Elements of logic, comprising the substance of the article in the Encyclopaedia metropolitana: with additions, &c

Front matter

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DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING .« 251

CHAPTER, II.

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Chapter III

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CHAPTER IV. Mr ovenusL AND.REAL QUESTIONS «. . o1 se <s..« e mOt

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MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF LEARN- BRO os be nox: cg Sa. Ee eee eee No. Il.

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THE RIGHT REVEREND

EDWARD COPLESTON, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF,

“My Dear Lorp,

To enumerate the advantages I have derived from your instructions, both in regular lectures and in private conversation, would be needless to those acquainted with the parties, and to the Public, uninteresting. My object at present is simply to acknowledge how greatly I am indebted to you in respect of the present Work; not merely as having originally imparted to me the principles of the Science, but also as having contributed remarks, explanations, and illustrations, relative to the most important points, to so great an amount that I can hardly consider myself as the Author of more than half of such portions of the treatise as are not borx ' DEDICATION.

rowed from former publications. I could have wished, indeed, to acknowledge this more explicitly, by marks ing with some note of distinction those parts which are least my own. But I found it could not be done. In most instances there is something belonging to each of us; and even in those parts where your share is the largest, it would not be fair that you should be made responsible for any thing that is not entirely your own. Nor is it possible, in the case of a Science, to remember distinctly how far one has been, in each instance, indebted to the suggestions of another. Information, as to matters of fact, may easily be referred in the mind to the person from whom we have derived it: but scientific truths, when thoroughly embraced, become much more a part of the mind, as it were; since they rest, not on the athority of the instructor, but on reasoning from data, which we ourselves furnish;* they are scions engrafted on the stems previously rooted in our own soil; and we are apt to confound them with its indigenous productions.

You yourself also, I have reason to believe, have forgotten the greater part of the assistance you have afforded in the course of conversations on the subs

* See B. IV. Ch. ii. § 1.

DEDICATION. Xi ject; as I have. found, more than once, that ideas which I distinctly remembered to have received from you, have not been recognized by you when read or repeated. As far, however, as I can recollect, though there is no part of the following pages in which I have not, more or less, received valuable suggestions from you, I believe you have contributed less to the Analytical Outline, and to the Treatise on Fallacies, and more, to the subjoined Dissertation, than to the rest of the Work.

{ take this opportunity of publicly declaring, that as, on the one hand, you are not responsible for any thing contained in this Work, so, on the other. hand, should you ever favor the world with a publication of your own on the subject, the coincidence which will doubtless be found in it with many things here brought forward as my own, is not to be regarded as any indication of plagiarism, at least on your side.

Believe me to be, My dear Lord, Your obliged and affectionate Pupil and Friend, RICHARD WHATELY.

- fe a fy Oke: : i af

Preface

‘T'ue following treatise contains the substance of the Article “ Locic” in the Encyclopedia Metropolttana. It was suggested to me that a separate publication of it might prove acceptable, not only to some who are not subscribers to that work, but also to several who are; but who, for convenience of reference, would prefer a more portable volume. In fact a number of individuals had actually formed a design (prevented only by this publication) of joining together to have the Article printed for their own private use.

I accordingly revised it, and made such additions, chiefly in the form of Notes, as I thought likely to increase its utility.

When applied to to contribute the Article, I asked and obtained permission from Dr. Copleston (now Bishop of Llandaff) to make use of manuscripts compiled in great measure from what I had heard from him in conversations on the subject, or which he had read to me from his common-place book, interspersed with observations of my own. ‘These manuscripts I had drawn up and was in the habit of employing, for the use of my own pupils.

