The English Constitution, and other political essays

Front matter

THE UNIVERSITY. i OF ILUNOIS LIBRARY

342.42

E)l4

Contents

viii

VIL

On Changes of Ministry yiii.

Introduction To The Second Edition

mistaking the date at which the likeness was attempted to be taken. I proceed to speak of the changes which nave taken place either in the Constitution itself or in the competing institutions which illustrate it.

It is too soon as yet to attempt to estimate the effect of the Eeform Act of 1867. The people enfranchised imder it do not yet know their own power : a single election, so far from teaching us how they will use that power, has not been even enough to explain to them that they have such power. The Eeform Act of 1832 did not for many years disclose its real consequences ; a writer in 1836, whether he approved or disapproved of themj whether he thought too little of or whether he exaggerated them, would have been sure to be mistaken in them. A new Constitution does not produce its full effect as long as all its subjects were reared under an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by that old Constitution. It is not really tested till it comes to be worked by statesmen and among a people neither of whom are guided by a different experience.

In one respect we are indeed particularly likely to be mistaken as to the effect of the last Eeform Bill. Undeniably there has lately been a great change in our politics. It is commonly said that “there is not a brick of the Palmerston House standing.” The change since 1865 is a change not in one point but in a thousand points ; it

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is a change not of particular details but of pervading spirit. We are now quarrelling as wO the minor details of an Education Act ; in Lord Palmerston’s time no such Act could have passed. In Lord Palmerston’s time Sir Greorge Grey said that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be an “ act of Eevolution 2” it has now been disestablished by great majorities, with Sir George Grey himself assenting. A new world has arisen which is not as the old world ; and we naturally ascribe the change to the Reform Act. But this is a complete mistake. If there had been no Reform Act at all there would, nevertheless, have been a great change in English politics. There has been a change of the sort which, above all, generates other changes — a change of generation. Generally one generation in politics succeeds another almost silently ; at every moment men of all ages between thirty and seventy have considerable influence ; each year removes many old men, makes all others older, brings in many new. The transition is so gradual that we hardly perceive it. The board of directors of the political company has a few slight changes every year, and therefore the shareholders are conscious of no abrupt change. But sometimes there is an abrupt change. It occasionally happens that several ruling directors who are about the same age live on for many years, manage the company all through those years, and then go oflf the

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«cene almost together. In that case the affairs of the company are apt to alter much, for good or for evil: sometimes it becomes more successful, sometimes it is luined, but it hardly ever stays as it was. Something like this happened before 1865. All through the period between 1832 and 1865, the pre-32 statesmen — if I may so call them — Lord Derby, Lord Eussell, Lord Palmerston retained great power. Lord Palmerston to the last retained great prohibitive power. Though in some ways always young, he had not a particle of sympathy with the younger generation ; he brought forward no young men ; he obstructed all that young men wished. In consequence, at his death a new generation all at once started into life : the pre-32 all at once died out. Most of the new politicians were men who might well have been Lord Palmerston’s grandchildren. He came into Parliament in 1806, they entered it after 1856. Such an enormous change in the age of the workerr necessarily caused a great change in the kind of work attempted and the way in which it was done. What we call the spirit ” of politics is more surely changed by a change of generation in the men than by any other change whatever. Even if there had been no Eeform Act, this single cause would have effected grave alterations.

The mere settlement of the Eeform question made a great change too. If it could have been settled by any

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other change, or even without any change, the instant effect of the settlement would still have been immense. New questions would have appeared at once. A political country is like an American forest : you have only to cut down the old trees, and immediately new trees come up to replace them ; the seeds were waiting in the ground, and they began to grow as soon as the withdrawal of the old ones brought in light and air. These new questions of themselves would have made a new atmosphere, new parties, new debates.

Of course I am not arguing that so important an Innovation as the Eeform Act of 1867 will not have very great effects. It must, in all likelihood, have many great ones. I am only saying that as yet we do not know what those effects are; that the great evident change since 1865 is certainly not strictly due to it ; probably is not even in a principal measure due to it; that we have still to conjecture what it will cause and what it will not cause.

