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From Chattanooga to Petersburg under Generals Grant and Butler : a contribution to the history of the war, and a personal vindication

William Farrar Smith · 1893 · Scanned text

48,587 words · about 3 h 24 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Author
William Farrar Smith
Language
English
Published
1893
Length
48,587 words · about 3 h 24 min
Sections
12 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain · PD-US by publication date

 

Contents (12)
  1. Front matter about 1 min
  2. Preface about 1 min
  3. Chapter I under 1 min
  4. Chapter III about 1 min
  5. Chapter I about 6 min
  6. Chapter II about 8 min
  7. Chapter III about 24 min
  8. Chapter IV about 18 min
  9. Chapter V about 52 min
  10. Chapter VI about 27 min
  11. Chapter VIII about 56 min
  12. Index about 9 min

Continue:

Front matter

a

= - t. mney yi or

Me ee yd =

Preface

—— EE

AutTHoucH the purpose of this volume is personal, it is hoped that it possesses sufficient historical interest to be on that account worthy of publication.

For thirty years I have quietly lived under gross misrepresentation of my military record, with a feeling of confidence that some seeker after truth, for historical purposes, would eventually discover the facts and do me justice.

A recent publication by General Butler, coming out as it did only a short time before the volumes of the “ Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,” which covered the events of the campaign in 1864, determined me to place before the public my military history in that campaign, drawn from the pages of the _ * Records.”

In the work of collecting material and placing the evidence in logical form, I have been greatly aided by Mr. George Otis Shattuck and Mr.

v1 PREFACE.

John Codman Ropes, of Boston, who in the midst of their busy lives have come voluntarily to my assistance. To them are due my grateful acknowledgments.

| WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH.

Chapter I

GENERALS GRANT AND HALLECK ON GENERAL Butter. —His _ | REMOVAL FROM THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE JAMES, AND MY APPOINTMENT TO IT BY PRESIDENT LINCOLN. — My REMOVAL, AND THE RESTORATION OF GENERAL BUTLER BY GENERAL GRANT. ; ; ‘ : : : Pee

Chapter II

SERVICES UNDER GENERAL GRANT AT AND NEAR CHATTANOOGA, AND THE ESTIMATES OF THEIR VALUE BY GENERALS GRANT, _ SHERMAN, AND THOMAS . ‘ , ‘ P : , cals

Chapter III

SERVICES NEAR BeRmMuDA HunpDRED, Corp HARBOR, AND PE- TERSBURG. — THE ESTIMATES OF THEM BY GENERALS MEIGs,

BARNARD, BUTLER, AND GRANT ; ; ; : ee | CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL BUTLER MOVES UPON GENERAL GRANT, AND SECURES AT ONCE MY REMOVAL AND HIS RESTORATION TO COMMAND. 41 CHAPTER V.

GENERAL GRANT’S SUBSEQUENT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF MY CONDUCT AT THE ASSAULT ON PETERSBURG, JUNE 15, 1864, WITH A TRUE ACCOUNT OF THAT ASSAULT AS SHOWN BY THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED ‘‘ WAR R=corpDs ” ; ; F . 60

CHAPTER VI.

UPoN WHOM RESTS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE PETERSBURG IN 1864, AND GENERAL GRANT’S MIS- REPRESENTATIONS UPON THE SUBJECT . - : : . 115

CHAPTER VII.

SERVICES UNDER GENERAL BuTLeR In May Anp June, 1864, AND WHAT HE SAID OF THEM AT THE TIME. ‘ ; . 135 vl CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VIII.

