.

Appendix G 284

Resolutions for Debate.

Index 287

Chapter I Introductory

On turning to the dictionary you will find that the word "debate" formerly meant "strife, contention." For example, Robert of Gloucester says in the thirteenth century — "in the days of Trinity next ensuing was a great debate and in that murder there were slain fourscore." Sir Walter Scott uses the term as applied to physical contest:

"But question fierce and proud reply Gave signal soon of dire debate."

The term is appHed usually to intellectual disputes; its field is not actually but figuratively a battle-ground. Its province is coextensive with the whole domain of thought. Wherever there are propositions in dispute, ideas attacked and defended, there is debate. In law before the court, in theology before the synod, in politics on the stump or in Congress — indeed, in almost all scientific, philosophic, or popular speeches and writings. Its instruments are not swords, shields, or arrows but arguments. The arms of the contest are intellectual ones, the contest one of reasons. According to the present use of the word, if A by chance meets B and makes an assertion which is denied by B, whereupon A offers reasons for his belief which are met by contrary reasons from B, there is debate. "A thesis is set down; you attack, I defend it; you insist, I reply; you deny, I prove; you distinguish, I destroy your distinctions; my replies balance or overturn your objections — such is debate." You assert your intention of pursuing a certain line of action, I reason with you to do the opposite — such is debate.

Debating is not confined to formal tribunals. The college student arguing upon the prospects of a baseball championship is as much a debater as the disputant in an intercollegiate contest. An amusing controversy showing the origin and conduct of a not uncommon type of debate may be found in Scott's "Antiquary" relating to the racial connection of the ancient Picts. Were they Teutons or Celts? Here we have assertion and denial, citation of authorities, pro and con, with distinctions, until as too often happens, the disputants lose their tempers, and Sir Arthur flounces out of the parlor in high dudgeon —

"... Why, man, there was once a people called the Piks "

"More properly Picis," interrupted the Baronet.

"I say the Pikar, Pihar, Piochtar, Piaghter, or Peughtar," vociferated Oldbuck; "they spoke a Gothic dialect "

"Genuine Celtic," again asseverated the knight.

"Gothic! Gothic! I'll go to death upon it!" counter-asseverated the squire.

"Why, gentlemen," said Lovel, "I conceive that is a dispute which may be easily settled by philologists, if there are any remains of the language."

"There is but one word," said the Baronet, "but, in spite of Mr. Oldbuck's pertinacity, it is decisive of the question."

"Yes, in my favor," said Oldbuck; "Mr. Lovel, you shall be judge — I have the learned Pinkerton on my side."

"I, on mine, the indefatigable and erudite Chalmers. . . ."

"Truly, gentlemen," said Lovel, "before you muster your forces and overwhelm me with authorities, I should like to know the word in dispute."

"Benval," said both disputants at once.

"Which signifies capid valli," said Sir Arthur.

"The head of the wall," echoed Oldbuck.

There was a deep pause. "It is rather a narrow foundation to build a hypothesis upon," observed the arbiter.

"Not a whit, not a whit," said Oldbuck; "men fight best in a narrow ring — an inch is as good as a mile for a home-thrust."

"It is decidedly Celtic," said the Baronet; "every hill in the Highlands begins with Ben.^'

"But what say you to Val, Sir Arthur; is it not decidedly the Saxon wall ? "

"It is the Roman vallum,'' said Sir x\rthur; "the Picts borrowed that part of the word."

"No such thing; if they borrowed anything, it must have been your Ben, which they might have from the neighboring Britons of Strath Cluyd. . . ."

Debating generally originates from conflicting opinions. "You say we are sectional!" exclaimed Lincoln in his Cooper Institute address. "We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you." The common mode of procedure, in starting an action at law, is for the plaintiff to file a paper which is followed by another paper from the defendant which is called an answer; at length, argument ensues, if not upon the general issue, upon special issues arising during the course of the trial, which are successively weighed, till the final issue emerges and is weighed and the case solved.

