The elements of Christian science; a treatise upon moral philosophy and practice

Front matter

THE

ELEMENTS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

A TREATISE UPON

Preface

Naturalists tell us that the oak has a northern circle, beyond which it does not grow. It has also a limit that is set for it towards the south. Thus it has a region, marked out by definite limits, upon the surface of the earth, within which it grows, and out of which it cannot live. In the language of natural science, this is called its Habitat. Within that habitat it lives, varied in vigor and appearance according to circumstances. The same tree, in sheltered valleys, shoots up a taller and more slender stem than the oak that braves the storm upon the mountain-side. The timber also of that oak, that has grown slowly in the clefts of the rock, has a roughness and a knotty strength that is never found in that which has started up rapidly from rich and cultivated soils. All these differences, and a thousand more, may be produced, and exist in oaks that have come from acorns of the same parent-tree.

To explain this, we know that all of these trees had, each of them, a constitution, a germ of vegetable life peculiar to the oak, suited to take up supplies from external things, and to grow thereby, hecmise it is a life.

To use the example again, — wherever the tree grows, in the North or the South, in the valley or upon the mountains, from the clefted rock or in the fertile plains, — there, amidst all variety of circumstance, the constitution is the same, — if the tree is anywhere capable of living, it is as an oak that it lives, and not as any other tree. Position modifies, hut never wholly destroys or wJiolly changes the nature.

The vigor of the tree, individually considered, its state and condition, are determined by these two elements, Nature and Position, — and 3 infinite varieties are produced in individuals, but tlie one element never wholly overcomes the other, — Position never entirely changes Nature, — Nature never wholly conquers Position. TVe have been so careful in laying out precisely, and illustrating this example, that our readers may clearly see, that wherever there exists organized life, then, if we would examine the state of the individual existence, these two elements must always be taken into account, — first. Nature, and secondly Position.

So it is with all organized life. The Horse, in the dry deserts of Arabia, in the damp climate and succulent pastures of Holland and Flanders, upon the high Pampas of South America, and again, upon our South-western Prairies, — in all these cases, the animals are very difi'erent. And in them, all the variety can be shown to have arisen from Position. The Nature can be proved to be the same in all, and the cifcumstances even be shown, in each particular case, that have modified it into such very difi'erent forms.

And upon this principle, all our researches into the nature of the animals are founded. We examine the Nature first, — that is, the organization in its various faculties and organs, its elements, powers, and constituent principles. Then we examine its Position, — the relation, that is, of all these to the circumstances of the country in which it dwells, — as to climate, and soil, and natural features, such as mountains and rivers, and their productions, animal, mineral and vegetable. And often, when in the Nature we have seen organs and faculties, the uses of which we could not at once discern, the consideration of Position shall at once flash light upon these problems, and again the facts of Nature evince the causes of Position. Nay, stranger still than this, — it has often happened in the case of animals that have been for ages tamed to the use of man, that the circumstances, which in the original habitat surrounded them, have explained facts of their natural action that seemed unaccountable to them who had seen them only as tame. The law of Nature and Position is an universal one, and is the foundation of all true philosophy in reference to organized animal life.

To extend the same principle upward to the Life of Man, to apply it to his Moral Being, is the object of this book. It is, as the reader may see, the principle of the motto, that I have chosen from Ecclesiasticus and placed upon my title-page, that says, " All things are double, ono

PREFACE. 5

against another, and there is nothing iniperfect." In other words, tliat there is no finite being that in itself has its perfection ; but only in hcini compared with a second can it be perfectly understood, — only iu being united with another, can it perfectly fulfill its appointed ends, — only in obtaining from some other, that which it has not in itself, can it be perfect. This principle of Twofoldness, any thinking man shall, upon calm and deep reflection, see to run through the world of created life. He shall see it, in reference to man, to be true in the words of my second motto, that " Man's perfection is not I;// himself, nor by anything in or of himself, but by that which is to him external." The Law of Duality, or to use a better word, before employed, of Twofoldness, extends to man as considered in every relation, as in the Home, in the Nation, in the Church, — as in his relation to External Nature, to his brother men, and to his Almighty Creator and Father.

