The founding of the Roman Empire

Preface

The first chapter of this work was originally read as a paper before the American Historical Association and was published in their proceedings for 1913. It has, however, been extensively revised and in part rewritten.

The general purpose of the work will, I hope, be sufficiently clear, but there are one or two matters to which it might be well to call attention. My quotations from Cicero's letters are all taken from Shuckburgh's translation. Not only is this version the work of an eminent scholar, but it seems to me especially excellent for the manner in which it has reproduced in English the style and flavor of Cicero's Latin. A few experiments convinced me that I could not improve on Shuckburgh's rendering, and I have therefore been content to adopt it. Needless to say, I have carefully compared the translation with the original text and In a few cases I have ventured to differ from Shuckburgh and to modify his rendering of the passage in question. Where such changes have been made, I have called attention to it in the notes, except in one or two cases where the alterations were very slight and trivial, or such as will necessarily arise in quotation. There are one or two other cases where I have quoted from modern translations for special reasons. For example, in the quotation from Hirtius on the siege of Uxellodunum I have taken the English version of Edwards because he holds the same view as to the date intended as Holmes, from which view I am inclined to dissent.

There are a number of disputed points where I have adhered to the conventional view without comment. Thus, for example, Boak has recently argued (in the American Historical Review for 1918) that after the time of Sulla the senate assumed the right to confer the imperium. I find myself unable to accept this view, and I note that its author has himself abandoned one of his supposed instances in the

History of Rome which ho has just published. If any such power was claimed by the senate no attempt was made to use it against Caesar. In connection with the proconsular impcrium o( Augustus I have taken account of the views advanced by IVlham (in his Assays o)i Roman History), but the criticism o( Hardy (in his Roman Studies) seems to me io leave the question very much .s-^/> jud%C9t to say the least, and it has appeared safer to adhere to the commonly received interpretation. Should either the views of l>oak or Pelham be accepted it would require only slight verbal changes in the text. I am also aware that doubts have been raised as to the province assigned to Caesar by the senate before his election as consul, but they do not appear to me to be o( sufficient weight to justify an amendment to the text o( Suetonius.

It remains only to acknowledge my indebtedness to several o\ my colleagues. I have to thank Professors Barker, Puncalf, and Hat tie o( this University for their kindness in reading my manuscript and for valuable suggestions. I am especially under obligation to Dr. 1\ M. Ratchelder of the Mathematics Department for very valuable assistance in preparing the manuscript for the press and in reading the proof.

Frank Burr marsh.

Austin, Texas. May 1. liVj-j.

VI

Appendix

The Lex Vatinia 271

The l>x Pompeia-Licima *,v

Chronological List of Consuls 2<n

List of Consulars Active in the Imperial Service 294

Analysis of the Consular Fasti 297

Alphabetical List of Consuls 305

List of Books Referred to in the Notes 314

Index

VII

Chapter I

No part of Ancient History has possessed greater fascination for the imagination than the story of the rise of the Roman republic from an insignificant town of Latium to a position of world empire and the destruction of the civil liberty of the Romans in the moment of their triumph. That the two things were intimately connected is obvious upon the surface, and historians have agreed that it was Rome's conquest of the Mediterranean world that proved fatal to republican institutions. Two main explanations have been advanced of why this should have been the case. One of these is that, assailed by the new temptations which the empire brought with it, the Romans themselves deteriorated in character ; the other is that, having begun her career as a city-state, Rome found her machinery of government inadequate to perform the work which world dominion imposed upon her. Both these explanations are quite obviously true and quite as obviously insufficient. The corruption and degeneracy of a people do not always lead to a change of government, and it should be shown why it did so in this instance. That a city-state could not govern an empire may be true, but it leaves open the question as to precisely why it could not. In what particular respects was the Roman republic unequal to its task? Just where and why did the machine break down? When the government did finally collapse why did not the entire fabric go to pieces? If the degeneracy of the Roman people will explain the fall of the republic, how shall we account for the fact that this same people continued to rule the world ? How did it happen that the Roman world emerged from the chaos of the civil wars, transformed indeed into an empire, but still Roman as dominantly as before? By what steps had the empire been developed out of the republican machine? — for it is surely incredible that it had no more solid foundation than the astute hypocrisy of Augustus. A survey of the last century of the republic, even if only in brief outline, ought to provide some definite answer to such questions, and such a survey is the purpose of the present work. Its object will, therefore, be to show in some detail just how and why the republic failed and fell and in what way the empire was gradually evolved to meet the imperative needs which the old system could no longer satisfy.