In formal debating contests, tlie questions discussed do not arise from conflicting opinions actually existing among the debaters themselves ; the questions are chosen by joint agreement, or by one party to the discussion, and presented to the other for the choice of sides. The two sides are called, respectively, the affirmative and the negative, the former being that side which maintains the proposition (which may be negatively stated) and the latter the side which denies the proposition. The proposition is usually stated affirm'atively,

' Argument is the process of resolving differences of

opinion by assertion and denial, followed by proof and counter-proof with distinctions. If the opponent is present and is heard, we call the argument a debate {debatere — to beat off). By it we aun to influence the opinions, beliefs, or actions of others. It thus presupposes the possibility at least of an opposing view, a difference of opinion. It presupposes also a knowledge of facts, an ability to correlate them, as well as the power to present them effectively. Viewed as an art, then, argument may be regarded as applying (i) the rules of evidence such as maintain in our courts of law, (2) the rules of reasoning such as exist in common sense or have been developed in text-books on logic, and (3) the principles of Hterary art and oratory or pubUc speaking, at the basis of which we now know (4) must rest a sound psychology. This forms a large and varied background, from which the debater and the writer on debating must draw his material if he is to grasp his subject fully or treat it as a whole.

^]]fi.t are \he. facts? What happened? What was done? These are the first questions which the lawyer asks of his client. They are equally important for the student of debate. The debater should be first of all the painstaking investigator. Even if the reasoning is valid, conclusions based on unsupported assertions may be entirely unwarranted. You say that we should grant the^ Philippine Islands complete independence within five years because they have shown themselves to be capable of self-government. But have they? What is the evidence in the case? On whose authority does it rest? Is he qualified to''speak_as an authority? If so, are his statements probable on their face, uncontradicted by others who have an equal right to be heard — and so on?

The legal rules of evidence are an important guide in any procedure in debating where the attempt is to resolve such issues of fact; for they have grown up through years of custom and practice, and though sometimes deeply embedded in legal subject-matter, have as a rule come to be recognized as a safe and just mode of procedure in general. The debater should know, for instance, such things as the difiference between testimony and authority, hearsay and first-hand testimony, primary and secondary evidence, and the important rules governing the production of testimony in courts of law. The law of evidence, according to Stephen, is that part of procedure which with a view to ascertaining the individual rights and liabilities in particular cases decides : (i) What facts m-'^y nnH rnny not he proved. (2) Wliat sort of evidence must be given of a fact which may be proved, and (3) by whom and Tn what manner the evidence must beproduced by^wKch any fact is to be proyfid,^

The facts being established as true, what do such

* James F. Stephen, "A Digest of the Law of Evidence," p. 6.

%gtsJm2prL with reference to the-Substantial things in

doubt? To exactly what are they relevimt? _ .WJm.t is

the nature~onEis relevajjgY^;;:;£ausaLi£)r example? ArgumentativFskill and the abiHty to think readily on one's feet should be based on an abiHty to reason soundly. The debater must know the natuje, of the relations existing belwccn propositions^ the ground of warrant for their assertion in ari argument. Apprehension, judgment, and "reasoning, according to Jevons/ form the chief parts of logical doctrine. Certainly, a debater must be able to perceive the truth, be wise and discriminating in his judgments, scrupulous and sensible in his inferences. Now, the proposition is the formal unit of argument, whether employed as a premise or a conclusion. It is regarded in logic as divisible into two parts called terms, and the process of formulating a proposition is the process of expressing some judgment between these terms. Grammatically, a proposition consists of a subject and a predicate, while mathematically it may be defined as an equation between two terms. Of course, the discovery, analysis, and arrangement of the material so as to appeal to the understanding involve, first and foremost, reasoning processes. The main and subordinate argument, heads and subheads, in the outhne of a case are step-by-step processes — links in a chain of reasoning; and in fine, as a perfect brief shows, a debate is an organic, logical structure.

Since logic treats of the laws of reasoning, the rational groundwork of the art of debate may be found in systematic shape in the science of logic. Its study therefore, if properly conducted, should mean for the de- ^W. Stanley Jevons, "Elementary Lessons on Logic," p. ii.

bater not only stability of foundation but a real gain in argumentative skill. Speaking of Junius, Professor Gk)odrich says: "His mind, in early life, had clearly been subjected to the severest logical training. Com-^ position, with him, was the creation of. a svstem of thought, in which everything is made subordinate to_ a just order and sequence ol ideas. One thought grows oiit of another m regular succession. His reasonings often take the form of a syllogism, though usually with the omission of one of the terms; and we never find him betrayed into that careless diffusion of style so common with those who are ignorant of the principles of logic. In this respect, the writing of Junius will am'ply repay the closest study and analysis. Let the young orator enter completely into the scope and design of the author. Let him watch the undercurrent of his thoughts and feelings. Let him observe how perfectly everything coincides to produce the desired impression — the statement of principles and the reference to facts, the shading of thought and the colorings of imagery. Let him take one of the more striking passages and remark the dexterous preparation by which each of its several parts is so shaped that the leading thoughts come forward to the best advantage — clear in all their relations, standing boldly out, unencumbered by secondary ideas, and thus fitted to strike the mind with full and undivided force. Such a study of Junius will prepare the young reader to enter into the logic of thought. It will lead to the formation of a severe intellectual taste, which is the best guard against the dangers of hasty composition, and the still greater dangers of extemporaneous speaking. Such speaking cannot be dispensed with. On the contrary, it is becoming more and more essential to the success of public men in every part of public life." ^

