Theodicy; essays on divine providence

Front matter

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE

SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND

THE GIFT OF

Book The First

On the Limits of Human Reason in its Judgments regarding Divine Prcrvidence.

I. The Study of the Ways of Providence comforts man under

Temptation i

II. God invites Man to the Study of the Ways of Providence

by setting before him the Book of Natm-e and of History 6

III. He who believes in the Existence of God can have no valid reason for being disturbed in mind on account of the Difficulties presented by the Government of Providence. He loves, however, to ponder on those Difficulties that he may better know the Greatness of God ... 9

IV. The Difficulties presented by the Government of Divine Providence spring from two Sources, viz., 1. the Infinite Wisdom directing that Government, and 2. \he Comparative Ignorance oiM.sa . . . .13

V. Every Difficulty against the Government of Divine Providence, when solved, dispels Man's Ignorance ; when adored, it enhances his Virtue 20

VI. The Difficulties of explaining Divine Providence may be

overcome in two ways, viz., by Faith and by Season 22 xii Contents.

CRKB. PAGE

VII. Faith is approved by Reason, and adds strength to Man's

Understanding . ... 24

VIII. By abusing Reason, some turn it to their own ruin . . 29

IX. By trusting solely to Reason, some endanger their own

salvation . . . . ■ - ■ 33

X. Reason may be safely trusted when associated with Faith . 44

XI. By Revelation only could the Divine Plan of the Universe be made known, and human doubts as to the perfection of its Government be dispelled . , . 50

XII. In the Plan of the Universe there is something Infinite and Mysterious. Here Reason comes to a stop and intrusts man to Faith . . .... 56

XIII. Continuation. — It is impossible for man to arrive at the Perception of God in the Present Life .... 60

XTV. The Foiu: Limitations of Human Reason are recapitulated. First Limitation : — Reason can form no positive idea of God . . 67

XV. Second Limitation of Human Reason : — It cannot embrace the Infinite ...... 79

XVI. Third Limitation of Human Reason: — ^The Intellectual Capabilities of each human individual have a purely accidental measure .... . . 82

XVII. Fourth Limitation of Human Reason : — It can know only those beings which, independently of its own act, are presented to it for contemplation . . . 88

XVin. Continuation. — Our cognitive acts are accidental to the mind. The material of our cognitions is limited, and furnished to each individual by the Creator . . . g i

XIX. Continuation. — Three objects of cognition granted to man

in a certain measure determined by God's own free will 95

XX. Continuation. — Divine Origin of a part of Language . , gS

XXI. Continuation. — Man owes to God, together with Language, the knowledge of some principal Truths which have been preserved in the Traditions of the Human Race . 102

Contents

Xlll

CHAP.

XXII.

Book The Second

On the Laws according to which Temporal Good and Evil are distributed.

CHAP. PAGE.

I. Purpose of this Book : — To set forth the special Reasons which vindicate Divine Providence in the Permission and Distribution of Temporal Evil .... 181 xiv Contents.

II. Question of the Origin of Evil. — Question of the Nature of

Evil. — Utility of these Questions .... 185

III. The Existence of Evil is no derogation to the Divine Per-

fection, because Evil does not affect God, but finite natures only, and its nature is not positive . . .188

IV. Given a finite nature, the possibility of Evil is inevitable :

God Himself could not prevent it, because He cannot

do the absurd 195

V. Existence of Evil is not opposed to the Perfection and

Sanctity of God any more than its possibility . .200

VI. Vindication of Divine Justice against the objection that the descendants ought not to be made to suffer for the sin of their first parent ... ... 204

VII. A first vindication of the Divine Goodness, on the ground that Man, from want of competent knowledge, cannot, without rashness, so much as frame an objection against that Goodness .... ... 216

VlII. In the Permission of Adam's Sin, the Goodness of God shines forth in this, that, through the Grace of the Redeemer, there is now opened to man a source of spiritual contentment far outweighing the temporal evils caused by that Sin 220

IX. Recapitulation. — The question of the Distribution of Temporal Evil 226

X. As no Man is perfectly free from sin, so no Man can affirm that in the Distribution of Temporal Good and Evil he is wrongfully dealt with 229

XI. Under a perfect Government of the Universe, whose funda-

mental condition is that it should obtain the Maximum of Good, Natural Virtue has no claim to exemption from all suffering : it can only demand that from among all the series of causes and effects that are possible, that which is the most favourable to it shall be chosen . 233

XII. Human Nature remains corrupt even after the Person has

been justified ; Temporal Evils fall upon corrupt Nature,

Contents.

