An essay on the nature, the end, and the means of imitation in the fine arts

Front matter

J

Ulrich Middeldorf

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CHAPTER I. — Definition of the elementary principle of imitation in the fine arts . . .9

CHAPTER II.— Of the idea to be formed conoerning resemblance in the imitation proper to the fine arts . . . . . .17

CHAPTER III. — That the resemblance which it belongs to every art to produce can only be a partial one . . . . .24

CHAPTER IV. — The consequences drawn from the foregoing definition and ideas are equally applicable to poetry as to painting . . .31

XIV

CONTENTS.

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CHAPTER V. — Nature has placed separations as real, between the arts of poetry, as between those of design: —

PROOF THE FIRST;

Drawn from the diversity of the faculties of the mind, and of the qualities of the objects available for imitation . . .40

CHAPTER VI. — Continuation of the same subject : —

PROOF THE SECOND ;

Drawn from the principle of unity in the mind, and from the unity of its action, from which results the principle of imitative unity, and from this again the separations established between all the arts . . .49

CHAPTER VII. — Of unity and variety in imitation.

Of the false notions arising from a misconception of those words . . . . .61

CHAPTER VIII. — Concerning the nature and spirit of the unions formed of several arts when they are collectively employed about a work in common 70

CHAPTER IX. — Of the erroneous means by which, employed through a desire of completing or increasing the imitative truth of every art, that truth is destroyed : —

FIRST ERROR OF THE ARTIST;

It consists in stepping beyond his own art to seek, in the resources of another, an increase of imitative resemblance . . . 81

CONTENTS.

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CHAPTER X. — Continuation of the same subject : —

SECOND ERROR OF THE ARTIST;

It consists in seeking truth short of the limits of every art, by a system of servile copy, which deprives the imitation, or the image, of that fictious part which constitutes at once its essence and its character . . 102

CHAPTER XI. — In every art there must be, with respect to truth, som ejiction, and with respect to resemblance, something incomplete . .113

CHAPTER XII. — It is the fictious and the incomplete in every art, and these alone, which constitute art, and become moreover the sources of the pleasure of imitation .... 121

CHAPTER XIII. — In what manner and by what means art is enabled to correct the Jictious, and to compensate the incomplete necessarily inherent in it 128

CHAPTER XIV. — Of illusion in the works of imitation ...... 136

CHAPTER XV. — The pleasure of imitation is proportionate to the distance which, in every art or imitative mode, and in the works of each, separates the elements of the model from those of the image ...... 156

CHAPTER XVI.— The comparative rank assigned by common opinion to the different arts seems to be confirmed by this theory, and, in turn, confirms it . . . , . 164

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CHxAPTER XVII. — The result of the preceding facts and notions leads to a knowledge of what ought to be the true end of imitation . . . ]72

Part II. The End Of Imitation In The Fine Arts

CHAPTER I. — Pleasure, the object of imitation. Of the two kinds of pleasure it affords. Which of the two is its end . . . .177

CHAPTER II. — On the right understanding, according to the spirit of this theory, of the idea of reality or identity in imitation, and of that of the pleasure resulting from it . . ,186

CHAPTER III — Of the superiority, in imitation, of the pleasure of the mind over that addressed to the senses alone . . . . 192

CHAPTER IV. — What imitation that is whose model

cannot be shown, and what name is given to it . 200

CHAPTER V. — Of the ideal. Definition of the

word. Of the meaning to be attached to it .210

CHAPTER VI. — Ideal imitation the result of a generalized study of nature . . . .219

CHAPTER VII. — Of the inferiority of the works of art compared with those of nature, unless recourse be had to the ideal model of imitation 226

CONTENTS.

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CHAPTER VIII. — Continuation of the same subject 235

CHAPTER IX. — Wherein the work of art may surpass that of nature .... 244

CHAPTER X. — Of the originating cause through which the ideal style in works of art was introduced into, and perpetuated in Greece . . 256

CHAPTER XI. — The works of ancient art shown to

be invested with the characteristics of the ideal 264

CHAPTER XII. — The notion of the ideal, as entertained in this theory, is in accordance with that of the writers of antiquity . . . 273

CHAPTER XIII. — The ideal in theory ought only to be explained to the understanding, and can only be so by rational analysis . . . 282

Part III. Of The Means Of Imitation In The Fine Arts

CHAPTER I. — What we are to understand by means of imitation, according to the object and spirit of this theory ..... 287

CHAPTER II. — Of convention, understood as a means of imitation. Of conventions practical and poetical ..... 293

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CHAPTER III. — Of poetical conventions, or the general means, which, common alike to all the arts, imitation employs in order to attain the ideal 301

CHAPTER IV. — Of the act of generalizing considered as a mean of attaining to ideal imitation in the works of poetry .... 307

CHAPTER V. — Of the act of generalizing in the works of the arts of design, and in the imitation of the human body . . . .321

CHAPTER VI. — Of the two customary phrases choice of forms, and union of scattered beauties.

