Fredericksburg, a study in war

Front matter

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3 55

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERVE

Preface

IT must be a primary object with every soldier to know exactly how war is carried on : how strategy is influenced, in its conception by politics and in its execution by tactics ; how both strategy and tactics are affected by terrain, by the seasons, by railways, telegraphy and sea power : how armies have been raised and organized, trained and led in battle ; how supplied with weapons and other means of defence, with food and clothing, ammunition and shelter ; how the' sick and wounded are cared for ; how the waste of war is repaired.

The study of these matters in peace time can only be pursued seriously when we illustrate the subject continually by examples drawn from history. It is not by remembering maxims, by explaining military phrases or discussing general principles, that a soldier learns his trade ; he must probe deeply the problems of war, examine them in every detail, and never be content to accept the ipse dixit of any historian, however eminent in his day and generation, while actual evidence is available.

The following pages will, it is hoped, enable the student, with a minimum of trouble and the least possible expenditure of time, to become thoroughly familiar x PREFACE

with the essentials of campaigning, by participating as it were in certain events that happened some forty years ago on the continent of America, in the decade that saw the battles of Magenta, Solferino and Sadowa in central Europe.

The campaigns of the great Civil War are especially fitted for study by the English-speaking soldier for several reasons ; there exists a full description of every pitched battle in all its phases, the march orders and reconnaissance reports are also available. The names of persons and places are already familiar to the student, and records are accessible at first hand without the intervention of a translator. There are but few gaps that need filling up by aid of the imagination, and we have not to take into account any difference of race, method of training or armament on the part of the combatants, as in the case of " foreign " wars. The American armies were similarly conditioned in all respects, even to the extent of being commanded by officers who had been trained in the same military academy ; and the official records of both belligerents have been printed without fear or favour side by side in that monumental publication just completed and entitled " War of the Rebel - lion."

Moreover, the American Civil War was in a certain sense a Renaissance ; new methods of warfare were adopted, the Nation in Arms was made manifest ; and from this period in the history of tactics we trace the appearance of heavy guns in the field, the genesis of modern cavalry, the establishment of signal and ambulance corps, and the use of hasty entrenchments, of field telegraphy, and of balloon reconnaissance.

PREFACE xi

The present volume presents a striking contrast to the story of an European campaign with which this Series commenced ; in place of the methodical strategy and forcing tactics of the Germans we must describe the puzzled flounderings of the Federal leaders ; instead of a disunited defence of the French frontier which in six weeks resulted in the unconditional surrender of a large army, we shall narrate the brilliant manoeuvres by which Lee and his lieutenants kept the invaders of Virginia at bay until the Union government was at its wits' end and the Confederate cause almost won. The writer's task has been to examine many Hundreds of letters and reports, written in the field and now preserved in the archives of the War Department at Washington, and, with such skill as he can command, produce for the Special Campaign Series a record of war which shall contain the Truth the whole Truth and nothing but the Truth, so far as that is possible in inditing the class of narrative which we call History.

INTRODUCTORY

Contents

PAGE

Chapter I Chapter II

After Shabpsburg — Rest and Recruitment — Geneeal Lee in the Shenandoah Valley — Geneeal Mc- Clellan along the Potomac — The Lines of Communication— Stuaet's Cavalry Raid — State of the Armies in Octobee, 1862 — Fedeeal Invasion of Virginia — McClellan's Flank Maech — Lee's Manceuvres — Fedeeal Line of Opeeations . . 13

Chapter III

BURNSIDE ASSUMES COMMAND — THE AEMY OF THE POTO- MAC at Waeeentox — A New Plan of Campaign — The March to Falmouth — A Maritime Base — Lee's Dispositions foe Defence — Jackson moves to Poet Royal ....... 31

Chapter XI

The Battle of December 13 — The Left Attack by Franklin — Jackson's Defence of the Confederate Right Section — The Right Attack by Sumner — Longstreet's Defence of the Confederate Left Section — General Burnside's Failure — General Lee's Decision . . .187

