The evolution of modern strategy from the XVIIIth century to the present time

Preface

For the last twenty-five years I have formed one of a group of British officers who have been as intensely keen to fit themselves for command, and to prepare the men under them for War, as any men in any nation under the sun. This group was, and still is, far more numerous than the British public imagines, and those members of it, who have been fortunate enough to obtain and to recognise their opportunities, have won for themselves the respect and admiration of all competent critics, of whom, unfortunately, there are few enough within our own islands.

Wherever men met, in clubs, messes, railway carriages — particularly railway carriages — we foregathered and talked, not "shop" but "War," with the single, whole-souled idea of being ready when the call should come, and so far from finding that this interest in our duty was considered "bad form," I, at least, personally found that it made me everywhere a welcome guest. As, in addition to my own, I was a dining member of seventeen different messes of all arms, and besides my club in town, belonged to half a dozen others in different parts of the world, I think I may claim abundant opportunity for the formation of my opinion.

Many of us had enjoyed, or rather made for ourselves, opportunities for becoming acquainted with foreign armies, and in proportion as to the use they had made of their time, they brought into the service a different attitude towards the fundamental considerations which lie at the base of all warlike operations than that which had hitherto prevailed amongst the senior officers.

Those who had fought through such campaigns as those against the Sikhs', the Crimea, and the Mutiny, saw in Warfare only the collision of the rival interests of governments, in which armies alone were concerned, and in which the nations, as nations, had but little interest — the old eighteenth-century standpoint, in fact, which survived quite naturally under the peculiar nature of our surroundings.

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Those trained in the foreign schools saw deeper into the heart of things, and knew that when, as in France and Germany, the terms " Army " and " Nation " had become synonymous, the whole conduct of warlike operations must undergo profound modification.

To reconcile the two schools was no easy task, for to express the difference one needs two entirely distinct vocabularies, and there was only one. Hence both sides constantly used the same words to express fundamentally different ideas, and it took far more time and opportunity for study than falls to the lot of most of us in the first twenty years of one's service, to recognise wherein these differences really lay.

Had it been possible to gather the pick of us together under one roof, and subject us to the guidance of a body of instructors, who had themselves preserved the continuity of tradition from the Napoleonic times as in Prussia, progress would, I think, have been both rapid and secure ; but, unfortunately, the machinery for this purpose did not, and still does not, exist, and when we asked for bread we were officially tendered an inferior concrete, a jumbled up mass of ideas derived from [practice in varying climates, and conditions imperfectly held together in a matrix of semi-digested historical tradition.

Being thus left without superior guidance, there was nothing for us but to work back to some common point of origin from whence both schools arose — i.e, some period in which all European nations made War with armies of similar organisation under similar circumstances— and then trace out at what point, and owing to what alterations, our paths began to diverge.

Following out this line of investigation, it became clear that " organisation " was the disturbing cause. When the French Revolution brought home to every unit in that nation that he or it was personally most vitally concerned in the issue of the great struggle in which they were engaged, an entirely new driving force made its appearance, which modified in the most startling manner the practice of the leaders in the field — i.e, the Art of Strategy.

Clausewitz was the first to define War as an extreme form of human competition. In other words, he did for the nation what Darwin subsequently did for individuals, viz. he showed that War was nothing more or less than the " struggle for the survival of the fittest " on the national plane, and once this idea is clearly grasped in its entirety the whole of the confusing problems involved in the

PREFACE. vii

raising of troops for War, their organisation, training, and employment in the field all fall into their proper places, and can be treated by ordinary scientific methods of research identically like any other matter susceptible of adequate analysis. The degree of accuracy in the solution attainable depending upon the number and reliability of the observations available, and the skill and trained judgment with which these are handled.

Now this is a method we have never attempted to apply, nor is it within the power of a single individual to do so, for the amount of material to be collated is enormous, and it would need a large staff of scientifically trained men to handle ; and hitherto neither our schools, universities, or the Army itself has been able to train and select the type of man fitted for such work in sufficient numbers.

