The diplomacy of the revolution

Front matter

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THE iiiatflriral $k^

WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT,

Preface

This volume is literally what it pretends to be — an Historical Essay, not a History. My object has been, at a time when the influence of our foreign policy is beginning to govern largely the fortunes of the country, to ask attention to the spirit and character of those negotiations which secured us a place in the world. I have stated facts with care, and drawn conclusions with caution ; but the general impression of these pages must of course justify itself.

The best of diplomatic histories is undoubtedly the record of the negotiations themselves, but as the mere diplomatic correspondence of the Revolution — that is, the communications of the foreign ministers of the United States with Congi-ess — takes up twelve goodly octavo volumes, besides requiring for its comprehension a wide field of contemporary history, it is certain that very few, whatever interest might be felt on the subject, would have either time or inclmation to master then- own conclusions. This is, therefore, simply an eflfoi-t to render more familiar to the public mind an important and interesting period of the country's history. It would have been easy to have made a larger book : the labor of this, such as it is, has been to condense its material into the fewest e pages.

In concluding, I must express my great obligations to Mr.

Vlll PREFACE.

Sparks, the ominent president of the University of Cambridge, for the kindness with whieli he allowed me to consult his invaluable MS. collection of documents relating to the early diplomatic history of the United States. I only wish that I felt any confidence that I had acknowledged my obligations, by using them to the most advantage for a subject, which I would be glad if this volume would provoke him to rescue from the hands of so incompetent a guardian as myself.

Chapter I. Iktroductory

In general opinion, the idea of Diplomatic History has been strangely misconceived : and men of even educated intelHgence are apt to regard diplomatic correspondence as a wearisome antithesis of studied ambiguity and disingenuous acuteness. Negotiation has almost come to be considered a sort of national special pleading which too often consumes time and obstructs justice ; while the restless spirit of modern society, eager for results, and regardless of either intervening rights or duties, rejects as mischievous surplusage in the economy of government a ser- 1

2 DIPLOMACY OF TPIE REVOLUTION.

vice, the particular purpose of whose labor is to elaborate doubts into difficulties, and to check the selfish extravagance of one interest by demonstrating the reasonable selfishness of another. " Time and I," said Cardinal Mazarin, " against any other two ;" but the course of modern policy seems to prove that every nation now regards the colleague of that sagacious statesman as its most terrible enemy. Whatever, is to be done must be done quickly, and the action of the world no longer lets " I dare not wait upon I world." And the mischief of this impetuous temperament is aggravated by that other characteristic of modern times, which tests the worth of public measures solely by their agreement with popular passion — a habit which elevates every popular paroxysm into a fit of inspiration, and denies that the people can ever imagine a vain thing.

Now, diplomacy involves, first, delay in order to discussion — the admitted possibility of there being more than one strong will or one just interest ; and next, it requires in its sphere as thorough a concentration of power into individual hands as is compatible with national safety.

The method and forms of diplomatic labor have also contributed to this general misconception. For although it is matter of historical proof that all great negotiations have been the expression of large national interests, yet, as in the earlier periods of European diplomacy those interests were represented in the persons of almost absolute sovereigns, and preserved in the antique shape of feudal rights, parchment charters, and complex institutions, a superficial criticism has confused the substance and the form, and identified the labors of learned and liberal jurists (for such ambassadors undoubtedly once were) with the maintenance of dynastic privileges and the perpetuation of antiquated formulas. Often, too, the chief merit of diplomatic skill is in what it prevents rather than in what it achieves. And as it usually happens that important negotiations are not made public until after the men and the events which governed them have passed away, this very success contributes to its own depreciation ; for each generation finds itself too busily employed in discharging instant claims, to give much time or study to past history and past heroes. The following language of a recent biographer of an eminent diplomatist contains a general truth, of which he is not the only illustration : " The labors of an ambassador, whatever difficulty and danger, whatever importance, responsibility, and even dignity, may belong to them, are from their nature necessarily so obscure, so unlike those of men whose deeds, being associated with eloquence and military glory, are ' bruited ' through the world, that the name of him to whose memory these pages are devoted, and who is considered by those who knew what he did and was as the greatest of English ambassadors, is so little known, that many have asked, or will ask, who was he who is thus highly estimated?"* But above the tumultuous hurry of modern events — away from the passionate wilfulness of popular statesmanship — independent of that noisy recognition which the world calls fame — in presence of the men whose dispatches have recorded the phases, and whose counsels have governed the crises of modern history, whose names are stamped indelibly upon those great charters of modern civilization — the treaties of "Westphalia, of Utrecht, of Vienna — it can be safely and surely said that diplomatic history has its own full and peculiar value.

* Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell, K.B., preface, page V.

INTRODUCTORY.

The leading fact in modern history is — to borrow a philosophical phrase almost generalized into common use — its progress by antagonism. For if any period be selected for special examination, while it will be found to have a general tendency, a uniform character, and a precise result, yet all this will have been attained by the conflict of opposing national interests ; and in each nation, the governing interest will have been matured through the contest of opposing parties. And it has usually happened that every historical period determines in one of those epochs where the interests of nations are so inextricably confused, that the history of the whole only can be the true history of any one. It is the comprehension of these great stages in human progress that gives to history its highest value, for here we learn the point which has been reached, and strive to learn the course which will be travelled. To study profitably such periods, we want not merely to catch what is called the spirit of the times — a vague consciousness of the onward sweep of the historical current ; but we need the careful analysis of those conflicting elements which have modified each other into one broad result — the items of those great national claims upon whieh

Time has stricken the balance. "Now, at the fulfilment of all these periods — at the close of every one of those fearful struggles which have convulsed in order to calm the nations of the world — the diplomatists of each era have been gathered together to determine the objects of national desire, count the cost of national success, and readjust the respective values of national power. In the record of their deliberations there should be found the justest estimate of national necessities, the strongest reflection of national sentiment, the truest summary of national history.

But there is another special value in the treasured experience of diplomatic records. The periods of modern history have never been characterized by the domination of some one great and absorbing empire. The civil code of no mighty capital has ever been elevated into the supreme law of a subject civilization ; the vigorous spirit of no one people has controlled the direction and the form of modern thought. The results of our centuries have been attained by the constant conflict of equal nations. In that struggle has been developed the grandest system of national justice that the world has ever seen. The sufferings of every war, and the blessings of

IN^ODUCTORY. 7

every peace ; the varied sagacity of every nation, and the common instincts of every people ; the practical experience of busy life, and the profounder wisdom of studious philosophy, have all contributed to its glorious perfection. And the Law of Nations, founded on principles of universal justice, sanctioned by the precepts of Christian revelation, illustrated and justified by the great events of history, appeals both to the pride and safety of the nations for its sacred preservation. But in the strife of so many interests, it has been and will ever be to the temporary advantage of some one nation, to deny the force of these impartial rules, and refuse a wise obedience to this common authority. On all such occasions it has been the peculiar duty of an enlightened and instructed diplomacy to invoke the experience of the past, and to vindicate at all hazards the absolute inviolability of international law. And even in those disastrous periods which the world has seen, when the unreasoning force of armed selfishness has trampled on recognised right, the language of diplomacy has been that of constant and spirited protest, and history has thus preserved upon its records strong testimony for Truth's appeal to after and better times. The value of this perpetual witness cannot be exaggerated ; for, borne as it has been bj the most powerful nations in their day of humiliation, it gives to international law a constant and consistent authority, under which the weakest people may shelter themselves securely.

Diplomatic history is also to some extent a history of motives and principles. For while general history, like the record of a legal verdict, announces simply a result, diplomatic negotiations, like the argument of counsel, declare the value of adverse claims^ and thus vindicate the moral merits of the contending parties. To every nation, therefore, its diplomatic records are of the highest importance, indicating as they do the various interests which in the lapse of time have determined its policy, the motives which under changing circumstances have governed its conduct, and the principles of public law which it has sanctioned as authority. To no people, however, does the study of their Diplomatic history recommend itself with more practical force than ourselves. It is the mistaken pride of present opinion that we stand apart from the world, intrusted by God's providence with our peculiar and separate mission ; that our wisdom is the summary of the world's experience, and our future independent of the world's control. But if history forces upon us any one conclusion, it is, that we belong as much to the past as to the future ; that we are an essential and inseparable portion of that Christendom whose deliberations are common because their interests are one ; and that our progress can be neither safe nor wise unless we realize, not only our value in, but our connexion with the world. Whatever may have been our situation once, we are now placed between the two highways of the world's commerce; and if we have extended the circle of national relations, we have not left, and cannot leave, the limits of national duty.

