Germany in defeat; a strategic history of the war. First [-fourth] phase

Front matter

By

Count Charles de Souza Major Haldane Macfall

CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Contents

The Personal Note ix

CHAPTER

I. The position of the Germans at the opening of

II

To journalism can be paid this great tribute, that it has made clear certain basic truths to the wide world. There is no delusion, except amongst the hopelessly ignorant, that Germany made her war for colonial expansion. Germany made her war with one deliberate purpose, a purpose that she has pursued with dogged resolution and unflinching courage and relentless intention for a generation — World Domination. The chief end of all Grerman preparation for war was the destruction of the mastery of the English-speaking peoples. AU other action was aimed at this supreme achievement. It was impossible to arrive at this ambition without first destroying France. Whether, having crushed France, the Prussian intended to take territory from her is merely academic discussion and useless guesswork. Germany's design was to crush France swiftly once and for ever, that she might thenceforth proceed to her attack on the English-speaking peoples — first the British and then the American.

MATTERS INTRODUCTORY xix

Whether Britain had stood aloof from her war with France or not, Germany intended to strike down British power. Had Britain stood aside Germany's work had been the easier — that was all. Germany's dogged scheme of befooling America is the guide to what would have been her handling of Britain.

It followed that France was bound to bear the brunt of Germany's attack. Whatever else happened, this was sure. And so it has proved. Russia was pledged to come to France's aid ; but Russian help could not come soon enough to save France if the German plan had succeeded. The entrance of Britain did more to help France in these perilous days, not only for the prodigious moral effect on France, not only for the great service done to France by Britain's small army, but by that sea-power which has damaged Germany more and more every day that the war was prolonged.

In challenging Britain at sea, Germany tried a fall with nature. The Germans challenged Destiny — or they rushed in where heroes fear to tread. Napoleon wrecked his great dreams of conquest by wasting his strength in challenging the sea-power of a sea-folk, as the Spaniard wrecked his all before him. The Prussian is to-day the victim of the like conflict with world-forces. The challenge to Britain at sea has been his ruin. The German is no more

XX GERMAJSTY IN DEFEAT

capable of sea-power than an elephant. Sea-power does not come from bookish theories and an elaborate organisation ; sea-power is an instinct, arising out of the seafaring habit, and is as much compelled on a people as the necessity for that people to win its bread upon the waters. All the professors, aU the encyclopaedias, all the admiralty offices, all the gold lace, all the submarine murders in creation cannot yield it. The master-key to admiralty is the sea-genius of a whole people.

Germany's machine-made effort to master the seas is of a part with her machine-made nightmare of world-dominion. A people does not become a world-empire by the book. World-dominion grows out of the very marrow and instinct of a race, and needs generations for its building. The German genius, but lately freed from serfdom, thought, like a parvenu, to become an imperial force by mechanical organisation. The parvenu needs always to be forgiven for his vulgarities ; they are part of his energies. But being lately risen out of slavery, it was inevitable that her valour should be the valour of the slave-folk, not of the master breeds. It was inevitable that chivalry should be denied to her, and that her wars should be fought foully. It was inevitable that she should think her navies to be made of master-stuff by shirking battle with her enemies' navies and accounting acts of piracy upon

:\IATTERS INTRODUCTORY xxi

unarmed merchant craft as being acts of valour and of war. It was inevitable that she should employ falsehood and treachery in her acts of war, since it calls for a long tradition of mastery to rise above the habits of the slave -folk.

Surely history can show no more tragically pathetic sight than a people arming themselves to go forth and conquer the world, who have not yet arrived at self-government — a people so lacking in master-valour that they have fallen behind the leading democracies of the world, and have not had the courage to acquire government over themselves ! The German peoples have been gulled into political slavery ; but that such a subordinate people should march forth to overwhelm the great democracies is surely the maddest venture outside Bedlam ! Nevertheless, so it has come about.

However, of prodigious value as the British alliance, above all Britain's sea-power, has been to France, we must not let our natural interest in the British achievement give us a false proportion. The fact remains that Prance had to bear the brunt of that stupendous onrush of Germany's vast legions, which the Prussians had prepared for a generation wherewith to overwhelm her, before she could gain help on any large scale. So far the world at large has probably realised the general state of affairs. But we now arrive at a significant part of the crisis in xxii GERMANY IN DEFEAT

the destiny of Western Europe which is not generally grasped. France not only bore the onrush of Germany's legions with consummate strategic ability, but she came within an ace of crushing the German armies very early in the campaign on Belgian soil ; and within a few weeks had not only stalled off the German attach, but had defeated the German arms in a series of battles that decided the destinies of European civilisation. In bald terms, with only a small contingent of British troops, and before Russia could come to her assistance, France had defeated and flung back the German armies, had taken the initiative, and had brought Germany to a state of siege. Further, France, had she cared to make the stupendous sacrifice, could have smashed the German armies to pieces. In other words, Germany is a defeated country, and at any moment she can be crushed.

