The downfall of Spain; naval history of the Spanish American war

Front matter

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Preface

Innumerable works have already been written upon the Spanish-American War. I can only plead as my excuse for adding one to the number, that the present work was almost completed in the autumn of 1898, before this flood of books and articles had issued from the press. It was, however, delayed from time to time by the necessity of re-writing first this and then that portion, in the light of fresh evidence. Thus the book has been written twice — in some chapters thrice— over.

The interest of this war lies in the complete information which we possess on the American side. The United States Navy Department g^ves to the world freely what it knows, and does not hide its secrets away in confidential reports. On no other naval war as yet waged have we such a wealth of evidence ; and hence the history of this three months' struggle is far more instructive than might a year ago have been expected That a free and intelligent nation gains by publishing the facts cannot be disputed. The most insignificant naval incidents seem to be followed with interest by the press vi PREFACE

and public of the United States. We can well understand this interest. If the American Army was unprepared, the Navy was ready when the struggle came ; it was free from political jobbery ; it did its work splendidly; and its fine achievements have endeared it to the heart of the people.

And, whilst the spectacle of our kinsmen winning such brilliant victories upon the element which we have always claimed, rightly or wrongly, as our own, appealed to us as a nation in a peculiar degree, we can yet feel deep sympathy with and compassion for Spain. There was infinite tragedy in the spectacle of a people going to certain defeat, because national pride would not permit it to abandon its colonies at the dictate of a stronger Power. We can best learn what the thoughts of Spaniards were by interrogating our own hearts as to what ours would have been under such circumstances. There is something pitiful and moving in the very poverty and resourcelessness of that unhappy squadron which the council of Spanish admirals sent to perish on the far-off beaches of Cuba ; something that appeals to us with especial force in the useless heroism and devotion of the weak, ill-fed garrison of Santiago.

With her mediaeval organisation and eighteenth-century methods, Spain was, indeed, bound to succumb. In this hour of her defeat she produced not a man. What credit in the war was won by her sons, was won by her soldiers and seamen, not by her generals and admirals.

PREFACE vii

Cervera was personally brave; he was chivalrous to a degree ; and he was badly used by the. politicians, yet he cannot be described as a great or commanding figure.

As an Englishman, who will hardly be accused of any political bias in American affairs, I cannot refrain from expressing surprise at the unjust and cruel attacks which have been made in the American press upon Admiral Sampson, or from expressing admiration for the dignity, self-restraint» and nobility of heart with which he has borne himself under them. To Englishmen his ceaseless vigilance, his wise dispositions, his correct and accurate judgment, and his high courage seem to have deserved another recompense. And that I believe is the opinion of all Americans worthy the name.

In this volume are incorporated small portions of various articles which I have written upon the war for the National Review^ United Service Magazine, Harpet^s Magazine, Army and Navy Journal of New York, and others, but in no case have the articles from these sources been incorporated whole. They have been re-written and re-cast, since much in them has been affected by later evidence. The description of the American ships is taken from Ironclads in Action, edition 5, corrected and brought up to date. The loss of the Maine, which is a naval incident of the utmost interest, has been included as it logically should be in a history of the naval war.

My object being to print matter which shall be useful to the naval student, I have, as far as possible, given viii PREFACE

important orders, dispositions, and descriptions in the words of the first-hand authorities — irritating though such interpolations may seem to some who hold that the writer should tell his own story. Some passages in translations, prepared for the American Navy Department, I have altered to make the English more intelligible, but without affecting the sense.

I have to thank Mr. Hearst of the New York Journal for his great kindness in permitting me to reproduce as many as I liked of his most interesting and valuable photographs, taken during the war. The United States' Navy Department and the Scientific American have also kindly allowed the reproduction of illustrations of which they hold the copyright.

H. W. Wilson.

CHAPTER I THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE Riots at Havana

The Maine arrives ...

She is blown up, Feb. 15, 1898

Experiences of the survivors

Some narrow escapes .

Admirable behaviour of the officers

The death roll ....

The Court of Inquiry

Did the magazines explode ?

Various hypotheses ...

The bunkers near the magazines

Divers' evidence

Signs that the lo-inch magazine exploded

Verdict of the Court

Difficulties which it involves .

No upheaval of the ship

How was the mine placed in position ?

Motive for her destruction .

