Problems of the self; an essay based on the Shaw lectures given in the University of Edinburgh, March 1914

Front matter

(Cornell Ittitieratta Hibrarg

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Chapter I Page

iNTEODtJCTORY 1

Interest of the question (1) ; its importance for metaphysics (2-4) ; objections to the feasibility of the enquiry, and to the necessity for it, answered (4-7) ; terminology (7-8) ; statement of the principal theories of the nature of the self with a view to the discovery of the best plan of procedure (7-11) ; proof that it is necessary to begin with experiences (11-15).

Chapter II

Impossibility of defining psychology, negatively, by reference to the non-physical (16-18) ; the distinction between ' act ' and ' object ' explained in the instance of cognition (18-22) ; the sources of psychological evidence, and the nature of proof attainable through introspection (22-30) ; introspective analysis of cognition (30-31) ; transition to the tripartite division of mind, and discussion of (1) meaning of terms, (2) common characteristics of conscious elements, (3) logical principle of division (31-36) ; reply to objections (36-38) ; formula for the positive principle of the constitution of mind (at any moment) derived from the above (38-40) ; problem whether a ' soul ' is also required (40-42) ; outline of plan of argument in this book (42-44) ; points to remember (44-45).

Chapter III

Point of view of discussion (46) ; necessity for considering the implications of the distinction between body and mind by direct analysis (46-47) ; discussion of the 'internal sense,' in its traditional meaning (47-52) ; its literal meaning defended (52-53) ; the objects of the ' internal sense,' on this interpretation, although subjective in a

ix special sense, agree with the objects of the other senses in being present to mind, but not parts of it (53-57) ; reasons why there is a peculiar difficulty in distinguishing experiences from the objects of the internal sense- shown in a discussion of feeling (including emotion and pleasure-pain), multiple personality, James's view of personal identity, and activity (57-75) ; the sense, if any, in which oonsciousness occupies position (75-77) ; reply to a fundamental objection (77-79) ; summary (79-80).

Chapter IV

Plan of argument in Chapters V.-VIII. (81) ; the usual view that experiences of feeling or will have the primacy in the self (81-82) ; meaning of the term ' feeling ' (82-83) ; discussion of the primacy of feeling as defended in the argument from origin (83-87) ; from the ' subjectively-subjective ' character of feeling (87-92) ; from ' interest ' (92-93) ; from the significance of moods (93-94) ; Mr. Bradley's view (94-100).

Chapter V

Course of discussion in Chapters V.-VII. (101) ; common-sense belief in the primacy of will (101-102) ; 'will ' may mean either volition or activity-experiences generally (102-103) ; plan of argument in this chapter as preliminary to its successors (103-104) ; introspective analysis and description of activity experiences (104-110) ; discussion of views of Berkeley in this connection (110-113) ; and of Munsterberg (113-115) ; problem whether activity experiences are causes, and Hume's arguments on this question (115-123) ; more precise enumeration of activity experiences, and definition of will in the narrower sense (123-126).

Chapter VI

Purposive behaviour probably the best criterion of the existence of mind, but this no proof of the primacy of will (127-128) ; meaning of 'purpose,' 'end,' and 'teleology' (128-133); psychology and biology (133) ; the meaning of 'purpose' in biology (133-134); the inconclusiveness of the negative arguments in favour of neo- vitalism (134-138) ; insufficiency of the positive arguments owing to the fact that they rely upon an unduly strained analogy between ' purposive behaviour ' and conscious purpose (138-144) ; meaning of ' teleology ' in biology (144-149) ; fundamental distinction between psychical and organic categories (149-151).

CONTENTS xi

Chapter VII Page

The Primacy of the PeactIoal Reason .... 152

Relation of the Practical Reason to the Will (152-153) ; the phrase indicates certain metaphysical arguments (163) ; criticism of Kant's proof of the primacy of the Practical Reason in the OrUique of Practical Reason (153-160) ; and of his arguments in the Critique of Judgment (160-165) ; criticism of Fichte's arguments (165,-174) ; and of Schopenhauer's (174-183) ; and of Bergson's (183-189) ; summary of results of Chapters IV.-VII. , denying the primacy of the will, and defending the analysis of CJhapter II. (190).

