An examination of the utilitarian theory of morals

Preface

This little treatise is but an unpretending contribution in the department of Moral Science. Written by snatches amid the varied duties of ministerial life, it lays no claim either to be profound in matter, or complete in form. Much less does it pretend to any originality .

The practical importance of correct views on the questions of Moral Science may be underestimated. Sound ethical principles are closely related to religion, just as the Theistic position is vital to sound opinions touching ethical principles. An attempt is made to keep this in view in these pages.

The value of well-founded doctrines in morals, both to the individual and to society, is of great moment in this age of independent research, and almost restless enquiry, when some even venture to propose reconstruction in religion and morals. Reflection on such things led the writer to examine and compare the two leading opposite schools of Moralists, with a view to discover the merits of their respective claims to acceptance. The result, in the form of a brief summary, is contained in the following pages.

No one can be more sensible than the writer, of the many imperfections in the attempt he has made to carry out his purpose, yet it is felt that the careful reader can scarcely fail to be helped to see the inadequacy of the Utilitarian System, and the sufficiency of the Intuitional Theory, to answer all the demands of an ethical system. Ethical Empiricism is radically defective.

In regard to the plan of the work, it is proper to state that fault may be found with the method of treatment. It may be thought by some that to sketch the whole ground continuously in the first part of the treatise, and then to

PKEFACE, review the same tojDics in the second part, is not in accordance with strict logical method. Some may have the feeling that it would have been better to have completed the statement and criticism of each topic by itself. Both methods were before the writer's mind, and after consideration he decided to adopt a plan which may be open to criticism, yet, which, it is believed, will best gain the end he lias in view. If any reader prefers the other order, he can secure it by reading consecutively the corresponding chapters in the first and second parts

This prefatory note would be incomplete without mention of the aid received, and of the thanks due to some of the kind friends whose assistance has done much to make this treatise what it is. Professor Young, L. L D., of University College, Toronto, whose able teaching in Mental ami Moral Science can never be forgotten, is mentioned, with grateful memory of profitable hours spent in his classes. Principal Caven, I). D., of Knox College, Toronto, whose valuable aid and wise counsel was so cheerfully given, deserves the warmest gratitude of the writer. To other friends who have encouraged him in various ways thanks are likewise tendered.

It may be added, that while the manner in which the topics are treated may render the book of interest chiefly to students in College or University, or to readers who have enjoyed some tuition in mental and moral science, it is hoped that the general reader may also be able to peruse its pages with intelligence and profit.

Such as it is, it is sent forth with the earnest hope that it may at least inspire in some minds a deeper interest in the great problems of Ethics.

Introduction

The aim of these pages is to discuss, in a somewhat general way, those views in regard to the questions of moral philosophy which, taken together, are now usually known as the Utilitarian System. It is clearly impossible in . the narrow limits of this little treatise to givedetailed exposition of the different phases which this system lias assumed', or to enter into elaborate criticism of its various positions. The hope is cherished, however, that though only a very general survey can be taken, yet a somewhat concise and intelligent view of the system, in its strength and weakness, may be presented'.

By way of introduction, a very brief histori- . cal outline of opinion in regard to the doctrines of moral philosophy may be given. Such a sketch will provide a basis of discussion, and will render historical reference less necessary as the exposition proceeds.

Moral philosophy really begins with Socrates (400 B C), though we find attempts to explain ethical problems made by Pythagoras (550 B. C), who was followed by Heraclitus (500 B.C.), but opposed by Democritus (410 B. C). Socrates, the sage of Athens, opposed the subjectivity of the Sophists in general, and combated with all his might their conventionalism in regard to practical morality He also regard ?d ethical questions as quite distinct from cosmological and metaphysical problems ; and he further held that in the very constitution of things there is a real, permanent, and objective distinction between right and wrong. Virtue is not dependent on the caprice of the individual, but has universal validity. Plato (375 B. C.) treated the subject of Ethics rather from a speculative than from a practical point of view. He looked upon virtue rather as a matter of pure intelligence than in its bearing on human conduct, Ethical questions were discussed more in tneir relation to knowledge than

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in their relation to action. Aristotle (350 B. C. ) gave the study of Ethics a more practical turn, and connected it with ihe voluntary actions of men. The questions were treated in their bearing on human conduct, and the best interest of the individual and society. The true good for man is happiness, and virtue is to be found in the choice of the mean between extremes.

