Twenty years of financial policy. A summary of the chief financial measures passed between 1842 and 1861, with a table of budgets

Front matter

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

Preface

HE germ of this volume will be found in the Table of Budgets contained in the Appendix. I have myself often felt the want of a convenient summary of the financial measures of recent years, and I hope that what I have here drawn up for my own use may also be found useful by others.

The explanatory notes which I had intended to add to the Table have grown into a volume ; and the Table, which should have been the text, has shrunk into an Appendix.

It was my wish to add a chapter upon the system of Public Accounts, and another upon the viii Preface.

financial progress of some other countries besides our own during the period of which I have here treated ; but I have not yet found time to write them ; though I do not abandon the idea, as I think a short popular account of our Financial System would be useful to many persons who have not the opportunity of studying it in detail ; and I am sure that a comparative account of the progress of other countries would throw much light upon that which we have made ourselves.

I have to thank my friend Mr. Anderson, of the Treasury, for his kindness in revising the Table of Budgets, and several other portions of the work.

Stafford H. Northcote.

Julyy 1862.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

Chapter I. (1842— 1844)

NTRODUCTORY Remarks

Financial Position of the country

Prevalence of distress Position of the Ministry ....

The Penny Postage

Why the Whigs were the Free Traders Sir R. Peel's Budget Speech, March 11, 1842 Review of Fiscal Policy since 18 1 6 . Principles of Sir R. Peel's Financial Policy Views of the Conservatives in 1842 . Opposition of the Liberals to the Income Tax Arguments of Sir R. Peel and his colleagues Disappointment of Sir R. Peel's calculations Soundness of his general policy . Budget of 1843-4, May 8, 1843

Budget of 1844-S

Conversion of the Three-and-a-half per cents Term of Income Tax expires .

Pages

1—5 5

5—7

7-9

10 — 12

12 — 21

21 — 26

26 — 32

33—37 37—41 41—47

47 48—50

50-53

53-58

Summary of Contents.

Chapter II. (1845-1847)

PagM

Renewal of Income Tax proposed .

61—64

The Surplus and its application

64—67

Comparis9n of the Budgets of 1842 and 1845

67—72

Lord J. RuSsell's criticism

72-75

Mr. Roebuck and Mr. C. Buller on the Income

Tax

Success of the Budget of 1845

Repeal of the Corn-laws

Free Trade Measures of 1846

79-80

Sir R. Peel quits office ....

Sugar duty Bill .....

Financial prosperity coincident with nationa distress in 1846 ....

83-86

Causes of the condition of the country

86-931

Dissolution of Parliament

(1847-1852).

Meeting of New Parliament .

Relaxation of Bank Charter Act

Fear of Invasion .....

West Indian Committee

7 7

100 — 105

Unpopularity of the Budget .

Summary of Contents. xi

Proposed increase of Income Tax abandoned Controversies respecting the Income Tax Debates on the Sugar duties, and Financial

Statements of June 30 and Aug. 25 Other questions discussed in this Session Financial Reform movement .

Mr. Cobden's Motion for reduction of Expen

diture . . .

Budget of 1849-50, June 22, 1849 . Budget of 1850-1, March 15, 1850 Repayment of advances ....

Opposition to the proposed Stamp duties Defeats of the Government on financial questions ......

Question of the renew^al of the Income Tax,

Budget of 1851-2, Feb. 17, 1851 . Resignation and recall of the Ministry Financial circumstances of the crisis Different views respecting the Income Tax Position of the Conservatives Budget again brought forw^ard, April 4 . Alteration in the House Tax Other changes in the Budget .

Mr. Herries' Motion for reducing the Income Tax ......

Mr. Disraeli's Motion — Claims of Agriculturists

Mr. Gladstone criticises the Budget

Mr. Hume's Amendment, limiting duration of

Income Tax to one year Select Committee on the Inconie Tax Other defeats of the Government .

Pages 106

107 109

109 115

116 116— 118

118 121 — 123

124 127 — 130 130—133

134—137 137—142

143 143—149 149—151

152 153

158 160

161 163 165 xii Summary of Contents,

Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Gladstone criticise the

financial arrangements Change of Government Budget of 1852-3, April 30 .

Dissolution of Parliament Budget of December, 1852 Budget rejected. Resignation of Lord Derby's

Government . . . . .

