The defenceless state of Great Britain

Front matter

'N

THE

DEFENCELESS STATE

Chapter I. Page

Striking contrast between young France and old England — Ruinous military expenses of the one — Fatal insecurity of the other — The British nation averse to the cost of security — Reasons why no minister can venture to pro¬ pose it — Difficulty of explaining the necessity — The writer’s reasons for attempting to do so — Mode in which his investigation will be conducted . 1

Chapter II

Descriptive sketch of the French Army — Of the Austrian Army — The Prussian Army — The Russian Army . 10

Chapter III

The Belgian Army — Its “ Cadres ” — Field Exercise — Reviews — Arsenal .

a 3

VI

CONTENTS.'

Chapter IV. Page

Strength of the British Army — The British Soldier — De¬ scriptive sketch of the duties of the various departments of the Army — Commissariat — Engineer department — Artillery — The staff of an army — Infantry and cavalry — Lamentable results in Spain and Portugal from the Army’s inexperience in field-discipline — Pre¬ sent condition of the Army — Comparative ages of the officers in the French and British services — Future consequences of the British Army being debarred by the nation from military education . 35

Chapter V

Hereditary aversion of the British people to any description of protection designated unconstitutional — Description of the progressive effects of discipline — Creates confi¬ dence — Description of young soldiers first coming into action — Consequences of over-excitement — Duke of Wellington’s sage opinions thereon — Gradually become subject to self-control — Men totally undisciplined worth¬ less in war — Their courage valueless — Their confusion increases with their numbers — Fallacy of relying for national defence on such a power — Comparative value of semi-organised bodies — Duke of Wellington’s opinions of the inestimable value of old soldiers — His descriptions of their conduct in the field — On the proclamation of peace, impatience of the nation to rid itself of its Army — Many of the pensions of our veterans commuted — Their miser¬ able condition in our colonies — Their death by hunger, want of clothing, and cold — Reflections . 88

CONTENTS.

Yll

Chapter I. Page

Man the only animal that voluntarily goes to sea — De¬ scription of a British Sailor — His successes in the late War — His calm courage — Jack’s belief that an Eng¬ lish Admiral is not permitted to strike his flag — Na¬ tional belief that we must always conquer at sea a fallacy — Exposition thereof — Description of the in¬ fancy, growth, and progress of War — Reflections . . 119

Chapter II

Description of the British system of Naval Warfare during the last War — Close quarters the policy and practice of Nelson — Description of yard-arm action — Its success — The Americans carefully study the British system, and remedy its defects . 130

Chapter III

Description of Nelson’s system of Gunnery — French and British equally ignorant of the art — Illustration of the extraordinary errors committed — Americans invoke the aid of Science — Build larger Ships — Arm them with longer and heavier Guns — Man them with British Sailors — Their success — The British nation smarts under the consequences — But as soon as peace was obtained forget the causes — Maintain the defective system under an erroneous idea of “ economy ”... 140

Vlll

CONTENTS.

CnAPTER IV.

Page

The successes of the American Navy create a deep impres¬ sion in Europe — • France especially determines to adopt the successful system — Descriptive sketch of the new system of Gunnery as recommended by Sir Howard Douglas — Alteration in the armament of Guns — Oddities in shot — Simplification of Wads — Strange anecdote concerning them — Horizontal shell-firing — Shells, percussion and concussion — The havoc they create, even to those who use them — Sanguinary effects they will probably produce in the next War — Powder — Fuses — Tubes — Musket, Pistol, and Sword Exercise — Action — Keflections . 154

Chapter V

Extraordinary contrast between the French and British methods of manning their Navy — Admirable arrange¬ ments of the French — • Description of the English system of Impressment — Improvidence in turning off Able Seamen as fast as they become valuable — The American system — The practice of Impressment incon¬ sistent with the Abolition of Slavery — Seamen must now be also trained Gunners — This subject explained — The nation in a fearful predicament — Impressment no longer practicable — • By voluntary enlistment a suf¬ ficiency of Seamen cannot be obtained — England the only country in the world that has neglected to organ¬ ize her maritime population — In consequence thereof the nation is unable, in a moment of emergency, to man her men-of-war in ordinary — Keflections . . . 180

CONTENTS.

