Democracy; a study of government

Preface

Carlyle, after showing Emerson the House of Commons, thought he would annihilate his friend's optimism in polities by abruptly asking him, "Don't you believe in the Devil now?" The memory of this incident, and the condition of things in this country, suggested that the title for the present essay should be " The Devil's Harness." But publishers might fear a oon mot for a title, and the advocates of popular government might resent the imputations which it would seem to carry against their idol. Yet tragedy and comedy are sufficiently mingled in politics to justify a little jeu (T esprit in the proposition to restrain some of the tendencies of the age. Besides, it is hard to resist the temptation to indulge in a little irony at the expense of Mr. Lecky for his pessimism respecting democracy, even if the sequel should reveal more sympathy with his criticisms than usually lurks in satire. I have considered Mr. Lecky half right and half wrong: right in his animadversions, but wrong in his implied demand for a return to eighteenth century methods. Such a verdict, however, while it allows a writer the privi-

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leges of a critic, also imposes duties that command the consideration of remedies for the political evils which it was not a part of Mr. Lecky's task to suggest. Of mere criticism, by both classes of political students, we have had enough, and more than enough. It is high time that something positive and constructive should be proposed. Barking at the Devil is not sufficient. Wearied, therefore, with the perpetual grumbling which is either unable to see a way out of the confusion, or too cynical and hopeless to try an escape, I have thrown all diffidence aside, and ventured, with an audacity that may surprise others as much as it does myself, to offer for debate a complete system of government, which is neither a reaction toward monarchy nor an acceptance of the status quo. If that confession frightens the reader, I beg of him to remember two things: (1) That the complexity of modern civilisation is so great that a single modification of political machinery will not suffice to solve the whole problem. (2) That the two main principles upon which the theory of government should be based are the adequate and immediate responsibility of the executive and legislative branches, and the integration and differentiation of functions which have operated so successfully in the organic and industrial worlds. If these two things are properly considered, there will be reason to think charitably of so large an undertaking,

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especially that the author does not profess to regard it as an object of immediate practical politics, but only a conception of government which it is necessary to have in mind when proposing measures of reform.

It may interest some students of political questions to know that the reflections which instigated this attempt to construct a system of government were the result of my study of the poverty problem on the one hand, and of the exacting and impossible demands of civic duty on the other. Not that the outcome offers any cure for destitution, but that the study of it in connection with universal suffrage and the growing tendencies to Socialism convinced me that the solution of the political problem was the key to much else besides. AVhat the poverty problem suggested was. the necessity of methods that would both diminish the influence of a class which can neither govern itself nor others, and secure more responsibility for public officials, and with it more intelligence and honesty in the execution of their duties. What our exorbitant civic duties suggested was the necessity of simplifying the functions of the citizen. A man cannot be expected to spend every night at some campaign committee meeting. On the one hand, the people care very little for abstract politics, and object to despotic powers only when they feel its abuses personally. On the other hand, the citizens

PREFACE shirk their duties, partly because they feel powerless to effect any reforms, partly because they cannot understand the many problems that they are called to solve, and partly because life has other pleasures and obligations than talking politics and running to the polls when the choice of rulers is between knaves. This situation led to a study of modern democracy and of political institutions whose development has not kept pace with the general growth of complexity in civilisation. I found no way out of the labyrinth, therefore, but to search for the principle upon which the regulation of complex social conditions should be based, and then to work it out in practical proposals which might at least illustrate the theory of government, if they did not offer a simple remedy for our troubles. We may shake our heads at the magnitude of the scheme which has been proposed, but the excuse for it is the real magnitude of the problem itself and the necessity for some general theory of government which shall be different from the method of " checks and balances," now obsolete, and which will offer an intelligible goal to such reforms as the condition of the age may make practicable and imperative. To those, however, who may be tempted to look for something simpler than the present proposals as a whole, I may say that there is no demand for a sudden revolution, or the casting of a whole new constitution, in order to move toward the end here

1' HE FACE suggested. The last few pages of the work will show how great reforms may be initiated by small changes which may be left to grow. But I have provided in the larger view of the problem an articulated system of means for satisfying the complex demands of government as a whole, and a principle that may help to guide the development which a few practical measures may initiate. This is the apology for so large a speculation. The rest may be left to a critical public, while I am willing to see the work a scapegoat, if only it may set my countrymen to thinking.

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