The introduction of short service some thirty years ago, however, threw open the doors for all practical reforms, and sound reform must have " grown itself " had the Public only been content to wait. By throwing greatly increased responsibility on the junior ranks it had compelled them to master the alphabet of their profession, and to use their brains before these organs had become atrophied by disuse, as had formerly been the case, and by degrees it was becoming apparent that the Army was a career in which brains would tell in the end just as in any other. But continuity in the conditions was just the one thing needed to give these men time to work their way to the front, and just at the critical moment we were struck in rapid succession by three most fatal blows, viz. 1st, the adoption of the three years' term of service with the colours ; 2nd, the Report of the South African Commission with its sequels ; and 3rd, the recurrence to what is practically the long service ideal, which fundamentally alters the whole condition of our military existence, and which, if it ever takes root, will divorce the regular Army from the nation, and sap the driving energy which was giving us the new race of officers we required. The mere fact that reform was attempted before, to quote Clausewitz, **the sensuous impressions of the battlefield had had time to yield to the results of mature reflection," proved the incapacity of the Public, as at present educated, to deal with such a problem. We ought to have had, twenty years ago, a properly organised General Staff to have dealt with the question ; but, failing that, the only thing to be done was forthwith to create one, and furnish it with a Military viii PREFACE.

History Section to collect material in sufficient quantity to check the tendency which exists after every campaign to treat its experiences as the last word to be said on the whole subject.

There is an idea in the public mind that an efficient Army can be produced if only departments are organised on a certain pattern — in other words, that it is the form and not the spirit which signifies. Recent events in Russia sufficiently refute this assumption, for here we see a staff organised, with almost Chinese fidelity, on the Prussian plan, producing results in diametric opposition to those achieved by their model. The truth really is, that no matter what departments may be called or how they are arranged, the daily output of work depends on the trained ability of its members, and the strength of the sense of " Duty " each brings to his task. If and in so far as the work done by the several branches of the War Office has fallen behind the standard the Public had a right to expect, the cause lay in the fact that, it being impossible under the conditions of long service either to train or select men of ability, personal interest was the determining factor in a man's career, and hence the internecine strife between the Departments, and the triumph of the Adjutant-General and chief Supply Officer over the real Staff Officer, viz, the Quarter-Master General.

No man could afford to look sufficiently far ahead to hold the balance between the several interests, and hence since in Peace the most important work is done in the Adjutant-General's Department, and in small Wars supply is the chief element of success, these two branches throve at the expense of the others, and when a relatively great War arose, neither the Quarter-Master General's or the Intelligence Departments had weight or position enough to make their influence sufficiently felt.

The only corrective for this state of affairs lies in the creation of a Military History Section of the General Staff, through which all the higher Staff Officers should be passed, so that all at all likely to occupy eventually responsible positions, would have had the opportunity of learning how the scientific historian works, and thus of estimating the value of the data collected and conclusions formulated.

It is enough to turn over the evidence given before the South African Commission to see how badly such an institution was needed. Men who had been really grounded in military history by having been made to help in the collection and appreciation of the

PREFACE. ix

data from which it is written, could never have fallen into the astounding inaccuracies of statement and hasty generalisations these pages reveal. It would need a whole treatise to expose all these mistakes and their consequences, and the task would bring one into collision with so many old friends and comrades, that I have not the slightest intention of undertaking it, it will suffice for my purpose if I select the most widespread fallacy resulting from the whole, viz. the exaggerated importance that has come to be attached to the value of good individual shooting in modem Warfare.