CHAPTER VIII The Self as Knoweb .... . . 191

Reasons for adopting a somewhat different plan of procedure in this chapter, and account of the scope of the chapter (191-193) ; summary of preceding argument, and of its presuppositions (193-195) ; the problem of the content of cognitive acts (195-198) ; is an introduction to the fundamental problem of this chapter (198-200) ; problem whether the direct analysis of an act of knowledge implies a knower other than the act (200-201) ; criticism of Lotze's arguments (201-206) ; self-consciousness and self-cognition (206-210) ; criticism of Mr. Bertrand Russell's view (210-212).

CHAPTER IX The TJnitt and Continuity of the Self . . . .213

Importance of unity and continuity in the theory of self-hood, and justification of delay in discussing it (213-215) ; plan of this chapter (215) ; preliminary considerations concerning (1) the preponderance of cognition, conation, or feeling in personalities of different types, and (2) concerning the danger of exaggerating the unity and continuity of the self (215-217) ; cognitive unity (217-218) ; Kant's proof and further explanations (218-223) ; criticism of Mr. Joachim (223- 229) ; limitations to cognitive unity (229-231) ; development (231- 232) ; logical character of cognitive unity (232-235) ; limitations to cognitive unity further explained (235-237) ; unity and continuity of feeling (237-238) ; the sentiments (239-240) ; reason in feeling and the logic of the sentiments (240-242) ; the unity and continuity of conation (242-244) ; summary of argument (244-245) ; personal identity (245-247) ; and the body (247-248).

Chapter X

The problem of the conditions of reteutiveness (249-250) ; the physiological theory (250-256) ; psychical dispositions (256-257) ;

xii PKOBLEMS OF THE SELF

and subconsciousness (257-268) ; arguments in favour of the existence of subconsciousness derived from unconscious cerebration, psycho-analysis, acquired dexterity, the summation of stimuli, sense-perception, and stored knowledge, are intended to explain the fact of continuity (257-263) ; but are inconclusive (263-265) ; the direct arguments more convincing (265-267) ; the range of explanation in terms of subconsciousness (267-268) ; the term applies to acts (268- 269) ; possibility that the observable continuity of the self need not require any further explanation (269-271).

CHAPTER XI MuLTiPiiE Personality 272

This kind of evidence supplies an invaluable test of the truth of a theory of the self (272) ; general discussion of dissociation (1) in evanescent, and (2) in more permanent forms (272-277) ; division of the types of cases (277-278) ; consideration of the evidence for the dissociation of personality with special reference to memory and retentiveness, organic sensation, the unity of endeavour and of feeling, (278-289) ; the problem of estimating the evidence for dissociation inio personalities considered (289-293) ; probabilities suggested by the Beauchamp case (293-297) ; discussion of the problem whether a plurality of personaljj^ies can co-exist in the same body (297-300) ; difficulties raised by multiple personality especially important in connection with the soul substance (300-301) ; concluding comparison with normal personality (301-303).

CHAPTER XII Discussions of the Sbbf as Substance in Modeen Philosophy 304

Necessity for considering certain historical theories on this question (304-305) ; great divergence of views (305-306) ; the cogito of Descartes and its implications (306-310) ; Locke's ambiguous position and the conflict between empiricism and rationalism (310- 319) ; Locke's interpretation of spirit (319-321) ; and of personal identity (321-324) ; Hume on personal identity (324-326) ; and on substance (326-328) ; and on the permanent ego (328-331) ; Kant's argument concerning the paralogisms of Pure Reason (331-334^ ■ Hegel (335-336).

Chapter XIII

Relation of this chapter to its predecessors (337-338) ; definitions of substance following Descartes, and interpretation (338-339) ■ -0. merely logical definition of substance impossible (339-341) ; substance implies the existent and not merely objectivity (339-343) ; imaginary

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

substances (343-344) ; the existent is subjectively known through the senses, and is objectively the particular (344-346) ; this implies stuff or SX17, (346) ; virhich is further explained (346-348) ; the unity or identity of substance (348-349) ; examples showing the apparent arbitrariness of our standards of this unity (349-351) ; the difficulty of the margin (352-3S6) ; independent existence of substances and uselessuess of transcendent explanation (356-357) ; application of the general doctrine of substance to organisms (357-358) ; and to the soul as the necessary unity of experiences (358-362) ; the soul pre-eminently a substance (362-365) ; objections (365-367) ; immortality (367-370).