An analysis of those two notions . . 336

CHAPTER VII. — Of the act of transforming or transposing considered as a mean of ideal imitation, both in the inventions of poetry and the forms of its language .... 358

CHAPTER VIII. — On the employment of metaphorical means, different according as the art differs. — Of the errors that exist on this head, more especially in the arts of design . . 367

CHAPTER IX. — Of the act of transforming and transposing considered as a mean of ideal imitation in the arts of design . . .378

CHAPTER X. — Of transformation in the historical

style of composition .... 388

CHAPTER XI. — Of transformation or transposition

in the allegorical style of composition . . 393

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CHAPTER XII. — Of certain proprieties to be observed in the allegorical style . . . 403

CHAPTER XIII. — Why the employment of modem allegory has less force and produces less effect in poetry than in painting . . . 413

CHAPTER XIV. — Of the effect of symbolical composition in the transformation of subjects and personages . 420

CHAPTER XV. — Explains why symbolical metaphor is in poetry of but little Worth . .431

CHAPTER XVI. — On certain practical means proper, exclusively, to the arts of design. Of nudity poetically considered . . . 440

CHAPTER XVII. — Continuation of the same subject. Of ideal clothing, or of ancient costume and habiliments transferred to modern subjects . 456

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X,

Introduction

Imitation is of so extensive and so varied an import, when its relations and effects in all that falls within the scope of the faculty of imitating are considered, a faculty which is one of the distinctive characteristics of man, that ever to have a complete and exhaustive treatise on the subject may well be despaired of.

Imitation would almost of itself afford means for a full exposition of man, both in his natural and social condition. Indeed, what is there, whether in his habits, his tastes, or his works, that does not admit of reference to the imitative instinct ? To enter into an investigation of the theory of imitation in its fullest extent, would be to submit every action of human life, every object that enters into the relations of social existence, to an analysis without end.

By restricting the idea of imitation, as is an-

INTRODUCTION.

nounced in the title of this essay, within the circle of the fine arts, so called, it will have been already seen that I am far from having projected one of those theories which, pretending to be universal, far exceed the abilities of their authors and the comprehension of their readers.

Some metaphysicians,* with a view to embrace the whole theory of imitation in the fine arts, have endeavoured to refer every idea concerning it to one general principle, but one so elevated, placed in a region so little accessible to the generality of persons, that those even who think they have attained to it, seize, as it were, but a point of concentration, where the whole absorbs its several parts.

Others,')' crawling as theorists along the multifarious paths of analysis, have flattered themselves that they have been enabled to trace out, step by step, the w’hole of a general doctrine, in every way applicable to each of the fine arts ; but in aiming at the universal, they have been wanting in unity ; they have had too many parts to join together to admit of forming from them one body, and from the incoherency of their production have been unsuccessful in achieving a wrhole.

If, in restricting a general theory of imitation to the fine arts, it were proposed to embrace the

INTRODUCTION.

whole of each one, or the ideas relative to each of its parts, the design nevertheless would be still vast, and the task to be prosecuted scarcely find a limit. In fact, each of the fine arts presents itself to our view, within its own particular and distinct province, well nigh as one of those confederate states, which with others forms one whole and the same empire, but which, though submitting to the general laws of a central government, has no less its customs, its privileges, its laws of exception, and its especial character impressed upon it by nature. Consider then, how many studies, and how great an extent of knowledge must needs be united to constitute a proper qualification to treat thoroughly the particular theory of all the fine arts, since so much labour is requisite to work out that of one only.

The entire theory of one art alone is not so very simple a matter.

At the very outset of an undertaking similar to the present, it is immediately perceived that, instead of one theory only, many, and among these very different ones, must necessarily be included. Every art produces by its works different impressions, and very distinct effects, from which arise forms of composition corresponding, either to the peculiar aspects of the model, or to the organs or faculties of the body or mind with which they are held to be in relation. For instance, according to the diversity of forms of composition in its

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INTRODUCTION.

works, an art addresses itself to the reason, the imagination, the feelings, the taste, or the physical organ. There will be then the theory of the reason or judgment, the theory of the imagination, that of the feelings and the expression of the passions, that of taste or of fitness, and that of the practical execution or skill.