Proor From THE “ WAR Recorps” THAT GENERAL BUTLER’S STATEMENTS WITH REFERENCE TO ME IN HIS BOOK ARE FALSE 140

RostER OF THE ARMY OF THE JAMES . ‘ : 2 . - 172 Aprrenpix No. 1. GENERAL SMITH TO SENATOR Foote . . 174 ApprenpIx No. 2. GENERAL RAWLINS TO GENERAL GRANT. 179 Apprrenpix No. 3. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL Bout- LER AND GENERALS GILLMORE AND SMITH A 4 . 181 Apprenpix No. 4. AssisTANT SECRETARY DANA TO Seonweinee STANTON . . : : ; ‘ . 184 AppEenpIx No. 5. Comassnnninera BETWEEN ‘Gian Bot- LER AND GENERAL SMITH ; . 186 AppenpDiIx No. 6. LETTER oF er Cocos Mosel Gar : - ; ; : F ; : : . . 189 AppEenpix No. 7. Lrrrer or GENERAL Hincks : : . 190 Apprnpix No. 8. LETTER oF GENERAL WISTAR ; ; . 191 INDEX . : - ; . ‘ y ‘ x > . 195

Norr. —In the pocket at the end of this volume will be found four maps and plans, showing the country covered by the Army of the James from May 5, 1864, to June 15, 1864, and the enemy’s works in front of Petersburg.

FROM

CHATTANOOGA TO PETERSBURG.

Chapter I

GENERALS GRANT AND HALLECK ON GENERAL BUTLER. — HIS REMOVAL FROM THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE JAMES, AND MY APPOINTMENT TO IT BY PRESIDENT LINCOLN. — MY REMOVAL, AND THE RESTORATION OF GENERAL BUTLER BY GENERAL GRANT.

On the 1st of July, 1864, the survivors of the splendid Army of the Potomac, which had crossed the Rapidan on the 4th of May, were in front of Petersburg. The army was anxiously waiting to be recruited for another effort, and it had appealed to the inexhaustible patriotism of the North for another half million of men.

The Army of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, under Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, called the Army of the James, had utterly failed in a campaign against Richmond, on the south side of the James River. This army, consisting of the 10th and 18th Corps, had, after a loss of several thousand men, been cooped up by a small force of the enemy, which had built a short line of breastworks between the James and Appomattox rivers.

A part of the Army of the James, under my command, was with the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg, and a part in Bermuda Hundred was idly watching the intrenchments of the enemy in their front. On that day General Grant wrote a letter to General Halleck, chief of staff of President Lincoln, in which he described General Butler as a very able administrative officer, but unfit for command in the field, and suggested that a new department should be formed in the West, “ where there were no great battles to be fought, but a dissatisfied element to control,” and that General Butler should be assigned to its command. In the same letter he described me as “really one of the most efficient officers in the service, readiest in expedients, and most skillful in the management of troops in action.” * On the 3d of July, General Halleck wrote to General Grant the following reply : —

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, July 3, 1864.

Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. : GENERAL, — Your note of the Ist instant in relation to General Butler is just received. I will, as you propose, await further advices from you before I submit the matter officially to the Secretary of War and the President. It was 1 This letter is inserted in full on pp. 29, 30.

foreseen from the first that you would eventually find it necessary to relieve General B. on account of his total unfitness to command in the field, and his generally quarrelsome character. What shall be done with him has, therefore, already been, as I am informed, a matter of consultation. To send him to Kentucky would probably cause an insurrection in that State and an immediate call for large reinforcements. Moreover, he would probably greatly embarrass Sherman, if he did not attempt to supersede him, by using against him all his talent at political intrigue, and his facilities for newspaper abuse. If you send him to Missouri, nearly the same thing will occur there. Although it might not be objectionable to have a free fight between him and Rosecrans, the Government would be seriously embarrassed by the local difficulties and calls for reinforcements likely to follow. Inveterate as is Rosecrans’ habit of continually calling for more troops, Butler differs only in demanding instead of calling. As things now stand in the West, I think we can keep the peace, but if Butler be thrown in as a disturbing element, I anticipate very serious results. Why not leave General Butler in the local command of his department, including North Carolina, Norfolk, Fort- Monroe, Yorktown, &c., and make a new army corps of the part of the Eighteenth under Smith? This would leave B. under your immediate control, and at the same time would relieve you of his presence in the field. Moreover, it would save © the necessity of organizing a new department. If he must be relieved entirely, I think it would be best to make a new department for him in New England. I make these remarks merely as suggestions. Whatever you may finally determine on I will try to have done. As General B. claims to rank me, I shall give him no orders wherever he may go, without the special direction of yourself or the Secretary of War. Yours truly, H. W. Hatuecx, Major-General.’