Consequences of the affair

FAGB

I

3 5 6

TI

IS

16 18

19 24 26 28 29 31

33 36 37

CHAPTER II STRENGTH OF THE TWO FLEETS American ships ready for sea in April

The battleships described

The monitors

Armoured cruisers

Cruisers ....

Gunboats . . . .

Torpedo flotilla

44 46 48 53

S4

Auxiliary craft .

Spanish ships ready for sea in April

Added later

Their description

Torpedo flotilla

Comparison of the two fleets

Spanish auxiliaries

Personnel of the two Navies

Quality of the two forces

The Naval Militia .

Strength of American crews

Spanish want of training .

Resourcelessness of the Spanish fleet .

Idle boasts .

Paper comparisons worthless

No Spanish plan of operations prepared

59 64

65 66

67 68 70

75 76

79 80 82 83

CHAPTER III Cervera's strategic views ...... 86

Captain Conchas's views ...... 87

Raids considered ....... 88

An attack on the Oregon ...... 91

A movement to Manila considered • • • • . 93

Cervera's complaints of his fleet ..... 95

Council of war ........ 96

Cervera ordered to the West Indies .... 97

Remonstrances of Spanish Naval Officers .... 99

The U.S. Navy Department forbids the bombardment of Havana 10 1

Admiral Sampson's proposals ...... 102

Bombardment panic in the U.S. . . . 107

Why no attempt was made to get touch of the Spaniards 109

An attack on San Juan . . ... . no

Sampson selected for command 112

Plans in the eastern field of war . 114

Voyage of the Oregon ....... /^.

Captain Clark's tactical views 117

Chapter IV The War In The East

Preliminary American movements Dewey leaves Mirs Bay Enter i Manila Bay Fired on by the Spanish forts

123 124 126 xi

PACK

Condition of the Spanish squadron .129

Admiral Montojo's preparations

Battle of Manila Bay, May i, 1898 .

The Cristina steams out to the attack .

13*

Dewey's withdrawal ....

The baule is resumed

Spanish losses .....

Effect of the American fire on the Spanish ships

Number of American hits

MS

American deductions

Effect of the Spanish fire on the American ships

Guns and appliances

Narrow escapes ....

ISO

The battle an execution

Compared with the Nile

IS4

Details of the victory delayed

The need of bases ....

Blockade of Manila

American troops despatched .

Camara's wanderings

Dewey reinforced ....

Capture of Manila .

Transport difficulties ....

CHAPTER V American fear of raids . ...... 174

Disposition of U.S. fleets .....

.

Disposition of Spanish fleets ....

Blockade of Havana b^^ins, April 22, 1898

The Wtnslow at Cardenas ....

Cable-cutting at Cienfuegos ....

Sampson moves eastward .....

He attacks San Juan .....

Results of the action .....

Why he drew off .....

News of Cervera's arrival m the West Indies reaches him

Sampson proceeds to Key West

The Navy Department's moves ....

The Harvard gets touch of Cervera .

Schley's Flying Squadron moves south

Cervera's voyage .....

Delays and mistakes

Xll

At Curagao ....

Arrives at Santiago, May 19

" State " of U.S. Navy in mid-May .

Schley proceeds to Cienfuegos

He blockades Cienfuegos

Fails to move to Santiago .

Sampson in the Bahama Channel

Orders of battle

Sampson and Schley .

Schley retires from Santiago

His grave error ....

Returns and forms the blockade, May 28

The Spanish Squadron located

First bombardment of Santiago

Santiago described

Fortifications rACE

Chapter VI Cervera At Santiago

Cervera's arrival— general disillusionment His delay in coaling Blanco's correspondence with Cervera Capture of the Restarmel .

Cervera's last opportunity lost .

" Corking up the bottle "

The Merrimac episode, June 3, 1898 . Chivalrous conduct of Cervera Bombardment of the Santiago forts, June 6 . Little damage inflicted on the forts Moral effect of the bombardment small Seizure of Guantanamo, June 7 Fresh bombardment of Santiago, June 14 and 16 Arrival of Shaffer's Expedition, June 20 . Phantom fleets .....

Sampson's orders for the disembarkation . The landing .....

Spanish mistakes ....

Cervera and Blanco exchange telegrams Cervera's complaints and predictions of disaster Cervera ordered to prepare to leave Sampson's dispositions for the blockade . Strain of the blockade . ^.

No torpedo attacks ....