Good shooting in action is conditioned by the state of the firer s nerves at the moment he pulls the trigger — and this quite obviously is determined by the impression produced on the soldier's mind by the appearance of the target his General is skilful enough to secure for him. For instance, if our men had never had a less favourable target than a mob of Boers driven into a hollow square around their led horses, they would have made quite as high a percentage of hits as did the Boers when the conditions were reversed. As it happened, it was the Boers who always had the good targets and we who had the difficult ones, and since there was not the smallest grounds for supposing that the leading of the former was better than that on our own side, it would have become clear that we had to deal with a new disturbing influence ; and by a process of elimination, the conclusion must ultimately have been arrived at, that this disturbing influence could only be the excess of mobility on the Boer side, from which all else logically followed. Since, however, owing to local conditions, we could not outclass the enemy in this respect, the policy we ultimately adopted — viz. to crush them by sheer weight of numbers — was the only conceivable solution ; and hence it would have been found quite unnecessary for any one to have questioned the courage of our troops, for, after all, that is what complaining of their shooting amounts to.

Further, the principal factor of success in War, whether modem, mediaeval, or pre-historic, is confidence between men and leaders, which evidently in our case only existed sporadically. Yet I contend that, in the great majority of cases, such want of mutual confidence was unmerited on either side.

Had both officers and men been so far grounded in military history as to understand how the factor of mobility was bound to affect the problems they were called on to solve, the leaders would not have complained of the men's bad shooting, or the men of their

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leader's want of capacity. If a general distrusts his men, not only are his decisions hampered and the strain of command enormously increased, but the men are quick to notice the want of confidence, and to react under the suspicion in a variety of ways, which still further increase the difficulties of the general's position.

Nothing, to my mind, proves the extraordinary capacity of the British soldier and his regimental officers better than the staunchness with which they stuck to one another throughout these trying years ; but the strain was there none the less, and I see no reason why it should be imposed on them in the future, when it can so easily be mitigated.

It was in the hope of contributing somewhat towards this mitigation that I commenced these pages in serial form. It would have been far more satisfactory to have attempted a closely reasoned treatise, unbroken by allusions to questions of the day, and working up to a final presentation of conclusions ; but the need seemed to me urgent, and both time and opportunity for more thorough research were alike lacking. I therefore gladly embraced the offer of my friend, Lieut-Colonel Alsager Pollock, Editor of the United Service Magazine, to contribute my ideas in monthly letters to his pages, and now beg to return him my sincerest thanks for the chance thus afforded to me of laying my views before the public. As they stand they are necessarily incomplete and imperfect, but I trust they will suffice to show something of the field for research and scientific investigation the study of military history, as a path to the exercise of command — which is strategy — discloses, and thus to entice some of the really strong intellects of the Army into its pursuit.

That the Army always has attracted such men, and in considerable numbers, is sufficiently demonstrated by the numbers of ex-soldiers who have achieved exceptional eminence as engineers, scientists, mathematicians, organisers of labour, etc. The misfortune has been that it has not known how to retain them ; and the reason I submit in explanation of the fact, I have derived from the study of several typical cases.

I have found that the scientific habit of mind simply recoiled from the empirical form in which all military subjects have been presented. It has always been a question of opinion, never of observed fact, and the class of mind which can really grasp and handle the aggregates of facts and figures with which military history deals.

PREFACE. xi

is disgusted with a subject that gives no scope for the exercise of their faculties. Finding no outlet here for their energies, they have turned aside to bridge-building, irrigation, astronomy, or quaternions, often with most conspicuous success for themselves, but loss to the country. But had it been made clear to them, as in the Prussian school, that the Art of Strategy is based on the sciences of organisation and tactics, both of which are essentially subjects for the exercise of the highest order of mathematical ability, and, above all, had there been the slightest indication twenty years ago that such intellectual exercise would have met with the slightest recognition, whilst our scientific lists might have been the poorer by several eminent names, the Army would have been out of all proportion more efficient, and the nation so much the stronger.

That generation is, I fear, lost to us ; but as the work of reorganisation goes on, and when at length the great cycle of War breaks over us, our generals and politicians, I feel assured, will find out the danger of relying on empirism as opposed to scientific method so vividly, that the demand for the true mathematician will soon exceed the supply, and the men who by organised scientific method can help our generals to secure ultimate victory, will find themselves the recipients of the empire's most substantial rewards.