Subsequently to Plato and Aristotle we find various one-sided developments of Socratic doctrines. On the one hand Antisthenes (380 B. C ) founded the Cynic school with which Diogenes is to be connected, and out of which the system of the Stoics grew (300 B. C). In a general way, and with cold severity of spirit, this school held that virtue is the only good, and that the rule of human conduct is right reason, with its practical maxim — " Live according to Nature." On the other hand Aristippus (390 B. C.) founded the Cyrenaic school, in which we find a clearly defined Hedonism, and out of which the Epicurean system was developed, (300 B. C). Here happiness, variously regarded, is che chief good of man, and its \ attainment is the proper end of human conduct. It is here that some of the leading principles which underlie modern Utilitarianism first clearly appear, though their germs may be -found in tbe sensual notions of Democritus ; just as the germs of modern Materialism are to be found in his atomic doctrines.

During the early ages of Christianity moral philosophy was generally viewed in its connection with the doctrines of the Church, and in its relation to the life and conduct of the Christian. Occasionally it sought a rational basis in Neoplatonism on the one hand, or shaded off into vague Mysticism on the other. In the Scholastic philosophy of the middleages (1100- 1400 A. D.) we find Ethics bound up with Christian doctrine and the Aristotelian philosophy. The questions chiefly debated were, the nature of moral distinctions, and the foundation of virtue Aquinas (1250 A.D.) held that moral distinctions exist in the very nature of things, whilst Scotus (1350 A. D.) maintained that they depend on the will or authority of Goclf^ In this latter notion we have the germ of one phase of the Ut ilitarian system, in which law, human or divine, is made the foundation of virtue.

As modern philosophy on its intellectual side begins with Descartes, (1620 A. D.) so on its moral side it may be said to commence with Hobbes (1650 A. D.), of whose opinions a good deal will be said in explaining and reviewing the Utilitarian system. From Hobbes onward we find a two- told development in moral philosophy. Along one line we find the various forms of the Inductive theory, and along another the different phases of the Intuitive system. As illustrations of the former the following names may be mentioned : — Bentham (1770 A.D.), with his fundamental principle of the greatest good of the greatest number; Paley, (1775 A. D) who gives prominence to the Divine Law as the moral standard, as Hobbes does to the law of the land ; Hume, (1760 A. D.) who found the rule of right in the principle of Utility ; Mill (1850 A. D.), who endeavors to transform the principle of Utility into a doctrine of general benevolence, in which he is followed, in a general way, by the modern advocates of the most fully matured forms of Utilitarianism. As illustrating the Intuitive system we may mention : — Cudworth (1650 A. D.), who held that there is an eternal and immutable distinction between right and wrong, both in the Divine mind and in the human reason ; Shaftesbury (1700 A. D.j, who first gave the name Moral Sense to the ethical faculty ; Butler (1730 A.D.), who emphasized the doctrine that

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conscience is an original faculty, and showed its proper place and paramount authority ; Hutcheson (1740 A. D.), who developed and gave more systematic form to the doctrines of Shaftesbury ; Reid (1780 A D.) Stewart (1800 A. D.) and the Scottish School generally, who upheld the Intuitive'system, alike in the intellectual and moral spheres.

There are some writers on moral philosophy who cannot properly be classified with the two Schools just outlined. We may name : — Smith (1750 A.D.), with his peculiar doctrine of sympathy ; Clarke (1700 A. D.), with his theory of the eternal fitness of things. Others of lesser note might be named did space permit.

In France and Germany ethical problems have received some share of attention. In the former country Helvetius (1730 A. D.) and his followers maintained, along side of a most thorough going Materialism, a Hedonistic system of a selfish and sensual character. The pursuit and attainment of pleasure is all and all for man. Cousin (1840 A D ) and the later Eclectics tend much more decidedly to the Intuitive doctrine. Amongst the Germans Leibnitz gave much attention to ethical questions, discussing especially the problem of evil ; but it was not till the time of Kant (1780 A. D.)

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that moral philosophy assumed definite systematic form in German}' . According to Kant we find in the Practical Reason, with its categorical imperative, the eternal and immutable principles of morality, and the authoritative rule of conduct, absolutely binding upon all. While modern Utilitarians impatiently declare that the word ought should be banished from the terminology of morals, Kant ascribes to this very notion fundamental importance and paramount authority. Later developments in Fichte (1800 a. D.J and Hegel (1820 A. D.J need not be followed out, and it may only be stated in passing that the Modern Positivist School, both in France and Britain, is to be ranked among the Inductive Moralists, and is more or less distinctly Utilitarian.

In America there are also names worthy of mention. At the head of the list stands Edwards (1740 A. D.J, whose labors both in Moral Philosophy and Theology have left an enduring monument for posterity ; McCosh, who is an advocate of the Intuitive system both in the mental and moral spheres. Others we may merely mention — Wayland, Bowen, Hickok, and Haven, in the United States ; and Young and Watson, in Canada.