CONTENTS xv

PAGE

Chapter XII

After the Battle — The Departments of an Army — The Federals on the Defensive — Burnside's Retreat — Cavalry Reconnaissance — Burnside's Last Effort — The "Mud" March — End of the Campaign

A. — Railroad Communications (Washington to Richmond ......... 259

B.— March Tables, September 26 — November 9

C — Federal Field Return, December 10

D. — Confederate Field Return, December 10 .

E. — Return of Federal Transport, December

F. — Comparative Tables of Losses at Fredericksburg ......

G. — Signallers' Report, December .

H. — River Reconnaissance, Report .

I. — Cavalry Reconnaissance, Report J. — Note on "Howison's"

269 271 272 273

283 286 289 297

(On in i ib

MAPS

[In pocket at end of volume.]

I. Strategical Map of the Eastern Theatre of War

II. Vicinity of Fredericksburg III. Fredericksburg Town V. General Franklin's Sketch-Map

IV. The River Rappahannock . . . Page 256

CHAPTER I Introductory

CHAPTER I

THE American Civil War began with the bombardment of Fort Sumter by the Confederates on April 12, 1861. Within, a year 232 engagements took place, and before General Kirby Smith surrendered to the Federals on May 26, 1865, no fewer than 2,260 battles, sieges and skirmishes had been recorded. Of the various armed forces under various leaders, operating over a vast area in forty states and territories, which contributed to this amazing total of combats, the most important organizations were known as the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia.

These commands were continually occupied during the whole of four years in protecting their own or threatening the enemy's capital. Washington on the left or east bank of the Potomac and Richmond on the left or north bank of James River are about 120 miles apart ; the Potomac River is the State-line between Virginia and Maryland, and the crossing of this natural barrier by one force or the other constituted at this period an act of invasion.

The policy of the Northern States was aggressive ; that of the Southern States was purely defensive ; and throughout the war, rival commanders shaped their strategy largely by political considerations : on the part of the North the attitude assumed was that of an established Government suppressing a rebellion ; on the part of the South the war was regarded as a struggle for freedom, a righteous resistance to intolerable oppression. The capture of Richmond and the overthrow of the newly constituted and rival Government was the aim of the Federal president Abraham Lincoln ; while, on the other hand, Jefferson Davis, ex-Secretary for War of the Federal Government, and now President of the Confederate States, expected by the action of his armies to justify his political existence as an independent ruler, to enlist fresh sympathizers among the Federals themselves, and to win official recognition as a " belligerent " by foreign Powers.

It is, however, remarkable that of all the Generals operating in the Eastern theatre of war, the chief of whom had been trained in the same military school at West Point and had fought side by side in Mexico, the really aggressive fighters were found at the head of the Confederate army whose Government was longing for peace, while the offensive strategy of the Federals was, for three years at least, directed by officers whose characteristics were caution, timidity and vacillation. The triumvirate at Washington consisted of the President (Lincoln), the General in- Chief (Halleck), and the Secretary for War (Stanton) ; and the Federal generals in the field were, until almost the close of the war, largely controlled by a body which resembled the old Aulic Council in Europe during the Seven Years War. It is safe to assert that if the material resources of the North had been at the disposal of Johnston and Lee and Jackson, or if McClellan and Pope and Burnside had encountered the economic difficulties of the Confederate leaders, the War of Secession would have quickly ended in favour of the South. The Federal Government, however, which had resolved to invade Virginia and capture Richmond, and possessed enormous resources in men and material, was served by some singularly feeble generals, while the Confederate Government which stood on the defensive and sought foreign aid as an unprotected, infant State, was upheld for four years by such a master of war as Robert Lee and his lieutenants Jackson and LongstreelTand Stuart. *