If by these pages I succeed in attracting only a few of the rising generation who, to my knowledge, exist in quite adequate numbers at Chatham and Woolwich, to take up these subjects in the spirit and with the thoroughness they deserve, I shall have amply attained my object, and any assistance I can give them I will most freely place at their disposal.

F. N. MAUDE, Lieut-Colonel^ P.S.C.j late R.E, February 6, 1905.

CHAPTER I. Introductory

Great difficulty in the study of strategy due to the use of terms which denote variable quantities not concrete things — Study of "the struggle for existence," i.e. War on the Continent — The French Revolution originated the "Nation in Arms" — Conditions of the coming struggle — Origin of protective tariflfs — Our present danger — A land army only can decide — War and the labour market — Given men the Army will evolve itself — Example, the American Civil War, 1862-64 — Need of intelligent obedience — Waterloo — Our bed-rock qualities — Ignorance of the consequences of defeat — Derrecagaix and Clausewitz's views on War — The use of force is absolute — Philanthropy in War a pernicious error — War indemnities — Effect on capital — On workmen — Surrender means national starvation, worse than the sufferings caused by War — Function of the "Volunteers " — The Parisian Commune — The food question — Influence of our officers — Dependent on custom and habit — Numbers in War — Discipline and its sanction — Effect of national ignorance of War in the past — Influence of the " Volunteers " not " political " — Numbers, not efficiency, our chief need — Effect of national ignorance on operations in the Boer War

Chapter II

The British public and the British subaltern — The differences of conditions under which civilians and soldiers work — The cause of routine — Simplicity of military conditions three centuries ago — Origin of military terms — Hard fighting, not manoeuvring, the primary condition of success — The early Militia levies had no communications — Origin of standing armies — Use of armour and consequent slowness of motion and growth of impedimenta — The Thirty Years' War — Armour is abandoned — Increase of manoeuvring power — Death of Gustavus Adolphus — Desolation of country paralyses all army movements — Influence of mercenaries — Contrast the soldiers of Cromwell — Origin of the *' laws of War " — Expediency not humanity — Dissolution of armies at close of the Thirty Years' War — Cause of Wars in the eighteenth century— Nature of armies — Origin of term "strategy" — Marlborough and the ne plus ultra lines — His real claim to our admiration — Influence of French literature — Frederick the Great and Napoleon — Their power of command — Defence of the British officer — His intelligence revolts at the teaching provided for him . . . .15

Chapter III

Marlborough's march to the Danube ; a violation of established rule, but the act of a genius in War — Forging of the Prussian Army — Its influence on the conduct of operations — Contrast between the topography of the Netherlands and Silesia — Origin of the "magazine system" — Cost of enlistment and training of the soldiers — Frederick's Wars not sufficiently studied in England — Skill of our generals in "small Wars" — The chief obstacles to a leader's success — Gradual change in Frederick's methods — Result on military thought — The school of manceuvrers — Poverty of Prussia — Consequences for the army — The "foreigners'* xiv CONTENTS.

paCr and " Landeskinder " — * Barry Lyndon ' — Codes of punishment — Limits of discipline — Desertion — These conditions common to all contemporary armies — Result when opposed to the French Revolutionary Armies — Influence of "starvation" as a "driving force" — Internal condition of France, 1790 — Creation of the new French Army — Their mobility, and its consequence when opposed to the slow moving forces of the Allies — Comparison with the Boer War — Origin of '* cordon system " — Object of present chapter — Difficulties created by our present system .25

CHAPTER IV. The French Army from 1792-1796

Importance of the study of French memoirs of the Revolutionary period to British officers — The code of punishment in the armies of the Revolution — State of the Army of Italy when Napoleon assumed command — The campaign of 1796 in Italy — The five plans for its conduct — Positions occupied on Napoleon's arrival at Nice — The Austrian Army and its inherent weakness • • • • 33