The application of this principle to the moral nature of man, will be found to be the leading idea of this treatise, that from which all its other principles flow, — that in whose light, all the phenomena of our Moral Being are viewed, and by which they are explained.

We take it for granted herein, that man has a Moral Nature and constitution, as well as an animal and intellectual being j and that to man as a moral being there are external facts and institutions that correspond to this moral nature. This treatise seeks to discover, define, and specify distinetl}', the various faculties of the moral constitution of man, and so to classify them that they may assume a definite, scientific, and practical form. And to do this, it considers them in the two-fold point of view, as in themselves first, and secondly, their relation to those other external fixed facts, which bear upon Moral Life, as the external circumstances of physical nature do upon the powers of vegetable or animal existence. This, as I have said, is my leading principle, and in reference to this it is, that I define Ethics to be " the Science of Man's Nature and Position."

And I can appeal to the Self-knowledge of every thoughtful man for the proof of the position I assume, that man is a being that has a Moral Constitution, composed of clear and definite elements, — and that this Moral Nature answers to, and is to be explained by moral influences and facts external to us. That this is the case with man considered as

6 PREFACE.

a race and as an individual, and that his moral growth depends upon these two conditions.

And he that shall go with me through this treatise, I hope will find that moral science is not without a deep interest. For surely, each man in this world who knows that he is endowed with a Moral Nature, and is placed amidst circumstances, all of which may have a moral effect, must think the question to be deeply interesting, " How shall I so cultivate this my Nature, and so employ this my Position, as to arrive at the fullest maturity and completeness of my moral being, that I am capable of?"

This is the question the author attempts to answer in this book, as a matter both of science, and also of practical action and guidance.

Chapter I. 13

Is man's nature ' good or eril' ?— There is a nature perfectly indifferent as to good or evil. — It is that of the brutes, not of man. — Man's nature is not partly good and partly evil.— It is not essentially evil. — This proved by the monstrous conclusions which would follow. — It is then essentially a nature good in itself, not evil in itself— bvX fallen.

Chapter II. 22

What is the nature of Good and Evil ?— The highest good, and the means of discovering it.

Chapter HE. 29

God the Supreme Good, and the only Standard of Good. — It must have been so to Christ and to Adam. — The case of Adam. — Adam's Moral Perfection — first, by his nature — secondly, by the gift of the Presence of God, as a Supreme Rule actually. Our fallen nature differs, first, in the withdrawal of that gift ; secondly, in disturbance and insubordination of faculties. Still, as a matter of each man's experience, and also of Historj', God is the Law and Standard of Moral Good to the Natural Man.

Chapter IV. 40

God has external means whereby he conveys His Knowledge unto Man. — 1. External Nature, 2d]y. Society.— The operation of External nature upon man's moral being explained.— The operation of Society is two-fold— first, of Law; second, of traditional knowledge or Opinion, whereof Society is a channel.

Chapter V. 55

Society brings to all men the knowledge of Good, and the Rule of it.— Man's nature yearns toward it, being good; but it finds itself unable — it is driven then, inwardly for aids — finds within, Conscience, Reason, the Heart, the Will, powers that aid us. — From these arise four philosophies, Socratic, Platonic, Epicurean, Stoic. — These powers the sources of moral progress. — Yet moral perfection by nature unattainable. — Original Sin. — Answer to the question, " How man does evil although his nature is good ?" — Differ cnce between Mental or Physical and Moral inability. — Original Sin is primarily in the incapacity of the moral or Governing Powers.

8 CONTENTS.

Chapter VI. 66

There are in human nature, Governing Powers and Powers Subordinate. — No powers in human nature essentially evil. — Anger analyzed as a proof of this assertion. — Evil action comes from the weakness of tlie Governing Powers, not the strength of Passions. — Laws of the Governing Powers. — 1st, Governing Powers should govern — Subordinate Powers only subordinately act. — Dangers from breach of this first law. — 2d, They should act always, others only intermittingly.— 3d, They govern according to a Law. This is the Law of God, which is also the Law of the harmony of man's nature.— The relation of moral to mental power.