That this was the earnest conviction of the great men who founded the Kepublic, their words and deeds are left to show. When the United States of America claimed from the nations of Europe a recognition of their independence, they declared in explicit language the position to which they thought themselves entitled ; and in their Diplomatic Correspondence with the Governments to whom they applied, they recognised most emphatically the rights and responsibilities which that claim implied. It is true that 1* mighty changes have been wrought since their day ; but these changes, it must be remembered, have resulted from the natural development of principles at work even then. And if ampler power and maturer knowledge have brought increased weight, it will be matter of pride as well as advantage to know that the country is moving in the direction indicated by those great men who perhaps " builded better than they knew," but who surely laid the foundations of this present power. It is no slight thing for a nation to possess a traditional policy. And if there is found in the diplomatic history of the Eevolution the outline of that foreign policy which the country's interests seem now to require ; if, consistently with national obligation and the broad requirements of national justice, may be found even then indicated the germ of that system which after events have only developed into fuller consistency, we will have that highest guarantee of political wisdom, the solemn and impartial approbation of the past.

In the diplomatic history of Europe previous to the American war, there were three periods of great and general interest, indicated respectively by the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of

Utrecht, and the Peace of Paris in 1763. The negotiations of Westphalia comprehended the interests of all continental Europe ; for the preceding war, which had commenced with the religious differences in Grermany, had ended by involving all Europe in what appeared to be an interminable conflict. The mass of interests to be discussed, and the nature of many of the questions between the Catholic and Protestant States of Germany, which were rather legal than political, depending often for decision upon charter claims, disputed feudal rights, and contested civil privileges, gave a complicated and somewhat technical character to much of the proceedings. But the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated the authority of international law, by proclaiming so close a community of interest betweeu the nations of Europe as to justify and even necessitate common counsels ; and it recognised the power of an European Congress to adjust national claims according to an understood system of national rights which was then the public law of Europe. The negotiations at Utrecht went further. The questions then discussed were not so much questions of right as of interest. They declared the existence of an

12 DIPLOMACY OF THE RKVOLUTIOX,

European balance of power not dependent upon dynastic rights nor feudal constructions, but regulated by the exigencies of great national interests. They recognised in every nation the right to protest against the exaggerated extension of any other nation, requiring for the common good a relative equality of national power. The interests, however, which had hitherto governed the foreign policy of nations was chiefly territorial ; and this influence determined to a great degree the character of that balance between the great states of Europe which it was the aim of the Treaty of Utrecht to establish. It was not until some time later that broader and more directly popular interests began to control the course of governments. But from that period the relations of nations were perpetually changing, and alliances seemed made only to be broken. Interests the most diverse were mixed up in the same issues, and, to borrow an apt illustration, " men fought in Saxony for the possession of Canada." That balance of power which had been made the system of Europe was very much modified after the Peace of Utrecht, by the family compact of the Bourbon dynasties, and the famous Treaty of 1756 between France and

Austria. But the Treaty of Paris, 1768, by which France abandoned her valuable North American colonies to England, was a still wider departure from the old principles. That treaty established, or rather recognised, two facts, which were to shape the policy of at least the immediate future. The first was, the vast and admitted maritime superiority of Great Britain, which threatened to destroy the system of the Peace of Utrecht, by introducing a new element into the calculation of national strength, the influence of which was almost monopolized by one power. The second was, that England's Colonial possessions were part and parcel of her national power, and, as such, direct makeweights in the European balance.

A few years after the negotiation of this Treaty, the United States of America declared their Independence. They found in full authority a political system based on these three principles: First, the community of national interest warranting national interference : Second, the recognised necessity of a relative equality of national power : and third, the direct importance to the European system of any changes in the Colonial strength of the European maritime powers. Did the United States accept the principles of the system into which they sought to enter ? And what practical obligations did such an acknowledgment imply ? These are questions of deep interest to a nation called to play no small part in the world's affairs : for it has been well and nobly said, " that it is impossible to separate the policy of the country from the conscience of the nation."

Chapter II. Negotiation With France

The Declaration of Independence by the United States required, as a necessary consequence, an appeal to the nations of Europe. ' For closely connected as was the whole system of the Euro* pean powers, the change in the relative strength of England, caused by this separation, was a matter of great moment — a new political element, which their interests forced them to examine. Not only so, but the commercial relations of the new power were either directly with European nations or their remaining colonial possessions ; and it was, therefore, of the first importance to the United States to determine as speedily as possible the character of those relations which depended for their adjustment upon other wills than their own. No sooner, therefore, had the idea of independence taken a practical shape in the deliberations of Congress than the subject of foreign alliances began to attract the thoughts and exercise the judgment of the national legislature. At the very outset of these discussions there was manifested a broad difference of opinion. One class of statesmen thought that the wisest and most dignified course was to conduct the war of Independence to its issue, and, having achieved its purpose unaided, to leave the great commercial advantages of the country to plead their own claims, and draw by their own attraction the regards and proposals of European powers. They thought — to use the expressive language of Dr. Franklin to Arthur Lee, when on his fruitless errand to Spain — '''A virgin state should preserve the virgin character, and not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others."* Another class, with a broader appreciation of political necessities, and, as it proved, a juster sense of the national interest, advocated the policy of diplomatic advances. They saw and proved that the interests involved in the question of Independence were, to a certain extent, European interests — affecting, by their modification, the entire balance of European power — and they felt themselves warranted in demanding efiicient

* Diplomatic Corresp. vol. ii. p. 57. Franklin to Lee, March 21, 1111.

NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE. H

support iu exchange for practical benefits. "I think," said John Adams — who more than any other man contributed to plan and execute the wise scheme of American policy — "I think we have not meanly solicited for friendships anywhere. But to send ministers to every great court in Europe, especially the maritime courts, to propose an acknowledgment of the independence of America and treaties of amity and commerce, is no more than becomes us, and in my opinion is our duty to do. It is perfectly consistent with the genuine system of American policy, and a piece of respect due from new nations to old ones."*

These differences were, however, without dif&culty harmonized into a plan of practical action, and perhaps, after all, consisted more in the argumentative statement of extreme opinions, than in any want of concert when the necessity appeared for a prompt and positive policy. It is certainly as great an error to suppose that the one party opposed all treaties, as to infer that the other advised " treaties with all the world ;" and

* Diplom. Corres. vol. v. p. 361, Adams to Franklin, Oct. 14, 1780. For a reverse opinion see Life of Gouverneur Morris, by Sparks, vol. i. p. 205-7.

it should be added that, if the abortive and mortifying negotiations with Prussia, Russia, and Spain, justify the caution of one course, the treaties with France and Holland are triumphant vindications of the bold sagacity of the other. And indeed, the very principles laid down in discussion by the advocates of foreign alliances, defined with strict and rather narrow limitations the sphere in which they should be sought. For Adams, who, from the autumn of 1775 through the spring and winter of 1776, was anxiously engaged in pressing upon Congress the three great points of national policy which were ultimately adopted, viz. Independence, the formation of State governments, and foreign alliances — has left on record his opinions as then expressed. " Some gentlemen," says he in his autobiography, " doubted of the sentiments of France, thought she would frown upon us as rebels and be afraid to countenance the example. I replied to these gentlemen, that I apprehended they had not attended to the relative situation of France and England ; that it was the unquestionable interest of France that the British continental colonies should be independent ; that Britain, by the conquest of Canada and her naval triumphs during the last war, and by lier vast possessions in America and tlie East Indies, was exalted to a height of power and pre-eminence that France must envy and could not endure. But there was much more than pride and jealousy in the case. Her rank, her consideration in Europe, and even her safety and independence were at stake.

The navy of Great Britain was now mistress of the seas all over the globe ; the navy of France almost annihilated. Its inferiority was so great and obvious, that all the dominions of France in the West Indies and in the East Indies lay at the mercy of Great Britain, and must remain so as long as Korth America belonged to Great Britain, and afforded them so many harbors abounding with naval stores and resources of all kinds, and so many men and seamen ready to assist them and man their ships. That interest could not lie; that the interest of France was so obvious, and her motives so cogent, that nothing but a judicial infatuation of her councils could restrain her from embracing us ; that our negotiations with France ought, however, to be conducted with great caution, and with all the foresight we could possibly obtain ; that we ought not to enter into any alliance which should entangle us in any future wars in Europe ; that we ought to lay it down as a first principle, and a maxim never to be forgotten, to maintain an entire neutrality in all future European wars ; that it never could be our interest to unite with France in the destruction of England, nor in any measures to break her spirit or reduce her to a situation in which she could not support her independence. On the other hand, it could never be our duty to unite with Britain in the too great humiliation of France ; that our real, if not our nominal independence, would consist in our neutrality. If we united with either nation in any future war we should become too subordinate and dependent on that nation, &c. * * * That, therefore, in preparing treaties to be proposed to foreign powers, and in the instructions to be given to our ministers, we ought to confine ourselves strictly to a treaty of commerce ; that such a treaty would be an ample compensation to France for all the aid we should want from her. The opening of the American trade would be a vast resource for her commerce and naval power, and a great assistance to her in protecting her East and West Indian possessions, as well as her fisheries ; but that the bare dismemberment of the British