IX

PART III. Introductory Chapter

Pjge

TJnpopularity of the investigation — Various classes by whom it will be condemned — Mode in which it is pro¬ posed to be conducted . 215

Chapter II.

Division of the subject into past and present — Ab¬ stract of Alison’s History of the threatened Invasion of England by the French in 1797 — Preparations then made — Napoleon abandons the design — In 1801 Napo¬ leon again makes preparations — Great Britain makes most powerful preparations for self-defence — Conduct of the King — Of the Prince of Wales — Of both Houses of Parliament — In 1803 Napoleon combines a flotilla of Praams — Patriotic exertions of the British Parlia¬ ment — and British people — Napoleon’s object to obtain for a few davs command of the Channel — His

V

secret deep-laid project — Suspected by Collingwood — Defeated by Sir R. Calder — Napoleon in rage and dis¬ appointment breaks up his army at Boulogne .... 219

Chapter III.

Comparison between the present moral power of the French and British nations — Reasons why the “ morale ” of the French Army has increased, while that of the British people has diminished, since 1803 — Evidence thereof — Comparison between the present physical

X

CONTENTS.

power of the French and British nations Sketch showing the Dr. and Cr. results of the Power of Steam in account with Great Britain — The invention on the whole highly in favour of England — Sketch showing, per contra, that the power of steam has removed the uncertainties attendant upon sailing-vessels — That combinations for invasion which could not before have been effected, are now practicable and certain — That steam has thus levelled the outworks of the defences of England — That out of the profits of the invention Great Britain must therefore strengthen her citadel — Absolute necessity of a standing Army — Popular abhor¬ rence of such protection — Inconsistent with the caution that characterizes the nation — Enormous amount of property insured in Great Britain from fire — From other results — Accidental Death Insurance Company . 240

Chapter IV.

ON THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

The wealth of Great Britain creates the power of maintain¬ ing a larger fleet than any other nation on the globe — Evidence showing that the exercise of this power has been neglected — Injudicious expenditure — Evident cause thereof — The confidence reposed in the Navy based on the notion that it is always ready at hand to prevent invasion — Obvious fallacy of this opinion — The colo¬ nial empire of Great Britain requires the protection of Naval power — The impossibility of its pervading the ocean and protecting the British Channel at the same time — Popular illustration of this truth — Beflections . 279

CONTENTS.

XI

Chapter V.

ON THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

Enormous amount of the French army — British army inadequate even to defend our colonies — Duke of Wel¬ lington’s opinion of the perilous condition of the nation — His opinion disregarded — Strange inconsistency — Dis¬ tinguished qualifications and character of Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, the nation’s chief engineer — Incon¬ sistency in rejecting his professional opinion also — Words of warning from old naval and military officers — offered in vain

Xll

CONTENTS.

Chapter I. ON THE CAFTITRE OF LONDON RY A FRENCH ARMY

Page

Descriptive sketch of the animated exertions of combined naval and military forces adequate for the defence of Great Britain — Lamentable contrast — Awful results —

Two fearful alternatives considered — London declared indefensible — Advance of the French army — Investment and capture of London . 317

Chapter II

French general proclaims parliamentary reform and redress of all popular grievances — Mode of feeding his troops — Skilful “ Commissaires ” — Orders to the press — Treat¬ ment of refractory editors — Contributions levied from the inhabitants — Concessions demanded from the British people — Dreadful effects of the sudden annihilation of credit — Possibility of internal riots, robbery, and rapine 339

Chapter III

Difference between uncivilised and civilised warfare — Mercy shown in the latter — Exceptions to the rule — In taking a fortress by storm — Other instances — Usual conduct of an invading army — Where revenge and insult are desired as well as conquest, the consequences are most lamentable — Reasons why these injuries are usually concealed . 353

CONTENTS.

Xlll

Chapter IV. DISCREDITABLE POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN

Page

The nations of the continent of Europe all perceive the defenceless state of England — Strange speeches of lead¬ ing members of the House of Commons boasting of the nation’s excessive power — The inevitable result — Peace meetings on the Continent likely to prove highly bene¬ ficial — In the meanwhile Great Britain ought not to remain unprotected — Glaring inconsistency in England’s conquests by war, and her present inability to defend herself by arras . 363

Chapter V. REMEDY

Beneficial results of continued appeals from the friends of peace to the inhabitants of the military nations of Europe — In the meanwhile the British people must protect themselves from the horrors of invasion, just as they protect their houses from fire, their vessels from storms, their persons from rain, their property from the swell-mob — Peaceful and economical results of this policy — Amount of military and naval force necessary to attain these great blessings — Estimated cost thereof — Short effectual plan showing how to obtain the money . 370

Appendix

XIV

CONTENTS.