Chapter I. 77

Of Conscience. — Mistakes with regard to it. — What it is not. — It is the sense of responsibility.— Socrates and Pj-thagoras.— The action of Conscience is, 1st, Prohibiting, 2d, Recording, 3d, Prophetic. — The Prohibiting office of Conscience considered. — The Recording Conscience. — The books that shall be opened. — The true solution of the facts of Conscience is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. — Conscience in us is not the Holy Spirit, but the ear that listens to His voice.— It is at once infallible and fallible.

Chapter U. 91

The value of Conscience. — Our position in consequence of it. — An examination of it in action, as, 1st, Withholding; 2d, Recording; 3d, Prophesying.— The emotions that are sanctions to it, 1st, Moral Restlessness; 2d, Shame: 3d, Fear. — The mai-k upon the Nature, 1st, the Stain; 2d, the Guilt. — Conscience is not properly a '.'judge," nor the pain from it properly " punishment."

Chapter IU. 104

The deficiencies of the Conscience and its laws deduced from its nature.— The deficiencies of Conscience, — the various kinds classified and enumerated. — Its Laws are three : First, of Obedience, — Examination of this law, — Practical inferences from this law. — 2d Law of Conscience, Permanence. — Its nature and effects. — By means of this second law all passions can be resisted, not otherwise. — Reason of sudden and unexpected moral fulls. — Besetting sins, or obstacles to moral progress. — 3d Law of Conscience, The law of Subordinatian ; that is, " while it rules us, itself must be ruled." The rule of Conscience is the law of God. — Evils that arise from ignorance of this law. — Morality is eternal and immutable. — Scruples of Conscience. — Explanation of their nature, and how to treat them.

Chapter IV. 119

The facts of Conscience render Natural Religion possible— and the facts of Revealed Religion perfect Conscience.— In whom the Conscience is perfect.— Conscience cannot pardon.— It leads us towards the Atonement of Christ.

Note upon the Practical nature of Justification in its connection with the Conscience. 126

CONTENTS.

Book III. The Spiritual Reason

CflAPTEE I. 129

First reasoning is not Reason, this illustrated. — The composition of human nature is not double, but triple. — Man having an Animal Mind, and a Sfjirit, these faculties in him correspond to two worlds — the world of the Seen and that of the Unseen. Hence two reasoning powers — the " Animal Mind " and Spiritual Reason. — Moral ideas are received from Society by the Reason. — All ideas of which it may be said, " God is," are of it, — a remark in reference to our future state and the grounds of our perpetual progress in it —The question of innate ideas.

Chapter E. 142

The Spiritual Reason. — Its Modes. — 1st. Moral Perception; 2d. Moral Feeling; 3d. Moral Principle.— These established and illustrated.— jVenia/ cultivation is different from moral, and cultivation peculiarly moral is necessary. — Is ever the divine Spiritual Reason wholly imdeveloped ?— Answered in the aflirmative. — The Reason may be developed consciously and unconsciously.

Chaptek hi. 151

There are two states, one of Consciousness another of Unconsciousness. — To exhaust man's Consciousness is not to know all his nature. — Unconscious teaching of moral truth

exemplified Moral application of this and grounds of it. — The Reason may receive

Spiritual teaching from Spiritual beings unconsciously. — Cultivation of the Reason produces, first, Jloral Harmony ; secondly, Moral Progress. — Moral teaching of Parents.— Viva voce teaching, its power. — The Spiritual Reason awakes before the Mental Power is ripe. — Spiritual truth may become a family inheritance. — AppUcation to Parents and to Children — Cultivation of the Reason in ourselves. — Perfection of the Reason.

CnAPTER IV. 165

The highest law of Reason is not Nature, nor the law of the Family, or of the Nation, but the Faith of Christ,— and this in a three-fold view. — 1st, as written; 2ndly, as enforced hj the Church and in the Church ; -Sdlj', as dwelling in the hearts of the Sanctified.— Other practical inferences. — The source of fanaticism is in denying its food to this faculty. — Practical conclusions.— Exhortation to those who are the teachers of this faculty to teach without fear.