Engines and boilers in Sampson's fleet Shafler's check of July 2 .

239 241

245 246 248 250 252

253 256 258

Cervera ordered to leave Cpancil of war Last preparations Cervera goes out, July 3

PAGE ib.

ib.

CHAPTER VII THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898 Sampson leaves the blockading force, July 3

Preparedness of the U.S. fleet to steam

Signs of an imminent sortie •

''The enemy's ships are escaping"

The battle opens

The Spanish destroyers crushed .

Their terrible condition

The Teresa on fire

She heads for the shore

The Oquendo follows her

The VIZCAYA fearfully punished

The Cristobal Colon's battle .

She surrenders .

American chivalry .

The Indiasuis fine work

The Oregon distinguishes herself .

The Iowa in action

The Texa^ share of the battle

The Brooklytis turn

Schley's much-canvassed action

Bravery of the Brooklytis crew

Spanish losses

Why the Spaniards signally Med

Hits on the Spanish ships .

American gunnery

Artillery strength of the fleets

Value cf target practice

Defensive strength of the fleets

Speed of the fleets

Torpedoes not used

An engineers' and captains' battle

Lessons of the action — ^risk of fire .

Extinction of fires m battle

Injuries to the Spanish ships

Recommendations of the U.S. Board

Big guns in the battle

Disposition of armour

The conning-tower and its value .

34«

35«

XIV

The engineers' work .

Decisive results of the battle Santiago bombarded again, July lo-ii Santiago surrenders, July 13

PAGB

374 375 378 379

Chapter VIII Cable-cutting, And Minor Incidents Of The War In The West

Mythical Spanish fleets

The 5/. Louis cuts cables off Santiago

Difficulties of cable-cutting

The Yankee and Galicia, June 12

The St. Paul and Terror, June 22 .

Attacks on Manzanillo

Destruction of Spanish shipping at Manzanillo

Seizure of Nipe Bay

The blockade of Havana

Difficulties of the blockade

Force required .....

Effectiveness of the blockade

Sufferings of Havana ....

Possibilities of blockade-running .

Performances of blockade-runners

413 415

Chapter IX The Puerto Rico Campaign, And Some Deductions From The War

General Miles sails firom Guantanamo

Lands at Guanica .

Intended bombardment of San Juan .

Management of war by Boards

Want of secrecy

Forts against ships .

Use of marines ....

Engineering experiences

Torpedo boats and their value .

Effect upon commerce

AUTHORITIES

INDEX ....

421 422

442 445

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FACBS rAOS

Admiral Dewey

The Wreck of the iWiwVkr .

The U.S. battleship Iowa

The U.S. cruiser Columbia

The Spanish armoured cruiser Vizcaya

Rear-Admiral Sampson

The U.S. cruiser Baltimore

The U.S. revenue cutter McCulloch

The U.S. cruiser Olymfna

Admiral Montojo .

The U.S. armoured cruiser New York

The U.S. monitor Amphitrite

Admiral Cervera

The U.S. dynamite cruiser Vesuvius

The U.S.S. Suwamey Vixen^ and St, Louis at Siboney

The U.S. cruiser New Orleans off Santiago

Chief Engineer MiUigan of the Oregon

The U.S. armoured cruiser Brooklyn

The Spanish destroyer Pluton

The Maria Teresa : broadside view of wreck .

The Oquendo : stem view of wreck .

The Vizcaya : starboard-quarter view of wreck .

The wreck of the Cristobal Colon .

The Oregon immediately after the battle .

The Maria Teresa : hole in 5*5-inch gun-shield

„ „ after turret

The ISLA DE Luzon : wreck after Manila The Maria Teresa : interior view, showing effect of fire The Gloucester bombarding Guanica .

Frontispiece ib,

ib.

354 422

MAPS, PLANS, AND DIAGRAMS

The Maine : profile .......

„ „ plans of main and berth decks Forward bunkers and magazines of the il/2uif^ Forward portion of the Maine^ from divers' sketches Elevation and deck plan of the Indiana^ Massachusetts^ and Oregon Elevations of the Brooklyn^ Texas, Iowa, New York, Maria Teresa,

and Colon The Central Atlantic The Bay of Manila

The Island of Cuba

The action at Cardenas

The harbour of Cienfuegos

The bombardment of San Juan

Puerto Rico

The Theatre of War in the West

Sampson's (i) order of cruising

„ (2) second order of battle .