What I have said above explains far better than I could otherwise render it intelligible, how foreign it is to my wishes to comprise, under the general expression of imitation , ideas and researches so extensive.

My design is not to consider the different arts, as modes of imitation, in the variety of the resources peculiar to all and each, of the studies they require, of the rules that observation and experience have assigned to them, of the methods which are proper to them, of the reasons which advance or retard perfection, of the causes of their impressions, &c., &c.

Far from having proposed to myself to tread such a multiplicity of paths, which may be compared to radii terminating at the circumference of a complete theory, I am contented, in the first part, or that which has for its object the nature of imitation , to place myself, as it were, in a kind of centre, which I look upon as the starting point of all the paths. It seems to me that certain altogether primary, and central, ideas upon what constitutes the elementary principle of that imitation

INTRODUCTION.

which is proper to the fine arts, have never been collected together, and reconciled under one single point of view, in such manner as to determine all the uncertainties of opinion, and give to it an invariable rule.

After having considered the nature of imitation, it cannot but be inquired what ought to be its true end. Here again incomplete ideas, the results of views too confined, have been the means of establishing doctrines which fall far short of their object. I have thought it incumbent on me to direct them to a more exalted end, which, without being exclusive, without prohibiting the power to desist at an inferior stage, might indicate to genius the goal which it should be its ambition to arrive at. Such is the subject of the second part of this work.

The end once established, there will remain for the theory to point out the way which conducts to it.

The third part is devoted to the development of the means of imitation. But what is so called, according to the system of this work, has nothing but the name in common with the practical, technical, or didactic means appertaining to each art. The means to be discussed are those which arise from the very nature of imitation, and are closely related to the nature of its end, those which depend on the action of the judgment and understanding, and which are directed by taste in accor-

INTRODUCTION.

dance with the genius proper to each kind of imitation. Nothing relative to execution, such as it is understood in ordinary language, is introduced in treating on the theory of these specific means. In short, be it understood, that the question to be discussed is the means of imitation, and not those of the imitator.

I do not conceal from myself how much a work on a theory more or less abstract, relating to the fine arts, may have to dread from many of its readers. On a subject of this kind, some would wish to find definite ideas that the mind may easily refer to things of common experience. Others, thinking that in discoursing of the fine arts an ornate style ought only to be employed, require of the author brilliant sketches which may lay hold on the imagination, high sounding passages, and graphic descriptions, pleasing to the ear and the senses, but which leave no permanent idea in the mind. But what was to be done? Every one in treating on a subject selects some particular point of view. To this he ought to adhere, and in consequence must expect that his views will not accord with the opinions or inclinations of all. Every subject, be it what it may, has its own peculiar judges, and it is their suffrages that one ought to be ambitious to obtain ; their actual number being a matter of trifling importance.

I foresee, moreover, an objection that will be

INTRODUCTION.

urged. It will be asked what good end such a theory will serve, and whether it can avail towards the production of better works. To this I would reply, — “I think that the beautiful works of art have rather given birth to theories, than theories to beautiful works. But there exist also theories which are, in their kind, beautiful works, and from which many derive pleasure. Thus it were not more fitting to ask of what use is the art of poetry, than of what use is a poem.”

Part I. Of The Nature Of Imitation In The Fine

ARTS.

Cicero, Be Nat. Dear., L. 1. § 27.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION OF THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLE OF IMITATION IN THE FINE ARTS.

After having restricted the theory of imitation, as will have been seen in the Introduction, to what, by common agreement, are termed the fine arts, I here propose to contract still further the circle of ideas which form the subject of this First Part. Far from ranging the circumference, as varied as extensive, of the imitative region of the works of genius, whose effects are every where felt, it is in the very centre of the principle on which that imitation which is proper to the fine arts is constituted, that I purpose to confine myself.

I have then no intention, in treating on the nature of imitation, to scrutinize its secret relations, by an analysis of the different kinds of impressions produced by its works, nor, in short, to lay down all that would be requisite to render the subject complete. I wish only to investigate and point out what imitation in the fine arts ought to be, in order to constitute imitation.

Thus it is its elementary principle, its intrinsic character, in other words, its essence which I design to discover and unfold.