10 CONTENTS.

Book IV. The Heart Or Affections

Chapter I. ^^^

Heart or Affections.— Its meaning.— Towards Persons. — Appetites and Desires towards Things.— It is towards Persons in Society.— Society in reference to this Power is a School of Love. — Errors that may be avoided by this consideration. — Use of Instinct in Animals.— Moral Principle and Rule of the Affections deducible from this. — What is " Nobleness " of Heart, and what Meanness.

Chaptkr II. 187

Sympathy.— Two kinds.— Passive and Active— Passive Sympathy, the sense of harmony of feeling with others.— Illustrations of it and its uses.— A moral precept founded upon it.— Second kind of Sympathy, the active power of entering voluntarily into the feelings of others.— It is vicarious.— Misery is in this world more than happiness for man unprotected.— But Society in all its forms is defensive against misery.— We sympathize more with sorrow than joy. — Hence its uses manifest. — SjTnpathy in a great measure voluntary. — Natural and acquired deficiency of this affection. — Hardheartedness. — Its natural punishments. — Sentimentalism a disease of the Sympathy. — Rousseau.— Law of sympathy. — Moral conclusions from this arising.

Chapter IH. 204

Habit ; Active and Passive.— Passage from Butler quoted, and practically applied. — Affectation. — Sentimentalism.— Unreality, or Romance.— Day-dreaming. — Remedies for these diseases of the Moral Nature.

Chapter IV. 221

From the Heart proceeds the greatest Evil. — Cause of this, Original Sin. — Effects : 1st, Uncontrolledness, or Self-will; 2d, Selfishness; 3d, Sensuality. — Uncoutrolleduess discussed.— The Passions. — Selfishness. — Paley's Theory discussed and refuted. — Unselfishness.— Annihilation of self. — Sensualitj'. — There is a threefold instinct to guide Man : of the Spirit; the Mind; the Body; 1st, the Spiritual Powers; 2d, the Desire of Having. — The nature and origin of Property, and the immorality of its assailants. — 8d, Pleasure and Pain; uses of these last. — "Good and Evil" is not determined by " Pleasure and Pain." — Systematic Sensuality. — The Christian Home alone cures these three faults.

Chapter V. 241

The Body — it is not evil— but it is affected, first, by Self-will, Selfishness and Sensuality. Second, by deittli and disease entering the frame, and by the loss of the Sacrament of Life. Third, by weakness of those mental powers that remain, and by total loss of others. — False imaginations about a future state recounted and reproved, and true ideas in their stead.— Our " body " is not that of brutes, and thereby contemptible, but is to be reverenced ; and of this the reason is, that the Word assumed Flesh, was born, lived and died as man — And is now as Man upon the throne of heaven.

Chapter VI. 254

The nature of man has, 1st, a capacity of life through the Word Incarnate ; 2d, of Receiving His Body and Blood; 3d, of the Indwelling of the Spirit. — Love is the highest Christian s'.a'i.'. — The Eucharist is hence a school of Works and Love.

CONTENTS. 11

Book V. The Home And Its Affections

Chapter I. 269

Society — of Divine institution — Coeval with man. — Man's nature answering to it, and it answering to man's nature. — The fictiou of a Social Contract examined and refuted.

Chapter II. 274

The Family always existent. — The Home, its realization in Space and Time. — Heathen notions of its institution. — The feeling that the Law makes it. — Man's nature. — Nature of Society, and the express Law of God.— These, not mere legislation cause it.— Pretty fables about marriage.— Natural feeling of Unity. — Doctrine of the Roman Law. — Common Law Doctrine. — Doctrine of the Scriptures. — Conclusions: 1st, Law does not make marriage ; 2 J, Marriage is no Sacrament, but a mystery ; 3d, All bound to marriage ; except, first, it be wrong for them to marry ; secondly, for a religious motive sake.

CHArTER HL 286

Laws of Marriage. — 1. Permanence. — The Scripture doctrine of divorce discussed. — The uses of permanence. — Causes of frequency of divorce. — St. Paul's advice in regard to Marriage. — Adultery a crime, nature and the divine law forbid it. — Its evil consequences.— The causes of Marriage unhappiness. — 2d. Law of Mutualness. — Marriage a moral good in itself.— Highest motive for Marriage is affection. — Children should not marry without consent of parents. — Third law, the supremacy m Marriage belongs to the Husband. — This doctrine is made tolerable by Christianity.