XV not upon the justified Person ; the true cause of these evils lies in the corruption of Nature itself ; God merely permits them ........ 240

XIII, The Permission of Temporal Evils, which are common to

good and bad alike, is not merely an act of Justice, but also an effect of Goodness, for they serve as a wholesome remedy to the moral infirmities common to all men 248

XIV. The Power of Prayer is a means offered to us by Christ for

removing all irregularities in the Distribution of Temporal Eva 254

XV. If we consider only the Natural Law, apart from the positive promises of God, we cannot prove that Temporal Evil must be distributed in accordance with Virtue and with Vice 258

XVI. Observation shows that Temporal Good has a continual tendency to be united with Virtue, and Temporal Evil, generally speaking, to follow Vice .... 268

XVII. Divine Justice sometimes delays the Punishment of the Wicked in the interests of Virtue, and thereby justifies the delay 276

XVIII. Many of those who complain of Providence, have a wrong notion of Virtue ; and yet Virtue, even as they consider it, is not without Temporal Advantages . .281

XIX. Why Temporal Good shows a tendency to accompany

natural Virtue, and Temporal Evil to accompany Vice 288

XX. Temporal Miseries serve to dispose Man to Supernatural

Virtue, and, consequently, to Supernatural Happiness 292

XXI. The very Complaints of those who, although abounding in Temporal Goods, accuse Divine Providence of not doing them Justice, are a justification of the same Providence 296

XXII, The Contentment which the true Christian finds in Temporal Afflictions, instead^of detracting from his right to an Eternal Reward, increases it .... 298

XXIII. Penalties, positive and natui'al, of Evil Doers. Goodness

XVI

Contents.

XXIV. The Question of the Distribution of Temporal Good and

Evil solved when vievifed in reference to the Supernatural 303

XXV. First Law of the Distribution of Temporal Good and Evil : — It must all serve unto the perfecting of the Church of Jesus Christ . . ..... 306

XXVI.

XXVII.

XXVIII.

Three Divine Decrees concerning the Execution of the First Lavif of the Distribution of Good and Evil in reference to Supernatural Virtue

Second Law of the Distribution of Temporal Good and Evil : — This Distribution is directed to educate Men to the Gospel 315

Three Divine Decrees concerning the Execution of the Second Law of the Apportionment of Temporal Good and Evil viewed in reference to Supernatural Virtue , 317

Book The Third

On tti'e Law of the Least Means applied to the Government of Divine Providence.

I. Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books

II. Other and more subtle Objections against the vindication of Providence as given above

III. The Solution of the above-mentioned Objections wiU be

general, that is, one for all . .

IV. The above Objections are drawn from uncertain and falla-

cious Principles . . ...

V. Three Laws of the Activity of Being

VI. The Law of Virtue, and the Law of Wisdom

VII. How the Law of Sufficient Reason may be identified with the Law of the Least Means ....

PAGE 339

387 405

Contents. xvii

VIII. In what sense it may be said that the Law of the Least

Means obtains in the world of real beings . . . 414

IX. The Solution of the Objections put forward is contained in

what has been said above ...... 444

X. Answer to the Allegation that " for God to do more or to

do less is all the same ; for neither costs Him anything" 456

XI, Positive Arguments, tending to prove that the Moral and Eudemonological Evils which occur in the Universe, far from militating against the Wisdom and Goodness of God, are a proof of them. Prehminary Notions on the way of measuring the Quantity of Action in order to ascertain if it be the least possible .... 467

* t, * To enable the reader at a glance to know which works of Rosmini are translated into English and which are not, the Italian titles have been appended to such as have not appeared in our own tongue.

THEODICY.— VOL. I.

ERRATA.

PAGE LINE

80 17 pretend .

CORRIGE.