On the 6th of July, in reply to this, General

Grant sent to General Halleck the following : —

HEADQUARTERS, City Pornt, July 6, 1864, 10 a. M.

Masor-GENERAL HALueck, Chief of Staff :

Please obtain an order assigning the troops of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina serving in the field to the command of Maj.-Gen. W. F. Smith,’ and order Major-General Butler, commanding department, to his headquarters, Fortress Monroe. . .

On the 7th of July, with the approval of

1 War Records, vol. 81, p. 598. * This would have given me the command of the Army of the James.

| CHATTANOOGA TO PETERSBURG. 5) President Lincoln, General Order No. 225 was issued in the following terms : — !

“The troops of the Department of North Carolina and Virginia serving with the Army of the Potomac in the field under Major-General Smith will constitute the HKighteenth Army Corps, and Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith is assigned to the command of the.corps. Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler will command the remainder of the troops in that department, having his headquarters at Fort Monroe.”

During the period covered by this correspondence I was in the intrenchments at Petersburg. On the 10th of July, I left for New York on leave of absence, given by General Grant, for the benefit of my health. On my return, on the 19th of July, I learned from him that Order No. 225 had been suspended by him, that General Butler had been restored to the full command of his department, which was enlarged by the addition of the 19th Corps, and that I was to be relieved and ordered to New York.

For General Grant it is difficult to find any justification for thus keeping the lives of thousands of men under an incompetent commander, and for the blunders which resulted. To me the effect of this change was of only personal consequence. To General Butler it was of doubtful advantage, as on the 4th of January following he was relieved from service and sent to Lowell for having concealed from General Weitzel instructions which General Grant had ordered him to transmit for the attack on Fort Fisher, for having taken personal command of the expedition which had been intended for General Weitzel, and finally for having disgracefully retired from before Fort Fisher after the explosion of his powder boat.’ It seems also from the letter which I insert, that he had lost the reputation for executive ability which he had possessed in July.

City Point, VireintA, January 4, 1865.

Hon. E. M. Sranron, Secretary of War:

I am constrained to request the removal of Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler from the command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. I do this with reluctance, but the good of the service requires it. In my absence General Butler necessarily commands, and there is a lack of confidence felt in his military ability, making him an unsafe commander for a large army. His administration of the affairs of his department is also objectionable.

U.S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.?

Of the extraordinary conduct of General Grant in relieving me from a command for which he had just recommended me in the

1 War Records, vol. 67, p. 44. 2 Butler’s Book, p. 829.

CHATTANOOGA TO PETERSBURG. T strongest terms, with a full and intimate knowledge of my capacity and services, and in restoring General Butler to his command and enlarging it, when he had just declared him incompetent, I could at the time get only a partial explanation. But General Grant’s subsequent action, his report on the last year of the war made in July, 1865, his Memoirs published in 1883, the disclosures made by General Butler in his book, and, more than all, the recent publication of the “War Records” covering that period, which present a complete photograph of what occurred at that time, have revealed the influences and motives which led to that change.

In order that they may be understood, it will be necessary to state briefly my relations to General Grant and to General Butler, and what J accomplished under them, and to show also what each of them had done and failed to do with reference to the attack upon Petersburg during the months of May and June, 1864.

Chapter II

SERVICES UNDER GENERAL GRANT AT AND NEAR CHAT- TANOOGA, AND THE. ESTIMATES OF THEIR VALUE BY GENERALS GRANT, SHERMAN, AND THOMAS.