It will be said that Germany is not yet crushed, and that her crushing may cost more loss of life than her defeat. That is perfectly true, just as it was true that the crushing of France after Sedan required as many months as the disaster of Sedan took weeks. It is equally true that Germany's defeat is not complete until she is crushed. The real danger lies not in the losses that may have to go towards her crushing, but in the patching up of a peace that will leave her the power to strike again.

MATTERS INTRODUCTORY xxiii

III

There is yet another political factor that stands forth in this war, not wholly grasped even to-day, but necessary to a full appreciation of the war.

There is a muddle-headed idea abroad that Germany has, so far, held her own and is in a dominant position because she has not suffered any large dramatic loss — has known no Sedan — that not being invaded she holds the key to mastery. And, to do them justice, the General Staff has boasted this splendour to the German people with no uncertain breath. But when the General Staff take off their coats and put their heads together in secret conclave, they talk no such balderdash. Yet the boast has its value, and for a quaint reason.

The inability of journalists to understand the full significance of the strategy of the war was rendered still more obtuse by the cunning and unscrupulous skill of the German Staff in the manipulation of the foreign — especially of the neutral — Press. But there was a more intense blindness and deafness inherent in journalism due to the wide Moltke-olatry of the military world since 1870.

Now, of all the delusions of man, perhaps the most difficult to cast forth is an " olatry." Whether a man love his idols or fear his idols, for some mad reason he is as unwilling to test them as he is unreasoning in his worship. And it is significant that, xxiv GERMANY IN DEFEAT

hating Prussia as most of the writers on the war hate her, there is scarce one of them that discusses or approaches the war except with Moltke-olatry upon the altars of his faith. There is scarce one who does not write as if Prussia were the Lord of War and the greatest of the warrior breeds ; there is scarce one who does not reason upon the war without looking at it in the terms of Germany. There is scarce one who does not reason as if Germany held the initiative and controlled the movements of the campaign !

Indeed, we find even military writers urging conscription and the imitation of the German methods and system upon us, at the very moment when we are giving our life's blood to destroy for ever those methods and that system !

The fact is that the sudden triumph of Prussia in 1870 tricked and dazzled Europe. That the Prussians blundered and botched their way to victory, that victory came often against the plan laid by Moltke, that Prussian strategy was successful because the French strategy was even more bliindering and botchy, was wholly unrealised. Prussia succeeded ; and the world set up Moltke as the supreme genius in war, and the Prussian as the supreme warrior. So we get aU this bombastic drivel in the Press about the War Lord and the like, which reads pretty chUdish to-day. Yet the creed has been

MATTERS INTRODUCTORY xxv

gabbled for so long that it seems impossible for the writers to shake themselves free of the banality. We, and Europe with us, are as responsible for the mad conceit of Prussia — if so blatant and tragic an egoism can be called by so trivial and light a word as conceit — as is Prussia herself. She came to look upon herself as invincible, and, to do her justice, she did all that lay in her power to make herself invincible. But she knew that the vast machine of war into which she had converted her people and her wealth and industries had this limitation — she must overwhelm her enemies with a rush, or fall. Time would always be against her wherever she struck. It was vital to Germany to win great victories and crush her enemies at the very outset of the war. To see what Europe, under Moltke-olatry, took to be the significance of the strategy of the opening of the war, there is no need to quote the fatuous editors who, last September, made the land ridiculous, but let us take the words of one of our most brilliant military writers in this week that I pen these lines : " The first of these expectations was amply realised " (i.e., great victories at the outset of the war). " The strong fortress of Liege was completely in German hands within ten days of the first shots. The full mobilisation of the German forces had not been completed a fortnight when the greater part of Belgium was securely held. The xxvi GERMANY IN DEFEAT

capital, Brussels, was entered and occupied immediately afterwards. The first French armies gathered to meet the shock were borne down in an avalanche of invasion. All the six weeks succeeding the forcing of the war were an uninterrupted triumph, even exceeding what had been expected by the general public in the German Empire : the whole garrison of Maubeuge, the crashing blow of the battle of Metz, the uninterrupted and enormous charge through Northern France, to the very gates of Paris, prisoners by the hundred thousand, and guns in interminable numbers. To crown aU, just as the decisive stroke against the beaten French army made possible the immediate occupation of Paris, with the approach of Sedan day, the Overman population received the astounding news of Tannenberg."