„ (3) third brder of battle Port of Santiago Port of Guantanamo Telegraph system of the West Indies . Blockade of Santiago : dispositions of June 2

,y „ „ final dispositions

First phase of the battle of Santiago, according to the New York

Sun . ^

Positions of U.S. ships when Cervera came out Coast near Santiago

The ofiicial U.S. plan of the battle of Santiago Elevations of Iowa and Brooklyn, showing external injuries Elevation of Maria Teresa showing hits

„ „ Cristobal Colon „ „ „ Vizcaya „ „ .

„ „ OQUENDO WW • •

Plans of Nipe Bay, Niguero, and Manzanillo

PACK

8 10

16 26

88 124

175 186 id.

id. ib.

234 260 ib.

ib.

NAVAL HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Chapter I The Destruction Of The Ma!ne

In December 1897 the growing tension between Spain and the United States inspired the American Government with anxiety for the safety of its numerous citizens in Havana.^ Accordingly the second-class battleship Maine, Captain C. D. Sigsbee, was ordered south from Norfolk to Key West' Captain Sigsbee was

1 Century (Captain Sigsbee), 57. 674, etc, etc. Destruction of United States Battleship Maine. Report of Court of Inquiry (cited as Inquiry)^ Washington, 1898. Files of Sun and Army and Navy Journal,

^ The Maine was a twin-screw ship of 6682 tons. On the water-line she had a belt of armour six to eleven inches thick and 180 feet long. She had two turrets with 8-inch armour, resting upon redoubts of 10 to 1 2-inch armour, and these again stood upon the protective deck, which was from two to four inches thick. The turrets were disposed eyi ^^^«, the forward . one to starboard and the after one to port In each was mounted a Y pair of lo-inch guns. Six 6-inch guns were mounted on the ship's superstructure. The boilers were eight in number, placed in two boilerrooms. There were two masts and two funnels. The ship was 31S feet long, fifty-seven feet in beam, and drew twenty-one and a half feet. On trial she steamed eighteen knots.

2 •''•■•''rHfe" Downfall of spain [February

informed that in case of serious disturbances at Havana, he was to take his ship to that place and protect American interests. General Lee, the United States Consul-General for Cuba, was to give the word when he considered the presence of the ship necessary. Such a visit, even where strained relations exist, is in no way contrary to international usage, though under the circumstances the despatch of so exceedingly powerful a ship as the Maine to the capital of Cuba had in it something very like a note of menace.

On January 15, 1898, and the following days there were riots at Havana, accompanied by hostile demonstrations on the part of the Spanish volunteers against the United States. On the 24th Consul-General Lee was informed by the American Government that it was intended to " resume the friendly naval visits at Cuban ports," and was told that the Maine would reach Havana in a day or two. Armed with the telegram. Consul Lee interviewed the Spanish authorities on the afternoon of the 24th. They not unnaturally protested, insisting that the United States must have ulterior objects in sending the ship. They asked that, as delay did not matter, if the visit was really for friendly purposes, the despatch of the Maine should be postponed until Madrid could be consulted. General Lee had himself, before this interview, telegraphed that the visit should not take place for six or seven days, to allow the excitement in the town to cool down. But the ship had already started, leaving Key West on the evening of the 24th ; and even if the authorities at Washington had desired to delay her, it is doubtful whether they could have succeeded in doing so.

X

About 1 1 a.m. of the 25th the Maine arrived off the entrance to Havana harbour. A Spanish pilot was forthwith sent off to her ; he brought her in, and con- Y ducted her to Buoy No. 4. It was noted, when her bearings had been accurately determined, that Buoy No. 4 was not quite in its charted position, and it was afterwards stated by Captain Stevens, of the American mail steamer, City of Washington, that he had never known ' a man-of-war to be anchored at this buoy, and that it was the least used one in the harbour.^ The Maine was placed 250 yards from the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII, and 400 yards from the German warship Gneisenau. Subsequently other ships arrived, and were moored at distances of over 200 yards from her. Room had, of course, to be given for the vessels to swing at their buoys, so that there was nothing suspicious in this. The American officers maintained fairly friendly relations with the Autonomist Government, then recently established at Havana, but were very coldly received by the Spanish officers. Only five or six of these visited the ship, and they showed no cordiality.