INDEX 371

Chapter I

It is a truism that no study is more perplexing and, at the same time, more interesting to a man than the study of mankind and, in the end, of himself. Even if the pressure of the day's business leaves the average man but little time for self-reflection, he is still intensely interested in the personality of others, and the most obstinate questionings which beset him concern his soul and theirs. Moreover, the great objects of human interest affect personality and are tinged with personality. It is unnecessary to prove this statement by referring to the drama, the novel, history, biography. The thing is too obvious to require comment, and it is enough to illustrate it by mentioning a curious fact. Even those who in general have no great fondness for the study of biography are more keenly interested in the personal history of the great writers in literature than in their works, or, at any rate, are interested in a degree out of all proportion to the intrinsic interest of the careers of those authors. How else is it possible to explain the mass of literature and the years 'of discussion devoted to the shadowy author of the Odyssey, or to the stray hints which are all that is known of the career of Shakespeare ? Ivfor is the reason very far to seek. As Samuel Butler says, ' Every man's work, | whether it be literature, or music, or pictures, or ^

1 B architecture, or anything else, is always a portrait of himself, and the more he tries to conceal himself the more clearly will his character appear in spite of him.' ^ That is the truth unless, perhaps, such sciences as mathematics or physics are excepted. It may be a rare thing for the artist to be more interesting than the whole body of his work, but his character and career usually excite more attention than those of any one of his creations, and thus it is that the self is central among the things which touch the spirit of man.

It does not follow, of course, that the majority of mankind are strongly attracted by the philosophical problems which cluster round the self. There are some minds to which any metaphysical discussion is stale and unprofitable. They may admit that philosophy began with wonder, but they marvel still more at the fact of its continuance. In the broad sense in which every man is a metaphysician he is occupied, probably, with the metaphysics of self to a greater degree than with any other philosophical problem. He would be less than human if he never asked himself, What is a man ? What is the soul ? What is this miracle of three, or thirty, or threescore years ? Nor could he fail to ask such questions so long as either theology or religion continues. Eeligion must raise the question whence man is and whither he goes, and it does not require a professional philosopher to point out that there is but little sense in asking such a question unless there is some comprehension of what it is that has come and what is about to depart. But the sense in which every man is a metaphysician is, after all, a very shallow one. Every man dallies with metaphysical conjectures, but there are very few who try to think philosophical problems out, resolutely and to the end, and unless a man make this attempt he has not begun to be a philosopher.

^ The Way of all Flesh, p. 62.

At the same time, if and so far as metaphysical problems are really felt and earnestly attacked, the problems of the self deserve to take precedence of all others. If the self is central in point of human interest, it is also central in point of metaf)hysical importance. Nearly every philosophical problem has some bearing on the self, and conversely the most distinctive of the problems of the self are among the widest and the most important in philosophy. Pluralism and monism, individuality and value, realism and idealism are each, in a very distinctive fashion, problems of the self. The relation of selves to the Absolute is the hardest problem of idealistic monism, for, on that theory, the self is the most obstinate of all appearances. The ultimate reality of selves has been the basis of idealistic pluralism from the days of Leibniz onwards. And it is needless to elaborate in the other cases. These are perennial problems, but it is also fair to claim that the problems of the self bear a peculiarly close relation to much that is most characteristic of contemporary philosophical discussion. The importance of volition and the relation of body to mind are certainly among these problems, and both have a direct and obvious connection with the self. There are others besides the pragmatists who stoutly contend that action, conation, will are the basis of reality, and cling to the belief that ago, ergo sum deserves to succeed the Cartesian cogito. Again the contemporary discussion of the problem of Body and Mind tends more and more to exalt the importance of the self. We hear less of the conservation of energy, and more of the growth of living energy : less of dynamics, and more of purpose : less of atoms, and more of cells : less of natural selection, and more of progressive creation. These arguments, indeed, may prove mistaken in the end, but their tenor, at all events, is significant. The tendency, a generation ago, was to explain the self in terms of something else. The increasing tendency, nowadays, is to explain other thmgs m terms of the self. '