The two causes combined to keep alive hostilities until half a million lives and thousands of millions' worth of property had been fruitlessly expended : not an acre being added to the possessions of the one belligerent, not a single concession or political privilege being secured by the other. The Confederates fought against time, hoping for European intervention (the emperor Napoleon III. had been invited to seize Mexico) or a change in political opinion in the North (a strong peace party often asserted itself), but failing these interpositions the result was inevitable : it became a mere question of wealth and population. The South was poor, its population scant and scattered, the Northern States were many, were thickly populated and were rich ; military adventurers from Europe poured into Washington, and high bounties could be paid to recruits for the " Union " armies. It was a contest of agricultural districts against industrial districts, comparable on a gigantic scale to a duel to the death between "Wessex" and the Black Country. The Federals, moreover, possessed the command of the Sea, and prevented the Southern States receiving money, guns or men from Europe ; while reserving all these advantages for themselves. Then, too, there were dissensions in the Southern camp. " State rights " had always been Davis's political cry when a member of Congress : it told against Davis when head of a new Government fighting for political existence. He could not coerce. The States would not stand Conscription. The Cotton States in particular had interests of their own, which were not served by a protracted war. "State " troops and the Confederate troops were raised by competing agents, just as the East India Company once recruited in opposition to the Crown. Finally, the Federals refused to exchange prisoners, so compelling the South to maintain 192,000 deserters and prisoners while their own troops wanted bread. Against all these disabilities and drawbacks Davis and Lee struggled successfully for four years, and then the Confederacy collapsed.

In the summer of 1862, Lee, as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, met the Army of the Potomac under McClellan, then besieging Richmond from the East, and, in a series of pitched battles between June 26 and July 1, drove it back to the sea and compelled it to re-embark for Washington with a loss of over 15,000 men. Lee then turned to the North, and advanced against another Federal organization known as the Army of Virginia, commanded by Pope. He defeated this force at Cedar Mountain, near Culpeper, on August 9. Ten days later Lee drove the Federal cavalry from Brandy Station and Kelly's Ford, and skirmished with the main body along the Rappahannock. Finally, Lee met the Army of Virginia reinforced by the Army of the

Potomac and between August and September 1 he beat them at Groveton and Gainesville, at Bull Run and Chantilly, and drove the last Union soldier out of Virginia across the Potomac, to seek shelter behind the fortifications of Washington. The Federals were ten days removing their wounded, under a Flag of Truce.

The offensive strategy of the Federals had so far cost them dear. Between June 26 and September 1 a loss of 32,749 men (killed, wounded and missing) had been incurred by McClellan's Army of the Potomac and Pope's Army of Virginia, in attempts to beat the Confederates in the field and seize their capital by " double lines " of operations southward and westward. It was now determined to secure at least unity of command, and the two organizations were accordingly merged into one, and a new Army of the Potomac created, and placed under the sole command of General McClellan.

The campaign which had resulted so disastrously for the Federals had occupied only two months, and on September 3 the Confederate general wrote to President Davis to say that in his judgment the time was come for a forward movement, carrying the war into the enemy's country. The general, fearing perhaps that the President's reply would again prescribe purely defensive strategy, did not wait to receive it, but, in spite of serious difficulties in regard to supplies, crossed the Potomac into Maryland. Lee reached the town of Frederick, about forty-five miles north-west of Washington, on September 8, and then again wrote to Davis, pointing out that the Federal president, with the enemy at his gates, might now perhaps be disposed to listen to proposals from the Southern government for peace, on the basis of " the recognition of our independence." At the same time Lee addressed a local proclamation to the people of Maryland, inviting them to throw in their lot with the Southern States. " Our army," he says, " has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled ; " and as though to give point to his arguments, on September 9 Lee issued orders to his corps commanders for immediate operations — operations which were to result in the capture by the Confederates of Harper's Ferry, with its garrison of 12,000 men and seventy-three heavy guns.