It was not entirely because the Roman state was municipal in its origin that it proved unequal to the task of governing a widely extended empire; the peculiar character of the Roman constitution had much to do with its failure. The Roman republic possessed a very intricate and delicately adjusted organization wherein each part was fitted to every other, and this complexity was one of the causes which led to the breakdown of the machine. With the very beginning of Rome's extra-Italian conquests the difficulty began. The problem which the administration of the provinces presented exercised a marked influence on the foreign policy of the republic — an influence generally ignored, but one which will repay a brief consideration. This is the more true because the problem, in one shape or another, lasted throughout the last century of the republic and exerted a transforming influence upon the institutions of the early empire. It will be well, therefore, at the start to see clearly the precise nature of this administrative problem for which the statesmen of the day were striving to find a satisfactory solution.

A glance at the history of the growth of Rome's imperial power will at once reveal some curious features which would seem to call for explanation. The first of these is the intermittent character of Roman expansion. In a relatively short space of time Rome annexed several provinces, and then for a number of years no additions were made to her empire. A brief table will perhaps make this clearer. From 241 to 197 B.C., a period of forty-four years, Rome annexed four provinces. Then from 197 to 146 B.C., a period of fifty-one years, no new territories were acquired. From 146 to 121 B.C., a period of twenty-five years, four more provinces were annexed. Then from 121 to 63 B.C., a period of fifty-eight years, there was no further increase of the Roman dominions. Thus it will be seen that the Roman empire expanded rapidly for forty-four years, then stood still for fifty-one years, then advanced again for twenty-five years, then remained stationary for fifty-eight years.

A second peculiarity is that in the periods of rest, if they may be so termed, the republic not only did not annex new provinces but strove earnestly to avoid doing so. It is not that opportunities were lacking but that Rome refused to take advantage of them. One or two illustrations will suffice to make this evident. As has been said above, in the fifty-one years between 197 and 146 Rome acquired no new territory. Yet, during this time, Rome carried on several important and successful wars. From 200 to 196 she was engaged in the Second Macedonian War, the result of which was to place Greece and Macedon completely at her mercy. On this occasion Rome contented herself with curtailing the power of Macedon and withdrew her forces. Hardly had the Roman legions departed than in 192 Antiochus of Syria invaded Greece, and Rome was forced into a, war with him. The result of that war was to leave Rome mistress of Greece and Asia Minor. Instead of using her opportunity, she gave up her conquests and withdrew her forces without adding even a single district to her empire. In 171 Perseus, king of Macedon, began a war of revenge on Rome. He was crushed at the battle of Pydna in 168 and his kingdom lay helpless at the feet of the conqueror. Instead of annexing Macedon, Rome contented herself with abolishing the Macedonian monarchy, divided the country into four republics, and retired across the seas. Nineteen years after Pydna, the Macedonians revolted under a pretender and this time Rome finally yielded to the inevitable, and there being no other way of keeping Macedon quiet, she annexed it as a province at the beginning of the second period of expansion.

Another instance of this same aversion to conquest is furnished by the province of Narbonensis, or Transalpine Gaul. After Rome had acquired possessions in Spain it

X was, as historians have often pointed out, inevitable that she should seek to gain a land connection between Italy and Spain. In ancient times the Mediterranean could only be navigated at certain seasons and it would thus be unsafe for Rome to rely wholly on the sea for her communications with the Spanish provinces. All modern historians have felt the force of these considerations. What has not been explained is why Rome remained blind to them for seventysix years. This, however, seems clearly a part of the general anti-expansionist policy which prevailed from 197 to 146. As soon as a forward policy was resumed Transalpine Gaul was promptly annexed and land communication with Spain assured.

