Development and Divine Purpose

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Preface

The present volume contains the first set of lectures given before the University of Cambridge, under the terms of the lectureship established in 1904 through the generosity of Dr. Stanton, Ely Professor of Divinity. It may be well to reprint in full from The Cambridge University Reporter of 23rd February, 1904, the letter in which Dr. Stanton communicated his offer to the Vice-Chancellor of the University : —

" The Senate last June accepted the proposal of the Special Board for Divinity to add to Part II. of the Theological Tripos a new Section on the Philosophy of Religion and Christian Ethics, the first examination in which is to be held in June 1906. We may hope that some students will begin to prepare for this examination after the present Academic Year, and the ^ question of providing for any who may do so,

Ci 00 viii PREFACE

Fellow of New College, and I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude for all that he has done for me in the way of moulding and stimulating my mental development. Though, with the exception of a suggestion or two for the introductory lecture, the present course was written without advice from him or from any one, yet I feel that the interchange of ideas which we have had together during the past few years, as occasion has offered itself, has helped not a little to determine my present outlook, both theological and philosophical. This is not a kind of debt which can be repaid. The only form of repayment possible is to follow the leading so generously given, and, while striving to grow oneself into a clearer vision and larger understanding of the truth, to share with others thoughts which have proved themselves so pregnant with life for one's own mind.

V. F. S.

Bramshott, 1906

X CONTENTS

CHAPTER V IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER

PAOB

1. The Problem of Origin 88

2. A First Cause 95

3. The Problem of Direction 98

4. Human Will a Directing Agency 102

CHAPTER VI TELEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN EVOLUTION

1. The Organism not Passive 1x0

2. Theory of Sexual Selection 1x5

3. Spiritual Factors Everywhere Operative • . . . xi8

CHAPTER VII RESTATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

1. Need of Restatement . . . • . . . . 123

2. The Appeal of the Whole X27

3. The Analogy of Self-Consciousness X31

4. The Meaning of Immanence X34

5. Partial or Universal Design 138

6. Conception of Value in Design 147

CHAPTER VIII ORGANISM AND MECHANISM

1. Characteristics of Living Matter X53

2. The Unity of Organisms 164

3. Mechanical Explanation of Organisms 168

4. Abstract Character of Physical Science 176

CHAPTER IX

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN— DIFFICULTIES

AND OBJECTIONS

1. Kant*s View of Organisms 187

2. The Argument from Analogy 190

3. Weaknesses of Teleological Argument 197

4. The Nature of God 205 k

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER X INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT

PAOB

1. Growth of Idea of Development 2x0

2. Development and Change 2x6

3. The End Gives the Meaning of Development . 22x

4« Origin and Validity 229

5. The Scientific and Philosophical Problems .... 235

CHAPTER XI

X. Newman's Theory of Development 244

2. Tests of Development : —

(a) Preservation of Type 255

(b) Chronic Vigour 260

(c) Assimilative Power 263

CHAPTER XII THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE

X. Moral Trust 26S

2. Causality and Will 270

3. Moral Will 279

4. Will not Capricious 282

Chapter I

T^ H E speculative activity of the present time ^ is characterised, one may affirm with certainty, by one prominent feature — its general recognition of the unity of knowledge, and of the close correlation and interdependence which exist between the various departments of inquiry. Special branches of study still retain their speciality, but it grows more and more difficult to draw hard and fast lines of demarcation round the subject-matter of each. What we may designate as borderland problems hold an increasingly important place, whether in natural science, ethics, or psychology. Truth is seen to be organic and concrete, and, for its apprehension, men recognise that an organic atti-

I tude of mind is necessary. Such an attitude of mind was that of the late Dr. Hort, whose Hulsean lectures, The Way^ the Truth y the Life — lectures given, let us remember, at the very same period when the theologian was also examining in the Natural Sciences Tripos — will, assuredly, for many a long year to come, continue to deliver their profound and striking message. No one understood more clearly than Dr. Hort that truth enters the mind of man by many avenues, and that the ripest thought and the clearest illumination come only to those who seek to see truth in its many-sidedness, and to grow into its fulness.