I wap been with General Grant two years at West Point, had known him there, though not - intimately, and had not seen him from that time until the 23d of October, 1863. His reputation, however, in the regular army and in civil life was well known to me, and I had followed his career during the Civil War with great curiosity. My intimate acquaintance with him began on the 23d of October, 1863, at Chattanooga, where I was then chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. He arrived at Chattanooga on that day. The communication of the army with its base of supplies at Bridgeport by the south side of the Tennessee River had been cut off by the enemy, who believed that they held the army at their mercy, and its destruction was only a question of time.’ The condition of the army is well described by General Grant in his Memoirs : —

“This country afforded but little food for his 1 Report of General Braxton Bragg ; War Records, vol. 51, p. 37.

[Rosecrans’] animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery, or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle, that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there, — ‘ on the lift.’ Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on ‘half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof.” * On the morning of the 24th, I went with General Grant to reconnoitre an important position which I had discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley. My plan was to seize by surprise the hills on the south side of the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry, build a pontoon bridge, and thus obtain possession of Lookout Valley, and recover the old line of communication and the control of the river. The arrangements had been partially completed before the arrival of General Grant, General Thomas having approved the plan shortly after he took command. Grant at once gave it his sanction, and although I was an officer of engineers, I was put by him in command of the forces to capture the heights

1 Personal Memoirs of General Grant, vol. ii. p. 24.

and gap on the south side of the river and Lookout Valley. The entire movement was successful, the army was relieved, it was made possible for General Sherman’s force to reach Chattanooga, which in its turn made possible the victory of Missionary Ridge.

As regards the merit and importance of the achievement, [ will only quote from others.

General George H. Thomas was then in command of the Army of the Cumberland. November 1, 1863, he issued the following order : —

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, CHATTANOOGA, November 1, 1863.

The general commanding tenders his thanks to Brig.-Gen. W. F. Smith and the officers and men of the expedition under his command, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Turchin and Hazen, the boat parties under Col. T. R. Stanley, Highteenth Ohio Volunteers, and the pioneer bridge party, Captain Fox, Michigan Engineers, for the skill and cool gallantry displayed in securing a permanent lodgment on the south side of the river at Brown’s Ferry, and in putting in position the pontoon bridge, on the night of the 26th instant. The successful execution of this duty was attended with the most important results in obtaining a safe and easy communication with Bridgeport and shortening our line of supplies.

By command of Major-General Thomas."

In General Order No. 265, issued November 7, 1863, General Thomas said : —

“The recent movements resulting in the establishment of a new and short line of communication with Bridgeport and the possession of the Tennessee River were of so brilliant a character as to deserve special notice. The skill and cool gallantry of the officers and men composing the expedition under Brig.-Gen. William F. Smith . . . deserve the highest praise.” *

In a later report General Thomas says : —

“The seizure of Brown’s Ferry and the splendid defense of Lookout Valley by General Hooker’s command decided the question of our ability to hold Chattanooga, for steamers began immediately to carry rations from Bridgeport to Kelley’s Ferry, leaving but about eight miles of wagon transportation from that point to Chattaeyo:

“The enemy made no further attempt to regain Lookout Valley after it had slipped from his grasp, and confined himself to an occasional cannon shot from the top of Lookout as he watched our trains undisturbedly moving from Kelley’s Ferry across the valley bearing rations to a grateful army... .

“To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived, and the ability which executed, the movement at Brown’s Ferry... .

1 War Records, vol. 54, p. 68. i i be CHATTANOOGA TO PETERSBURG.

When the bridge was thrown at Brown’s Ferry on the morning of the 27th the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without.” *

The report of C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to the Secretary, made October 28, was as follows : —

CHATTANOOGA, October 28, 1863, 5 P. M.

Everything perfectly successful. The river is now open, and a short and good road in our possession along the south shore. We had an insignificant skirmish near Wauhatchie. The great success, however, is General Smith’s operation at the mouth of Lookout Valley. Its brillancy cannot be exaggerated.