Chapter IV. 305

Law of Parents and Children. — Not merely an Animal Relation. — Evils arising from this notion. — Parents are bound to children: 1st, Corporeally; for maintenance. — Limits of this obligation. — The State can enforce it. — 2d. Mentally ; for Education. — Limits of this right. — The State has no power of Religious teaching: of moral teaching, only up to a certain point. — 3d. Spiritually ; for Religious Education. — The State has no right in this whatever.

Chapter V. 312

The right of the child to a Spiritual training, from its being always a moral being, and from the needs of its nature. — That right extends to,lst, Direct instruction as to its nature and position, i. e., Ethical Teaching. — 2d, As to the nature of God, i. e.. Religious Teaching— 3d, Personal Sanctity in the Father and Mother.— 4th, Practical Guidance and Governance.— 5th, Baptism or Covenant with God.— The perfection of the Home is Love.

12 CONTENTS.

Chapter I. ^12

Arguments tipon the Will generally mere thorny quibbles. — The opinion of Milton to this effect.— Censure upon its harshness.— The opinion of Bishop Beveridge. — The Sentiments of Hooker as to the Will of God and the Nature of His Decrees.— St. Augustine, liis character and temper.— Two ideas held by him to be connected, Grace and Predestination.— These are not so connected naturally. — Evil consequences, on both sides, of taking it to be so. — The Theological Controversy waived. — The Will discussed as a faculty of our nature.

Chapter H. 332

Definitions of the Will: three given. — Objections answered. — Logical and Real examination of the sophism, " The will is determined by motives, and therefore is not free." — Motives are of two kinds : Spiritual and Temporal. — The first free the Will, the last-men tioned enslave it — Two powers that combine in every Human action, the Will of the JIan, and the effect of Circumstance.— From this fact a new gi-ound taken upon the subject of the Will.

Chapter HI. 3.39

The meaning of " Circumstance." — It does not imply doom or Physical Necessity .- But an ever-present God acting upon us, according to the Laws of his nature and the Laws established for us by Him, and therefore good. — The question of Freedom different from that of Power.

Chapter IV. 246

The Will has a power of resistance to Motive. — Motives upon the Will do not act necessarily. — The evil results of Fatalism. — Analogy to the Will and its JMotives of the concurrence of forces, Mechanical, Chemical, and Vital. — Brute animals are really and truly what the Fatalist thinks man to be. — Man has a Will : Brutes have properly no Will. — The question of Free-will i« a practical one. — As a matter of fact there are men whose Will is not free.— The two Wills, the " Will of the Flesh," and the Spiritual Will. — Society trains the Will. — The Spiritual Law sets the Will de facto free : examples from Conscience, the Reason, the Heart.

Chapter V. 363

The second power of the Will, that of Purpose; illustrated by a comparison of cases: 1st, Sets its object in the Future; 2d, Prescribes a law to the WiU.— A rebuke of the Heathen Morality, tljat tells us not to look to the Future.— We must, by our being, look towards it.— This fact interpreted.— True Christian Hope ; 1st, Looking steadily to Christ, and secondly, imposing voluntarily the law of God upon the action, is that only which perfects Purpose of Will.

Chapter VL 372

The question of Power — Man's will originates power, and is not merely an agent of it. -The evils of Fatalism exemplified in a quotation from Diderot.— Man's Will is free in act and fact when it coincides completely with the Will of God in Choice, in Purpose, and in Power.

General Cokcllsion. 379

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.

Book I. Human Nature

P b^

|1°

CHAPTER I.

Is man's nature ' good or evil' ? — There is a nature perfectly indifferent as to good or evil. — It is that of the brutes, not of man. — Man's nature is not partly good and partly evil. — It is not essentially evil. — This proved by the monstrous conclusions which would follow. — It is then essentially a nature good in itself, not evil in ilself— hut fallen.