Now it is certain that the German General Staff thus desired the German public to read the opening chapter of their war. It is certain that the Moltke-olatry of the Grerman people so led them readily to read it. It is only too weU known that the mass of our Moltke-olatrous Press so read it. It is the object of these pages to show that, on the contrary, the Germans went to their doom ; that they lost their war ; that the retreat of the French was one of the most masterly acts of war in the history of man ; that the Grermans came near to complete and appallingly disastrous defeat at the very early

MATTERS INTRODUCTORY xxvii

stages of their " victory " ; and that the invincibility of the German arms lay shattered and broken at the end of this " victory." What is more, it is incredible that the German Staff were ignorant of the disaster that had befallen the German arms, however much they might strive to deceive Germany or Europe. It may be that in the first days of their astounding and overwhelming rush into France they looked to victory ; but the dream could not have lasted a week. Hours before they arrived within sight of Paris, the General Staff must have sat uneasy in their saddles — for these men are soldiers, and they are bound to have realised that the master-mind and master-will of the whirlwind was no German, but lay in one called Joffre, and that Prussia had brought forth no man of genius to compare with him. They must have realised that, except by some stroke of wild fortune, they were a defeated people — and it is to their credit that they so realised their defeat, and with consummate skill prepared a series of positions for their retirement so that that defeat should at least not become a mad rout.

I say these men were soldiers. As they rode back towards the Rhine from the Great Defeat, they at least knew fuU well that the dream of Prussian World-Dominion had flickered out, and that the star of Prussia had sunk in the waters of the Marne.

H. M.

xxvi GERMANY IN DEFEAT

capital, Brussels, was entered and occupied immediately afterwards. The first French armies gathered to meet the shock were borne down in an avalanche of invasion. All the six weeks succeeding the forcing of the war were an uninterrupted triumph, even exceeding what had been expected by the general public in the German Empire : the whole garrison of Maubeuge, the crashing blow of the battle of Metz, the uninterrupted and enormous charge through Northern France, to the very gates of Paris, prisoners by the hundred thousand, and guns in interminable numbers. To crown all, just as the decisive stroke against the beaten French army made possible the immediate occupation of Paris, with the approach of Sedan day, the German population received the astounding news of Tannenberg."

Now it is certain that the German General Staff thus desired the German public to read the opening chapter of their war. It is certain that the Moltke-olatry of the German people so led them readily to read it. It is only too well known that the mass of our Moltke-olatrous Press so read it. It is the object of these pages to show that, on the contrary, the Germans went to their doom ; that they lost their war ; that the retreat of the French was one of the most masterly acts of war in the history of man ; that the Germans came near to complete and appallingly disastrous defeat at the very early

MATTERS INTRODUCTORY xxvii

stages of their " victory " ; and that the invincibility of the German arms lay shattered and broken at the end of this " victory." What is more, it is incredible that the German Staff were ignorant of the disaster that had befallen the German arms, however much they might strive to deceive Germany or Europe. It may be that in the first days of their astounding and overwhelming rush into France they looked to victory ; but the dream could not have lasted a week. Hours before they arrived within sight of Paris, the General Staff must have sat uneasy in their saddles — for these men are soldiers, and they are bound to have realised that the master-mind and master-will of the whirlwind was no German, but lay in one called Joffre, and that Prussia had brought forth no man of genius to compare with him. They must have realised that, except by some stroke of wild fortune, they were a defeated people — and it is to their credit that they so realised their defeat, and with consummate skiU prepared a series of positions for their retirement so that that defeat should at least not become a mad rout.

I say these men were soldiers. As they rode back towards the Rhine from the Great Defeat, they at least knew full well that the dream of Prussian World-Dominion had flickered out, and that the star of Prussia had sunk in the waters of the Marne.

H. M.

Chapter I The Position Of The Germans At The Opening Oe The War

A HISTORY of the War of 1914-15, written in English or French, must necessarily begin with the campaign waged in Prance and Belgium during the first phase of the war, because although it is true that the first flames of the conflagration lit up the banks of the Danube and that developments in the Eastern theatre quickly assumed a decisive character, the fact remains that the first and principal effort of the aggressor nation was made in France and Belgium, and that the destinies of Europe were there fought out.

This campaign, to be clearly understood, must be divided into three distinct periods : First, from the opening of hostilities to the end of the so-called " Battles of the Marne " ; second, the battles of the Aisnes and of St. Mihiel and those of Flanders ; and third, the war of the trenches, commonJy called the " siege-war."