. . . . pretend to

151 13 apparition semblance

303 After last line, insert : . . . . what relations he is linked

with beings other than

400 13 descrimination .... discrimination

420 21-2 nor in the second way, but nor in the third way, but in

in the third . . . the second

433 20 exists . . consists

ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

Book I

ON THE LIMITS OF HUMAN REASON IN ITS JUDG- MENTS REGARDING DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

Chapter I. The Stxxdy Of The Ways Of Providence Comforts Man Under Temptation

4. Undeserving the name of Wisdom I account that kind of knowledge which has no influence on the human heart, but accumulates idly in the mind like so much dead weight, without adding to the sum of man's good, or lessening his ills, and without satisfying, or even soothing with well-grounded hopes, the ceaseless longings of his nature, (i)

Granting, then, that only the knowledge which makes us better, and strengthens us, and raises our minds to salutary thoughts, has a right to be called Wisdom ; what better means could we have of acquiring so precious a treasure, than pondering on the Eternal Counsels apparent in the vicissitudes of

(i) On the nature of Wisdom see Rosmini's Essay On the Notion of Wisdom ("Dell' Idea deUa Sapienza") in the volume entitled Introduction to Philosophy ("Introduzione alia Filosofia"). — Translators'' Note.

B created things, and endeavouring to bring our own lives into harmony with them r

5. All the dangers and temptations which imperil man's fidelity to virtue, are, it seems to me, due to one sole cause, viz., the trouble and difficulty which man experiences in steadfastly adhering to the path of duty, in a state which deprives him of many enjoyments and subjects him to manifold suffering. Sensible good lures his appetite to such a degree that, through greed of possessing it, he forgets the law of righteousness ; suffering has so saddening and depressing an influence on him, that in the hope of ridding himself of the galling burden, or at least of escaping fi-om the extreme vexation of having his inclinations thwarted, he abandons himself to evil. But no sooner has he done so, than the stern voice of conscience rebukes him for having allowed his affections to deceive him, and for having violated that unbending law which fixes certain limits to the indulgence as well of human desires as of human aversions. Then there arises within him a fierce battle between two contrarj^ forces : the incorruptible conscience, which, as a heavenly herald, unceasingly proclaims in his heart the divine legislation ; and the bent of sensible nature, which, blind to the light of truth, will hear of nothing but what is agreeable and delightful to itself. This struggle continues until at last it comes to pass, that either he is brought back to virtue, or, being too faint-hearted to regain the mastery, becomes hardened in evil.

6. Now it is when a man has settled down in this lamentable state of moral perversion, that his mind enfeebled and unhappy, is apt to be led astray by study of Providence a Source of Comfort. 3

harbouring sinister thoughts against the high dispositions of Divine Providence, (i)

The ills that befall him, and the restrictions imposed on sensuous gratifications, are to him a source of endless annoyance and discontent. Unable to find a means of assuaging this misery, he casts the blame of it upon that God Who is the Supreme Disposer of all human things, and has, to the sinner's chiefest discomfort, graven on the inner tablets of the heart that solemn unalterable command: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Wretched is the man fallen into so deplorable an error, who has not the mental strength to understand that the bounds set to present enjoyments are rather apparent than real, wisely ordained by the best of legislators to the end that we may, at a most trifling sacrifice, hereafter secure an unstinted fulness of all that we can desire.

7. This doctrine is so consoling, that we ought to look upon it as good, and as such, embrace it with our hearts, even though our minds do not fully comprehend its truth. Happy, however, are they, who can

( I ) The influence of the passions on men's judgments has been well expressed in the axiom : Unusquisque judicat 'prout affectus est; which agrees in substance with the English Proverb: "The wish is father to the thought."

St. Augustine has said: "Be it known and understood that there would have been no error in Religion if man had not worshipped as his God, his own soul, or his body, or the desires of his fancy." (De Vera Relig. Ch. X., no. 18.) And in the 38th Chapter of the same book, no. 69, speaking of Infidel reasoners, he uses language equally strong, if not stronger. Hence one of the principal obstacles which stand in the way of rectifying the judgments of those in error, is the difficulty of rectifying their affections; for "Wisdom wiU not enter a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins." (Wisdom, i. 4.) But, as Christianity teaches, in order to rectify disordered affections, something more is necessary than mere human reasoning. — On the nature of himjan error, its causes, and its remedies, see The Origin of Ideas, from no. 1245 to 1377- — Tr.

not only desire or believe it, but also understand it. Does the infinitely wise Legislator, perchance, forbid us to investigate the reasons of the laws whereby He dispenses good and evil, if we are competent to do so ? On the contrary, he invites us all thereto.