Debating means also the expression of ideas in speech or writing, and so must be classified as a species both of oratory and of literary composition. It is well for the college debater if he seeks to acquire the technic both of the finished speaker and of the Hterary artist. The distinguishing characteristics of debating as a type of expression seem to lie in its argumentative and in its dialogue character. Debating, however, is not only an expression of ideas, but a presentation of them to others; it is not only an appeal from reason to reason, but from one state of consciousness to another state of consciousness. The facts being known and their relations, the question arises: ''How shall I present them? " The answer is that we may view logical reasoning and judgments as concepts, and image them suggestively within the experience of the persons addressed. Suggestion is the broadest term used for the process of conveying our ideas to others. Since objects and things, to which ideas refer, cannot always be present to the senses, we are in the habit of recalling them to consciousness by suggesting an image of our idea with its understood meanings and with its natural associations. Imagination or the image-making process is therefore a process of reducing general or abstract ideas to sense-perception. It has a basis in feeling as well as in memory, and furnishes the true method of gaining interest and attention, as well as of producing conviction and behef. Anterior to the association of ideas, be it remembered," is the association' ot' images, with — ^l^ndieii, uiid with aitistg: "~ — — ' *

iC. A. Goodrich, "British Eloquence," p. 153.

Psychologically, therefore, debating is the art of the associ_ative and suggestive or inhibitmg imagination. The successful arguer will seek to remove all inhibitions, of whatever sort, which tend to interfere with the acceptance by another, at their proper weight and value, of the facts and logic of his case. He will also on his own part seek to interpose objections which tend to inhibit the case presented by his opponent. Psychology, the ultimate basis of argument, is the science of mental phenomena.

The media or symbols of imagery are words (written or spoken) and gesture (including facial expression). Their suggestions are carried by the physical vibrations of light and sound. y

;<^The same principle — adaptation — which causes the / ^eye to close when blinded by light, which makes one V ( man succeed and another fail in the race of life, defines f the good debater as the man who does the right thing V at the right time— and in the right way. Arguments \ are not absolute, but relative in character. ^^^

c Constructive Thinking. — Logical rigor is essential for

^^ the foundation and structure of an argument, but it should not be so stressed in the teaching of debating as to interfere with the use and free play of the imaginative powers nor with their growth and development.

Creative ability is more or less present in all men. Fairy-tales and child myths find their counterpart among older people in the projection of business enterprises and idealistic plans in every sphere. Assuredly, the man who debates needs to develop his analytical and discriminating powers, but he will need more. I have before me a report of a committee on prison reform containing very detailed statements numbered from one to twelve, and giving conclusions and recommendations as to facts and conditions. The preliminary data based on a personal inspection of the prisons was of course necessary to the making of sound recommendations, but the recommendations which were made presented a new view of prison reform and in fact a new prison. Thus, the data drawn from observation and experience were combined with new ideas in the minds of the reform committee. Moreover, in presenting their report to the assembly, they will defend their findings of things as they unfortunately are in connection with their recommendation as to what they would have them to be. Is it not clear from this illustration that any theory of argumentation which makes it one only of logical analysis and logical classification is partial and inadequate? Argument depends not only on past experience but on past experience plus creative thinking applied to the work at hand. Any other theory forced upon the undeveloped student tends to dull and deaden his imaginative powers at the very time they are longing for expression. The bird that does not learn to sing when it is young rarely learns at all. Argument should be taught as both analytic and synthetic, destructive and constructive, and with a full appreciation of its psychological and its logical basis.

Minds, Issues, and Audiences: Two Types. — There are indeed two types of minds: the one conservative and retrospective, the other progressive and prospective. The first type is guided by authority, habit, and imitation, the second by the constructive and destructive tendencies in the changing world about us. The one obeys fixed immutable, absolute, and dogmatic principles or laws; the other, knowing that conditions are never identical except in purely scientific experiments, recognizes first of all the facts perceived and organizes them at once into a clear conception or judgment. It is naturally this second type — and it contains geniuses and leaders of thought and action — which sees the necessity and value of the argument from sign. For they see in it as nearly as can be had an approximation ' to the reasoning which they constantly employ and recognize as their own.