The principal question arises most naturally from a main doctrine of these essays. I have said that Ipabinet government is possible in England because England was a deferential meant that the nominal constituency was not the real constituency ; that the mass jf the ten-pound ” householders did not really form their own opinions, and did not exact of their representatives an obedience to those opinions ; that they were in fact guided in their judgment by the better educated classes;

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that they preferred representatives from those classes, and gave those representatives much license. If a hundred small shopkeepers had by miracle been added to any of the ’32 Parliaments, they would have felt outcasts there. Nothing could be more unlike those Parliaments than the average mass of the constituency from which it was chosen.

I do not of course mean that the ten-pound householders were great admirers of intellect or good judges of refinement. We all know that, for the most part, they were not so at all : very few Englishmen are. They were not influenced by ideas, but by facts ; not by things palpable, but by things impalpable. Not to put too fine a point upon it, they were influenced by rank and wealth. No doubt the better sort of them believed that those who were superior to them in these indisputable respects were superior also in the more intangible qualities of sense and knowledge. But the mass of the old electors did not analyze very much ; they liked to have one of their ‘‘betters” to represent them ; if he was rich, they respected him much ; and if he was a lord, they liked him the better.

The issue put before these electors was which of two rich people will you choose ? And each of those rich people was put forward by great parties whose notions were the notions of the rich — whose plans were their plans. The electors only selected one of two wealthy men to carry ^ out the schemes of one ot two wealthy associations.

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So fully was this so, that the class to whom the great body of the ten-pound householders belonged — the lower middle class — was above all classes the one most hardly treated in the imposition of the taxes. A small shopkeeper or a clerk who just, and only just, was rich enough to pay income tax, was perhaps the only severely-taxed man in the country. He paid the rates, the tea, sugar, tobacco, malt, and spirit taxes, as well as the income tax, but his means were exceedingly small. Curiously enough the class which in theory was omnipotent, was the only class financially ill-treated. Throughout the history of our former Parliaments the constituency could no more have originated the policy which those Parliaments selected than they could have made the solar system.

As I have endeavoured to show in this volume, the deference of the old electors to their betters was the only way in which our old system could be maintained. No doubt countries can be imagined in which the mass of the electors would be thoroughly competent to form good opinions ; approximations to that state happily exist. But such was not the state of the minor English shopkeepers. They were just competent to make a selection between two sets of superior ideas ; or rather — for the conceptions of such people are more personal than abstract — between two opposing parties, each professing a creed of such ideas. But they could do no more. Their own notions, if they had been cross-examined upon them, would have bee»

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found always most confused and often most foolish. They were competent to decide an issue selected by the higher classes, but they were incompetent to do more.

The grave question now is, How far will this peculiar old system continue and how far will it be altered ? I am afraid I must put aside at once the idea that it will be altered entirely and altered for the better. I cannot expect that the new class of voters will be at all more able to form sound opinions on complex questions than the old voters. There was indeed an idea — a very prevalent idea when the first edition of this book was published— that there then was an unrepresented class of skilled artizans who could form superior opinions on national matters, and ought to have the means of expressing them. We used to frame elaborate schemes to give them such means. But the Eeform Act of 1867 did not stop at skilled labour ; it enfranchised unskilled labour too. And no one will contend that the ordinary working-man who has no special skill, and who is only rated because he has a house, can judge much of intellectual matters. The messenger in an oflSce is not more intelligent than the clerks, not better educated but worse : and yet the messenger is probably a very auperior specimen of the newly enfranchised classes. The avei-age can only earn very scanty wages by coarse labour. Vhey have no time to improve themselv^^s. for they are .abouring the whole day through ; and their early education was so small that in most cases it is dubious whether, 2

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even if they had much time, they could use it to good purpose. We have not enfranchised a class less needing to be guided by their betters than the old class ; on the contrary, the new class need it more than the old. The real question is. Will they submit to it, will they defer in the same way to wealth and rank, and to the higher qualities of which these are the rough symbols and the common accompaniments ?