8. But if our minds are unable to soar so high, what then ? Shall we have the audacity to dispute in all things with the Divine Intelligence? Or rather, should we not seek to render ourselves partakers of God's own Wisdom through Faith ? Let us strengthen our weakness by a firm reliance on the words of our Creator, which so strongly urge upon us abstinence and patience : abstinence from momentary delights, by reminding us of the eternal punishment prepared for intemperance, and patience under momentary sufferings, by promising us, in return for it, ineffable and eternal joys, (i) Nevertheless, it is, as I have said, perfectly lawful for every one to try, as best he may, to find out the sublime reasons of the government of Divine Providence: — a government wholly directed to the advantage of the good, who for love of righteousness often sacrifice sensible enjoyments, and willingly sub-

(I) It will be observed that the piurpose of this work is not to prove directly the existence of God and of Christian Revelation. The author takes both these things for gianted. But if an intelligent reader, who is animated by the pure love of truth, happens to be an unbeliever, there can be but little doubt that by following closely the Author's reasonings he will find in them such a cumulative mass of evidence, though indirect, in favour of the truth of both, as to make him feel that it would be very irrational of him to continue in his unbelief. If it were necessary, not a few cases could be mentioned of strong, clear-headed Italian thinkers, who, after falling into religious scepticism by drawing strictly logical deductions from the principles of the prevalent false philosophies taught them in their youth, have been reclaimed to CMstian Faith and life by an attentive and serious perusal of the works of this Author. — Tr.

study of Providence a Source of Comfort. 5

mitto sufferings; and to the confusion of sinners, whom Providence blesses with many good things, and protects from many evils, in such wise, however, as to leave to their own free will the power of preferring virtue to pleasure, or suffering to sin.

Chapter II

GOD INVITES MAN TO THE STUDY OF THE WAYS OF PROVIDENCE BY SETTING BEFORE HIM THE BOOK OF NATURE AND OF HISTORY.

9. The consideration of the plan which God follows in instructing mankind has often excited in me a thrill of sublime emotion. That plan consists in permitting that doubts, or rather difficulties, should arise in men's minds, in order that men may be roused to action, and moved to reflection and the investigation of truth.

We may imagine all this universe, both physical and moral, as a grand and sacred book opened by God before men's eyes, and full of queries and problems for the mind of man to solve, and so to increase the store of his knowledge and contentment. The pages of the great volume are unfolded gradually in the course of centuries : — the multiplication of the human race, its division into divers peoples, the dispersion of these peoples over the face of the earth, then in succession their mutual relations, their wars, their rivalries, their alliances ; and in particular the history of the Jewish People, which God directed with a peculiar Providence, intending to make it a figure, on a small scale, of what the entire human race was destined to beatalater period. The problems found in the earlier pages of this book are more easy to solve than those which come

Nature and History the Book of Providence. 7

after; nor is a new page ever opened until man has succeeded in deciphering those that precede.

It seems as if Infinite Wisdom delighted in adopting with human beings the process known as the Socratic Method, by which the most difficult truths are easily elicited from the lips of illiterate persons and of children; the secret simply consisting of a few interrogatives skilfully arranged in a certain order. In this way, I believe, does God act towards His creatures. He ordains that things which are marvellous, and wholly at variance with their modes of thinking, should happen before the eyes of men, that being struck with wonder at the novelty, they may feel prompted to direct their attention to investigating the hidden causes of things. He does not wish to say everything Himself, because, being good. He does not wish His beloved creature, man, to remain idle and inert, or to be deprived of the noble gratification and merit which he can gain by instructing himself in many things. To this end. He has endowed man with the faculty of knowing, that he may enjoy the honest pleasure of developing knowledge for himself, of being in part his own teacher. God would not assist him save in that for which his natural knowledge could not suffice. And what was this?