C. A. Dana?

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

After the capture of Brown’s Ferry and Lookout Valley and the reopening of the short line of communications to Bridgeport, I was diligently employed in reconnoitring the country about Chattanooga for the purpose of devising a plan for an advance against Brageg’s army, as soon as Sherman should arrive with the Army of the Tennessee. This plan was submitted to General

1 Army of the Cumberland, by Van Horne, vol. i. p. 398, taken from Report on Conduct of the War, supplement ; part i. Report of General Thomas, pp. 119, 120.

Grant and approved: by him, and is given in his letters to General Burnside of November 14 or 15, and in his instructions to Thomas of November 18."

The preliminary movements of Sherman, including his crossing of the Tennessee and march against Missionary Ridge, and the movement of the cavalry brigade towards the Holston River, were all in accordance with the original plan, but a report from a deserter, November 22, that Bragg was preparing to fall back, induced General Grant to order General Thomas to move to his front on a reconnoissance in force, and that made the further carrying out of the original plan impossible.

Of General Sherman’s movement, that officer, in his Memoirs,’ says: “I will here bear my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent (viz.: thirteen hundred and _ fifty feet) laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith.”

General John M. Corse, whose bravery in holding the fort at Allatoona at a critical moment is known to all the world, writes under date of August 3, 1892, that “on the day preceding the assault on Missionary Ridge by Sherman’s forces, I was selected by General Sherman to lead the assaulting column, and was taken by him to General Grant, when the general plan was shown and explained to me, and my position designated. In the course of the conversation General Grant gave General W. F. Smith the credit of the plan and spoke of him in the strongest terms of confidence and respect. General Macfeely, the late Commissary General of the army, said that Grant told him that ‘ Baldy ’ Smith was the ablest general in that army, and that the successful movement against Bragg was due to Smith.”

From the time of the seizure of Brown’s Ferry, on October 27, I had constant intercourse with General Grant, and discussed all the military movements with him freely. On the 12th of November, without solicitation or suggestion on my part, he promoted me to the position of chief engineer of the military division of the Mississippl, and on the same day he sent to the Secretary of War the following recommendation : —

Hon. E. M. Sranron, Secretary of War:

I would respectfully recommend that Brig.- Gen. W. F. Smith be placed first on the list for promotion to the rank of major-general. He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the army ; is very practical and industrious. No man in the service is better qualified than he for our largest commands.’

I have the honor, &c., U. 8. Grant, Major-General.

As nothing had been done in Washington for my promotion, the reason being, as stated by Secretary Stanton, that there were no vacancies, on the 30th of November, General Grant wrote the following letter to President Lincoln : —

H’pq’rs Mizitary DIVISION OF THE MIssISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 30, 1863. His ExceLtency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States :

In a previous letter addressed to the Secretary of War, I recommended Brig.-Gen. Wm. F. Smith for promotion. Recent events have entirely satisfied me of his great capabilities and merits, and I hasten to renew the recommendation and to urge it. The interests of the public service would be better subserved by this promotion than the interest of General Smith himself. My reason for writing this letter now is to ask that W. F. Smith’s name be placed first on the list for promotion of all those previously recommended by me.

I have the honor, ete.

U.S. Grant, Major-General.’

1 War Records, vol. 56, p. 122. 2 Ibid. p. 277.

No stronger tribute could have been paid to my services or capacities. I need not say that I felt grateful and became warmly attached to General Grant and his interests. My friendly feelings seemed to be reciprocated by him. I was on his staff constantly with him at Nashville and elsewhere in the West until the end of February, 1864. By his invitation I came East with him in his private car when he came to Washington early in March, 1864, to accept the position of Lieutenant-General. Before he went into the field, I was absent on informal leave and in New York with my family. On the 31st of March he directed me to meet him in Washington. I went with him to Fortress Monroe and was assigned to the command of the 18th Army Corps in the field.

Chapter III

SERVICES NEAR BERMUDA HUNDRED, COLD HARBOR, AND PETERSBURG. — THE ESTIMATES OF THEM BY GENERALS MEIGS, BARNARD, BUTLER, AND GRANT.