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In throwing them into a form suitable for the En: cyclopedia, and in subsequently enlarging the Article into the present volume, [ have taken without scruple whatever appeared most valuable from the works of former writers; especially the concise, but in genera. accurate, treatise of Aldrich. But while I acknowledge my obligations to my predecessors, of whose labors I have largely availed myself, I do not profess to be altogether satisfied with any of the treatises that have yet appeared ; nor have I accordingly judged it any unreasonable presumption to point out what seem to me the errors they contain. Indeed, whatever defer-_ ence an Author may profess for the authority of those who have preceded him, the very circumstance of his publishing a work on the same subject, proves that he thinks theirs open to improvement. In censuring however, as I have had occasion to do, several of the doctrines and explanations of logical writers, and of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be understood that this is not from my having formed a low estimate of the merits of the Compendium drawn up by the Author just mentioned, but, on the contrary, from its popularity, (it being the one commonly used at Oxford) —from the impossibility of noticing particularly all the points in which we agree, —and from the consideration that errors are the more carefully to be pointed out in proportion to the authority by which they are sanctioned.

I have to acknowledge assistance received from several friends who have at various times suggested remarks and alterations. But I cannot avoid particularizing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel Col

PREFACE. XV lege, who actually composed a considerable portion of the work as it now stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original author of several pages. Some valuable illustrations of the importance of attending to the ambiguity of the terms used in Political Economy, were furnished by the kindness of my friend and former pupil, Mr. Senior, of Magdalen College, and now Master in Chancery, who preceded me in the office of Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, and afterwards was appointed to the same at King’s College, London. They are printed in the Appendix. But the friend to whom it is inscribed has contributed far more, and that, in the most important parts, than all others together ; so much, indeed, that, though there is in the treatise nothing of his which has not undergone such expansion or modification as leaves me solely responsible for the whole, there is not a little of which I cannot fairly claim to be the Author.

Each successive edition has been revised with the utmost care. But though the work has undergone not only the close examination of myself and several friends, but the severer scrutiny of determined opponents, I am happy to find that no material errors have been detected, nor any considerable alterations found necessary.

On the utility of Logic many writers have said much in which I cannot coincide, and which has tended to bring the study into unmerited disrepute. By representing Logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teach.

: / xV1 ; PREFACE.

ing the use of the intellectual faculties in general they raised expectations which could not be realized and which naturally led to a reaction. The whole system, whose unfounded pretensions had been thus blazoned forth, came to be commonly regarded as utterly futile and empty: like several of our most valuable medicines, which, when first introduced, were proclaimed, each, as a panacea, infallible in the most. opposite disorders ; and which consequently, in many instances, fell for a time into total disuse; though, after a long interval, they were established in their just estimation, and employed conformably to their real properties.

In one of Lord Dudley’s (lately published) letters to Bishop Copleston, of the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the study of Logic, that it was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods in which the intellectual powers of mankind seemed nearly paralyzed,—- when no discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and deep-rooted: and that when the mental activity of thy world revived, and philosophical inquiry flourished .atid bore its fruits, logical studies fell into decay and contempt. And this I Have introduced in the “ Elements of Rhetoric,” (Part II. Ch. iii. $¢ 2,) among other examples of a presumption not in itself unreasonable, but capable of being rebutted by a counter-presumption. When any study has been unduly or unwisely cultivated to the neglect of others, and has even been intruded into their province, there is a presumption that a reaction * will ensue, and an equally excessive

* See “ Charge,” 1843,

PREFACE. XV contempt, or dread, or disgust, succeed. And in the present instance, the mistaken and absurd cultivation of Logie during Ages of great intellectual darkness, might have been expected to produce, in a subsequent age of comparative light, an association in men’s? minds, of Logic, with the idea of apathetic ignorance, prejudice, and adherence. to error; so that the legitimate uses, and just value of the science (supposing it to have any) would be likely to be scornfully overlooked. Our ancestors having neglected to raise fresh crops of corn, and contented themselves with vainly threshing over and over the same straw and winnowing the same chaff, it might have been anticipated that their descendants would, for a time, regard the very operations of threshing and winnowing with contempt, and would attempt to grind corn, straw, and chaff all together.

The revival of a study which had for a long time been regarded as an obsolete absurdity, would probably have appeared to many persons, thirty years ago, as an undertaking far more difficult than the introduction of some new study ;—as resembling rather the attempt to restore life to one of the antediluvian fossilplants, than the rearing of a young seedling into a tree.

It is a curious circumstance that the very person to whom the letter just alluded to was addressed should have lived to witness so great a change of public opinion brought about (in a great degree through his own instrumentality *) within the short interve’ — indeed within a small portion of the interval — between

* See Dedication.