The first period, naturally, should start further back than the actual outbreak of hostilities, as it should include such important matters as the organisation, mobilisation and concentration of the armies.

The military problem should be looked at, from the start, as more directly affecting the two principal and more military opponents in the struggle ; that is to say France and Germany. In the long run it is true that the scope of operations became considerably wider, extending as it did as far as the Caucasus, the Dardanelles, and the Eg5rptian plains, not to mention Tsing-tao in distant China ; but diu'ing the first and most decisive period of the war the main factors in the conflict were the French and German armies. England, at the outset, could not put more than a couple of small army corps in the field — the Indian contingent, a couple of divisions, not landing in France until after the end of the first period of warfare. Belgium had also but very few soldiers to put in the field, and had no time for effective concentration. And finally, Russia was not able to make her weight felt on Germany until her mobilisation was complete and she had properly settled with Austria.

The German scheme of operations, as is well known, was based on the rapid and overwhelming defeat of the French. Reading Bernhardi, one

POSITION OF THE GERMANS 3

sees that the Germans, or rather that their military leaders, did not despise the French army as much as might be thought, and that France was clearly realised to be their most powerful and resourceful foe upon the Continent.

The German solution of the problem therefore lay in the direction of the most effective use of all the means at their disposal for the crushing of France in the shortest possible time.

The means at the service of Germany if employed with full force were of the most decisive nature — rapidity of mobilisation and of concentration, and vast superiority of numbers. The first — ^rapidity of mobilisation and of concentration — was bestowed partly by the Grerman Constitution, which allowed the head of the army to issue mobilisation orders without sanction of parliament ; and partly by a railway system built entirely for strategic purposes. The second — vast superiority of numbers — was provided by a larger population and a greater centralisation of forces. In this matter Germany enjoyed a special advantage, for she had no troops to bring out from across the sea from distant shores ; whilst France had part of her best fighting material away in Africa and in her Asiatic colonias.

No German, even of the less sanguine temperament, could entertain any doubt as to the result of the struggle ; and in those busy days of active preparation and hasty diplomatic dealings Germany stood triumphant, intoxicated with the consciousness of her might and the absolute certainty of victory — of swift and crushing victory. Her people had lived on the memories of 1870 ; and since then Germany had become even more united, strong and defiant. The respect and awe in which she was held bespoke to the German recognised weakness on the part of her neighbours. Pacifism, to the German mind, the desire for imiversal peace, was but a euphemism for cowardice. The hour had come . Germany, with a light heart and the ' ' silvery laugh of Siegfried," would step over her boundaries and overwhelm " effete," " decadent " nations with her war-trained millions. Of a certainty, amongst the vast and glittering armies which, towards the end of July, 1914, poured across the Rhine in a westerly flood, there wa;S not a single man who doubted for one instant that the end of France was at hand.. Even the date chosen for opening the campaign was of good omen and must bring luck to the Kaiser's arms, for was it not on the first of August, forty-four years ago, that the victors of Sedan and Metz had crossed the frontier ! This time, however, in variance with 1870, and as the higher command clearly foresaw, the problem of crushing France in the shortest possible time would only be half solved by the secret mobilisation

POSITION OF THE GERMANS 5

and rapid concentration of the German armies. The mobilisation and concentration, for instance, would not be sufficient to place aU the first-line troops and an equal number of first-rate reserve formations in the west, as at least half the units thus mustered through lack of space or of ground on which to deploy would have to remain inactive in the rear for many weeks, and could only advance to fill up gaps in the more forward army corps — a congestion due to the nature of the difficulty presented by the shortness of the French frontier. From Thionville in the north to Mulhausen in the south, no more than three armies, each of four or five army corps, could be concentrated ; and there were four more armies of equal strength that would consequently be held back. Furthermore, the French eastern line of defences was very strong ; and French concentration could be safely effected behind this unassailable line, thus robbing Germany of the benefit of her greatest advantage — superiority of numbers. She would win, of course — she had no doubts on the subject ; but it might be months before she achieved a decisive and complete success ; and Russia by that time would have become a dangerous foe at her back.

Such were the views of the German General Staff, who, contrary to popular belief, considered their war-plan entirely from its technical aspect, and were never influenced by sentimental reasons nor restrained by any moral or political considerations. FuU of their books and the teachings of Frederick the Great and of Moltke, they subordinated everything else to strategic necessity.