It was some such recognition as this of the organic nature of truth which doubtless prompted Professor Stanton to make his most generous offer, from which has resulted the foundation of the present lectureship. And that the University of Cambridge should have selected a member of the sister University of Oxford to be her first lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion is, surely, proof that, corresponding to the recognition of the interdependence of all branches of knowledge, is the practical feeling that all seekers for truth belong to one brotherhood, and that the search is best promoted by throwing open to competition teachers' posts, which, in earlier years, might have been regarded as closed to any others than members of the society in which the vacancy occurred. The justification for attributing to the founder of this lectureship a certain intention is to be foimd in the notice in The University Reporter of 23rd February, 1904, which embodies Professor Stanton's letter, offering to endow this post. The reason given in that letter for the foundation of the lectureship is, that a new section, dealing with the Philosophy of Religion and Christian Ethics, has just been added to the Theological Tripos. Further, one of the regulations attached to the tenure of this office is, that the lecturer shall submit in advance a statement of the proposed subject of his lectures, both to the special Board for Divinity, and to the special Board for Moral Science. May not this be taken as conclusive evidence that in Cambridge the view obtains that the problems of ethics, theology, philosophy are all vitally interconnected, and that, in some sense, the Philosophy of Religion may be regarded as mediating between these three .'^ This, at any rate, is how the present lecturer interprets for himself the terms of his commission, that he is required to lecture on those subjects which lie on the confines of science, philosophy, theology, those borderland problems of which mention has just been made.

To define with any exactness the scope of a Philosophy of Religion is not easy, nor will any attempt at such definition be made here. But I may, perhaps, be allowed to offer a few introductory remarks upon the point, before proceeding to characterise more precisely the subject-matter of this volume. The supreme function of the Philosophy of Religion is, from one point of view, the same as that of all philosophy, to discover the ultimate unity or ground of all being and knowledge. But she is, perhaps, more particularly concerned with the investigation of the three following problems. Can personality be predicated of that ultimate imity ? What is the relation in which this unity stands to man ? What importance and significance are to be attached to the verdicts of the common religious consciousness ? For purposes of analysis and exposition we speak of these as three problems, but they are really one. They all merge in the great inquiry, whether God is a Personal Being. That, after all, is the supreme question to which we seek an answer. As ethical beings, we wish to discover whether the moral laws, which ethics conceives as abstract and impersonal, can be interpreted as the expression of a Divine will and character ; whether the strange, spiritual significance of the beauty of the natural world of form and colour — the ** fancy from a flower-bell," the ** sunset touch '* — is only illusion, born of irrational association, or whether it is a real witness to a personal existence, greater than ourselves; whether our deepest hopes and aspirations, the out-reaching of our spirits after a Father of all spirits, in prayer, and resolve, and consecration of self, are vain and fruitless, or whether there is a God who hears, and answers, and regards.

Just because religion is the movement of man's whole personality towards that final unity which we call God, and which faith interprets as a person, the conception of personality remains the central conception in a Philosophy of Religion. The religious life of man demands that he shall be able to enter into conscious relationship with a personal God. The history of religious development has been, on the whole, that of a progress towards God, interpreted as a personal Being, while the noblest form of known religion distinctly characterises God as possessed of a peri sonality which has true and abiding points of affinity with our own. The religious consciousness seems to grasp God by methods more direct than those which are available for philosophic reason. Religion lays hold by immediate intuition, as it were, of the supreme object of her faith. Prayer affords an open avenue of approach ; the feelings of awe and reverence place her at once in the heart x>f the Divine presence. It is for the Philosophy of Religion to justify, if she can, these direct verdicts of the common consciousness. As life precedes philosophy, so religion precedes that further reflection upon herself which we call the Philosophy of Religion. If this justification can be achieved, if God can be made real to reason and reflection, there will result, surely, for the individual, what we may call a larger intuition, or immediate apprehension of God, as certain, as direct, as the other, but more strong to withstand the disintegrating effects of criticism. The temper of the steel will have been tested, the dross will have been burnt away from the true metal. What we are urging is this, that, just as the simple, religious consciousness never lays hold of God by a movement of reason or reflection alone, so, after reflection has been brought to bear upon the contents of the religious con-

N sciousness, reason will find herself transfigured into something larger than what we usually mean by the word. She will be an organic reason, a reason expressive of the whole rich content of human nature.

