Front matter
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Preface
For a number of years the writer has been engaged in training teachers for elementary and secondary schools. During this time he has had excellent opportunities to observe the struggle of beginning teachers in their attempts to interpret courses of study. He has frequently had occasion to listen to expressions of discouragement from teachers of experience, both trained and untrained, who were attempting to follow courses of study that failed to give a clear statement of the subject matter to be taught and the method of teaching it. Often he has found such teachers to have recourse to courses of study of other systems in spite of the fact that the fundamental plan of such courses might not be in harmony with that of the system to which it was being adapted. The present study is an attempt to show how such courses of study may be made of greater service to teachers in their task of making instruction materials meaningful, of bringing about organization of knowledge on part of children.
The assumptions in the discussion of this problem are as follows, (i) The course of study of a school system is a plan of action for the teachers of the system; it lust therefore indicate clearly what is to be taught and how such materials are to be made real experiences on part of children. (2) The object of teaching must be the organization of experiences by children with a view of making them available for further use and, for this reason, helps given teachers on "how to teach" must concern themselves largely with the problem of how children's experiences are to become organized. I am greatly indebted to Professor Frank M. McMurry for helpful suggestions and criticisms in making the study; to the works of Professors Dewey and I. E. MUler for a statement of the psychology of thinking; to Dr. William H. Kilpatrick for suggesting the final arrangement of chapters; to the critic teachers of the William McGuffey School of Miami University for supplying some of the illustrations of children's organizations of the third chapter and for trying out the concrete plans of the fifth chapter. The bibliography indicates those books most frequently used in connection with the various phases of the discussion.
J. W. H.
The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text.
Contents
PAGE
I. Organization of Experience: Its VAirE and Its Factors i
1. WTiy Organization of Facts is Important . i
Chapter One
I. Why Organization of Facts is Important
Why do we attempt to organize knowledge? Venn holds that "the object of all classification is to keep our control over the parts by marshalling the objects in order ; to know where to find a thing when it is wanted, and to economize our statements in the retention and communication of our knowledge." ^ To these ends he adds another which he designates as the "ulterior purpose" and which he states as "the aid and the stimulus to fresh study." ^ This latter end to him appears the most important of all. Bain agrees when he holds that "a science has a certain order or arrangement of topics, suitable to its ends in gathering, in verifying, and in communicating knowledge." Mill holds that "the end of classification, as an instrument for the investigation of nature, is ... to make us think of those objects together, which have the greatest number of important common properties; and which, therefore, we have oftenest occasion, in the course of our inductions, for taking into joint consideration." AvailabiUty of facts, therefore, either for practical apphcation, the solution of practical problems, teaching, or for the extension of knowledge, are here indicated as the chief ends of organization. In these statements there is another end implied which is emphasized by Hobhouse when he says "the ideal of knowledge, as we understand it, is to reduce the mass of facts with which it deals to an orderly and intelligible system." In this system every element, whether particular fact or general law, would be explained by its relation to the system as a whole." ' Creighton expresses the same idea when he maintains that in a system "no fact is allowed to stafid by itself, but has to take its place as a member of a larger system of facts, and receive its value and meaning from this connection." * And again, when
' Theory of Knowledge, pp. 473-474. * Introductory Logic, p. 340.
he says, "The better we are able to put together in a systematic way the various facts which we have learned about geology, or astronomy, or the weather, the more significant each fact becomes." The geologist may be able to tell from the appearance of the cliffs what has taken place in a locality thousands of years ago. And, similarly, for the fisherman, the temperature, direction of the wind, its rising or its falling, etc., are all signs from which he is able to infer, more or less correctly, the kind of weather which may be expected." Organization is here considered the key to meaning and, therefore, the basis of rational behavior. Facts which are unrelated to other facts, which do not find a place in some system, some scheme, remain meaningless and do not affect rational conduct.
Authors of text-books on rhetoric insist upon the importance of good organization of thought as a means of securing clearness, and much space is devoted to showing just how clearness may be brought about in this manner. " Unity," "Coherence," and "Emphasis" are insisted upon with this idea in mind in connection with every form of discourse. Books and discussions noted for clearness, simplicity, and force are those which -are well organized. Drummond's "The Greatest Thing in the World," Fiske's "The Critical Period in American History" (both mentioned by McMurry for that reason), Burke's Speech on Conciliation, and Spencer's "Essays on Education" are illustrations of good organization.