Just as there are two types of mind, there are two types of opinion over which differences may arise, and hence, two types of issues: issues of stability and issues of change. To the first class belong the issues adjudicated in law-courts, to the second the resolutions and bills adopted by parHamentary assembhes. The issues in academic debates are the issues of parliamentary bodies — issues of change. And since the democracies of the world are almost equally divided into great liberal and conservative parties, the sharpest division which we may make of audiences is also twofold: ^Chose jfho look back before going forward, and those who go for- 'ward without losing back."' -— — -- -

Persuasion. — Persuasion may be defined as an appeal for decision through logic and the emotional reactions to imagery. Psychologically, a speaker is related to his hearers as stimulus to reaction; logically, as cause to effect. The suggested images of objects which exist in the external world may be necessary to enable others to accept our ideas. Such images, moreover, may awaken in others pleasurable or unpleasurable feelings with regard to these ideas. Experience shows that in debating it is almost impossible at times to avoid either an expression of our own feelings or an appeal of some sort to the feelings of others. The affirmative side, for instance, will make use of the emotions of approbation; the negative, those of disapprobation. A speaker appeals to the emotions legitimately, when he does so to overcome prejudice, to prevent fatigue, or otherwise to facilitate thinking. Such appeals are at times not only so instinctive as to be inevitable, but are essential to the end in view — decision. They may create sympathy or antagonism, suspense or surprise, desire, motive, or sheer determination of the will, but they should always leave reason enthroned and be supported by justice and right.

The Debater Himself. — As to the debater himself, he should be a man of individuality, should possess constructive as well as analytical powers and, without running into the fallacies of the persuasive orator, should always be able to give a personal touch which adds so much to human interest.

No mere formal study of the elements of debate will make a debater. No body of knowledge, no rules of thinking, no principles of expression or suggestion can take the place of the indefinable power of the speaker himself. There is in every great orator, every great debater, an individuality, a creative impulse which masters formal rules so thoroughly that the mechanical process — the technic — is lost in the earnest expression of ideas and beliefs. Facts, principles, illustrations, phrases, rhythm, even processes of thought are all transmuted by the alchemical power of the great artist, who knows, who thinks, who feels, who images not after a pattern. He combines what he gets from without with that which comes from within and in so doing transforms and turns into gold — true to reality, true to himself. Originality or genius is fed by innumerable sources, most of which are too delicate, too subtle, too varied to be easily recognized, even by the man himself, at the time. In addition to formal rules, therefore, it is beheved that the growth of such a power is to be encouraged in other ways, such as by (i) famiharity and association, with the speeches and writings of the great debaters and a careful study and analysis of their productions, and (2) by frequent practice in impromptu public speaking and debate — done under such circumstances and on such occasions as will arouse and command the highest psychological interest.

Plan of the Book

In one of his greatest speeches, Lincoln once said with rare simplicity and common sense: "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." The larger divisions of the subject as treated in this book are: (i) logical organization; and (2) presentation.

Under the term logical organization, we will consider first, briefs and brief-making, or the analysis and synthesis of a particular proof in a special skeletonized form with its special features; second, arguments, or the important types of associative processes which form the basis of logical inference and which have been designated with special names as arguments ; third, evidence, or facts and opinions derived from others, as used in debating in comparison and contrast with the prescribed or customary use of evidence in courts of law.

We shall then perhaps be ready to consider the final topic of presenting our ideas in an argument before an audience, or the subject of presentation. This will be shown to involve imaginative suggestion, including, as always, the need of adaptation to ends and circumstances. It involves further the viewing of our judgments and reasons as concepts, for the purpose of bringing them within local experience for recognition, comparison, and decision. The presentation is treated in chapters on imagination in argument, suggestion in argument, and the instruments of suggestion.

PART I LOGICAL ORGANIZATION

Chapter II

Need of a Plan. — In our moments of appreciation of any work of art, it is perhaps natural for us to think of it more for itself than as the product of a mind that had carefully planned and a hand that had skilfully executed. And yet we know that every worthy artistic product means skill both in designing and in execution. In these respects, the art of composition closely resembles the art of architecture. Just as the architect makes his drawings and specifications in advance of the construction of a building, so too the writer of any substantial work must give careful thought to the way his material is to be put together, what purpose it is to serve, and what impression it is to make when finished. The plan of an argumentative composition when carefully worked out and with appropriate details is called a brief; but a brief must follow certain elementary rules of construction. It does not consist merely of a few "speaking notes," but should be so full in material and so exact in statement and in suggestion of method as to be intelligible and convincing to another.