APPENDIX.

Page

I. — The Duke of Wellington’s attention to details —

“ The Little Kettle Question ” . 393

II. — The Duke’s warning, in 1811, of the disposition of the French to invade England, and of the con¬ sequences . 396

III. — Present amount of military stores in France . . . 397

IV. — Capital invested in the transit trade of Great Britain 398

V. — Measures adopted by the Netherlands for the forma¬ tion of a thorough system of national defence . 400

VI. — Admiral Sir Charles Napier’s letter, corroborative of

the defenceless condition of the British peojDle . 401

VII. — Mode in which the Landwehr or militia forces of the

Continent are constituted . 408

The Sketch to face Chajp, V., p. 294.

Part I. Military Warfare

THE

DEFENCELESS STATE

OF

Chapter I

Striking contrast between young France and old England — Ruinous military expenses of the one — Fatal insecurity of the other — The British nation averse to the cost of security — Reasons why no Minister can venture to propose it — Difficulty of explaining the necessity — The writer’s reasons for attempt¬ ing to do so — Mode in which his investigation will be conducted.

Although there is nothing more fascinating in nature than the guileless simplicity, the unsus¬ pecting confidence of a child, yet it is the pain¬ ful, the thankless, and almost the revolting duty of a faithful guardian deliberately to sully this purity, by admixing with instinctive good that salutary knowledge of evil without which — just as the moth flies into the flame that consumes

B

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I.

it — the youth of both sexes are liable, solely from their innocence, to be ruined.

As regards individuals, age, by accumu¬ lating experience, acquires caution. “ What ! ” said a young Spanish monarch to his aged general, “ do you advise this from fear 1 ” “ No — Sire !” was the calm, dignified reply, “ es precauciON.” And yet, while every mem¬ ber of a community thus daily becomes more anxious to guard himself from any description of evil, a nation, in proportion as it increases in wealth and luxury, usually reverts to the un¬ suspecting confidence of its childhood ; in short, like the traveller in the fable, the sunshine of prosperity almost invariably induces it to cast aside — as a useless encumbrance' — the cloak of protection.

This apparent anomaly is strikingly illus¬ trated by the contrast which, at the present moment, is exhibited between France and the British people.

It is well known to our commercial men that the financial state of “ la jeune France” not only rests on an unsound basis, but that its

RBC

NcU

Chap. I. MILITARY WARFARE

escape from a second bankruptcy is mainly to be attributed to the temporary success of a welltimed action upon the currency, by an issue by the Bank of France, in small notes, of a hundred millions of francs, which, coming during a season of perfect tranquillity both at home and abroad, has fortunately caused no run upon the bank for specie, and has therefore appeared to the Parisians an actual creation of wealth to the extent of the increase of circulation ; and yet, while it is undeniable that a political or com¬ mercial panic would cause this hectic flush to fade, this inflation suddenly to collapse, the burdens of France, as compared with those of Great Britain, are enormous. For instance, including all the expenses of our immense colonial empire, the average annual expenditure for purposes of government of old England is 19<s. 4 d. per head on a home population of thirty millions; while young France, with scarcely any colony except Algeria, pays 31s. per head for the same purpose !

With little foreign commerce to protect, she also maintains a standing army of 408,000 men,

b 2 t

4 MILITARY WARFARE. Part I.

exclusive of a numerous and expensive national guard.

Again, while the civil administration of the French republic, solely supported by an unqua¬ lified system of patronage, expends annually 308,000,000 of francs (say 12,078,431/. sterling) among 598,000 employes, four-fifths of whom are under the Ministers of the Interior and Finance, England in the same departments expends only 2,786,000/. per annum among 235,000 persons !

It is evident, therefore, that, independent of the tax upon time and of personal liberty caused by an indiscriminate conscription of the national guard (the burden of which in a commercial country no figures can adequately represent), the provinces of France are drained to maintain, besides regular troops, an immense citizen army, supplying patronage and wealth to Paris; and thus, with hypertrophy at the heart, the ex¬ tremities are paralyzed.