Briefly, then, if any metaphysical problems are interesting, those of the self are most likely to be so : if any are important, those of the self must be among them. And there can be no serious objection to the feasibility of discussing these problems. There are, of course, superficial objections to the discussion of any metaphysical problem whatever, but these objections have not deterred metaphysicians in the past, and will not deter them in the future. They are easily refuted, and, in any case, have no peculiar relevance to this enquiry. The objections which may be raised, in limine, to a specific discussion of the self hardly require detailed consideration, although they certainly deserve a passing mention.

It may be maintained that the self, as it were, shines by its own light, that every one knows what it is, and that instead of finding, or inventing, problems in it we should restrict ourselves to the task of showing how other things may be explained in terms of it. But has this argument ever been seriously held ? On certain metaphysical theories, it is true, the self has been proclaimed the clue to the riddle of existence. It is a ' transparent unity,' and therefore we cannot see into it ; we can only see through it. Certainly it would be the rashness of mere folly to deny that the self, when understood, may prove itself the master-key of philosophy. But, if it is so, it owes its position not to its simplicity, and not to the ease with which it will fit, but to the fact, already mentioned, that most philosophical problems reach their climax in it. There are no idealists who believe that the self is transparent to the casual observer. A veil of obscurity intervenes before it can show itself as transparent as it really is, and that is enough for a beginning. In any

INTEODUCTORY 5

case, no one can really believe that there are no problems of the self. The writers ^ who contend that the self must be ultimate (because it is so extremelyparadoxical) and those who contend that it cannot be ultimate (for precisely the same reason) do not argue wholly at random, and it does not require a believer in the Hegelian dialectic to see that this is a case which demands enquiry.

Although the argument that a man must know himself better than anything else is frequently maintained by philosophers, neither Descartes, nor M. Bergson, nor any other exponents of it would conclude that discussion of the self does not involve problems. After all, the better a thing is known the more enigmatical it becomes. It gives rise, not to fewer, but to more intelligent questions. And why is it easier to understand the self than to understand other things ? There is no reason why knowledge should know its like more easily, or better, than anything else. If, in point of fact, the surest knowledge is that of the self, the reason lies, not in the necessity of the case and not ih the nature of knowledge, but in the superior interest of the psychical and the greater preoccupation with it. And this fact, after all, may be dispi^ted. It is just as important for any one to know himself and his feUows as it is for him to know anything else. He is as dependent on society as he is on bread ; he requires a knowledge of stocks and shares as well as of stocks and stones. But the science of psychology is in its infancy when compared with the physical sciences, and that, at least, is a fact very hard to reconcile with the other ' fact ' that is presumed. For the rest, it is unnecessary to consider the futile statement that we must know what the self is, because we are selves. We have opportunities, that

' Of., e.g.. Dr. M'Taggart {Studies in HegeUcm Cosmology) and Mr, Bradley {Appearance and Reality) respectively.

is all; and opportunities for knowledge are not

knowledge. , ^i ^ ^.i, ij?

Indeed, for every one who contends that the sell is not a fit subject for study, since it contains no mystery and involves no problems, there are many who maintain that it is useless to study it because it is the most inexplicable mystery in the world. 'One may understand the Cosmos but never the Ego: the Self is more distant than any star.'^ So Mr. Chesterton, and so, I do not doubt, many who agree with him, and many who do not. This extreme, however, is scarcely more Ukely to be true than the other. Mr. Chesterton himself does not scruple to maintain that while it is possible to understand causes and effects in our own persons it is never possible to understand them in a laboratory, and those who argue in his vein might easily bring forward plausible reasons for believing that the self is less mysterious than the multiplication table. There are problems of the Cosmos and special problems of the millions of Egos which, as Mr. Chesterton seems to forg'et, are included in it. And there are no a priori reasons which condemn in advance the attempt to solve such problems. Problems of the self are on the same footing, in this respect, as others in philosophy. A philosophy can never be judged by its fruits, and therefore it is unwise to raise the question what fruit it can be expected to bear. No philosophical discussion, except one of a very limited scope, can hope for finality or maturity. But if there is no season of harvest in philosophy, there is at least the possibility of perpetual growth. A philosopher is like an explorer. He never knows his luck. If there is something to be discovered, after all he may find it. If he fails he may at least inform others that certain routes are impracticable or require better equipment. There is need for the venture