Chapter V

Bonaparte's instructions from the Directory — The Austrians assume the offensive — Combat of Monte Legino — Bonaparte issues his orders — His generals obey to the letter — Defeat and rout of d'Argenteau — Provera at Cosseria — Beaulieu receives news of Argenteau's defeat — Wukassovitch's detachment and his unfortunate mistake — French discipline breaks down at Dego — Bonaparte rallies his troops and retakes Dego — Beaulieu's continued inaction — Bonaparte turns on the Sardinians — Ceva — The Biccogna — Critical situation of the French — Colli withdraws from his entrenched position — Criticism — "Interior lines" — Willisen's definition of " strategy " — Bonaparte's best sources of supply — Clausewitz's views on "retaining" forces — Application to situation before Dego — Napoleon's true merit 42

Chapter VI

Moreau and the Archduke Charles in Germany, 1796 — The Archduke's limitations compared with Napoleon — ^Jomini and the French plan of campaign — Real nature of the miscalculation of the French Government — "Exterior lines of operations" — The campaign of Marengo — Bonaparte's preparations — The "Army of Reserve" — Concentration on Geneva — Comparison with modern conditions of transport — Sea-power — The object of national armaments — Bonaparte's feverish energy — What is an "army" — Comparison between 1800 and 1870 — Did Bonaparte originate the idea of using Switzerland as a "re-entrant base" — Physical difficulties of the march over the Alps compared with modern exploits — Value of the St. Gotthard as a line of communications — Suggested War game — The Austrian collapse after Marengo 52

CHAPTER VII. The Campaign of Ulm, 1805

Advantages of a re-entering frontier — The works of MAL Alombert and Colin — The Grand Army — Napoleon's supreme influence over it — The Staff — Proportion of veterans — The Hussars — The discipline of the infantry — Age of the officers — Instruction at the depots — The artillery and engineers — Horse supply — Inadequacy of transport arrangements — Terrible weather encountered — Sufferings of the troops— Even Vandamme complains— Marmont's letters — Berthier's reply — Hunger as an incentive to marching — Davout's letters — Condition of the Guard — Captain Bugeaud's testimony — Fezensac's description of the hardships — Napoleon's letter to Luchesini — His "strategical deployment " — Importance of Wiirzburg — Navigation of the Main — Bamberg — Bernadotte's march from Gottingen to Frankfurt — Consequent delay of Davout's corps — Feeling against the French in Hannover .,.,,. 63

CONTENTS, XV

CHAPTER VIII. The Campaign of Ulm, 1805 {continued)

PAGE

State of French Army on arrival on the Rhine— Comparison with 1870 — The Austrian Army — Its commanders — General Mack — His reforms — The requisition system — Its effects — Progress of the campaign — Mack's reason for pressing on to Ulm — French violation of Prussian neutrality — Mack's views — His mistakes — Reorganisation of his army — Mack's opportunity — He believes the French in full retreat — Secrecy and despondency in War — loth October — French Stafif blunders — 14th October — Elchingen — Conduct of the Archduke — State of the roads prohibits rapid movement— Wemeck's surrender — Mack's unfortunate faith in Russian promises 74

Chapter IX

Poland and East Prussia : influence of their topography on Napoleon's movements — The "magazine system" again — The Russian Armies — Eylau and Friedland — Introduction of the case-shot preparation by. '* massed " batteries — The effect of this innovation on strategy — Spain and Portugal — The British system of supply — The Duke of Wellington's merit as a *' strategist" — The campaign of 1814 — Its interest rather diplomatic than military — Bar sur Aube — Sezanne — The question of obstacles — ' Hamley ' — Practice in the writing of orders — Intelligent confidence in one's leaders — Character and initiative — Waterloo : the cause of Napoleon's failure 85

Chapter X

Influence of the Napoleonic legend — His memoirs — The St. Gotthard Pass— Wiirsburg — Essential cause of Napoleon's failure — Military reform in Prussia — Scharnhorst — Clausewitz— His training — The permanent value of his work — War, the "struggle for the survival of the fittest" — Frederick's system compared with the French school — Clausewitz's purpose to train average men for the responsibilities of high command — He was the first to introduce "scientific method" into military research — Influence of short service — Competitive examinations — Continuity of tradition — The Prussian General Staff"— Influence of " mobility " — The study of military history .... 95