Having given this brief sketch, it only re-

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mains to be further stated that, in discussing the Utilitarian theory of morals, the task in hand will be two-fold in its nature. In the first place a general statement and exposition of the system will be given ; and in the second place an analysis and criticism of its various positions will be offered. To this task we now proceed.

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THEORY OF MORALS.

GENERAL STATEMENT AND EXPOSITION. PRELIMINARY.

The facts with which any system of moral philosophy has to deal are those connected with man's moral nature, and those arising out of his conduct in its ethical relations. Such questions as the following at once arise : — What is the constitution of man's nature viewed as moral, and what the guiding principle of its activity? What is the essential nature, and what the origin of the conceptions of right and wrong % Wherein consists the obligation to do certain things, and to refrain from doing others ? Why is it that approbation attends certain actions, and disapprobation actions of a different kind ? What is the

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motive wliich prompts men to act in any particular way, or is human conduct determined by a variety of motives ? What is the fundamental relation of man to his fellow men, and how does he stand related to the Divine Being \ Are the principles of morality subjective merely, and hence variable, or are they objective really, and hence immutable ? Is man a free agent, or is he under the law of necessity, consciously or unconsciously \ These and many similar questions arise when we look at the facts which come before us, and with these the ethical system has to deal, and endeavor to give satisfactory solutions to the various problems.

In seeking to deal with these questions moral philosophers have both approached them by different paths, and have sought the fundamental principles of the ethical system in widely different regions. The enquiry has been made upon two distinct lines, and along these the solution of the problems has been attempted. Some writers have directed their attention almost entirely to the inner sphere of human consciousness. These give prominence to our notions or conceptions of morality, and seek by analysis of these notions, as well as of the feelings and emotions connected with them,

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to elaborate an ethical system. In this point of view the enquiry is directed chiefly into the nature and validity of the notions expressed by the words, right, wrong, duty, obligation, &c , and into the character of the emotions flowing Irom the exercise of the moral faculty in the conduct of life.

Others have viewed moral principles chiefly in an objective light, and hence such moralists seek the solutions of the problems of Ethics in some quarter beyond man's moral nature and consciousness. They deal specially with the standard of morals, and give prominence to something in the objective sphere, which may be regarded as the rule of right. One will give prominence to Law, human or Divine ; another to the necessary relations, or eternal fitness of things ; and another to General Utility in some of its forms. According to this point of view the explanation of all questions in morals is to be found in some external ground, or objective principle ; either Law, General Utility, or some other feature in the nature of things It will be observed that the enquiry here is directed chiefly to the question of the ethical standard, and to the question of the foundation of virtue, rather than to an explanation of the origin of our moral conceptions, or to an analysis of our ethical sentiments.

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Examples, did space allow, could easily be given of both of these tendencies all along the history of speculation. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson may serve as examples of the former, while Hobbes and Clarke will suffice for the latter. As to these two ways of considering the questions which present themselves in morals, it may be remarked that both are true in a measure, but neither is complete in itself. Moral principles may be justly regarded as having an external ground and objective validity of a certain well defined nature ; and yet our knowledge of these principles, as well as of all moral emotions, must in the very nature of the case be subjective, and must be studied on the arena of consciousness. Every system of Ethics to be complete must deal with both, and seek to present each in its proper place and relations.

It is necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to make another preliminary remark. Much obscurity has been imported into discussions on moral philosophy, by failing to keep quite distinctly apart two closely related questions. The question of the nature and origin of moral distinctions, and the question of the ethical standard should never be confounded. In answer to the former question, some theory

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sufficient to account for the facts of man's moral nature, and ethical conduct and relations, must be propounded ; while, as to the latter, some law, rule, standard, or principle, must be laid down, by the use of which the moral significance of actions may be determined. Any theory to be complete must discuss both the theory of the moral sentiments, and the question of the ethical standard; yet they are to be treated as quite different, though closely related questions. An adequate system of moral philosophy must account for the origin, and explain the nature of all moral facts ; and at the same time it must announce such a clearly defined rule, or well understood standard, as will suffice to direct personal conduct aright.

It only remains to enquire in regard to the method to be pursued, whether we should proceed inductively or deductively. Must we from observed facts reason back to principles, by the ordinary methods of inductive enquiry ; or must we start out from certain assumed, though it may be well founded principles, and from these principles explain the facts according to the rules of deductive reasoning ? Whatever theory of morals is held, it is clear that the truly scientific method is the inductive, by

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means of which the facts are observed, classified, and their laws or principles unfolded. This is' true whether the field of observation be outward nature, human society, or man's consciousness. At the same time induction, to be complete, involves deduction, if not as a direct aid, at least as an instrument of verification. This then gives us the true method in morals as in any other science, and to employ induction and deduction in their proper relations will render our method complete, and our results assured.