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the writing of that letter and its publication, that the whole ground of the presumption alluded to has been completely cut away. During that interval, the treatise which was with his aid composed, and by his permission inserted in the Encyclopedia, attracted so much attention as to occasion its separate publication, in a volume which has been frequently reprinted, not only in England, but in the United States of America ; where it is in use, I believe, in every one of their Colleges. Add to which, the frequent allusions (compared with what could have been met with twenty or thirty years ago) to the subject of Logic, by writers on various subjects. And moreover several other treatises on the subject, either original works or abridgments, have been making their appearance with continually increased frequency of late years. Some indeed of these have little or nothing in common with the present work except the title. But even that very circumstance is so far encouraging, as indicating that the name of this science instead of exciting, as formerly, an almost universal prejudice, is considered as likely to prove a recommendation. Certainly Lord Dudley, were he now living, would not ‘speak of the general neglect and contempt of Logic; though every branch of Science, Philosophy, and Literature, have flourished during the interval.

To explain fully the utility of Logic is what can be done only in the course of an explanation of the system itself. One preliminary observation only (for the. original suggestion of which I am indebted to the same friend to whom this work is inscribed ) it may be worth while to offer in this place. If it were inquired

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PREFACE 3 XIX what is to be regarded as the most appropriate intel. lectual occupation of MAN, as man, what would be the answer? The Statesman is engaged with political affairs; the Soldier with military ; the Mathematician, with the properties of numbers and magnitudes; the Merchant, with.commercial concerns, &c. ; but in what are all and each of these employed ?— employed, I mean, as men; for there are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, which are in great measure common to us with the lower animals. Evidently, in Reasoning. 'They are all occupied in deducing, well or ill, Conclusions from Premisses ; each, concerning the subject of his own particular business. If, therefore, it be found that the process gding on daily, in each of so many different minds, is, in any respect, the same, and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced from that system, for the better conducting of the process, then, it can hardly be denied that such a system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention, — not of the members of this or that profession merely, but —of every one who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. _To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in general, and to learn to do that well, which every one will and must do, whether well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education.

Even supposing that no practical ja keene a in argumentation resulted from the study of Logic, it . would not by any means follow that it is unworthy of attention. The putrsuit of knowledge on curious and xX PREFACE, interesting subjects, for its own sake, is usually reckoned no misemployment of time; and is considered as, incidentally, if not directly, useful to the individual, by the exercise thus afforded to the mental faculties. All who study Mathematics are not training themselves to become Surveyors or Mechanics; some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry is even expected in aman liberally educated, though without any view to his practising Surgery or Medicine. And the investigation of a process which is peculiarly and universally the occupation of Man, considered as Man, can hardly be reckoned a less philosophical pursuit than those just instanced.

It has usually been assumed, however, in the case of the present subject, that a theory which does not tend to the improvement of practice is utterly unworthy of regard; and then, it is contended that Logic has no such tendency, on the plea that men may and do reason correctly without it: an objection which would equally apply in the case of Grammar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, &c., in all of which systems the practice must have existed previously to the theory.

But many who allow the use of systematic principles in other things, are accustomed to cry up Common- Sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in Reasoning. Now by Common-Sense is meant, I apprehend, (when the term is used with any distinct meaning, ) an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system. of rules: such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established principles to guide us, — no line of procedure, as it were, distinctly, chalked out, — we

PREFACE. xXx1 must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common- Sense. But that Common-Sense is only our. secondbest guide —that the rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are always desirable when they can be had, is an assertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the testimony of mankind in general; which is so much the more valuable, inasmuch as it may be accounted the testimony of adversaries. For the generality have a strong predilection in favor of Common-Sense, except in. those points in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge of a system of rules; but in these points they deride any one who trusts to unaided Common-Sense. A Sailor e. g. will, perhaps, despise the pretensions of medical men, and prefer treating a disease by Common-Sense: but he would ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship by Common-Sense, without regard to the maxims of nautical art. A Physician, again, will perhaps contemn Systems of Political- Economy,* of Logic, or Metaphysics, and insist on the superior wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such matters; but he would never approve of trusting to Common-Sense in the treatment of diseases. Neither, again, would the Architect recommend a reliance on Common-Sense alone, in building, nor the Musician, in music, to the neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their respective arts, have been deduced from scientific reasoning aided by experience. And the induction might be extended to every department of prac-

"€ See Senior's Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, p. 28.