The Maine had apparently been selected for this mission because of the tact and experience of Captain Sigsbee and the excellent discipline of her crew. As relations between Spain and the United States were exceedingly strained — almost to the point of rupture — great precautions were very rightly taken on board her to prevent an external attack or surprise. Extra sentries

1 This was hearsay evidence, given by Captain Sigsbee. Captain Stevens was examined by the Court, but not on this point, which seems extraordinary.

were placed on the forecastle and poop with loaded rifles ; one-fourth of the watch was kept on deck ready to go to quarters, and a small quantity of ammunition for the quick-firers was stored in the chart-house. Steam was kept up to work the turret guns in case they should be required. The sentries were directed to warn off all unauthorised boats approaching the ship. To prevent infernal machines being placed on board by visitors, all persons who came up the ship s side were carefully watched, especially when they had packages ; they were accompanied below, if they went below ; and after they had gone the places where they had been were examined. Extreme vigilance was required of the ship's company.

A few days after the Moines arrival a proclamation was circulated — not, of course, by the Spanish authorities —calling upon Spaniards to avenge the insult of the Yankees in sending a man-of-war of their ** rotten squadron " to Havana, and concluding, " Death to the Americans ! " There was also on one occasion a hostile demonstration by a crowd crossing the harbour in a ferry-boat. Such incidents at least showed the necessity of caution. It was obviously impossible to sweep the harbour about the ship for mines, nor could the search-lights of the Maine be employed at night, as this would have been an act calculated to offend the Spanish authorities. Captain Sigsbee notes that in the harbour the Maine looked much bigger than her real size ; she seemed enormous, and the populace believed that she was the finest vessel in the American Navy.

On the night of February 15, when the disaster occurred, the Spanish ships Alfonso XII and Legazpi were moored to starboard, about 200 or 250 yards away from the Maine; and the American mail steamer City of V Washingtatty Captain Stevens, about 200 yards astern. The night was a cahn and still one, very dark. All the evening the Maine had swung steadily in one direction, and that a somewhat unusual direction. It was not, however, the only time that she had headed thus.^ What is perhaps significant is, that her position on this particular night and at this particular hour was precisely that which she would have occupied to engage the shore batteries had she been inside the harbour during war. The sentries noticed no boats, and there had been , nothing to cause any suspicion of foul play. The officer ^ of the watch was on deck ; Captain Sigsbee was in his cabin letter-writing ; the other officers were either sitting on deck, in the ward-room, or in their cabins ; the crew, 328 in number, were all on board, and except the watch on deck had turned in ; at the starboard boom rode one of the ship's steam launches, with steam up and a watch on board.

At 9.40 the catastrophe occurred. Observers, sitting on deck in the City of Washington, heard what sounded like the noise of a shot. They looked, and saw the Maine s bow, as it seemed to them, rise a little out of the water. An instant later there came a terrible rush of fire and smoke, accompanied by an appalling and prolonged concussion from rather forward of the ship's centre. The middle of the ship seemed to fly back, and as darkness again settled over the water she sank. There appears to have been some shock conveyed by

1 Inquiry y 115.

the water at the first explosion, since the captain of a

British vessel in the harbour deposed that he " thought

his ship had been collided with." All the observers

. outside the Maine who gave evidence agreed on the

A two explosions, the first sounding like a gun-shot.

The evidence of the survivors on board is, as we

should expect, much more confused In such moments

of extreme strain the mind is peculiarly apt to accept

inaccurate impressions, and its estimates of time cannot

be accepted as correct. Under the stimulant of a great

shock an instant becomes many seconds or even minutes;

acts become sub-conscious, and men afterwards as little

remember what they felt or did, as a sleep-walker after

waking knows what he has done in his sleep. This

explains many discrepancies in the evidence of obviously

honest witnesses. Moreover, the shock of the second

explosion (if there were two) was so violent as to exert

a stunning and numbing effect upon the brain in many

of the men on board. To Captain Sigsbee it seemed

that there was one prolonged, bursting, crashing roar,

followed by the metallic sound of falling debris. To

Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright there only appeared

one very heavy shock, which half-stunned him by its

violence. He noticed no list till after the explosion.

Chaplain Chidwick speaks of one loud report, after which

" everything became dark." Lieutenant H olman felt first a

** low grumbling," and then a " heavy booming explosion."

His first thought was that the ship had been destroyed

by a very heavy mine. He noticed *no list of the ship.