To arrive, however, at this mature and reasoned conviction of the existence and personality of God, is to have achieved the supreme synthesis of thought. It is to put the copingstone upon the building. The goal is only to be won, if it is to be won at all, after many efforts and much labour have been devoted to the solution of subordinate problems. And the Philosophy of Religion is called on to investigate these subordinate problems. Her inquiry here becomes one with that of general philosophy, which receives at the hands of the special sciences the conclusions which they have reached, and revises and correlates them in the light of her conviction, that there is a final unity somewhere to be found. Like philosophy, the Philosophy of Religion will show a spirit of receptiveness, patience, humility; but, in all her inquiries, she will be constantly reminding herself that it is religion in which she is primarily interested, and that religion is something very old and universal among men. The remembrance of this fact, while it need not create a bias or prejudice in her mind, will certainly affect the spirit and temper of her inquiry. There is no such thing as complete impartiality of mind. All speculation rests on a basis of some presuppositions. Every investigator brings with him, to his work of search, his own complex personality. An absolutely impartial mind would be an empty mind.

One other introductory topic, upon which a few words must be said, is the relation of theology to the Philosophy of Religion.

The situation here may be summed up by saying that, in matters theological, the movement of reason must be free and unfettered. We can no longer adopt the mediaeval dictum, that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. Theology, if she would lay claim to the title of scientific, must herself adopt the method of reason, which is the method of free inquiry.^ The principle of authority cannot be, for a reasoning being, an ultimate principle. In so far as the dogmatic utterances of any theological system represent the summed up reflection of the thoughtful minds of the past, the Philosophy

^ See Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy ^ chap, xiii., pp. 352-4.

of Religion will treat them with the utmost reverence ; but she will hold herself free to criticise them, and, if need be, to restate them. If they were born of critical reflection, reflection may still ask them for their credentials. The Philosophy of Religion is not worthy of the name of philosophy unless she preserves her right of free inquiry at the bar of reason. Even a religion which claims to be a revealed religion must appear before this tribunal ; for she has to prove that the mysteries, which she holds in her hands, are God-given, and she can make good her position only by the appeal to reason.

It is, I think, worth while to insist upon this point, for there is still to-day much use made, in what can only be called an irrational manner, of this principle of authority in religion ; while a very interesting psychological study is presented by some theologians who seem to have effected, in their own minds at any rate, an adjustment or compromise between the principle of reason and the principle of authority. A careful analysis, for example, of what one may call the logic of such a volume of essays as Lux Mundi, would, not improbably, reveal grave incompatibilities of thought and method.

This, however, is by the way. What I would lo DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE

venture to urge is, that, in an age which has been touched by the spirit of criticism, and, above all, by the spirit of historical inquiry, any appeal to the principle of authority, as such, and as an independent principle, cannot possibly be justified. There is a wealth of meaning in a saying of the late August Sabatier, which occurs in the preface to his volume (posthumously published, and recently translated into English), The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit} He writes, " The history of a dogma is its inevitable criticism ". Every dogma, that is, received shape under definite, historical conditions, and the formulation of the truth was affected under pressure from those conditions. The organism took some colour from its environment To understand the dogma, therefore, you must study it in the light of the historical circumstances under which it arose. From the origin of the dogma you pass on, naturally, to study its subsequent history. You begin to criticise it, from the point of view of its suitableness to the; needs, both intellectual and practical, of a later time. You ask, whether the dogma is the expression of a truth, which is a truth for

us, here and now, or whether lapse of time has revealed it as belonging to the things which pass away. Or, if the truth, which the dogma embodies, proves itself to be possessed of a present vitality, you inquire if there may not still be need for restating that truth in language more suitable to the advancing thought of the age. May we not have to disentangle, in the dogma, the local and temporary elements from those which are essential and eternal ? A task, such as this, is a paramount duty for an age which is characterised by the spirit of historical inquiry ; but, in undertaking the task, you part company with the principle of authority, as an independent principle. A little farther on, in the introduction to the same volume, Sabatier asks this question : ** What is the education of mankind, if not the passage from faith in authority to personal conviction, and to the sustained practice of the intellectual duty to consent to no idea, except by virtue of its recognised truth, to accept no fact until its reality has been, in one way or another, established ? '*

Passing now to the more immediate subject of this volume, we proceed to indicate its scope and intention, and to say something as to the reasons which make the subject a fruitful field