The importance of organization is well illustrated in industrial concerns, such as large manufacturing establishments. In the manufacture of an automobile, for example, hundreds, or even thousands, of workmen may be engaged. Some of these men make the various parts, each producing the same part over and over again during his working hours. Others assemble these parts, some the several units, such as the wheels, the rear axle, the engine, etc., and others these minor units into the complete car. Each of these men, therefore, plays a very definite part in the manufacture of the car and incidentally holds a very definite relation to all the other men engaged in the process. In estabhshments in which the organization is perfect there is no waste of time or effort on the part of the men; the product, therefore, can be efficiently and economically made.
The above illustration will serve not only to indicate the importance of organization in the industries, but it will also show the 5 Op. cit., pp. 383-384.
Organization: lis Value and Its Factors 3
significance of organization of knowledge for behavior or conduct. Before the men employed in an industrial establishment can work efficiently a method of procedure — an organization of the factory
— must have been thought out, or planned, by somebody. The efficient organization of the factory, therefore, is merely the counterpart of efficient planning or organization of ideas.
It matters little, therefore, what fields of knowledge or of conduct are under consideration, whether we take the sciences dealing more especially with classifications, or those which attempt the development of principles or laws; or whether we turn from these fields of theoretical endeavor to the world of practical affairs,
— organization is always conducive to clearness, to easy control over facts, making possible their application to the solution of practical problems, or to the extension of knowledge, and, ultimately, to rational and efficient conduct.
2. How THE Mind Organizes its Experiences
How does the mind organize its experiences? Organization of knowledge is the product of thought or reflection. "It is by judging or thinking," says Creighton,^ "that we attempt to bring the various parts of our experiences into relation with one another." "Judgment combines the new facts with which it deals, with what is already known, in such a way as to give to each its proper place in relation to, and interdependence with, the others. Different facts are not only brought together, but they are arranged, related, systematized." ^ It is evident therefore that whenever organization of facts is a desideratum thought or reflection is the essential condition. The problem of the organization of knowledge thus becomes the problem of the psychology of thinking, the problem of "how do we make facts meaningful" becomes the problem of "how do we think." Professor Dewey gives the following analysis of a complete act of thought. There is, first, a felt difficulty; second, there is an attempt to locate and define the difficulty; third, there follow suggestions of possible solutions; fourth, the development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; fifth, further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief. The first of these steps conditions the other four; unless there is a felt difficulty there will be no thinking. The second step has for its object 6 p. 342. ' p. 340.
making the difficulty as clear as possible, to determine "just what is the trouble, or to make clear the specific character of the problem." The third step, the advancement of a hypothesis, controls the selection of facts essential to the solution of the problem. The fourth step has for its object establishing the impUcations of a given suggestion or hypothesis, selecting and arranging facts thought to have a bearing upon the case with a view of establishing a solution. The final step concerns itself with the verification of the tentative solution by the introduction of further facts, or the application of the tentative conclusion to other situations definitely planned for the purpose, leading finally to the complete establishment of the tentative conclusion or to its rejection as unsatisfactory. From this analysis it will be evident that organization of thought results in response to a problem, and that it consists in the selection and arrangement of facts with the guidance of a hypothesis proposing a tentative solution.
An outline of Wilson's essay, "The Truth of the Matter," as given in Professor Genung's "Working Principles of Rhetoric," will serve to illustrate this theory.
"Introduction: The ideal of writing history is to make a narrative that out of the profusion of actual facts so selects the few it can handle as to convey an impression of the whole truth and of every order of truth.
I. The defect of the present-day "dispassionate" ideal.
1. While it gives facts, it does not adequately impress the truth.
2. And this because it lacks the art necessary to this latter object.
II. The historian's art and its end analyzed.
1. From Macaulay's art, masterly but lacking, we learn that, while
our narrative must contain in solution a judgment of things, that judgment must not be imposed from without as an advocate's plea but evolved from within as a discovered impression.
2. From Carlyle's and Gibbon's lack, respectively, we learn that, while
the impression must be unitary, it must be neither too lurid and passionate nor too pale and remote.
3. From Green's lack we learn that, while scholarship and artistry may
be in masterly combination, the result will fail imless the plan and variety of the telling answer to the plan and variety of the fact.
III. The supreme requirements that this analysis suggests.
1. That impressions be conveyed in the fresh and living spirit of impres-
sion and not in the severe spirit of scholarly accumulation.