As has been pointed out, this second period of expansion lasted for twenty-five years and came to art end in 121 B.C. Of Roman policy after this time Professor Tenny Frank has admirably said : "A careful examination of the behavior of the home government . . . reveals the significant fact that a complete indifference to expansion, at times verging upon a positive aversion, existed at Rome. The Asiatic province and Cyrene constitute the only considerable territorial additions, and these were gifts, accepted in both cases with certain restrictions. In Africa, Gaul, and Cilicia, Rome took charge of the least rather than the largest possible portion of territory at her disposal. The senate was, of course, the center of the anti-imperialistic sentiment, discouraged, it would seem, by its experiences in Spain, and wholly out of sympathy with the military developments necessitated by foreign possessions."1 The facts here stated are entirely correct, but the explanation of the senate's attitude seems hardly adequate. Another explanation that has been offered of this attitude is that the senate was jealous of the power of the governors of the provinces aFrank, Roman Imperialism, 274. Of the two provinces here mentioned the annexation of Asia really dates from the preceding period since it was then that the first steps were taken for making it a Roman dependency; the other, Cyrene, seems not to have been administered as a separate province for a considerable time.

and found them difficult to control.2 This motive was doubtless present, yet it can hardly be the whole explanation, since this motive would be likely to be felt as strongly at one time as at another, while the opposition of the senate to new annexations is clearly greater at certain periods than at others. Why should the senate have been more reluctant to extend the territories of the republic before 146 B.C. than after that year?

If we turn, however, to the constitutional problem which the administration of provinces presented to the Romans, an explanation is readily forthcoming. Previous to 146 this problem involved greater difficulty than it did after that date, owing to certain new developments in constitutional usage. This explanation, moreover, will apply equally at another point. The growth of the empire was again arrested in 121 B.C., but it so happens that the administrative problem had again become difficult of solution at about that time.

The key to the senate's attitude may, perhaps, be found in its composition and its position in the Roman state. In early times the duty of making out the list of the 300 senators had been intrusted to the censors. Very soon, however, their freedom of choice began to be limited by custom, if not by law. Certain persons — namely the ex-magistrates — came to be regarded as having a moral, if not a legal, right to be placed upon the roll. This right seems to have been established by the Ovinian law, which probably directed the censors to fill the vacancies in the senate by designating the most worthy of the ex-magistrates, including the tribunes and quaestors.3 The number of these last two zFor example Heitland (The Roman Republic, ii, 187-88) says: "That the senate was anything but eager to annex provinces is clear enough, and was no doubt mainly due to the known difficulty of controlling distant governors." He also points out some other considerations such as the influence of the "old Roman" party and the wealth or poverty of the province in question, but he seems to regard the reason quoted as the chief cause of the senate's attitude. Mommsen has also emphasized the fear of the vast power which must have been intrusted to the governor as the reason for the refusal of the senate to accept the gift of Egypt under the will of one of the last Ptolemies. History of Rome, iv, 319.

3The exact provisions of the Ovinian law have been disputed. The arguments in favor of the view taken in the text are very strong and are fully set forth in Willems, Le senat de la republique romaine, i, 153-73.

classes must have been more than sufficient for the purpose, so that under ordinary circumstances the censors would have little, if any, opportunity to go outside their ranks. Whatever the provisions of the Ovinian law, the account which Livy gives of the filling up of the senate after the disastrous battle of Cannae strongly suggests that by 216 B.C. the rule was clearly established in practice that the extribunes and ex-quaestors should be preferred to citizens who had not held office.

When the problem of administering dependencies first presented itself it was comparatively easy of solution. The earliest provinces acquired by the Roman people were Sardinia and Sicily, which were taken from Carthage at the end of the First Punic War primarily for the purpose of keeping her at a safe distance from southern Italy and securing the safety and control of the Italian seas. Having annexed them, Rome was obliged to provide in some fashion for their government. A brief experience sufficed to convince the Romans that the tranquility and safety of these islands required the presence in them of a Roman governor armed with the imperium,41 that is one of the higher Roman magistrates. But all the magistrates were then fully occupied in Italy, and Rome had none to spare for her extra- Italian possessions. Under these circumstances the obvious course to follow was to increase the number of magistrates with the imperium and send the newly created ones across the seas. As it was out of the question to increase the number of the consuls, the praetors were selected for this purpose and their number was raised from two to four. At the same time, as it was customary for a magistrate holding an independent command to be accompanied by a quaestor, the number of the quaestors was increased to meet the new demands. This successfully solved the problem for the

*The term imperium signified the power of command. It was applied to the sum total of the powers conferred upon the higher magistrates. The Roman made no clear distinction between civil and military, executive and judicial functions, but included them all in the one term. In a broad sense the imperium thus meant the power of governing and whoever had received it from the people could act as an executive magistrate, sit as a judge, or command an army The only regular magistrates possessing the imperium were the consuls and praetors.

time being, and when, at the close of the Second Punic War, Rome annexed two new provinces in Spain, the same method was again resorted to in order to secure governors. The number of the praetors was now raised to six and that of the quaestors to twelve. At this point, however, a halt was called and for the next 51 years a steadily anti-expansionist policy was followed by the senate. One reason for this must certainly be found in the fact that there existed definite obstacles to any further increase in the number of the magistrates, and hence that it was difficult, or impossible, to administer more territory. The precise nature of these obstacles will repay a brief consideration.