Meanwhile the new Army of the Potomac had been put in motion through Maryland to repel Lee's invasion. Leaving a considerable force for the defence of Washington, the Federals moved north and west on five parallel roads (his army would have occupied fifty miles if marched on a single road, as some of McClellan's critics had advised), and on September 13, four days after the Confederates had evacuated Frederick, the Army of the Potomac entered the town and found there (accidentally preserved as a wrapper for cigars) a copy of Lee's " March " Orders, in which he had outlined his new plan of campaign. With all his faults, McClellan was a competent soldier — he had represented the United States with the allied armies in the Crimea — and knew how to profit by such intelligence as fortune had placed at his disposal ; and accordingly the Confederate corps under Longstreet experienced next day a reverse that decided Lee to retire immediately to Southern territory.

At noon on September 15, however, news reached him of the victory of Jackson's corps at Harper's Ferry, and, better still, of the march of Jackson northwards to unite with Longstreet. So, when two hours later the scouts of McClellan's advanced guard were observed watering their horses at Antietam creek, Lee suddenly resolved to give battle, and began forthwith to post his guns on the high ground between the creek and the town of Sharpsburg, having the Potomac (which here flowed southward) a few miles in his rear. During September 16 the preliminary movements for battle occupied both armies, and at dawn on September 17 the fighting began : some 35,000 Confederates were opposed to 62,000 Federals (who had another 25,000 in reserve), and at the end of the day the Army of the Potomac had lost nearly 13,000 men. Lee's army had however suffered hardly less severely, and on September 18, when news was brought to the Confederate leader that McClellan's losses were about to be made good by reinforcements, and that the Pennsylvania Militia were ready to swarm into Maryland from the north, he felt that these circumstances, coupled with increasing difficulties in regard to his own supplies and consequent depletion of his rank by straggling, demanded a retrograde movement, and the abandonment of that strategic counterstroke which had promised no less a result than the immediate termination of the war in favour of the Southern cause.

The same night Lee recrossed the Potomac into Southern territory, covering his retirement by a cavalry attack on the enemy's rear at Williamsport, and securing his passage (a single ford) by batteries of heavy guns.

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Chapter II

After Sharpsburg — Rest and Recruitment — General Lee in the Shenandoah Valley — General McClellan along the Potomac — The Lines op Communication — Stuart's Cavalry Raid — State of the Armies in October, 1862 — Federal Invasion of Virginia — McClellan' s Flank March — Lee's Manoeuvres — Federal Line of Operations.

CHAPTER II

The battle of Sharpsburg was memorable for fierce fighting. The Federals left over 2,000 dead upon the field, and even the Confederates, who on that occasion relied on defensive tactics, were appalled at their own losses. Then Lee and McClellan appear to have realized simultaneously that a period of recuperation must precede any further effort on either side. Lee in the Shenandoah Valley, south of the Potomac, and McClellan on the northern bank of the river, accordingly spent several weeks in recruiting their strength. Lee, writing from his camp on the Opequon, west of Charlestown, on September 21, says that the efficiency of his army is " greatly paralyzed by the loss to its ranks of the numerous stragglers." He mentions four brigades which between them mustered only 820 men. It must remain one of the unsolved problems of war that the Washington authorities had detained, for the protection of the capital from the south, a large force which by operating on Mc- Clellan's left flank in September might have severed the Confederate communications with Richmond while Lee's army was held fast by McClellan north of the Potomac. On the day of the battle of Sharpsburg a reconnaissance on the railway from Alexandria to Bull Run showed that the bridge there could be made passable for trains in an hour. Evidently Lee's right and rear were then protected only by small cavalry detachments, as McClellan had surmised a week before, when, in an able memorandum, he had protested against an unnecessary dispersal of forces.