The imitative faculty is truly characteristic of man ; it is concerned in all his acts, it enters into all his works ; among all creatures it belongs to him, and to him alone, in such wise that he may be defined by this property, in naming him the imitative animal. Hence, the numberless different significations in which the word imitation is employed ; hence, the variety of imitative effects which are continually produced in all the works of human industry ; and hence, consequently, the necessity of isolating the theory of imitation in the fine arts , and submitting it to an especial investigation.

In order to define it, it is necessary to disengage the idea or notion of it, from those which characterize the imitation proper to the other arts. The habit of confounding properties inherent in two distinct operations of the imitative faculty is the cause of all the mistakes, which, from the manner

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of speaking, are transferred to the manner of seeing and feeling, and which, after having warped the judgment of those to whom the fine arts are addressed, finish by deceiving the judgment, and vitiating the taste of those who produce them.

To separate by a clear, elementary, and, by its very simplicity, incontestible distinction, the principle of the imitation proper to the fine arts, from that of the other kinds of imitation, is not to devote oneself to an unprofitable analysis ; it will be seen, on the contrary, that it will be to lay open, in aid of theory, a fruitful source of advantage, if it is true that from its consequences may be derived the laws of taste by which the fine arts should be regulated.

I reduce this fundamental principle to its most simple expression in the following terms : To imitate in the fine arts, is to produce the resemblance of a thing, but in some other thing which becomes the image of it.

By this definition may be at once distinguished the essential difference that exists between the imitation which is proper to the fine arts, and the other kinds of imitation.

To produce certain resemblances belongs, without doubt, to every kind of imitation. But even though all imitation produces resemblances, all resemblance is not therefore necessarily a result of imitation ; which is self-evident, as, for instance, in the works of nature in which are found the greatest number of resemblances, and those the most striking. It is sufficient to name any one of those numerous objects which she is perpetually reproducing. The word reproduce expresses that power which she possesses of bringing forth a countless number of organised bodies, which, succeeding each other in the same forms and with the same properties, must in consequence frequently present a very great similarity. Every one is aware that in all this there is no imitation. It is not nature that imitates ; it is she that is imitated.

Nearly the same thing holds good, of the resemblances which exist among what are called the works of human industry. Man also brings forth objects, which, by reproducing, he multiplies in order to supply the wants of society. But these objects resemble each other without, on that account, begetting in us either impressions or pleasure such as arise from the resemblances, which the imitation of the fine arts produces.

It may truly be affirmed that the idea of the similarity which exists between one ear of corn and another, between one fruit and another on the same tree, in no wise affects us. In like manner no agreeable emotion arises within us at the innumerable resemblances which may be found among the manufactured productions of human industry. Every one will say that such would assuredly be the case, because, in the first instance, that of natural productions, the resemblance is the result

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of organic power, and, in the second, of a mechanical operation.

Undoubtedly : but that is not sufficient.

Why does not this sort of organic or mechanical repetition equally give rise in us to the idea of resemblance or imitation, and, above all, to the pleasurable emotion which is attached to that idea ?

The reason is, simply because that which constitutes the primary condition of imitation is wanting ; namely, the image.

I admit that those who are acquainted with the nature of this process of repeating the object, viewing it only in the light of a mechanical result, refuse to assign the least value to a conformity which has no merit in their eyes. But this judgment is in them the consequence of their knowledge. Now, in a like case, I find that the same judgment is arrived at through the feelings or instinct of those even who are ignorant of the mechanical secret of the conformity.

The object, being thus rendered conformable to its model, does, in fact, announce to all what it is, and, yet better, what it is not. Now, what it is, is this ; morally speaking, it is the same as its model, though, physically, it may be some other. And it is yet more easily seen what it is not ; it is not the image of its model, but only the repetition of it.

Thus then we see why the kind of imitation which ought rightly to be termed repetition, yields no pleasure (of the same nature with those which belong to the imitation of the fine arts). In truth, the pleasure which is produced by works of imitation proceeds from the act of comparing. It is certain that the eye and the mind, whose operation is here the same, are required to judge, and, in order to judge, they must compare, deriving enjoyment only from this twofold condition. If the pleasure arises from the judgment itself, which is formed between the object to be imitated, and that by which it is imitated ; if the mind enjoys so much the more, as will be seen hereafter (Chap, xv.), as there is more to compare and more to judge, it is then obvious that, in imitation by means of identical repetition, there is absolutely nothing to enjoy, since nothing apprizes us that there is aught to judge, or to compare.