2. That the color and proportion of such impressions be conceived as
they must have come to the actors in the midst of the events.
Conclusion: This art of telling the truth requires imagination as well as scholarship, literary art as well as candor and honesty."
The following facts stand out in this outline : First, the incentive to reflection or thought which led to the resulting organization, or reorganization of facts, was a difficulty, an unexplained situation, containing some elements or factors whose relationship was not clear. Mr. Wilson asks, "How should history be written in order to convey the whole truth?" because there is a wide divergence of views on this point as shown by the actual practice of historians. Second, such facts are selected as have a direct bearing upon the difficulty or problem, and will therefore make possible its solution. Finally, the facts found to have a bearing upon the problem are arrranged in such a manner as to make the solution proposed clear, forceful and sound.
3. The Factors in Organization more fully Described
(a) The Problem. What is the nature of the problem which induces organization? The presence of a problem is not an indication, however, that it will function effectively in the organization of experiences. Problems which seem of the greatest significance to one individual, or class, are ignored by others. The problem of the theologian quite generally fails to be appreciated by the scientist; that of the scientist by the merchant; while those of the merchant remain a matter of indifference to other classes. Children often show a marked indifference toward the problem of the text-book, and, at times, toward those of the adults in their environments. The problem which is to induce mental activity leading to organization of experiences must appear vital to the individual; unless he feels its importance and appreciates in some degree that something is to be gained through its solution, something worth while is to be known, no effort will be put forth.
How will such a problem arise? The fact that an individual feels the significance of a vital problem, feels its worth to himself, is an indication that it is closely related to his experience. His experience is inadequate for instant recognition of relationships, or immediate solution of the problem, but is nevertheless the essential factor giving rise to it. Mr. Wilson's problem, "How should history be written so as to convey the whole truth?" is the outgrowth of his experience as a student, teacher, and writer of history. Mr. Darwin, in his "Origin of the Species," before plunging into the discussion of the subject, gives us an account of the state of knowledge on this topic up to the time of his writing. These few pages show that because of his comprehensive knowledge of the field has it become possible for him to see the significance of the problem which he then takes up for solution. Problems to be vital to an individual must therefore be closely related to his experience, must, in fact, be an outgrowth of this experience.^
But while experience, by making apparent the contradictory nature of facts and judgments, makes it possible for problems to arise, it must not be assumed that mere contradictoriness of judgments in itself makes a problem vital. Mr. Wilson takes up the solution of his problem not merely because he finds that historians differ in their method of treating historical data but because he feels that it is a point of great importance in the writing of history . to represent each period truthfully, and that the method of the historian has a very close relation to this end. A problem will be appreciated as vital only when it is recognized as having direct relation to the attainment of some end which, if realized, will mean the satisfaction of a need. "Experience," it has been pointed out, "may lead one to see a value in work that to the inexperienced would seem mere useless drudgery. But the experience merely makes clear the connection between the work and the need. It cannot create the need. The energy in a motive comes from within. . . . Experience merely enables this energy to acquire clearness and direction, and thus to become a conscious motive." ' While experience does not create needs it does so modify the fundamental native needs that they express themselves in very different ways in different individuals. As Professor Thorndike says, "Each individual acquires interests in a special circle of friends, special divisions of knowledge, a special profession or trade, a special locality, and so with many objects of modern life." Experience may therefore be said to play the double role of making the individual cognizant of the value of work in the satisfaction of a need and of modifying somewhat fundamental native needs. Needs thus modified have been called acquired needs.'-" Problems to be vital, therefore, must have a very intimate relation to the individual's needs as well as to his experience.
(b) How will the Facts for the Solution of the Problem he Chosen ? What is the nature of the facts which will be chosen for the purpose of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problem? It has
* Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, pp. 37^0.
" Monroe, Encyclopedia of Education, Art. "Apperception." ^^ Bagley, Educative Process, p. 83.
been shown that the condition which impels an individual to organize his experience is a problem which has a vital significance to him. The problem, as was pointed out, always implies a difficulty, a "gap" in the individual's experience, which must be bridged over through reflection, or thought. Through thought such mediating facts are selected as will establish a close connection between these formerly unrelated elements in the situation and lead to a conclusion based upon, and closely dependent upon, the facts so related. Now, if, as was just intimated, the facts selected are to be used for the purpose of estabhshing k chain of reasoning in a problematic situation, the implication would be that they must be definitely related to the problem to be solved and that the facts not so related must be rigorously excluded.