To mismanagement at Washington no doubt Lee's army owed its salvation at this critical period of the war. Time to recover was all that the Army of Northern Virginia now wanted, and time is what the Federals gave without stint. Longstreet's Corps and Lee's Headquarters after recrossing the Potomac had encamped close to the Martinsburg road, about six miles from Winchester. Jackson had isolated the 2nd Corps as usual, which rested at Bunker's Hill, six miles further north. Cavalry Headquarters were at Leetown, and Stuart's three brigades under Lee, Hampton and Munford, distributed between Shepherdstown, Hedge ville and Charlestown, covered the army. In Winchester were large hospitals filled with wounded, and various military establishments (some supplies of boots and shoes came up during Lord Wolseley's stay there), but few civilians or shops. Guards picketed all the roads, and the provost marshal's written permission to enter or leave the town was demanded. The railroad between Manassas Junction and Strasburg, and between Winchester and Harper's Ferry, had just been destroyed by Jackson. The Richmond railroad at Staunton was a four days' journey (92 miles) up the Shenandoah Valley turnpike — perhaps the only regularly metalled road in the entire State — and up and down this road, crossing two or three streams, tributaries of the Shenandoah, by fords knee deep — the bridges having been destroyed in the course of Jackson's summer operations — poured all the traffic that accumulates in rear of an army in the field. Every twenty miles the Commissariat department had established " posts " for the relief of wayworn travellers to and from the army, such as prisoners and escorts — the former well clothed in the regulation blue frock-coat and light-blue trousers of the Union forces, the latter riding along in every variety of coat or jacket, or even in their shirt-sleeves — parties of convalescents marching to rejoin the army, batches of sick and wounded — many of them shoeless — slowly toiling home to recuperate ; and ambulance carts filled with crippled soldiers or* returning empty for a fresh burden. In one of these carts Lord Wolseley travelled from Staunton to Winchester to visit Lee at this period, and it is from his vivid picture that our knowledge of the Confederate lines of communication with Richmond is derived.

Just at this time long trains of guns and ammunition wagons — the spoils of Harper's Ferry — were being sent to the rear. The Army of Northern Virginia had been largely supported by these involuntary contributions on the part of the Federals. Every alternate wagon and ambulance cart, we are told, bore upon it the letters US; in every camp were found tents, carts, horses and guns similarly marked. Confederate regiments had been known to go into action with smooth-bore muskets and destitute of kit, and appear on parade the next day with a complete outfit — knapsacks, blankets and greatcoats — and armed with new Austrian rifles.

Winchester had been a Confederate depot when Lee was in Maryland, and his drafts from Richmond proceeded there via Luray and Front Royal, after resting and drawing rations at Culpeper. A journey on wheels southwards from Winchester to Staunton would be first broken at Middletown, a village thirteen miles distant : the next night would be spent between Woodstock and Mount Jackson : by the evening of the third day Harrisonburg would be reached : and the remainder of the journey, twenty-five miles to Staunton, would be covered on the fourth day. Thus through the Shenandoah Valley — the garden of Virginia it had been called — Lee's communication with the railroad and so with Richmond lay, and evidence of the fact was abundant in the fields, where only farms fenced with loose stones were distinguishable from common or waste lands, since the wooden posts and rail fences had served to kindle the bivouac fires of the Confederate army.

Staunton, like Winchester, had become a Confederate depot ; the few shops open demanded war prices for their goods — Lord Wolseley paid half a sovereign for a shilling pocket knife, and searched in vain for a tea-pot or kettle — the best of its houses had been converted into military hospitals ; in its only hotel " beds " were represented by sufficient floor space to lie down upon, but at the station a south-eastern train might be caught for the journey of eleven hours (120 miles) over the steep slopes and sharp curves of Blue Ridge and South West Mountains, bending northwards to Gordonsville junction, thence south-east to Hanover, and so to Richmond, the " base " on which Lee's army depended ultimately for its supplies and stores, recruits and munitions of war. In September, 1862, a large proportion of the passengers from Staunton to Richmond were the sick and wounded with their attendants, and soldiers from the army at Winchester going home for ten days' furlough.

This season of rest and refitment was spent by the Federals in the neighbourhood of Harper's Ferry, where the Shenandoah joins the Potomac. The Union army stretched along the big river from Williamsport to Berlin, and had its supplies sent out from Washington by three routes, viz., the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which follows the course of the Potomac ; the Baltimore and Ohio railroad through Newmarket to Berlin ; and the Cumberland Valley railroad through Chambersburg to Hagerstown : all were excellent lines of supply for an army that had nearly 4,000 wagons moving between the railhead and the troops.