Such is the essentially negative and inconsequential effect, as far as the faculty which compares and that which judges is concerned, of al\ resemblance termed identical, of every mode of reproducing one object by another, which cannot be accounted an image of it, since it is confounded with it.

Thus, suppose two vases of the same size be placed one on each of two tables made in like manner to match, no one will be struck with the resemblance of the two vases, nor with the con-

OF IMITATION.

formity of the two tables ; but let a painter reproduce upon his canvass one of these tables surmounted by its vase, and there will result from this kind of resemblance a new power which will arrest the eye ; for the attention is apprized, by the proof the representation on the canvass affords of it, that the image of an object is concerned.

If it be now supposed that the representation of the same object takes place by an optical illusion, or that the picture is so disposed as to conceal that it is a work of painting, it will be found, that, the idea of an image being no longer presented to the spectator, the effect of the imitation with respect to it will be nullified. — Nothingappealing to him for judgment, he has nothing to compare, and therefore experiences no pleasure ; for the principle of the pleasure is in the reference, which in this case he has been unable to make, of the image to its model.

Now no such reference can be made, except between two objects, not only different, but distinct, that is to say which of themselves apprize us that they are different.

As regards imitation, I call all those objects identical, which do not present themselves to us as different ; it being understood that it is not here meant to take the words identity and difference in their absolute and mathematical acceptation : I will just remark here, that according to the rigid sense of the word, there is but one sole identity in nature. This well established fact will become one' of the fundamental supports of the theory of imitation in the fine arts, by aiding to prove what kind of resemblance is proper to their works. Those objects then are called identical, which simply appear to be so, as are all the works produced by mechanical operations. This kind of apparent identity, which is the cause of confusion between similar objects, is precisely that at which the imitation of the fine arts ought not to aim. Such resemblance ought not to be its end. Repetition by means of an image being the exact opposite of that by means of identity, all imitation which has the latter in view tends only to destroy itself, since in so doing it no longer aims at appearing imitation.

This idea may perhaps appear so simple that there can be no need of insisting upon it ; perhaps also, its simplicity considered, it may be deemed little worthy of being converted into a principle ; but I would observe that an elementary principle, before an opportunity has been afforded of developing its bearings, must necessarily be simple ; if not, it is no longer a principle.

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Chapter II

OF THE IDEA TO BE FORMED CONCERNING RESEMBLANCE IN THE IMITATION PROPER TO THE FINE ARTS.

Resemblance is without doubt a necessary condition of imitation. These two expressions and their corresponding ideas approach so nearly, that in ordinary language they are often taken for one another; but this is not the greatest error. It consists in confounding resemblance by means of an image , or that of the fine arts, with similarity by means of identity , or that of the mechanical arts.

It is of importance to the theory which it is here designed to establish, to determine also the precise nature of imitative resemblance, and the limits within which it is confined, since in this respect there exists so much error, no less on the part of those who, by extending, think to increase the domain of every kind of imitation, than of those who deem that the pleasure ought to be greater, in proportion as the resemblance is more homogeneous. It will be well also on this point

c to examine the nature of things ; for, in order to lay a firm foundation, it is scarcely possible to dig too deep.

Be it in whatever it may, does the idea of resemblance carry with it the necessary conclusion, that, where it exists between two objects, there can be no difference between them? No one does or can understand it in such a light ; for, if it were maintained that such ought to be the definition of resemblance, it would only serve to prove that it cannot exist. The very works of nature, or what we have called the results of an organic power, when we find them invested with such resemblance as to create confusion among them, only appear so to us on account of our inattention ; viewed nearer, and subjected to a more strict examination, they present to us very great varieties. These varieties are so numerous, that experience, conjointly with reason, obliges us to acknowledge that there are not, for instance, two leaves entirely alike.

The same may be said of all the mechanical productions of human industry. We defy it, by any means whatever, to produce in the works it elaborates with the greatest care, a complete resemblance, so multiplied are the causes which conduce to diversify them.

The idea of a complete resemblance is then, in speculation, but an abstraction, and, in reality, a chimera. If there can only be a question of an

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approximate resemblance, even in those works whose similarity is the result of an organic or mechaaical principle, the same may with still greater truth be affirmed of resemblances produced by an imitation, which does not repeat the object in reality, but only by an image.

This then is the elementary principle which should never be lost sight of, in estimating the nature and the properties of that resemblance, which it is the part of imitation to produce in the fine arts.

Now the fundamental idea of this kind of resemblance is afforded to us by the idea we have of what an image is ; and this idea is exceedingly simple.