XX11 PREFACE.

tice. Since, therefore, each gives the preferenee to _unassisted Common-Sense only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though unconsciously and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments.

There is, however, abundant room for the employment of Common-Sense in the application of the system. To bring arguments, out of the form in which they are expressed in conversation and in books into the regular logical shape, must be, of course, the business of Common-Sense, aided by practice; for such arguments are, by supposition, not as yet within the province of Science; else they would not be irregular, but would be already strict syllogisms. To - exercise the learner 1n this operation, I have subjoined in the Appendix, some examples, both of insulated arguments, and (in the later editions) of the analysis of argumentative works. It should be added, however, that a large portion of what is usually introduced into Logical treatises, relative to the finding of Arguments, — the different kinds of them, &c., I have referred to the head of Rhetoric, and treated of in a work on the Elements of that Art.

It was doubtless from a strong and deliberate conviction of the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing from an acquaintance with Logic, that the University of Oxford, when remodelling their system, not only retained that branch of study, regardless of the clamors

PREFACE. | xxiti of many of the half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to it, by making it an indispensable part of the Examination for the first Degree. This last circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, in a great degree, produced an effect opposite to what was designed. It has contributed to lower instead of exalting, the estimation of the study; and to withhold from it the earnest attention of many who might have applied to it with profit. I am not so weak as to imagine that any System can ensure great proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either in all students, or ina very large proportion of them: ‘‘ we sow many seeds to obtain a few flowers:’” but it might have been expected (and doubtless was expected) that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive some benefit worth.»mentioning from their logical pursuits; and that a considerable proportion of the distinguished candidates would prove respectable, if not eminent logicians. Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable, or such as I might not have formed myself, had I been called upon to judge at that period when our experience was all to come. Subsequently, however, experience has shown that those expectations have been very inadequately realized. The truth is, that a very small proportion, even of distinguished students, ever become proficients in Logic; and that by far the greater part pass through the University without knowing any thing at all of the subject. Ido not mean-that they have not learned by rote a string - of technical terms; but that they understand aksolutely nothing whatever of the principles of the science.

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I am aware that some injudicious friends of Oxford will censure the frankness of this avowal. I have only to reply that such is the truth; and that I think too well of, and know far too well, the University in which I have been employed in various academical occupations above a quarter of a century, to apprehend danger to her reputation from declaring the exact truth. With all its defects, and no human institution is perfect, the University would stand, I am convinced, higher in public estimation than it does, were the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in all points respecting it, more fully known. But the scanty and partial success of the measures employed to promote logical studies is the consequence, I apprehend, of the universality of the requisition. That which must be done by every one, will, of course, often be done but indifferently ; and when the belief is once fully established, which it certainly has long been, that any thing which is indispensable to a_ testimonial, has little or nothing to do with the attainment of honors,* the lowest standard soon becomes the established one in the minds of the greater number; and provided that standard be once reached, so as to secure the candidate from rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any such branch of study is regarded as a matter of indifference, as far as any views of academical distinction are concerned.

Divinity is one of these branches, and to this also

* In the last-framed Examination-statute an express declaration has been inserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have weight in the assignment of honors.

PREFACE. XXV most of what has been said concerning Logic might be considered as equally applicable; but, in fact, there are several important differences between the two cases. In the first place, most of the students who are designed for the Church, and many who are not, have a value for theological knowledge, independently of the requisition of the schools; and on that ground do not confine their views to the lowest admissible degree of proficiency: whereas this can be said of very few in the case of Logic. And moreover, such as design to become candidates for holy Orders, know that another examination in Theology awaits them. But a consideration, which is still more to the present purpose, is, that Theology, not being a Science, admits of infinite degrees of proficiency, from that which is within the reach of a child, up to the highest that is attainable by the most exalted genius; every one of which degrees is inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If any one understands tolerably the Church-" catechism, or even half of it, he knows something of divinity; and that something is incalculably preferable to nothing. But it is not so with a Science: one who does not understand the principles of Euclid’s demonstrations, whatever number of questions and answers he may have learnt by rote, knows absolutely nothing of Geometry: unless he attain this point, all his labor is utterly lost; worse than lost, perhaps, if he is led to believe that he has learnt something of Mathematics, when, in truth, he has not. And the same is the case with Logic, or any other Science. It does not admit of such various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. Of course [am °