.4 of inquiry at the present time. The two ideas of Purpose and Development are closely connected in the thought of this generation. The question which we are all asking is, What is the meaning, and what are the essential implications of the idea of development or growth ? Will development prove, on analysis, to be a teleological conception, or can we interpret it without any reference to the idea of purpose? The sovereign principle which rules our minds to-day in every department of inquiry is that of development or evolution ; and, if we would understand the mind of the century in which we live, we must make some attempt to interpret the principle. Fully to interpret it will be impossible. To no age is it given to understand completely the ideas which govern it. Just as you cannot appreciate the height of a mountain if you stand at its immediate base, so you cannot see the full significance of an idea, such as that of development, until a considerable period of time has elapsed, during which the idea has had opportunity to reveal itself in its richness and complexity. Even now we do not understand adequately the significance of the principle of nationality, though that principle has been at work in human societies since the dissolution of the Roman Empire. We are all feeling our way towards a comprehension of this conception of development, which is proving itself to be so profound, and so charged with meaning. And there is all the more reason for this attempt at analysis and interpretation when we remember how recklessly the word "evolution'* is used. Many seem to think that the mere utterance of the term brings with it a lucid explanation of all difficulties. Many forget, too, that evolution may mean very different things when applied to different subjects or fields of inquiry. In investigating, then, such a problem as the meaning of development, we are turning the eye of critical reflection inward upon the dominant movement of our own thought. We are seeking to understand ourselves more clearly, so to grasp the essential spirit of our own age that we may the better help to mould the development of the ages which are to follow.

Again, theological questions are to-day exercising a peculiar fascination over a growing number of students. Why is this? Is it not because this conception of development is being applied in the sphere of theology.'^ Theology has at times stood apart from the movements of thought around her, and she has always done so with loss to herself. But even the most secluded mountain lake sometimes feels the full fury of the gale, and to-day theology stands exposed to all the winds which blow from the four quarters of the heaven. Men are seeing that the law of development operates in theology as elsewhere, and on all sides they are setting themselves to investigate the history and conditions of this evolution. They bring into play their powers of regressive historic sympathy, and endeavour to disengage the germinal principles of Christianity from the accretions, or the natural developments, of later times. They retrace, critically, the whole movement of the river from mouth to source, and back again from source to mouth, and the task is one of the profoundest interest. It cannot, therefore, be amiss, in the face of such speculative activity upon these most vital of all problems, to ask ourselves what the idea of development really means.

If, on the other hand, we think of the idea of purpose, there are not wanting good reasons for an investigation of this conception. First and foremost stands the fact of our own purposive activity as rational beings. Whatever doubt there may be about the applicability of the conception of purpose to the operations of the natural world, there can be none whatever about its applicability to ourselves. We do habitually act with purpose. We set up before ourselves ends, and contrive means to reach them. And it is inevitable that we should ask whether the principle of final causation is not to have some place in our interpretation of the world around us, whether we may not use our own human nature as a key to unlock the riddle of the universe. The historical importance of the argument from design is sufficient justification for making an attempt once more to examine its validity. By a kind of native instinct man has always seen, and will continue to see, evidences of the work of a designing mind in the natural world. He refuses to acquiesce in a view of the universe which makes him a lonely being in the midst of a world of matter, which shows no trace of spiritual kinship with his own nature. His interest lies in proving, if he can do so, that the purposiveness which he finds in himself is linked on to a larger purposiveness, running through the whole scheme of existence.

As an additional reason for investigating at the present time the conception of purpose, we may mention the recent appearance of a movement in philosophy, known as personal idealism. The supporters of this movement contend that, if we would rise to a true interpretation of reality, we must start from the practical activities of human nature, the will, the striving after the realisation of ends, the whole conative movement of the personality. They maintain that the idealistic philosophy of the past has been too abstract, both in method and results, and that its conclusions stand in need of revision. Such revision they are attempting to carry out, on the basis of a psychology which finds in will and purpose the keynote of human nature. Upon the success of the attempt it is too early, as yet, to pass judgment, for the results of the movement are not sufficiendy matured. But of its importance there can be no doubt. Any speculative endeavour to emphasise the element of will, and to interpret ultimate reality in teleological terms, must command attention, because of its appeal to some of the convictions which lie deepest in our spiritual nature.