Tue 18th Army Corps was in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, then under the command of General Benjamin F. Butler. It appears to have been General Grant’s intention, as shown by his letter to General Meade, dated April 9, 1864, that I should command all the troops of that Department in the field." But his intention was never acted on. General Gillmore commanded the 10th Army Corps in the same Department. From the early part of April I was engaged in organizing and drilling my troops. On the 5th of May we landed at Bermuda Hundred and opened a campaign against Richmond.

Although the plan of General Butler’s campaign was, as I shall presently show, in direct violation of the orders of General Grant, and against an earnest written remonstrance signed by General Gillmore and myself, I entered upon it with a determination to do my best. The

1 Personal Memoirs of General Grant, vol. ii. p. 134.

officers and men fought as bravely as men ever fought. Thousands of lives were wasted and little was accomplished. General Grant expected me to accomplish something, and was bitterly disappointed, and on the 21st of May he wrote as follows to General Halleck, who was the Chief of Staff of President Lincoln : —

H’pq@’rRs ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. In THE FIELD, May 21, 1864, 7a. mM. (Received 10.35 A. M.)

Mas.-Gen. H. W. Hatueck, Chief of Staff:

I fear there is some difficulty with the forces at City Point * which prevents their effective use. The fault may be with the commander, and it may be with his subordinates. General Smith, whilst a very able officer, 1s obstinate, and 1s likely to condemn whatever is not suggested by himself. Either those forces should be so occupied as to detain a force nearly equal to their own, or the garrison in the intrenchments at City Point should be reduced to a minimum, and the remainder ordered here. I wish you would send a competent officer there to inspect, and report by telegraph what is being done and what in his judgment it is advisable to do.

U.S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.?

in the same day General Halleck issued to General M. C. Meigs and General J. G. Barnard

This reference to City Point seems important. 2 War Records, vol. 69, p. 43.

an order directing that they should “immediately proceed to army on James River, examine the position which it occupies, and means of defense. . . . General Grant wishes particularly to know what is being done there, and what, in your judgment, it is advisable to do.” ’ General Meigs and General Barnard were among the ablest officers in the army, and they proceeded at once to Bermuda Hundred. I did not see them or either of them, or communicate with them directly or indirectly. They must have obtained their information from headquarters. |

May 23, 1864, they reported: “ We have not yet been able fully to post ourselves as to the relations of the corps commanders, but think the report of want of harmony may be exaggerated, at least so far as General Smith is concerned.”’”

May 24, 1864, they reported, among other things, as follows : —

“ What in our opinion ought to be done is either, first, to place an officer of military experience and knowledge in command of these two corps, thus making them a unit for field operations, and then assume the offensive ; or, second, to withdraw twenty thousand men to be used elsewhere. General Butler is a man of rare and great ability, but he has not experience and training to enable him to direct and control movements in battle. .A corps gives its commander full occupation on the battlefield, and leaves him no time to make suggestions to the commander-in-chief as to the movements of two corps. General Butler is satisfied with the ability and aid of General William F. Smith. He does not appear to be satisfied with General Gillmore. General Butler evidently desires to retain command in the field. If his desires must be gratified, withdraw Guillmore, place Smith in command of both corps under the supreme command of General Butler; let Smith put Brooks in command of one corps, and Weitzel of the other, unless you can send here better officers. You will thus have a command which will be a unit, and General Butler will probably be guided by Smith, and leave to him the suggestions and practical execution of army movements ordered. Success would be more certain were Smith in command untrammeled, and General Butler remarided to the administrative duties of the department in which he has shown such rare and great ability.” *

General Barnard also reported orally to General Grant” as follows: ‘ General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes and that I could do the latter [2. e., withdraw troops| with great security; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, 1n cooperation, to produce any effect. He

1 War Records, vol. 69, p. 178. 2 Personal Memoirs of General Grant, vol. ii. pp. 151-153.

said that the general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers, which was of oreat strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior ; but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butler’s line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork ; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck, and it was, therefore, as if Butler was in a bottle.” |

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