On September 15, President Lincoln, on receiving McClellan's report of the successful operations at South Mountain, had telegraphed : " Destroy the rebel army if possible." But ten days had now elapsed without any progress being made in this direction, further than to fight a drawn battle at Sharpsburg ; the rebel army had been allowed to retire without molestation into Southern territory ; and the Army of the Potomac, which President Lincoln hoped to find pursuing and dispersing the Confederates, was itself in a state of exhaustion and its leader in his most lethargic mood. Far from taking the offensive, McClellan a week later apparently found himself unable to protect the territory his army occupied, for Lee's cavalry division on October 9 crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ford, moved north through Maryland and Pennsylvania, and camped at Chambersburg, a Federal depot without a garrison. The Confederate leader, General Stuart, there took as prisoners and paroled all the

c sick and wounded in the hospitals, seized 500 remounts, cut the telegraph wires, obstructed the railway communication with Washington, destroyed all the arms, ammunition, and clothing stored in the town, and a train of loaded cars on the railroad. The raiding expedition then circled to the east towards Gettysburg, and, leaving Frederick on its right after turning southwards, recrossed the Potomac near Sugar Loaf Mountain, camped at Leesburg, east of Blue Bridge, on the night of October 12, and returned through Snicker's Gap to camp at Berryville, near Winchester, on October 14. Stuart's cavalry had covered 126 miles and had remained fiftysix hours within the enemy's lines, eluding every one of the numerous Federal detachments which had been warned — always just too late — to intercept him, and assisting materially in the breaking down of the Union cavalry, which formed the subject of lengthy correspondence between Lincoln and McClellan.

The commotion which this Expedition caused, not only at army Headquarters, but at Washington, may be gathered from the circumstance that orders and correspondence on the subject fill fifty pages of the Official Records, and General McClellan next day received a letter from the President to remind him that by remaining on the defensive with the Potomac between himself and his enemy, he was hardly carrying out the plans of the Government. On October 6, the General-in-Chief at Washington had written : " The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be re-inforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. . . . I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions." And now, after Stuart's raid, President Lincoln personally rebuked his general for what he termed his " over-cautiousness," pointed out that the fears McClellan had expressed in regard to subsistence were groundless, and finally read him a lecture on strategy. Lincoln's remarks were not without point. " Change, positions with the enemy," he says, " and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours ? . . . It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it."

In this letter, dated October 13, Lincoln summed up the situation. A call for troops on July 2 had resulted in 421,465 men enlisted for three years being furnished by twenty-four States and Territories ; and another " call " on August 4 had added 87,588 militia (enlisted for nine months only) to the Union forces. The administrative departments were found equal to enlisting, organizing and equipping 80,000 men in less than a month, and yet nothing had been accomplished by the general in the field ; though, the Federal Government having undertaken the role of invader, it was incumbent on its Generals to attempt to imitate the great masters of offensive strategy, to seize and keep the initiative, and leave the enemy no breathing time. From this point of view McClellan must be judged like any other general who accepts command of an army of invasion. Stung perhaps by the accusation that his conduct was " unmanly " McClellan promised to make a move.

A glance at the map will show that though the Federals in crossing the Potomac and again invading Virginia were actually moving nearer to their base at Washington, fresh lines of supply would become necessary, that the old depots must be abandoned and their stores removed to Washington, to be reissued and forwarded to new depots in Northern Virginia. McClellan could not, as Lee had done to a large extent, live on the country, for the Confederates would of course remove all that they could not themselves consume. It is true that railways existed, but they had never been constructed for military purposes ; they were single-line tracks, only suited to the moderate traffic of an agricultural district sparsely populated ; and no doubt the task was an onerous one to supply an immense shifting population, like the Federal army, dispersed over many camping grounds, with its enormous daily requirements. The wagon roads, too, had not been constructed for the passage of thousands of army wagons, and it was common knowledge that only so long as the fine weather lasted could roads be relied upon for transport purposes.