Chapter XI

Effect of alterations in armament on strategy — The " case-shot " attack — Becomes impossible in America against long-range small arms — The consequences disastrous to the Federals — Richmond as an "objective " — The Austro- Prussian campaign of 1866 — The Franco-German War — French fail to make use of the advantages of their new infantry weapon — Fatal influence of Marshal Niel's views — Napoleon III.'s reliance on Austrian and Italian assistance — The new French official account — German comments — Critical moment in the strategical deployment of the German armies — Want of "driving energy" in the French Army — Comparison with 1800 and 1805 — Breach of continuity in warlike tradition — Effect of rumours on French staff— Lorrach and Duttweiler — Absence of maps on the French side — Transport and supply — Result of requisitioning — Commencement of hostilities before declaration of War .... 104

Chapter XII

Moltke's memoir of 1869 — Influence of universal service on the temper of the German nation — Absence of confidence of the French nation in its leaders — German miscalculations — Errors in execution of Moltke's deployment — The Crown Prince and Von Blumenthal — Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles — Events take the supreme direction out of Moltke's hands — The German armies "fight themselves" — " Readiness to assume responsibility " the secret of their success — Want of this readiness on the French side — The crisis of Gravelotte — Result of Clausewitz's teaching — The Boer War and political considerations . 114 xvi CONTENTS.

Chapter XIII. Page

The object of military education — The "spirit of the age" — Influence of numbers on degree of literal obedience required — The true purpose of our armaments — The "strategy" of the eighteenth century doomed — Influence of superior mobility — Steps necessary to secure it — The training of infantry to spade work — Improved means of transport on roads — Supply of provisions — Co-operation of business men — Our danger in War-time from the "unemployed" — The dangers from the Press — How to combat them — The purpose of a Great General Staff— Importance of training in the writing of orders— Decentralisation and its safe limits — Concluding reflections . . . . . . . .124

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN STRATEGY.

CHAPTER I. Introductory

Great difficulty in the study of strategy due to the use of terms which denote variable quantities not concrete things — Study of " the struggle for existence," i.e. War on the Continent — The French Revolution originated the "Nation in Arms" — Conditions of the coming struggle— Origin of protective tariffs — Our present danger — A land army only can decide — War and the labour market — Given men the Army will evolve itself — Example, the American Civil War, 1862-64 — Need of intelligent obedience — Waterloo — Our bed-rock qualities — Ignorance pf the consequences of defeat — Derrecagaix and Clausewitz's views on War — The use of force is absolute — Philanthrophy in War a pernicious error — War indemnities — Effect on capital — On workmen — Surrender means national starvation, worse than the sufferings caused by War— Function of the "Volunteers " — The Parisian Commune — The food question — Influence of our officers — Dependent on custom and habit — Numbers in War — Discipline and its sanction — Effect of national ignorance of War in the past — Influence of the "Volunteers" not "political" — Numbers, not efficiency, our chief need — Effect of national ignorance on operations in the Boer War.

The great stumbling-block in the path of the would-be student of strategy arises out of the fact that whereas books and treatises invariably use expressions which are intended to convey definite concrete conceptions, such as "armies," "infantry," "cavalry," etc., none of these " things " are in fact " constant quantities," but represent " variable " measures of fighting magnitude, changing daily, even hourly in value, and often according to no known law which might enable their commander to anticipate and hence provide means to meet their variation.

Were it otherwise, if for instance an army of say 200,000 fightingmen always represented a fixed number of units of fighting-work, neither more nor less, how infinitely simple all strategical combinations would become. There is not a militia candidate who could not tell you, and rightly too, what Napoleon should have done in the Waterloo campaign to ensure a crushing numerical superiority over Wellington on the battlefield of the i8th June, and the same holds true of hundreds of other instances, in which, nevertheless,