As I have defined Ethics to be the Science of Man's Nature and Position, it is manifest that the whole subject, scientifically treated, must embrace, at least in effect, all questions that concern his nature and its relation to external things. But as this is a thing plainly impossible, for what scientific system details all its applications, consequences and deductions ? And as the purpose of Science is to render such tediousness unnecessary, by giving principles and propositions that will imply all consequences, it seems to me that such should be the course with a true science of Ethics. And therefore I shall try to establish, in regular order, such conclusions as shall be the most natural, and the most fruitful in consequences ; so that if possible, I may be able, principle after principle, and conclusion after conclusion, to give a system at once practical and scientific.

This being my intention, the question which naturally comes first in a science of man's nature and position is this —

" What is Man's Nature ? Every man having the idea of good 13 and evil — what is it tvith regard to good, and with regard to evil f

Is IT GOOD, OR IS IT EVIL ?"

I am aware the question will sound preposterous and absurd to many ; but still it is a deeply important question. There are three modes in which man may have a moral quality, in which what he does may be described as good or evil, — his thoughts, his words, his actions. Let the reader mark this. The question is not, are man's thoughts good or evil ? are his words good or evil ? are his actions good or evil ? That is not the question ; that can be plainly answered. His thoughts, words and actions are not his nature. They come from it, certainly, but they are no more his nature than buds, flowers and fruits are the tree from which they come. To decide, then, about thoughts, words and actions, this is quite a different thing from deciding upon the quality of his nature.

I have said that this question is an important one ; I say that it is more, it is the central and primary one of Natural Ethics ; one without which there can be no science of Ethics, no knowledge of it. It is not a high theoretic question which we may live in the world without discussing, and be better not discussing than entering upon it, as is the question of the " Origin of Evil," the question " Whence did evil come into the world, since God is all good and Almighty?" But it is a wholly practical one, — the question, " Is this nature, this which I have, this which is my nature as a man, good or evil ?"

Now, manifestly all the possible answers that may be given to this question are contained in a few words. I may say that " it is good" — I may say that "it is evil" — I may say that "it is partly good and partly evil" — or I may say that it is " perfectly indifferent to either." These four embrace all the possible answers that can be given to the question, and the calm consideration of them all, and the decision of it aright, is absolutely necessary to any- progress "at all in true Ethical Science. He that will study any science must first master the first principles, and without the complete and accurate knowledge of them he can make no progress ; it is to him an utter impossibility. This question is the first principle in the science of which we treat. Decide it aright, and there is only one right answer of the four, and you shall be able to advance further onward. Take to youi'self either of the three that are wrong, and the very foundation of religion and morality shall be astray with you ; and only by God's grace against your convictions, only by the teachings of God's Providence loading you against yourself, against your ideas and fancied knowledge, shall you go aright.

NoAV, the fourth of these says that man's nature is indifferent, having no moral quality at all. Are there such natures in existence ? There are. Those beings that we call " animals or brutes" — these are of that kind.

We see in animals the most undoubted proofs that they reason ; of this all natural history of modern times is full, that they argue and reason from premises to conclusions, just as man does. All kinds of that property called reasoning, we see in animals just the same as in man, the same in kind, not the same in degree ; the reasoning power is very manifestly exercised by the brutes. True it is, that we see it in them vastly inferior to another power, that of "instinct," which works towards ends of which it is perfectly unconscious. Still the reasoning power is not the distinguishing character of man, that which separates him from the animals, nor is " instinct" the peculiar possession of the Brute creation. For the beasts have reason, and man has instinct ; each of them, however, in an inferior or less degree. The definition, then, that man is a reasoning animal, or an animal whose quality is to reason, is false ; and that an animal is an organized machine, or a being having only instinct, is false also.

Now, what is the character that really differences the two natures, that of man and the beasts? It is not either reasoning power, nor is it instinct ; still less is it any of the differences given by Locke or his followers. It is this very thing of moral indif- -ference, that the nature of beasts and their actions are really neither good nor evil. That the sense and feeling of pleasure and pain is to them all, and that of moral good and moral evil, a good or an evil quality in actions ; they have no feeling.