There is a peculiar difficulty in answering this question. Generally, the debates upon the passing of an Act contain much valuable instruction as to what may be expected of it. But the debates on the Eeform Act of 1867 hardly tell anything. They are taken up with technicalities as to the ratepayers and tne compound householder. Nobody in the country knew what was being done. I happenea at the time to visit a purely agricultural and conservative county, and I asked the local Tories, “ Do you understand this Eeform Bill ? Do you know that your Conservative Government has brought in a Bill far more Eadical than any former Bill, and that it is very likely to be passed ? ” The answer I got was, What stuff you talk ! How can it be a Eadical Eeform Bill? Why Bright opposes it I” There was no answering that in a way which a “ common jury ” could understand. The Bill was Supported by the Times and opposed by Mr. Bright ; and therefore the mass of the Conservatives and of common moderate people, without distinction of party, had no conception of the

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effect. They said it was “ London nonsense ” if you tried to explain it to them. The nation indeed generally looks to the discussions in Parliament to enlighten it as to the effect of Bills. But in this case neither party, as a partjj could speak out. Many, perhaps most of the intelligenf Conservatives, were fearful of the consequences of the proposal ; but as it was made by the heads of their own party, they did not like to oppose it, and the discipline of party carried them with it. On the other side, many, probably most of the intelligent Liberals, were in consternation at the Bill ; they had been in the habit for years of proposing Eeform Bills ; they knew the points of difference between each Bill, and perceived that this was by far the most sweeping which had ever been proposed by any Ministry. But they were almost all unwilling to say so. They would have offended a large section in their constituencies if they had resisted a Tory Bill because it was too democratic ; the extreme partizans of democracy would have said, “The enemies of the people have confidence enough in the people to entrust them with this power, but you, a ‘ Liberal,’ and a professed friend of the people, have not that confidence ; if that is so, we will never vote for you again.” Many Kadical members who had been asking for years for household suffrage were much more surprised than pleased at the near chance of obtaining it ; they had asked for it as bargainers ask for the highest possible price, but they never expected to get

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it. Altogether the Liberals, or at least the extreme Liberals, were much like a man who has been pushing hard against an opposing door till, on a sudden, the door opens, the resistance ceases, and he is thrown violently forward. Persons in such an unpleasant predicament can sc^arcely criticise effectually, and certainly the Liberals did not so criticise. We have had no such previous discussions as should guide our expectations from the Eeform Bill, nor such as under ordinary circumstances we should have had.

Nor does the experience of the last election much help us. The circumstances were too exceptional. In the first place, Mr. Gladstone’s personal popularity was such as has not been seen since the time of Mr. Pitt, and such as may never be seen again. Certainly it will very rarely be seen. A bad speaker is said to have been asked how he got on as a candidate. “ Oh,” he answered, when I do not know what to say, I say ^ Gladstone,’ and then they are sure to cheer, and I have time to think.” In fact, that popularity acted as a guide both to constituencies and to members. The candidates only said they would vote with Mr. Gladstone, and the constituencies only chose those who said so. Even the minority could only be described as anti-Gladstone, just as the majority could only be described as pro-Gladstone. The remains, too, of the old electoral organization were exceedingly powerful , the old voters voted as they had been told, and

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the new voters mostly voted with them. In extremeljy few cases was there any new and contrary organization. At the last election the trial of the new system hardly began^ and, as far as it did begin, it was favoured by a peculiar guidance.

In the meantime our statesmen have the greatest opportunities they have had for many years, and likewise the greatest duty. They have to guide the new voters in the exercise of the franchise; to guide them quietly, and without saying what they are doing, but still to guide them. The leading statesmen in a free country have great momentary power. They settle the conversation of mankind. It is they who, by a great speech or two, determine what shall be said and what shall be written for long after. They, in conjunction with their counsellors, settle the programme of their party — the platform,” as the Americans call it, on which they and those associated with them are to take their stand for the political campaign. It is by that programme, by a comparison of the programmes of different statesmen, that the world forms its judgment. The common ordinary mind is quite unfit to fix for itself what political question it shall attend to ; it is as much as it can do to judge decently of the questions which drift down to it, and are brought before it ; it almost never settles its topics ; it can only decide upon the issues of those topics. And in settling what these questions shall be, statesmen have now especially