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far from supposing that all who understand any thing, much or little, of a certain Science, stand on the same’ level; but I mean, what is surely undeniable, that one who does not embrace the fundamental principles, of a Science, whatever he may.have taken on authority, and learned by rote, knows, properly speaking, nothing of that science. And such, I have no hesitation in saying, is the case with a considerable proportion even of those candidates who obtain testimonials, including many who gain distinction. There - are some persons (probably not so many as one in ten, of such as have in other respects tolerable abilities,) who are physically incapable of the degree of

steady abstraction requisite for really embracing the principles of Logic or of any other Science, whatever pains may be taken by themselves or their teachers. But there is a much greater number to whom this is n great difficulty, though not an impossibility ; and who having, of course, a strong disinclination to such a study, look naturally to the very lowest admissible. standard. And the example of such examinations in Logic as must be expected in the case of men of

these descriptions, tends, in combination with popular prejudice, to degrade the study altogether in the minds of the generality.

It was from these considerations, perhaps, that it was proposed, a few years ago, to leave the study of Logic altogether to the option of the candidates; but the suggestion was rejected; the majority appearing to think (in which opinion I most fully coincide) that, so strongly as the tide of popular opinion set against the study, the result would have been, within a few

PREFACE. XXVili years, an almost universal neglect of that science. Matters were accordingly left, at that time, in respect of this point, on their former footing; which I am convinced was far preferable to the proposed alteration.

But a middle course between these two was suggested, which I was persuaded would be infinitely preferable to either; a persuasion which I had long entertained, and which is confirmed by every day’s observations and reflections; of which, few persons, I believe, have bestowed more on this subject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged, be made optional to those who are merely candidates for a degree, but indispensable to the attainment of academical honors ; and the consequence would be, that it would speedily begin and progressively continue, to rise in estimation and to be studied with real profit. The examination might then, it was urged, without any hardship, be made a strict one; since no one could complain that a certain moderate degree of scientific ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain prescribed study, should be the conditions of obtaining distinction. 'The far greater part would still study Logic; since there would be (as before) but few who vould be willing to exclude themselves from the possibility of obtaining distinction; but it would be studied with a very different mind, when ennobled, as it were, by being made part of the passport to Uni- ‘versity honors, and when a proficiency in it came to be regarded generally as an honorable distinction. And in proportion as the number increased of those who really understood the science, the number, it was

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contended, would increase of such as would value it on higher and better grounds. It would in time come to be better known and better appreciated by all the well-informed part of society: and lectures in Logic at the University would then, perhaps, no longer consist exclusively of an explanation of the mere elements. This would be necessary indeed for beginners; but to the more advanced students, the tutors would no more think of lecturing in the bare rudiments, than of lecturing in the Latin or Greek Grammar; but, in the same manner as they exercise their pupils in Grammar, by reading with them Latin and Greek authors with continual reference to grammarrules, so, they would exercise them in Logic by reading some argumentative work, requiring an analysis of it on logical principles. |

These effects could not indeed, it was acknowledged, be expected to show themselves fully till after a considerable lapse of time; but that the change would begin to appear, (and that very decidedly) within three or four years, was confidently anticipated.

To this it was replied, that it was most desirable that no one should be allowed to obtain the Degree of B. A. without a knowledge of Logic. This answer carries a plausible appearance to those unacquainted with the actual state of the University; though in fact it is totally irrelevant. For it goes on the supposition, that hitherto this object has been accomplished ;— that every one who passes his examination does possess a knowledge of Logic; which is notoriously not the fact, nor ever can be, without