This remark concerning method suggests another important point which concerns the nature and order of the facts, with which we shall have presently to deal, and an allusion to this point will pave the way for entering intelligently upon the consideration of the main topics to come under review. When the order of the facts and their real nature is considered, we find that the term Inductive stands over against the term Intuitive, as in a measure indicating the nature and order of the facts, as well as hinting at the only possible method available in ethical enquiry. According to the distinction which thus appears all ethical systems fall more or less completely into two classes. The one regards the conceptions of

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right and wrong, of duty and obligation, as simple, ultimate, and underived, and as such, not capable of being resolved into any simpler conception. The other class maintains that these conceptions are not simple, and underived, but compound, secondary, and derived from some simpler notion, or fact. To theories of the former class the name Intuitive is generally given, and to those of the latter the term inductive is usually applied. All forms of the Intuitive theory, however much they may differ in details, agree in holding that the conceptions denoted by the words, right and wrong, &c, are ultimate and underived, and as such, they are regarded as the primitive deliverances of an original faculty generally called Conscience, but sometimes known as the Moral Sense, or as the Practical Reason. This School may be traced from Socrates and Plato, down to CudAvorth and the Scottish Intuitionalists, and it is found in Kant and his followers in Germany and elsewhere.

In like manner all phases of the Inductive system, however much they may differ in details, are at one in denying that ethical conceptions, or moral principles are simple, ultimate and underived. They further profess to show how, by association, education, external re-

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straints, &c. , all our moral conceptions may be derived from, and can be resolved into some simple conception or more fundamental principle. To this theory in its various modifications different names are given. The general term Inductive is the most comprehensive ; the name Associational denotes the prominent part which the laws of association play in the genesis of moral conceptions ; the term Experiental implies that on the field of experience this development takes place ; the word Development points to the fact that our ethical notions, as we find them, are the result of evolution ; and the name Utilitarian denotes that the fundamental principle or conception is I that of General Utility. It is with the particular aspect of the Inductive theory indicated by the last mentioned name that we propose to deal. The term Utilitarianism is a very general one, and it embraces systems which differ not a little in their details. It may denote the happiness doctrine of Democritus, as well as the eudamionistic system of the Cyrenaics and of the Epicureans. It is likewise applied to many modern systems such as those of Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, Bain, Spencer, Modern Positivists, and in a sense, Paley and Hume. ' The term Utility, it need scarcely be ex-

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/plained, means usefulness, convenience, advan- I tage. General Utility hence denotes that which is generally useful or advantageous, whether to the individual or to mankind. It is only in more recent and refined forms of the system that we find it identified with general benevolence. In the earlier and cruder forms of the doctrine, it is the good, happiness, or advantage of the individual, that is prominent, so much so in some cases, that the epithet Selfish is the only proper one to apply to them. Most Utilitarians hold that in General Utility we have the criterion of virtue, and in relation to this principle all moral facts may be satisfactorily explained. Those actions which are generally useful are right, and ought to be done ; those actions which are not of general advantage to mankind, are wrong, and ought not to be done ; and it is by the fact of their Utility that their moral character and our obligation to do them are determined. Utilitarians further contend that all the facts of our moral nature and ethical conduct can be fully explained without reference to an original faculty, whether it be called Conscience, Moral Sense, or Practical Reason. By the law of parsimony, therefore^ they contend, no such faculty should be postulated. ^ _

Chapter I. The Utilitarian Theory Of Knowledge

We now proceed to a more detailed statement and exposition of the system under review. As the opinions held by Utilitarians have of late years undergone important alterations, it will only be fair to judge of them in their most matured forms. Very brief reference will therefore be made to earlier and cruder opinions, and attention wrill be directed chiefly to what may be termed* Modern Utilitarianism, the great apostle of which is the late John Stnart Mill. ^The first topic is the Theory of Knowledge.

A Theory of Morals always involves and must presuppose a theory of Knowledge. The intellectual and moral are thus so closely related that our Psychology goes far to determine our Ethics. If the nature of the mind be such that it possesses no a-pririri (dements which are necessary, as the very conditions of

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knowledge, then the Intuitional Theory of Morals can have no intellectual basis. If all our knowledge not only begins with, but arises from, experience, then our knowledge of moral distinctions must come from the same source, and we are necessarily thrown upon some form of the Inductive system of Ethics. If even Locke's doctrine of Innate Ideas, indefinite and often misunderstood as it is, be true, and if there be thus no innate principles either theoretical or practical, either intellectual or moral, then in the region of experience we must seek the only knowledge of ethical truths possible to us, and the only explanation of moral conceptions we can ever give.