Now while France, the elasticity of whose resources in time of peace is truly astonishing, by the unnecessary maintenance of enormous

Chap. I.

MILITARY WARFARE.

military forces is thus deliberately cutting her own throat with her own sword, Great Britain, by a diametrically opposite process of suicide, is jeopardising her existence in the scale of na¬ tions, and her enormous wealth, by trusting for defence to an empty scabbard ; in fact, there cannot in nature exist a more extraordinary con¬ trast than between the exaggerated length of the sword of France in proportion to that of its purse, and the tiny means which England pos¬ sesses to protect her home-population and vast property from the horrors of invasion !

The one country, with nothing in its pocket, is to be seen armed to the teeth ; the other, with a protuberance of wealth which attracts the attention of the world, is absolutely tooth¬ less !

And yet how truly estimable are the senti¬ ments of the British nation ! In what other region of the globe can, among any class of people, be found so strong a sense of justice — so anxious a desire to offend no one — so earnest a wish for peace — such steady application to busi¬ ness — so much patient industry — so much gene-

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part 1.

rosity in prosperity — so much patient resignation under adversity ?

But while the nation, animated by the senti¬ ments we have described, has been indulging in the placid belief that its disinclination for war would ensure peace, and that, even if it unhap¬ pily failed, its past victories would ensure future protection, — several naval and military officers of considerable experience — among them the Duke of Wellington — have in books, pamphlets, and letters declared the defences of Great Britain to be totally inadequate to its defence !

In any other country but England such cor¬ roborating opinions would instantly have been deemed worthy of investigation, but our states¬ men of all politics had two insuperable difficulties to contend with, —

1st They were perfectly sensible that, as they did not understand the subject, it would be extremely hazardous for them to undertake to explain it ; and —

2nd. That even if by great application they could succeed in doing so, the whole nation was so totally unacquainted with even the rudiments

Chap. I.

MILITARY WARFARE.

of the art of protecting a great empire, that as it would be practically impossible to obtain the remedy proposed — namely, money — the less said about the disease the better.

It need hardly be remarked that there exists nothing in these reasons sufficient to induce the officers of the navy and army to alter the opin¬ ions they had respectively expressed. They, how¬ ever, very properly did not feel disposed to repeat them excepting in private society, where, without reservation, they continue to maintain them.

But there, the difficulty they encounter, even among their own friends, proceeds from the fact that in the great question they have to argue there exist two holes, only one of which they are each respectively able to stop.

For instance, if a soldier officer indisputably proves that the British army is inadequate to resist the invasion of the French, instead of conquering his antagonist, he is invariably de¬ feated by the remark, “ Oh, yes ! hut tell me, what would our NAVY he about ? ”

On the other hand, if a naval officer triumph¬ antly, as he thinks, demonstrates that we have

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I.

not force enough in the Channel to prevent invasion — his opponent adroitly escapes by say¬ ing, “ In the name of the British AI1MY, I should just like to see 'em come ! ”

Now it really appears — as indeed it has hitherto proved- -to be almost hopeless and impossible for any individual to attract the good sense and sober attention of the country to the consideration of two separate slippery subjects, each of which is unpalatable and unpopular.

The stake, however, at issue is so enormous ; — all that we venerate, love, esteem, and value are so inextricably involved in it ; — it so clearly affects not only the welfare of the British people, but the political, moral, and commercial relations of the whole globe, that we have de¬ termined to undertake the task.

With this object in view, we propose, by a series of unconnected sketches, to divide our subject into the five following sections : —

3. The invasion of England by a French army.

Chap. I.

MILITARY WARFARE.

4. The capture of London by a French army.

5. Reflections thereon.

The two first of these sections will no doubt attract the criticism of the twin professions to which they relate. The whole of them are submitted to the calm judgment of a people who of their own accord will make whatever allowance they may deem to be due to the difficulty of an attempt to elucidate in light popular language a subject of the gravest im¬ portance.

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I.

Chapter II. Sketch Of The Principal Military Forces Of

EUROPE.

Descriptive sketch of the French Army — Of the Austrian Army — The Prussian Army — The Russian Army.

The French Army is composed of —

Regular troops : —

Men.

Staff .....