and there is room for hope. That is all that need be said.

For purposes of clearness it is necessary to make an explanation with regard to terminology. Generally speaking, the words ' person,' ' soul ' or ' mind ' may be regarded as synonyms for the self, and it would be mere pedantry to avoid using them as synonymous, unless there is some special liability to ambiguity in the particular context in which they are employed. Indeed, the words ' consciousness ' and * mentality' might sometimes be used in a similar sense, although with some inappropriateness and, in the latter case, with a wilful disregard of euphony. It is well to remember, however, that these terms are only approximately synonymous with the word * self.' The two latter are abstract rather than concrete, if strictly employed, and, even if they are employed loosely, they may still imply a conception of the content of the self which might well be disputed. They imply that the self is nothing but consciousness, and this, whether true or not, is very far from being universally admitted. ' Person,' ' soul ' and ' mind ' come nearer to the meaning of 'self,' but each of them has a shade of significance which it is desirable to avoid at the outset of an enquiry like the present. The 'soul' and the 'self may mean the same thing, but the latter is humbler and less steeped in extraneous associations ; and, consequently, it ought to be used by any one who desires an unaccented reading of the problem. The word ' soul ' seems too aristocratic to have its ancestry scrutinised or its income assessed.

It breathes the rarefied atmosphere of poetry and theology. It leads, perforce and at once, to questions of vitalism, and the meaning of the indiscerptible substance. I am far from wishing to assert that the self is not a noble thing, but when we speak of the soul we are apt to forget that it may also be ignoble, and, what is worse, occasionally dull. Nor do I believe that the problems of the spiritual substance and the vital principle are irrelevant to a discussion of the nature of the self. On the contrary, I intend to discuss them. The question is one of emphasis, and that emphasis may be all-important. 'A discussion of the soul makes it necessary to proceed at once to these questions. A discussion of the self need not approach them until after a more prolonged and more careful survey. Similarly, the term 'self is broader ^ and freer, though not looser, than either 'person' or ' mind.' ' Mind,' in common parlance, refers almost exclusively to the intellect, and, although the intellect is a part of the self, it is but a part, in the end, and possibly not the most important part. 'Person,' again, lays special emphasis upon certain ethical and legal implications {e.g. upon the degree of memory implied in the? continuance of responsibility), and, although these characteristics certainly deserve consideration, it is desirable to avoid a terminology which brings them into unduly high relief. The word ' self,' then, includes what these other words include, and is preferable because it does not dictate the road which the discussion must follow.

It would clearly be futile to begin to discuss problems of the self without making a preliminary attempt to define what is meant by that term. The sage remark that a definition is the culmination rather than the starting-point of an enquiry is very properly disregarded even by those who make it. A preliminary definition is only an indication of the route to be followed, and therefore it is indispensable. The chief difficulty, in this as in so many other cases, is^ to find a definition which merely asks questions without begging them, and, probably, it is never possible to ask the right sort of question without begging or assuming something. Certainly, the self cannot be defined in such a way as to satisfy all parties, but it does not follow that there can be no consensus of opinion as to the right line of enquiry into its nature. Different schools may agree in this, though their conclusions are as the poles asunder. Let us consider how that is possible.