This is so true that the problem we have just surveyed had been thought out and solved by the Germans long before the war ; and the German Staff had made no secret of it. A scheme of strategic railways had been elaborated and laid down along the Belgian frontier ; and the military writers of Germany — some of whom were officers of distinction — had given the widest publicity to the fact, and to the aims of Germany in this direction. Finally, the points chosen north of Treves for the concentration of several German armies conclusively proves that the German General Staff had irrevocably made up their minds to violate Belgian neutrality ; for the concentration of an army is an intricate, lengthy business, and cannot be altered without cross-orders, counter-marches, and the confusion which results.

In fact, the German Staff, adhering always strictly to strategic principles, omitted nothing from their calculations — ^not even the possibility of Great Britain participating in the struggle, nor of Belgium resisting. The German people and the rest of the army, of course, knew nothing of that, as it is not

POSITION OF THE GERMAKS ?

customary for the heads of the army to discuss their plans in public. Nor is the public, untrained to reason in strategy, able to draw conclusions from even obvious preparations.

But the weighing of alternatives, which is the basis of all strategic counsels, can leave no doubt that when the gamitlet was thrown down and the Teutonic hosts were sent swarming along the frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium, the German General Staff were quite ready to face all eventualities and to modify their plans, if necessary, as they went along. Nothing could stop them. They accounted themselves geniuses in war, every one of them. They accounted their troops invincible, and themselves the directors of invincibility. They confidently believed that no troops in the wide world coTild stand against the German arms. Even at the worst, with Belgium and England fighting on the side of France, they entertained no doubt as to the result. They had enough resources to crush any foes, and alternatives galore to fit any political modification that might present itseK. Of course they preferred to fight France by herself until they could, in all ease, transfer their victorious and invincible troops to some other corner of the earth.

Chapter II The Position Of The French At The Opening Of The War

At the outbreak of war the situation for France, although terrible and most threatening, looked simple enough ; and it was, after all, the one that had been anticipated for years, and for which the military authorities had made ready.

War with Germany implied an attack from the foe on the frontier which mattered most, the frontier which, for that reason, had been most elaborately fortified. From Verdun in the north to Belfort in the east, close to the Swiss frontier, stood the vast rampart against German assault — a bastion of strength against all surprise. There also lay the covering troops — " troupes de couvertures " — the " iron divisions " of the 20th and 7th corps, the " Ironsides " of France, fully trained and equipped, ever ready for war at an hour's call, not to mention other troops trained almost to as high a pitch for battle. Whilst these superb armies fought and kept the Germans at bay, the other forces of France would be mobilised, concentrated, and brought for-

HOLLAND

/_ uenereii posUtans of the German ffejlem a.rmi^5

at the ouidreah of War.

Z I I J^rench army

"SWITZERLAND

To \act P'fg^ 8.

POSITION OF THE FRENCH 9

ward to the field of battle. The shortness of the front to be defended, as weU as its strength, would make all this possible ; and, as matters stood on the day that the Grermans set foot on French territory, the immediate prospect was not mrfavoiu'able to France.

Even the inclusion by the enemy of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the scope of operations could not make much difference, as the frontier portion of this tiny State where it touches France was infinitesimal. It only enabled the invaders to attack the insignificant fortress of Longwy, which was garrisoned but by a battalion of infantry.

The Germans derived some advantages by the orders given to the French covering troops to leave a space of ten kilometres (six miles) between themselves and the frontier. This measure, which was taken by the French Government in order to show its pacific intention and its strong desire for compromise and a peaceful solution, enabled the aggressors to seize some important positions along the frontier, particularly over the Tosges mountaias ; also to extend their entrenched lines in Lorraine, south of Saarburg and Savem, right into French territory. But all this mattered little, and German incursions and depredations on the frontier villages could not affect the strength and value of such strongholds as Verdun, Toul, Epinal or BeKort,

— or decrease the moral of the finest troops in France. The concentration of the French armies, therefore, was undertaken on the basis that France alone would oppose Germany in Western Europe ; and the whole of the French forces, consisting of five armies of four to five army corps each, were gathered up gradually, to be stretched on a line extending, roughly, from Mezieres to BeKort. They were to face eastwards. One of these armies, however — the 4th — was slightly in the rear, in reserve, west of Commercy ; and this was the only indication that a strategist would get, by a glance at the map, that the French General Staff felt, or knew, that the dreaded violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans was imminent ; because, from its position, the 4th French army could, without a pronounced change of front, proceed to the north as well as to the eastward. This it did when the violation of Belgium by Germany was an accomplished fact and Belgium asked France for her support. Then, and not until then, the action of the three first armies was extended northwards ; the 5th army slipped along the Meuse, from Mezieres to a point opposite Fourmies on the Belgian frontier ; and the 4th army, wheeling slightly northwards, stepped in between the 5th and 3rd army on the Meuse.