The problem in each case will determine just what facts will be essential for the purpose of solving it. Problems differing in any degree will require a somewhat different content for solution. The writer on zoology who aims to give the reader a systematic knowledge of the structure of the various organisms composing the animal kingdom selects a body of facts somewhat different from those of the writer who is especially interested in informing his readers concerning the methods to be employed for the effective control of certain forms of animal life. Certain facts, such as the relationship of a given order or class to other orders and classes, are of great significance in the one case but mean very little in the other. Thus the gill slits, the notochord, the dorsal nerve chord, and the eye developing from the brain, found in the larval Ascidian, are of great significance to the zoologist for establishing the true relationship of this class of organisms in the animal kingdom; but all the facts which might be stated about this class of animals would possess little if any value to the man of business. The fact that the early stages in the development of the fish, reptiles, chicken, and rabbit are quite similar may be of significance to the biologist for his purposes, but has no relation to the problems of the author of a cookbook or the manager of a meatshop. The several phases of psychology illustrate this point. The specific problem of physiological psychology is to account for the physical basis of mental life; its data are selected with this end in mind. Educational psychology attempts to show the relation of certain phases of general psychology to problems of education; its problem is "What can psychology offer for the solution of specific educational problems? " Child psychology deals with another group of problems and so does the psychology of adolescence, each selecting the facts essential for that purpose. And so with other phases of psychology. Similar illustrations might be given in almost any other field. Thus we have political history, economic history, educational history of the United States; mathematical geography, physical geography, political geography, commercial and economic geography, etc., each having its specific problem and selecting the facts essential for its solution and ignoring others not so related. Only those facts, therefore, which have a definite relation to the problem and are needed for its solution will have any value in that connection.
Not only must the data used in the solution of a problem be relevant, however; they must be of a quality to make possible the ready recognition of those relationships which it is the purpose of thought to establish. The normal thing to do when confronted with a new situation is to interpret it in the light of previous, similar situations. "Whenever a new way of acting is to be organized," says Charters, " (the solving of the problem) experience falls back upon old ways with which it is familar and therefore knows how to handle. . . . From all this past experience, that which can be adapted in reorganization for the new purpose is used." " In accordance with this law the individual in his attempt to work out the solution of a problem first appeals to his own experience in search of facts, principles, or laws, which might possibly enable him to solve the difficulty. These facts or principles he attempts to evaluate from the point of view of their relationship to the new problem. Knowing them in other connections he appreciates more readily those phases which make them significant in the new situation.
Often, however, the experience of the individual is not suflScient for the demands made upon it; the facts needed must be obtained in some way from outside sources. What facts will an individual choose under such conditions? There may be multitudes of facts which will suggest the answer, upon which the conclusion may be based, and any of these might therefore be selected as a basis for it. But a limited number only will be chosen, the choice being again effected in accordance with the Law of Apperception; those, namely, which have a meaning for the present purpose, whose relationship to the problem is most readily detected. Experience functions in this respect as it does in the location and definition of the problem; here it determines what facts shall be selected, limiting the choice " Charters, Methods of Teaching, p. 155.
to those which are related to the individual's experience and to the problem, and which for that reason have the greatest significance to him; all others will be ignored.^^
Relevancy of facts to the problem and a quaUty to make this relevancy most apparent and thinking most effective are the characteristics of facts usable for problem solution and the resulting organization of materials. There remains for discussion the number of facts essential for the satisfactory solution of a problem. In the solution of any problem the task, as previously indicated, is that of finding suitable mediating facts and of arranging them in an order appropriate for establishing the solution. How will the number of facts to be used in any unit of organization be determined? Both the comprehensiveness of the problem and the stage of development of the individual engaged in its solution are determining factors. Every unit of organization may be considered a system and as such must have the necessary number of elements to make it complete. The system constructed by Darwin in his "Origin of the Species" is very comprehensive and requires a wealth of data to establish it because of the magnitude of the problem. The very comprehensiveness of the problem suggests numerous minor problems each one of which must be considered in detail and disposed of in the same careful manner as the main problem in order to construct the system, a sound argument in support of the contention. Since Darwin's object is not merely to satisfy himself with reference to the problem he suggests, but to compel acceptance of his conclusion and belief in the soundness of his reasoning, he must use extra care to leave not even a small gap " in the chain of reasoning, and, for this reason, supply sufficient data to bring this about. Whether the problem be large or small the materials introduced must always be sufficient in quantity to constitute a complete solution. ^^ The relation of the number of data needed for the solution of a problem to the development of the individual engaged upon it will be discussed in the second chapter. Facts then to be valuable in the solution of a problem must be relevant and must be of a quality to make ready recognition of this relevancy possible. The number to be used in the solution of a problem will depend upon the comprehensiveness of the latter and the maturity of the individual.