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a great responsibility. If they raise questions whieh will excite the lower orders of mankind ; if they raise questions on which those orders are likely to be wrong ; if they raise questions on which the interest of those orders is not identical with, or is antagonistic to, the whole interest of the state, they will have done the greatest harm they can do. The future of this country depends on the happy working of a delicate experiment, and they will have done all they could to vitiate that experiment. Just when it is desirable that ignorant men, new to politics, should have good issues, and only good issues, put before them., these statesmen will have suggested bad issues. They will have suggested topics which will bind the poor as a class together; topics which will excite them against the rich ; topics the discussion of which in the only form in which that discussion reaches their ear will be to make them think that some new law can make them comfortable — that it is the present law which makes them uncomfortable — that Government has at its disposal an inexhaustible fund out of which it can give to those who now want without also creating elsewhere other and greater wants. If the first work of the poor voters is to try to create a “ poor man’s paradise,” as poor men are apt to fancy that Paradise, and as they are apt to think they can create it, the great political trial now beginning will simply fail. The wide gift of the elective franchise will

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be a great calamity to the whole nation, and to those who gain it as great a calamity as to any.

I do not of course mean that statesmen can choose with absolute freedom what topics they will deal with, and what they will not. I am, of course, aware that they choose under stringent conditions. In excited states of the public mind they have scarcely a discretion at all ; th( tendency of the public perturbation determines what shaL and what shall not be dealt with. But, upon the other hand, in quiet times statesmen have great power ; when there is no fire lighted they can settle what fire shall be lit. And as the new suffrage is happily to be tried in a quiet time, the responsibility of our statesmen is great because their power is great too.

And the mode in which the questions dealt with are discussed is almost as important as the selection of these questions. It is for our principal statesmen to lead the public, and not to let the public lead them. No doubt when statesmen live by public favour, as ours do, this is a hard saying, and it requires to be carefully limited. I do not mean that our statesmen should assume a pedantic and doctrinaire tone with the English people ; if there is anything which English people thoroughly detest, it is that tone exactly. And they are right in detesting it , if a man cannot give guidance and communicate instruction formally without telling his audience “ I am better than

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you ; I have studied this as you have not,” then he is not fit for a guide or an instructor. A statesman who should show that gaucherie would exhibit a defect of imagination, and expose an incapacity for dealing with men, which would be a great hindrance to him in his calling. But much argument is not required to guide the pubbc, still less a formal exposition of that argument. What is mostly needed is the manly utterance of clear conclusions ; if a statesman gives these in a felicitous waj- (and if with a few light and humorous illustrations so much the better), he has done his part. He will have given the text, the scribes in the newspapers will write the sermon. A statesman ought to show his own nature, and talk in a palpable way what is to him important truth. And so he will both guide and benefit the nation. But if, especially at a time when great ignorance has an unusual power in public affairs, he chooses to accept and reiterate the decisions of that ignorance, he is only the hireling of the nation, and does little save hurt it.

I shall be told that this is very obvious, and that everybody knows that 2 and 2 make 4, and that there is no use in inculcating it. But I answer that the lesson is not observed in fact ; people do not do their political sums 80. Of all our political dangers, the greatest I conceive is that they will neglect the lesson. In plain English, what I fear is that both our political parties will bid for the support of the working-man ; that both of them will

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promise to do as he likes if he will only tell them what ’ i is; that, as he now bolds the casting vote in our affairs, both parties will beg and pray him to give that vote to them. I can conceive of nothing more corrupting or worse for a set of poor ignorant people than that two combinations of well-taught and rich men should constantly offer to defer to their decision, and compete for the office of executing it. Vox populi will be Vox diaboli if it is worked in that manner.

And, on the other hand, my imagination conjures up a contrary danger. I can conceive that questions being raised which, if continually agitated, would combine the working-men as a class together, the higher orders might have to consider whether they would concede the measure that would settle such questions, or whether they would risk the effect of the working-men’s combination.