I St Man's faculty of knowing required to be stimulated and roused so as to be drawn forth into its own peculiar act;

2nd To progress in the wisdom necessary to man, this faculty required to have suitable queries or interrogations put to it by its Supreme Instructor;

3rd And it likewise required to be furnished with some general principles, to enable it, by their application, to arrive at the right answers to those questions. Furnished with these aids, man would be in a position to form for himself a science of a truly ennobling character. God provided him with them, and, having done so, left him, as I have said, freely to enjoy the honest and noble delight of being the author of his own wisdom.

Chapter III

HE WHO BELIEVES IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CAN HAVE NO VALID REASON FOR BEING DISTURBED IN MIND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVIDENCE. HE LOVES, HOWEVER, TO PONDER ON THOSE DIFFICULTIES, THAT HE MAY BETTER KNOW THE GREATNESS OF GOD.

lo. The very objections, then, the very difficulties, which the government of Divine Providence presents, are of advantage to man, and might be regarded as a sign and gift of Providence itself; provided only that on meeting with such enigmas, which after all are merely the result of his own ignorance, he do not, like a coward, shrink from their encounter, giving himself up at once for vanquished, and so prove unfaithftil to that Supreme Goodness which would have made use of this very means to enlighten him.

For so, in truth, is it wont to happen, that by being brought face to face with the like problems, men of upright heart are led to investigate and to discover the mighty secrets of Divine Providence. Firm in the belief of the existence of a Supreme and Infinite Being, they never doubt the goodness and wisdom of His rule. No difficulty, however impossible to solve by the aid of mere reason, can in the least degree shake the constancy of their faith, or cool the ardour of their love for that infallible Lord. Still, lo On Divine Providence.

they love to meditate on those diificulties with a view to their solution; for it is precisely by penetrating" into the depths of those wonderful ways by which God works out His designs, that man comes to understand how immeasurably the Divine Greatness transcends human littleness.

II. The delight which a wise man experiences in endeavouring to penetrate into reasons like these, is similar to, though of course far exceeding, that which is felt in scanning the conduct of some great man, who by vastness of genius, prowess, and sagacity in counsel, was immensely in advance of all his contemporaries. How pleasing it is to note the grand aims of such a man's enterprises, and the extraordinary and novel means whereby he achieved success ! The less apparently fit — nay, the more obviously unfit these m~eans appear for the attainment of the end in view, and the more unexpectedly and happily that end and the whole enterprise was accomplished, the greater is the delight afforded by the study of the singular and altogether exceptional ways by which it was brought about. How pleasing to identify one's own with those wonderfully sagacious and far-reaching views, which, before they were justified by the event, would perhaps have been condemned by everybody as eccentric, if not utterly preposterous !

Now, if even man when gifted with superior genius or character, very frequently acts in a way quite different from that which would be pursued by other nien, and which they sometimes think wrong or foolish, need we wonder if the Infinitely Wise Ruler of the universe very often disposes events in a manner which we find it hard to conceive, and which seems to us

Belief in God removes Difficulties. j i

absurd, merely because it is wholly at variance with our own notions of things ?

1 2 . All that is demanded of us in this m atter, therefore, is that we should treat God with the same respectful consideration which we very readily show towards great men. We say that a great man, an extraordinary genius, seems to be free from the restraint of common laws. We call an artist, a painter, a poet, original, for the very reason that he has been able to strike out for himself a path never before trodden by anyone — in other words, because, leaving behind him all vulgar precepts as suited only to insufiiciently secure intellects, he has raised himself on the powerful wings of a:n inspired nature, to flights which till then it would have been thought rash or impossible to attempt. Does this mean that he withdrew himself from subjection to the eternal rules ? No ; he only withdrew himself frotti subjection to such rules as were known to the men of his time, who, accustomed to measure everything by these alone, set down as foolish or abnormal, not merely what fell below that standard, but also what rose to an order one degree above it. (i)