During the period of Roman history that closed in 197 B.C. two important developments had been taking place. In the holding of the offices a definite sequence had been gradually established by which it was customary to hold the quaestorship before the praetorship and the praetorship before the consulship. The quaestorship had thus been made the first step in a Roman's official career, even the tribunes being usually ex-quaestors. While this was happening there had been another development of great importance going on. Little by little a new aristocracy was taking shape and was becoming all the time more and more clearly defined and more and more powerful. From the earliest days of Rome there had been a close association between nobility and the holding of office. One of the outstanding marks of the old patrician aristocracy had been their monopoly of office. When the long conflict between the patricians and the plebeians had at last ended in the victory of the people and the magistracies had been thrown open to all the citizens, much of the old feeling still remained. Thus it speedily happened that those plebeian families whose members had been elected to office by their fellow citizens began to take their place side by side with the old patrician families to form a new nobility. As early as 217 B.C. one of the tribunes had denounced this tendency, saying that the new plebeian nobles had begun to despise the people the moment they had ceased to be despised by the patricians. The denunciation was without effect and the new nobility continued to develop without check. This new aristocracy was composed of all those families which had attained to any of the curule offices.5 As the holding of these offices thus came to confer distinction, not only on the man who held them but on his descendants as well, it was entirely natural that the families so ennobled should feel themselves a class apart and should exert themselves to keep the offices in the hands of members of their class as far as possible. Such an attempt coincided far too well with the aristocratic and conservative temper of the Roman people not to meet with a large measure of success, and the outstanding fact about the Roman republic, from the end of the Great Wars on, is the contrast between its theoretical and its actual government. In point of law, the republic was a democracy and its offices open to all citizens without distinction of birth, while in point of fact, they were almost entirely monopolized by a ring of noble families. After 197 B.C. it may reasonably be assumed that this nobility was so far developed and had become sufficiently class-conscious to begin to view the broad problems of Roman policy from the standpoint of aristocratic interests.

It is evident that a nobility like that of Rome could not regard with indifference an indefinite increase in the number of the offices. If this were permitted a point must ultimately be reached when the number would become too great for the existing aristocracy to fill, and since the holding of the higher offices conferred nobility, an undue increase in their number was equivalent to a creation of peers. An aristocracy tends naturally to exclusiveness ; the English House of Lords has twice stooped to profound humiliation to avoid the cheapening of their rank that must come with a large addition to their number. A similar attitude on the part of the Roman nobles might safely be inferred. It would mean, in point of fact, that they would seek to check the increase in the number of the offices as soon as this

5The curule offices were the consulship, praetorship, and two of the four aedileships. Of the aediles two were known as curule aediles and the other two as plebeian aediles. The curule offices were those which had once been exclusively patrician and were distinguished by certain special marks and privileges.

threatened to bring about any considerable augmentation of their class. By 197 this point had actually been reached, and it is consequently at that time that the increase in the number of the magistrates was checked. But if this were done it was evident that the state could not be permitted to assume new administrative responsibilities, and thus the Roman nobility was forced to adopt an anti-expansionist policy abroad as a necessary means of securing its exclusiveness at home.

So satisfactory was the existing system to the nobility that they prevented any alteration in the number of the magistrates for over a century and contented themselves with strengthening those features of it which worked most directly to their advantage. In regard to the magistrates a brief consideration will suffice to show that any change must have been to the disadvantage of the aristocracy. There were during this time 6 praetors and 12 quaestors. Custom, if not positive law, had imposed the rule that the quaestorship should be the necessary preliminary to all other offices — even in most cases, to the tribuneship. In the case of this last office the quaestorship seems never to have been required, but it was very generally held and it is probable that few of the tribunes who had not held it were admitted to the senate. More and more the quaestorship became the path that led, not only to all the higher offices, but to the senate as well. As the traditional number of the senate was fixed at 300 it would seem that the number of 12 quaestors a year would somewhat more than suffice to fill its ranks.6 It was quite clearly to the interest of the nobles