Cadet Cluverius experienced a slight shock like the

concussion of a 6-pounder gun, followed by a very great vibration and a very heavy shock. Cadet ^nljgn^ standing by the side of Commander Wainwright at the time of the explosion, felt first a shock of considerable force, and then a terrible and most violent explosion. At the first shock the ship was lifted and thrown considerably over to starboard. Chief-Engineer Howell felt a shock, and then a continued series of convulsions, accompanied by a noise like the rending of the ship in pieces, and followed by a tremendous crash. After the explosions came a list to port. Paymaster Ray remembered only one violent upheaval, and this was also the experience of Surgeon Henneberger. The surgeon observed also a list to port. Lieutenant Blow felt first the shock of a gun— of a very heavy gun — and then a terrific concussion. Lieutenant Jungen was conscious, not of an explosion, but of a dull roar followed by a terrific crash. Lieutenant Catlin of the Marines felt only one violent shock, at which all the lights went out. Cadet Pronson first felt something like the shock of a salute — or of a very small gun — ^and thereafter, or simultaneously, a tremendous shock. Cadet Boyd, remembered a " crashing booming," and was half-stunned. It was preceded by a shock which resembled that of the coupling up of "a large freight train." This would exacdy agree with the sensation caused by "a lo-inch gun fired close aboard," with which Lieutenant Blow compares the first shock.

All these officers were below in the after part of the ship. On the quarter-deck or poop it seemed to Lieutenant Blandin. officer of the watch, that there were two explosions. He was all but knocked down, and died some months later of the mental shock. He saw no water thrown up. To Lieutenant Hood, sitting on the port side of the deck, it appeared that there was first a big under-water explosion, felt rather than heard. At this he turned and looked forward, and saw the whole starboard side of the deck fly upwards, like the edge of the crater of a volcano. Flames rose, and there was a violent explosion. He thinks that a portion of the superstructure of the ship was in the air when he first looked, and that the first explosion opened up the ship. Private Anthony of the Marines, on sentry duty on the quarter-deck, noticed first "a trembling and buckling of the decks, and then a prolonged roar." The ship instantly dipped forward to port, broke in the middle, and seemed to cant over to port. A sheet of flame rose to the sky. Boatswain Larkin remembers an explosion, but was stunned. Private McKay felt one shock, accompanied by an upheaval of the ship, and was " hit in the face " by a flash of fire. Assistant-Engineer Moms "saw fire and felt the ship going from underneath him." Apprentice Ham heard a sharp report and saw a flash of light, then felt a second explosion, when the ship lifted right out of the water. Seamen Larseg and NIoriniere felt a heavy jar, saw flame, and were thrown in the air. Coal-passer ^elville, close to these two, and slightly forward of the after-turret, felt an ** electric shock " right under his feet, followed by a heavy explosion. Seaman McCann, swinging in his hammock on the quarter-deck, felt a jar and saw a flash, followed by a heavy explosion.

It should now be explained that the Maine had three superstructures, rising from the main-deck. There was

I

CO

i)

H one forward ; then a clear space and the forward turret to starboard ; then the midships superstructure, with two funnels and two boat-cranes, the funnels fore and aft on its centre-line, the cranes on either side rising from the main-deck abreast the after funnel. At the forward end of the superstructure was the conning-tower, with the chart-house above it ; at the after end, inside the superstructure, on the port side, the galley, and on the starboard side the armoury. Abaft the midships superstructure and between it and the after superstructure, well over to port, was the after-turret. In the after superstructure were Captain Sigsbee's quarters ; above it the mainmast and a search-light platform. Rising from the forward superstructure was the foremast The crew was berthed in the forward and midships superstructure, and underneath the main-deck, on the berth-deck, forward, and amidships. The officers were berthed aft, where were the ward-room and the gun-room.

It will be observed, that as the explosion was obviously located forward, the survivors suffered from the shock ;^ more and more the further forward they were situated.^ The after-turret and awnings spread over the quarter-deck screened from the concussion most of the officers and men abaft the turret. Seaman Reden, sleeping in the after-turret, as we should expect, felt no shock behind the thick armour, but woke to a blaze of fire and the rush of water entering the turret Much forward of this turret very few men escaped, and their narratives are of exceptional interest. Corporal Thompson, swinging in his hammock on the port side of the superstructure, lO THE DOWNFALL OF SPAIN [Febmaiy