Now if we trace the history of speculation in Moral Science, we shall find that Inductive Moralists of the Utilitarian type have all held sensational or experientalist doctrines regard- ^ ing human knowledge. In some cases, of course, no distinct theory of knowledge is set forth, but so far as this is done, we find substantial agreement in empirical doctrines, and in every case a purely empirical Psychology is involved. In the sensualism of Democritus and in the Hedonism of Epicurus we find as pure Sensationalism touching the theory of knowleHge^ as we find anywhere. Modern

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Empiricists have improved but little on those old sensational doctrines. So in modern times, all the noted Inductive Moralists such as Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, Bain, and Spencer, to say nothing of Helvetius and the French Sensualists hold, more or less definitely, Sensational or Empirical doctrines. It is clear that if we begin with Intellectual Empiricism, it is impossible to get beyond Empiricism in Ethics ; and as the intellectual element in any system is usually determined prior to the moral, the Theory of Knowledge necessarily determines the Theory of Morals, whether it shall be Empirical or Intuitional. The importance of this point is such as to call for a ^yery brief outline of the main positions of the Empirical system in regard to the Theory of Knowledge. I The first position relates to the view to be /taken of the mind in its original or precognitive state. Does it, or does it not possess an a-piori element? The position of the Empirical School in answer to this question is that the mind possesses no such element. Human knowledge is all a-posteriori in its nature, and Empirical in the manner in which it is acquired. The mind, they say, is without any original conceptions, necessary principles, or subjective forms ; and the result in know-

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ledge does not require the assumption of such an a-priori element All cognitive products come from without the mind, and take their rise from, as well as find their explanation in, experience.

The next important position of Empiricism refers to the attitude of the mind, as knowing subject, towards its object in cognition. Here Empirical philosophers maintain that the mind is substantially passive, or at most merely receptive. The cognitive process is determined entirely from without, and there is no primitive spontaneity of the mind, no subjective tribute brought by the mind to that experience, which is the occasion of knowledge. The beginning of the knowing process thus depends upon the object, and in cognition that object determines the cognitive subject, and produces all its states The mental attitude then is receptivity as distinguished from spontaneity. -£

A further point relates to Sensation. This is taken to be the effect which the impressions of the object produce in the subject through means of the sensitive organism. Sensation, according to the Empirical School, is the primitive fact in human knowledge. From Sensation all our mental possessions can be explained and the fabric of knowledge constructed.

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By writers of this School very able expositions of the nervous system are given, and many acute remarks made upon the functions of the brain, and thus the physiology of sensation is clearly set forth, though it is admitted that in the psychological element of sensation the germs of all higher forms of knowledge are to be found. The basal fact in cognition, according to Empiricists, is sensation.

The next point to be noticed refers to the relation between Sensation and Consciousness, Empiricists usually identify these facts, and hence they do not allow the important distinction generally made between them by Intuitionalists. With Empiricists generally, the notion of feeling is made prominent in connection with sensation. Feeling is the generic idea ; and to have a sensation, and to be conscious, are virtually the same thing. Both are phases of feeling, and in connection with this feeling we have knowledge, if indeed the feeling be not itself the knowledge. Hence to have the feeling of pain, to have the sensation of pain, to be conscious of pain, and to have a knowledge of it are regarded as identical facts by many Empiricists. Their position is that sensation and consciousneess are identical, and sensation is regarded as knowledge.

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The next important point has reference to the higher forms of knowledge, and the maimer in which these are reached. That which remains to the mind after sensation is termed an idea. This element is retained by the mind, and as it were recorded there, so that it may be reproduced by the exercise of what is called Memory. The process by which the higher forms of knowledge, and more purely intellectual results are reached, has been somewhat happily termed Ideation. To this process, viewed by itself, the direct operation of the senses is not necessary. Sensation leaves a certain result or effect with the mind, and in erecting the fabric of knowledge, the process consists essentially in reproducing, constructing, or reconstructing the mental product of sensation, thereby giving us all the cognitive results we are capable of.

The last point in this statement concerns the law, or method according to which this process of Idea tion is carried on. Memory, as we have seen, has a very important function in retaining, and reproducing that which sensation leaves to the mind. Then the laws of mental Association are brought into play upon the product of sensation in order to work it up into all the forms of knowledge. Different views