No doubt the question cannot be easily discussed in the abstract ; much must depend on the nature of the measures in each particular case ; on the evil they would cause if conceded ; on the attractiveness of their idea to the working-classes if refused. But in all cases it must be remembered that a political combination of the lower classes, as such and for their own objects, is an evil of the first magnitude ; that a permanent combination of them would make them (now that so many of them have the suffrage) supreme in the country; and that their supremacy, in the state they now are, means the supremacy of iguo

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ranee over instruction and of numbers over knowledge. So long as they are not tauglit to act together, there is a chance of this being averted, and it can only be averted by the greatest wisdom and the greatest foresight in the higher classes They must avoid, not only every evil, but every appearance of evil ; while they have still the power they must remove, not only every actual grievance, but, where it is possible, every seeming grievance too ; they must willingly concede every claim which they can safely concede, in order that they may not have to concede unwillingly some claim which would impair the safety of the country.

This advice, too, will be said to be obvious ; but I have the greatest fear that, when the time comes, it will be cast aside as timid and cowardly. So strong are the combative propensities of man, that he would rather fight a losing battle than not fight at all. It is most difficult to persuade peaple that by fighting they may strengthen the enemy, yet that would be so here ; since a losing battle — especially a long and well-fought one — would have thoroughly taught the lower orders to combine, and would have left the higher orders face to face with an irritated, organized, and superior voting power. The ojurage which strengthens an enemy, and which so loses, not only the present battle, but many after battles, is a heavy curse to men and nations.

In one minor respect, indeed, I think we may see

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with distinctness the effect of the Eeform Bill of 18C7* I think it has completed one change which the Act of 1832 began; it has completed the change which tha< Act made in the relation of the House of Lords to the House of Commons. As I have endeavoured in this book to explain, the literary theory of the English Constitution is on this point quite wrong as usual. According to that theory, the two Houses are two branches of the Legislature, perfectly equal and perfectly distinct. But before the Act of 1832 they were not so distinct; there was a very large and a very strong common element. By their commanding influence in many boroughs and counties the Lords nominated a considerable part of the Commons; the majority of the other part were the richer gentry — men in most respects like the Lords, and sympathising with the Lords. Under the Constitution as it then was the two Houses were not in their essence distinct ; they were in their essence similar ; they were, in the main, not Houses of contrasted origin, but Houses of like origin. The predominant part of both was taken from the same class — from the English gentry, titled and untitled. By the Act of 1832 this was much altered. The aristocracy and the gentry lost their predominance in the House of Commons ; that predominance passed to the middle class. The two Houses then became distinct, but then they ceased to be co-equal. The Duke of Wellington, in a most remarkable paper, has explained what

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pains he took to induce the Lords to submit to their nevt position, and to submit, time after time, their will to the will of the Commons.

The Eeform Act of 1867 has, I think, unmistakably completed the effect which the Act of 1832 began, but left unfinished. The middle class element has gained greatly by the second change, and the aristocratic element has lost greatly. If you examine carefully the lists of members, especially of the most prominent members, of either side of the House, you will not find that they are in general aristocratic names. Considering the power and position of the titled aristocracy, you will perhaps be astonished at the small degree in which it contributes to the active part of our governing Assembly. The spirit of our present House of Commons is plutocratic, not aristocratic ; its most prominent statesmen are not men of ancient descent or of great hereditary estate ; they are men mostly of substantial means, but they are mostly, too, connected more or less closely with the new trading wealth. The spirit of the two Assemblies has become far more contrasted than it ever was.

The full effect of the Eeform Act of 1832 was indeed postponed by the cause which I mentioned just now. The statesmen who worked the system which was put up had themselves been educated under the system which was pulled down. Strangely enough, their predominant guidance lasted as long as the system which they created.

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Lord Palmerston, Lord Eussell, Lord Derby, died or else lost their influence within a year or two of 1867. The complete consequences of the Act of 1832 upon the House of Lords could not be seen while the Commons were subject to such aristocratic guidance. Much of the change which might have been expected from the Act of 1832 was held in suspense, and did not begin till that measure had been followed by another of similar and greater power.

The work which the Duke of Wellington in part performed has now, therefore, to be completed also. He met the half difficulty; we have to surmount the whole one. We have to frame such tacit rules, to establisn such ruling but unenacted customs, as will make the House of Lords yield to the Commons when and as often as our new Constitution requires that it should yield. I shall be asked. How often is that, and what is the test by which you know it ?