6Willems (i, 161-164 and 404-406) has attempted to fix the average duration of life of the ex-quaestors and has estimated it at 30 years or slightly less. The size of the senate as reorganized by Sulla was certainly between 500 and 600, which, based as it was on 20 quaestors a year would give the average life at from 25 to 30 years. On the basis of 25 years 12 quaestors a year would give 300, while with 30 years the number would be 360. Before the last increase in the number of the quaestors they probably numbered 10, which, on the basis of 30 years average life, would give 300. It may not be unreasonable to infer that very probably before this last increase the quaestors were not quite numerous enough to fill the vacancies in the senate and that after the increase the number was slightly larger than was required. The nobility, in that case, would seem to have stopped the increase as soon as the number became obviously too large to serve their purpose and this was, perhaps, as soon as the position of the nobility became sufficiently strong and well defined to enable them to act successfully.

to maintain this office as an indispensable first step in an official career and not to permit an undue increase in its numbers. It must have served as an excellent means of preserving the supremacy of the aristocracy at once in the magistracies and in the senate. It was almost always held at an early age, at 30 or thereabouts, and under the conditions of Roman public life so young a man had rarely been given any opportunity to impress his personality on the voters, unless, perhaps, in the law courts. In general the candidates for the office would be comparatively unknown men and the nobles would have little difficulty in securing the return of the members of their families who might stand. Now and then a new man might be chosen, but the Roman voter called on to decide between two candidates who were both personally but little known to him would nearly always vote for the one who bore an historic name. The quaestorship could thus be made to serve the purpose of the aristocracy if the senate and the higher magistracies were made to depend upon it. The greater the number of the quaestors in proportion to the number of the noble families the less efficiently it could be employed in this way. The stationary number of the quaestors seems therefore readily intelligible. To increase the number would simply have meant admitting so many more inconvenient rivals for the higher offices from outside their ranks.

The objections to any change in the number of the praetors are even more obvious. The holding of this office in itself conferred nobility and 6 was quite as large a number as the aristocracy desired to have. It was, indeed, upon this office that the size of the nobility ultimately depended. It is true that both the consulship and the curule aedileship ennobled their holders, but the praetorship invariably preceded the one and almost invariably followed the other. In the earlier days of the repulic this had not been true. In former times there had been but two consuls, two praetors, and two curule aediles, so that at this period the offices must have been held more or less independently of each other. There were therefore at first six offices which conferred noble rank. It may be only a coincidence, but it is, at least, suggestive that the Roman aristocracy stopped the increase in the number of the praetors at precisely this same number. It would seem that they had no great objection to the increase so long as it kept within the limits of the already existing noble families. When that point had been reached and any further increase must have resulted in the creation of more noble families, a halt was promptly called. Yet if new provinces were to be governed it was necessary to increase the number of the praetors. Experience had clearly shown that the governors must possess the imperium which meant that they must be either praetors or consuls. Their class interests as an aristocracy therefore impelled the Roman nobles to set themselves against imperialism and foreign conquest.7

The only solution of the difficulty that would permit of new annexations was to create a new office which should not confer nobility, or a seat in the senate, and use this new magistracy for the government of the provinces. This would have meant the direct election of the provincial governors in the assembly, since only the people could confer the imperium. This plan, which would seem so obvious and natural to a modern mind, was open to grave objections from the standpoint of the senate and of the nobility who used that body as an instrument of government.

In the first place, a large part of the power and influence of the senate sprang directly from the fact that it concentrated in itself the whole official experience of the Roman world. Consuls and praetors must inevitably treat with respect the deliberate judgment of a body in which sat every Roman who had led an army or governed a province. Once let official knowledge and experience accumulate outside the senate and much of its influence would be gone. This was

a consideration absolutely vital to a body which, like the senate, ruled far more by influence than by legal right.

Indirectly, too, such a proposal would have been injurious to the nobles. In the Roman mind there was a very close association between the magistrates, the senate, and the nobility. Office-holding and a seat in the senate were among the badges of the noble. Once create important offices which did not confer nobility or a senatorship and there was bound to arise a new order to rival the existing nobles. Such a development could not but appear dangerous to those nobles and could not be expected to find favor at their hands.

Still further, a considerable part of the senate's control over the provincial governors lay in the fact that they were ipso facto senators, and the opinion of their order, spoken through that body of which they were themselves a part, could not but weigh heavily with them. Break this connection, let the people name governors who had no direct interest in the supremacy of the senate, and a blow would be struck at its power. If the senate already found its control over the provinces too weak, it would not be likely to consent to a change which would have weakened it still more.