The accounts of the self which are found in the works of different philosophers are very various and frequently conflicting. In "proof of this it is sufficient to cite a few instances. According to Hume, the self is a succession of impressions and ideas which, fleeting and perishing, are in a perpetual flux and movement. ThiSi view, variously amended but not transformed, has its adherents to-day, and is one of the current interpretations of the theory which Lange has described as 'Die Psychologic ohne Seele.' Others, again, who are by no means followers of Hume are in substantial agreement with him at least in one respect. According to Mr. Bradley, 'the Ego that pretends to be anything either before or beyond its concrete psychical filling is a gross fiction and mere monster, and for no purpose admissible.' ^ Such a statement is very far from implying the way of impressions and ideas, but it clearly expels any Arch- Ego or other intruder who is not an ordinary guest in the mind's presence-chamber, entering in the usual way. And it is irrelevant whether the ' monster ' has the shape of a permanent impression, as it had for Hume, or whether it adopts some other form.

Many, however, would deny that the vehemence of Mr. Bradley's assertion gives it any claim to acceptance, and they would dispute it with at least equal vigour. It is true that Lotze^ declares that when he calls the self a ' simple and indivisible substance,' he is speaking ' in all innocence,' and merely means to express the fact of its indivisible unity. Such a theory is indeed incompatible with Hume's, for Hume meant to imply that a self is only

' Appearance and Reality, p. 89. ^ Metaphysic, English translation, vol. ii. p. 173.

10 PROBLEMS OF THE SELF ohai..

indivisible because it is divided. But it is not necessarily incompatible with Mr. Bradley's. The fact remains, however, that many would agree with Lotze in a sense that is not so innocent. They would take him to mean, as he certainly said, that a unity of consciousness must have a ' centre,' ' and, with or without warrant, they would take this 'centre' to imply something either beyond or before the concrete psychical fiUing. They would assert that knowing without a knower is a contradiction in terms. They would maintain that no single experience can be understood without the assumption of a self, and that the self must be more than any or all such experiences. This interpretation may be wrong, but it is prevalent, and, at least on the surface, it is not nonsense. It is in fact the usual view, whether or not it is capable, in the -end, of withstanding logical criticism. I do not know precisely what Dr. M'Dougall ^ means by the ' non-mechanical teleological factor ' which he finds requisite for life in general and the soul in particular, but I do know that, in the form in which he means it, neither Hume nor Mr. Bradley could possibly accept it. There is, in other words, a profound opposition between those who maintain that the self cannot exist except within or between experiences, and cannot have any other content, and those who maintain that it .must also be something more, if, indeed, it does not he wholly outside such experiences.

And there are many other views. The late Mr. P. W. H. Myers, in his Human Personality, defends the theory that the self which is known is but a fragment which, when supplemented by the subconscious and by other hitherto unexplored tracts of mind, will be seen to belong to an astonishing and supra-personal whole. The grounds for this theory

' Appearance and Reality, p. 169. '^ Body and Mind, p. 364.

I INTRODUCTORY 11

are lacking, but its possibility is beyond dispute. Similarly there is the ' transmission theory ' in its two forms. In the first of these forms the body is regarded as a sort of prism which breaks the white beams of the eternal soul into the variegated personality we are accustomed to consider ours. In the second form the body is regarded as an organ of concentration. Consciousness is really diffused. The body collects it, and so creates those fickle, partial, paradoxical unities which are the men who see before and after. Either theory magnifies the office of the body, and neither stands alone in doing so. In one of his Essays in Radical Empiricism Professor James remarks : ' So far as we are " persons," and contrasted and opposed to an " environment," movements in our body figure as our activities ; and lam unable to find any other activities that are ours in this strictly personal sense.' ^ The plain implication, from which there is no evidence that James would have shrunk, is that the personal and individualised self is the body, and although this view is rarely held (at any rate upon psychological grounds), it cannot safely be neglected.

Moreover, there is the doctrine that the self consists of that in which interest is felt, a theory which seems to imply a peculiar view of the relations of meum and tuum. But the theories mentioned are enough to illustrate the great disparity between the different philosophical theories of the nature of the self, and in view of this disparity it might well appear hopeless to try to begin this enquiry in a way that all parties would recognise to be fair and just. The disparity of the conclusions, however, does not necessarily indicate that there is no common ground in the way the problem is attacked. In the theories which have been mentioned there are two main lines of cleavage,