Once more, whatever view we may ultimately take of the Christian religion, we are face to face with this fact, that the highest known form of religion, the form which seems to be possessed of the vitality necessary to make it a conquering, missionary creed, is one which conceives of the world as the stage upon which a great, historic purpose is being slowly consummated. Christianity (and we may include under the term the earlier beliefs of the Old Testament, which belong to the same line of spiritual ancestry) was the first religion to possess a philosophy of history. And the dominant conception of that philosophy is this, that through time and in the seeming maze of human history a divine, eternal purpose is being gradually worked out. The Philosophy of Religion has to investigate the demand of Christianity to be regarded as a true explanation of the world-process. In particular, she is confronted with a unique, historic figfure who claims, not only to fulfil the past, but to control the future ; in whom, as in a focus-point, many convergent lines of evolution seem to meet, and from whom radiate out new forces of development. The Christ of history raises the teleological problem in an acute form.

We have already suggested that one of the most pressing problems for our thought to-day is how we are to interpret development Is the conception to be construed teleologically ? Do the two ideas of purpose and evolution ultimately involve each other ? This problem is raised in a special manner by the conflict between evolutionary science and teleology, over the argument from design. Have modem biological theories of evolution succeeded in destroying the argument, based, as it is, upon the existence of exquisite adaptations in the organic world ? Has Darwin given the final quietus to Paley's contention in the Natural Theology ? This is a question which is full of interest at the present time, and it raises clearly, at a particular point, the important issue as to the compatibility or incompatibility of the two conceptions of purpose and development. It forms one of the problems with which the Philosophy of Religion has to deal. Historically, the argument from design has played a significant part in the determination of the wider problem of the existence and character of God. Since it has fallen somewhat into disrepute to-day, there is all the more need to examine it carefully, in order that we may decide whether the argument is worthless, or whether it only requires to be restated to recover its apologetic value for the theist.

The title of this volume, Development and Divine Purpose, covers so wide a field that it is obvious that in the space at our disposal no exhaustive treatment of the subject is possible.

Any attempt in that direction would involve a complete philosophy. The field of inquiry is, therefore, narrowed to the following dimensions. We begin by discussing certain aspects of the argument from design, with especial reference to Darwinism, and modern biological theories of evolution ; and an attempt is made to restate the argument in terms more suitable to the conditions of modern thought and knowledge. The nature of organisms is then investigated, with a view to discovering what are the peculiar characteristics which mark off living from inorganic matter, and how far physical science can claim success in her endeavour to interpret organisms in mechanical terms. The concluding section of the volume deals with the ideas of development and purpose in their larger meaning ; and, in particular, with the problem of what canons are necessary for interpreting a development, and in what ways we may test a development in order to decide whether it has remained true to, or has departed from, its essential principle. Throughout the whole inquiry we keep in mind the necessity of determining whether the idea of development is to be construed teleologically. Such a method of dealing with the subject before us appears more satisfactory than to attempt, at the outset, a formal definition of growth or development. Definition is one of the last stages arrived at in the process of thought, and definitions are never complete or satisfactory accounts of the subject-matter defined. The richer the object of the definition the more difficult it becomes to define it. Some of its wealth of meaning must be lost in the endeavour to fix it in a precise terminology. Further, part of the process of development now going on in the world consists in a development of our ideas. There is a development of the idea of development ; and, until that development is completed, no fully adequate definition of the conception is possible. It is with the idea of development as with the idea of life. Our difficulty is, that we can never arrest the growth of the living organism which we are examining. While we are examining it, it has moved another step in its evolution. Its present we never succeed in analysing, but only its past. Its ** is *' is eternally becoming a " was *\ You can arrest its growth only by killing it, and then it is not life, but death, which you are investigating. We are, that is, gradually feeling our way towards a complete analysis of the sovereign idea which at present masters us, but which we hope one day, in our turn, to master.

Chapter II Paley And The Argument From Design

PALE Y and Darwin are the two great names round which our discussion of the conception of design will mainly centre ; and our problem will be to decide whether, and, if so, to what extent, Darwin has succeeded in destroying Paley's teleological argument. Paley is, by common consent, regarded as the chief exponent of the older teleology. He best states for us the popular view on final causation as it existed before the time of Darwin, and as it still exists in the minds of those who do not realise what a change in outlook was effected by the publication of the Origin of Species. It is the fashion to-day to decry Paley. The gulf which separates the modem mind from his mind is enormous, and we shall find reason to conclude that his method of stating the argument from design is, in the light of present knowledge, indefensible. At the same time, there is a vigour and force about his writings, there is a power of presenting an argument, which is very striking. Nor do his conclusions lack an essential core of soundness. His argument, certainly, needs to be restated, but it is by no means the case that it is worthless.