Empire would be to her an incalculable security and benefit, worth more than all the exertions we require of her, even if it should draw her into another eight or ten years' war." Or, as he has condensed it in another shape, " Is any assistance attainable from France ? What connexion may we safely form with her ? 1. No political connexion ; submit to none of her authority ; receive no governors or officers from her. 2. No military connexion ; receive no troops from her. 3. Only a commercial connexion — that is, make a treaty to receive her ships into our ports ; let her engage to receive our ships into her ports ; furnish us with arms, cannon, saltpetre, duck, steel."*

* These two extracts will be found in the Life and Works of John Adams, edited by his grandson, vol. ii., the first at pages 504-506, the last at pages 487-489. The first quotation is in every way so remarkable, not only as forcibly stating the principles of the country's policy then, but actually anticipating in its counsel the difficulties that arose in the administration of Washington with regard to the course to be pursued between England and France, that it is proper to state that it is taken from the autobiography, not the diary, and the former was written long after the events which it narrates. But the latter quotation appears to be a note made at the time of the debate, March, 1776.

"^^""he idea of a treaty on so narrow a basis was, under the stress of circumstances, abandoned ; and the country, finding advantageous alliances within reach, was forced to assume reciprocal obligations of a more warlike character.;^ But these opinions express the first intentions even of the extremest party in Congress. Governed by these views, on June 12th, 1776, a committee, consisting of Dickinson, Franklin, Jno. Adams, Harrison, and Kobert Morris, was appointed by Congress to prepare a plan of treaty to be proposed to foreign powers. On September 17th of the same year a plan was submitted, discussed, and adopted, and, in a few days after, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee were commissioned to represent the United States of America at the Court of Versailles.^ The treaty which they were instructed to propose, and under circumstances to modify, was based on the principles expressed above. It was essentially and only a treaty of commerce. It asked for no military aid, it stipulated no political conditions. The only recognition of the probable interference of France consisted in express provisions : 1. That if, in consequence of the treaty, Great

* Secret Journal of Congress, vol. ii. pp. 7-29.

NEGOTIATION WITH PRANCE. 23

Britain should declare war against France, the United States should not assist Great Britain with men^ money, ships, or any articles considered contraband under the provisions of the treaty. 2. That France should never invade, or under any pretence attempt to take possession of Labrador,^ New Britain, Nova Scotia, Acadia, Canada, Florida, Newfoundland, &c., &c., it being the intent of the treaty that the United States should have the sole, exclusive, undivided, and perpetual possession of the countries, cities, towns on the said continent, and of all the islands near it, which were or had been under the jurisdiction of Great Britain, whenever they should be united or confederated with the United States^ 8. That if France should, in case of war, get possession of any British colony, there should be the same freer dom of trade between such conquests and the United States, as between France and the United States.

To these very stringent articles, implying certainly no very great sense of weakness on one side, and manifesting but small confidence towards the other, were added the commercial clauses, providing for the freest trade between France and the United States ; proclaiming the most liberal principles of maritime law ; requiring the protection of the French navy as convoy in certain cases, and guaranteeing that France should protect the subjects and vessels of the United States against the depredations of the Barbary powers " as effectually and fully " as the King of Grreat Britain, before the commencement of the war, protected the people and inhabitants of the United States '^then called British colonies in America."

That such a treaty could be negotiated seems fairly impossible. For, in the first place, it implied that the independence of the United States was not a matter of European discussion at all ; the treaty assuming it as a fact beyond the control of the very nations whose interests it was to influence. In the next plate, it offered no guarantee to France that such independence could be preserved, even if recognised ; for there was nothing in the treaty to prevent a reconciliation with England, and at any moment France might have found the combined forces of England and America acting in concert to check the progress of her arms. And lastly, the only advantage held out, in exchange for the commercial privileges demanded, was free trade with a country covered with invading armies, and at war with the great maritime power of the world. Indeed the treaty went so far, in one of the provisions just quoted, as to demand free trade with conquests to be made with no assistance from the party who thus hoped to reap the benefit. The Commissioners, however, were provided with instructions which relieved them from the necessity of supporting the high tone of the treaty ; for not only were they authorized to waive, if necessary, some most important points, but they were informed, "It is highly probable that France means not to let the United States sink in the present contest : but, as the difiiculty of obtaining true accounts of our condition may cause an opinion to be entertained that we are able to support the war on our own strength and resources longer than in fact we can do, it will be proper for you to press for the immediate and explicit declaration of France in our favor, upon a suggestion that a re-union with Great Britain may be the consequence of delay ;" and further, '' you are desired to obtain, as early as possible, a public acknowledgment of the independency of these States on the crown and 2