(i) Peter Bayle, having set forth the objections wiiich the existence of evil suggests against Divine Providence, concluded by saying that he thought them unanswerable. Leibnitz, in his defence of Divine Providence, showed that the reason why Bayle could not extricate himself from those difficulties was because he had recourse to cavil instead of Logic. Among the many excellent things which Leibnitz said on this subject, we have the distinction of the arguments which can be brought against a given truth into demonstrative argiunents, and apparent and conjectural ones ; and he proved that to overthrow a truth which is certain either from reason or from faith, as for example the wisdom and goodness of God, no conjectural and apparent arguments are of any force, but only demonstrative arguments. Now no demonstrative argument against the Divine Attributes has ever been produced. " We have no need of a supernatural revelation " (says this great man) " in order to know that there is one only principle of aU things, perfectly good and perfectly wise. Reason gives us infallible demonstrations of this; consequently, aU objections drawn from the imperfections which we observe in the way in which things proceed in the universe rest merely on fallacious appearances. For, if we could only understand the universal harmony, we should see that what we are tempted to blame is part of the design most worthy to be chosen; in one word, we should see, and not merely believe, that what God has done is the best."

Whence he also infers that Bayle's attempt to represent reason as being in contradiction with Faith is a blunder; since, if his argument had any value, it would rather set reason in contradiction with itself. He wisely adds: "When there is question of opposing reason to an article of our Faith, objections amounting to mere likeUhood need not give us any trouble ; for, all the world agrees that mysteries are against appearances, and do not at all look like truth when viewed on the side of reason ; but it is enough that they contain no absurdity. Therefore, to refute them, demonstrations are necessary. This is, doubtless, the meaning of Holy Scripture when it declares that ' the wisdom of God is foolishness before men,' and when St. Paul remarks that the Gospel of Jesus Christ ' is foUy to the Greeks and a stumbling block to the Jews.' Clearly, truth cannot contradict truth, and the light of reason is a gift of God no less than the light of Revelation. Hence it is an approved principle in sound Theology, that the ' grounds of credibility ' (Motiva credihilitatis) establish once for all the authority of Holy Scripture before the tribunal of reason, which thenceforth implicitly accepts the teaching of that authority notwithstanding all apparent arguments to the contrary. — One of the causes by which Bayle may have been induced to beheve that the objections brought by reason against Faith could not be answered, is, that he seemed to be under the impression that God must be justified in a way similar to that which we see usually adopted when an accused party is defended before a human judge. But he forgot to reflect that at the tribunals of men, who cannot always get at positive truth, it is often necessary to decide the case upon probabilities and likelihoods, and in very great part M.'^iya. presuTnptions ox preconceptions ; whereas it is, as we have always said, agreed by aU that mysteries, although true, have not the appearance of truth " (Discours de la conformity de lafoi avec la raisonj. And the merit of Faith consists precisely in this, that we, on God's word, beheve that to be true which does not look like truth. Now, to know what God's word is, we have the " grounds of credibihty," which, taken in their entirety, form a most complete demonstration.

Chapter IV

THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE GOVERN- MENT OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE SPRING FROM TWO SOURCES, VIZ., I . THE INFINITE WISDOM DIRECTING THAT GOVERNMENT, AND 2. THE COMPARATIVE IGNORANCE OF MAN.

13. It is chiefly for the reason expressed in this heading that God-fearing men remain firm and constant in faith and in their love of the Supreme Being, even in the midst of tribulations. No accident, no reverse, however sudden, painful, contrary to our ways of thinking, and, apparently, even to the Divine Perfections, can have the least power to make us waver in our faith in those Divine attributes, when once we have well fixed in our minds the following very simple truth: —

God, being essentially possessed of an intelligence infinitely superior to ours, must naturally proceed in a way differing from, and far wiser than, ours; His rules of action must be such as, at the outset, appear to our short-sighted minds opposed, or at least ill-suited, to His purposes. If in His works He were merely to follow a mode of thinking like that of man, we should have no sign whereby to know and admire His Wisdom. Our minds would no longer be able to ascend from the traces of Divine Wisdom impressed on creatures to the Creator Himself. Finding in things and events nothing but a ray of wisdom, uniform and commensurate with man's own, we could indeed infer from it that an intelligence governs the universe, but only an intelligence limited as that of man is ; and thus there would be an end to our conception of the existence of God, the Infinite Intelligence.