3,826

Cavalry ....

58,932

Infantry, &c.

301,224

Artillery ....

30,166

Engineers ....

8,727

Pontoon Train, &c.

5,755

Total .

408,630

Garde Nationale : —

82 battalions of 1500 men .

123,000

2,378,000

2,501,000

Of whom 2,000,000 are armed

with firelocks.

To the above are to be added : —

Garde Rationale of Paris

129,800

Total .

2,630,800

Chap. II. MILITARY WARFARE

From the latter total there might be formed about 300 battalions of retired soldiers, perfectly capable of joining the army as regular troops.

“ The Garde Nationale ” of France, instituted “to maintain order and obedience to the laws; to support the army in defence of the frontier and coasts ; to maintain the independence of France and the integrity of its territory,” is composed, with certain exceptions, of all French¬ men from 20 to 60 years of age, formed in each commune of 82 departments into companies, battalions, and legions. The cavalry into squa¬ drons. Each battalion has its colours, subofficers, and corporals. The expenses of this extraordinary force are voted, regulated, and overlooked like all other municipal charges.

Instruction. — During the monarchy there were annual encampments for the purpose of instruct¬ ing the regular army in field operations and ma¬ noeuvres. The ground chosen was usually in the neighbourhood of Compiegne or St. Omer ; the ordinary force from 20,000 to 25,000 infantry, in two divisions, to each of which were attached

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I* a brigade of 1000 cavalry and a battery of 12 guns.

These assemblages of troops remained in camp three months, commencing in August, the infan¬ try under tents and the cavalry cantoned in the adjacent villages. The tirst two months were employed in a series of manoeuvres approved of by the Staff, executed first by the troops of each arm separately, and afterwards by the whole united force. The last month, after the harvest had been got in, was devoted to strategetic war movements of attack and defence, according to the features of the country.

In 1843 the Government ordered the for¬ mation of four camps, at Villette, Charenton, Homainville, and Ivry, in addition to which, for the permanent reunion of a corps of cavalry, barracks for 30 squadrons were constructed at Lunenville, at which place the mounted regiments in the neighbourhood assembled every year about the end of April, when, under a General-in¬ chief, they were formed into two divisions, to each of which was attached a battery of light artillery. During six months the whole of these troops were

Chap. IT.

MILITARY WARFARE.

exercised in grand cavalry manoeuvres, on ground selected for that purpose, and during the last week of their assemblage they performed cam¬ paign movements.

Since the revolution of 1848, although these encampments and assemblages of troops have been superseded by the formation of corps d’armee, required for the maintenance of tran¬ quillity, as also to meet such political contingen¬ cies as might arise from the disturbed state of Europe, large bodies of men are occasionally congregated to carry on such military exercises and evolutions as may be deemed necessary for their instruction. For each corps d’armee there is nominated every year by the Government an Inspector-General, authorised to review the troops under his orders, each regiment being inspected separately. The principal points to which the attention of this officer is directed are the discipline, instruction, clothing, ac¬ counts, and promotion either for merit or long service. The inspections commence July 1st, and the reports must be sent to the Minister of War by the 1st of December.

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I.

Garrisons . — Under the Bourbons the gar¬ risons of Paris and Versailles in 1830 were composed of —

Garrison of Paris : — ^eu‘

Household troops . . 1,000

Garde Royale, Infantry . 12,000

Ditto Cavalry . 1,440

Ditto Artillery . 1,600

Line, 4 regime ts, Infantry . 7,200

Garrison of Versailles : —

Household troops . . 1,000

Garde Royale, Infantry . 2,400

Ditto Cavalry . 1,440

In 1837 the Garrison of Paris was

augmented to 31,800

That of Versailles to . . 14,600

Between 1843 and 1848 the Gar¬ rison of Paris was augmented

That of Versailles reduced to . 4,200

Since 1849 the army of Paris, half of which is quartered in the capital and the other half in

Chap. II.

MILITARY WARFARE.