12 Dewey, How We Think, p. 199.
1' But facts must not be so numerous as to make it impossible for the individual to manage them.
(c) The Arrangement of Facts to Indicate the Solution of a Problem. The facts essential to the solution of any problem having been chosen, they must be arranged in such an order as to indicate the solution. How does the mind proceed in the arrangement of facts to indicate the conclusion sought, the relationship to be established? For this purpose it will be well to recall certain phases of the psychology of thinking. Once the problem which gives rise to organization has been clearly defined, enough elements in the situation may be known to make possible the statement of one or more hypotheses. Each hypothesis must then be tested out by (i) the selection of certain facts which will be relevant to the plan suggested by it, and (2) the arrangement of these facts in such a way as to indicate clearly the relation to be established and tentatively proposed in the hypothesis. An illustration will make this clear.
In attempting to account for New York's greatness as a trade center one might suggest as the possible causes the cosmopolitan character of its population, the intelligence and farsightedness of its commercial leaders of an earlier day, its favorable location, etc. Noting first the character of its population we find that the composition of the population of other large cities on the Atlantic coast is quite similar to that of New York. The same advantages, or disadvantages, attaching to this factor would be shared by all. This suggestion will therefore be discarded as unsatisfactory. Considering next the character of its commercial leaders it may be found that while New York has always had some great financiers, the same is true of the other cities on the Atlantic coast. And while undoubtedly there were farsighted business men who suggested the building of the canal and railroads, wharves, etc., such suggestions were valuable only because the presence of certain physical features , such as the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, the East River, New York Bay, etc., made them possible. The second suggestion, too, must therefore be dropped as inadequate. To test the adequacy of the third we may ask ourselves what advantages New York's location offers over those of the other large Atlantic cities. Here we should find that the city has a splendid harbor, direct water routes to Europe and South America, and that it has — and always has had — a more favorable connection with the hinterland than the other cities. To determine the significance of these factors for the problem in hand we ask what advantages arise from them. We should thus establish the facts that favorable connection with the interior of the country has meant in the past more favorable
Organization: Its Value and Its Factors ii
connection with the country's raw products and readier access to its markets; that water connections equally good as those of other cities means access to the raw materials and markets of other countries; that a superior harbor means that ships will come to New York rather than go elsewhere, especially since in case of New York there is the added advantage of better connections with the interior of the continent. As a result of such testing of hypotheses, or reasoning, a number of minor connections will have been established, or recalled, for each of these above statements is a statement of a relation valuable in laying the foundation for the final relationship to be established, that between New York's location and its importance as a trade center. Relations to be established, therefore, are foreshadowed by the hypothesis, but come to be definitely established only after the selection of relevant facts and the development, through reasoning, of such connections between these facts as are valuable in determining the conclusion, the final connection sought.
The route which the mind takes in organizing its experiences, it will be seen from this account, is a circuitous one. Numerous suggestions appear, all of them seemingly satisfactory. But a number of them may lead into blind alleys and must be discarded before a satisfactory one will be found.
The organization resulting in any instance will, of course, depend upon the nature of the problem inducing it. Thus the business man who is considering how to vote on the tariff question will come to see the relation of the tariff to his business. Consciously, or unconsciously, his problem becomes, "How will the tariff affect my business? " and, as a result, the data chosen in deciding that matter will have a close relation to this problem, and their arrangement will be such as to show the relation of the tariff to his business. Quite different may be the organization of facts by the economist considering the relation of the tariff to the life of the nation as a whole. Not only is there likely to be a much larger number of data included in this case, data, too, of a far wider range, but they are likely to be so arranged as to lead to a somewhat different organization and conclusion. Thus while the business man may have decided that for his own interest he must vote for high protective tariff the economist may have arrived at the conclusion that while a high protective tariff is of benefit to some interests, the people of the country in general do not profit from it and ultimately they must pay the increased prices due to it. The nature of the
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