Versailles, and within a circle of five leagues, has been composed of 1 1 brigades (of which two are cavalry) formed into two divisions. This force, under the command of General Changarnier, comprehends 60 battalions of infantry, contain¬ ing altogether 60,000 men, and 10 regiments of cavalry, or 50 squadrons, amounting to 6000 horses. To the different regiments are attached artillery, consisting of 20 batteries, of 120 guns, besides which there are the reserve of the Ecole Militaire, the Chateau of Vincennes, and the siege artillery for arming the forts surrounding Paris, of which about one-third are mounted in battery, and the remaining two-thirds in the arsenal at Bourge. To this imposing army of about 80,000 men may be added the Garde Nationale of Paris, composed of sixteen legions, containing 128,000 infantry and 1800 cavalry — ■ total 129,800 ; besides which the chemins de fer du Nord et de Bourge could within one day transport to the army of Paris an augmentation of 20,000 infantry with a numerous artillery, and in a few days the army of the Alps might, leav¬ ing a sufficient garrison in Lyons, also supply

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I.

the capital with a reinforcement of 25,000 men ; and thus could quickly be congregated under experienced generals a body of, say 125,000 disciplined and well-appointed troops, perfect in the art of war, ready to suppress domestic insur¬ rection, or to join very many thousands more for any foreign enterprise.

The Austrian Army

In time of war is composed of —

Men.

Infantry, 324 battalions .

489,240

Cavalry, 306 squadrons .

54,560

Artillery .....

26,104

Engineers, Staff, Marines, &c.

56,549

Grand total

626,453

Peace total of the Austrian army 378,552 1

In addition to the above, the Landwehr, forming the reserve of the regular army, is com¬ posed of a force sufficient, whenever required, to

1 The Austrian army at the present moment is deficient of its usual force by the temporary disbanding of 100,000 Hungarians, who have not yet been re-organized.

Chap. II.

MILITARY WARFARE.

augment the regiments of infantry from 3 battalions (their number in time of peace) to 5.

Instruction . — Previous to 1848 three or four divisions of the Austrian army were at irregular periods of three or four years assembled together in Gratz, Styria, or in Bohemia, for the purpose of military manoeuvres. This course of instruction lasted about a month, of which the first part was occupied in brigade movements and the latter in campaign evolutions, carried on in accordance with the strategetic features of the country. Since 1848 the Austrian army has had much better practice than can be afforded by camps of exer¬ cise. The troops, all placed on the war estab¬ lishment, are now formed into great corps, viz., in Italy, Hungary, and Bohemia. Of these three armies the two first are each composed of upwards of 100,000 men, that of Bohemia of about 60,000.

Up to the period of the war with Hungary the strength of the Imperial army was about 450,000 men, of which there was furnished by Hungary a force of about 150,000 men, consisting of 15

MILITARY WARFARE.

Part I.

regiments of infantry, 12 of hussars, and 13 of frontier troops. The latter, composed principally of Transylvanians, have almost all retained their fidelity to the Emperor.

The troops of each of these armies, under the command of their respective generals, have been in the habit of assembling for field manoeuvres in brigades and divisions, to each of which there has been attached an adequate proportion of artillery.

Garrisons. — The garrison of Vienna, pre¬ vious to 1848, consisted of —

Men.

2 Regiments of Infantry . . 3,784

5 Battalions of Grenadiers . . 4,625

6 Squadrons of Cavalry of the Line 730

8 ditto Hussars and Lancers . . 1,313

1 Regiment of Artillery . . 3,720

1 Brigade of Artillerie de Place . 480

The above garrison, at present on the war establishment, amounts to from 18,000 to 20,000 men, which by railroads to Bohemia now in ope¬ ration might in a few days be quadrupled.

Chap. II.

MILITARY WARFARE.

The Prussian Army.

The devastation, destruction of property, and heavy exactions which Prussia suffered while under the dominion of the French have been productive of extraordinary self-defensive ar¬ rangements on the part of the nation to prevent the recurrence of such calamities. Every Prussian male subject, without exception, from the King’s son downwards, is obliged to serve, in time of war, from the age of 18 to 24, in time of peace, between the ages of 20 and 25, for 3 years, in the army ; after which all men between 25 and 32, trained as above, belong to the Landwehr of the 1st class, and during that time are liable to be summoned annually for drill for 14 days. In case of war the Landwehr of this class are at once sum¬ moned to serve in the regular army, in or out of the kingdom, as required.

The Landwehr of the 2nd class, composed of all men trained as soldiers between the ages of 32 and 39, also assemble during war to garrison the fortresses.

20 MILITARY WARFARE. Part 1.