Paga

-170 170 171— 173

174 — 180

Chapter IV

(i8S3)- Financial importance of the year 1853 Budget of 1853-4, April 18, 1853 . Mr. Gladstone's arguments respecting the In

come Tax .....

His Plan for its gradual extinction . Succession duty and other taxes Remissions of taxation ....

General character of the Budget Sir E. B. Lytton's amendment on the Income

Tax ....

Mr. Palmer's Amendment The Succession duty Mr. Pitt's Plan of Legacy and Succession duties The increase of the Irish Spirit duties Failure of Plan for revising trade licences Repeal of Advertisement duty .

Abolition of minor Customs' duties Soap duty repealed .

Revision of Assessed Taxes Conversion of 3 per cent. Stocks

182 183

185 — 192

194—195

201 202

203 — 210 210

220 — 226

Summary of Contents. xiii

Expectation of a Fall in the rate of interest Reduction of interest on Exchequer-bills . Remarks on these operations .

jinan

Introduction of system of paying gross revenue

into the Exchequer Financial character of 1854 The Budget of 1854-5 .

Mr. Gladstone's View as to Loans in time of war Second Budget, May 8 . . .

Issue of Exchequer-bonds Controversy respecting Mr. Gladstone's

cial arrangements .

The question between Loans and Taxes Change of Government .

Budget of 1855-6 ....

Loan of 16,000,000/, Opposition to the proposed Sinking-fund Further issue of Exchequer-bills Sardinian and Turkish Loans .

Further Supplementary Estimates and a

Loan of 5,000,000/.

Budget of 1856-7 ....

Sir G. Lewis' Remarks on the War Observations on the effect produced by the

war on the National Expenditure Third Loan, 5,000,000/. .

Sir G. Lewis' Remarks upon the State of the

Debt, and on the Pressure of Taxation

in this and other'countries .

fresh m

239 243 246 250 251

255—257 258 — 264

278 279 281

283 288

289 — 290 xiv Summary of Contents.

Mr, Disraeli's and Mr. Gladstone's Remarks

upon the Necessity of Economy . .291- Prorogation of Parliament - . . .

PagM -292

Chapter VI. (1857—1861)

Financial character of 1857

Cost of the war .....

State of trade

Moral effect of the war ....

Agitation against the " war ninepence " .

State of Foreign Affairs ....

Opening of the Session. Debate on the Address

Sir G. Lewis' Views as to the Remission of Taxes

His Proposal for the coming year

Income Tax reduced to yd. .

Tea and Sugar duties fixed for three years

Mr. Disraeli's Resolution

Sir G. Lewis' Answer ....

Mr. Gladstone's Speech ....

Remarks on the Budget of 1857

Expense of Persian and Chinese wars

Speeches of Lord. J. Russell, Mr. Cardwell, and

Mr. Milner Gibson

Resolution defeated

Defeat of the Government on Mr. Cobden':

Motion respecting China Financial Measures in anticipation of a Dis'

solution .....

Estimates brought forward in New Parliament

3"

3"

313 316

318 318 321

321—323 3*3

3*4 326

Summary of Contents.

Supplementary Estimates, July 17 .

Tea and Sugar duties fixed for three years,

Aug. 12

Circumstances of the Autumn of 1857 Commercial Pressure ....

Bank Restriction Act suspended Meeting of Parliament ; Committee on the

Bank Acts

Defeat of the Government on the Conspiracy

Bill, Feb. 19, 1858 Change of Government ....

Estimates for 1858-g brought forward

Budget, April 19

Repeal of War Sinking-fund .

Postponement of Exchequer-bonds . Equalisation of Spirit duties Discussion on the Budget, and on the Ex

chequer-bonds' Bill Financial Results of 1858-9 Necessity for increased Estimates in 1859

Mr. Ducane's Resolution

Opposition to the Repeal of the Paper duty

Supplementary Estimates and second Financial

Statement , .

Financial Results of 1860-1

Mr. Horsfall's Amendment on the Tea duty Review of Financial Policy from 1 842-1 861

XV

Pages

329 329 331

356 357 358 360 361 xvi Summary of Contents.

Appendix A.

Pagei

Tableof Budgets from 1842— 1 86 1 . . 375

Appendix B.

I. General Taxation not falling directly on

Property 396

II. General Taxation falling directly on Property 397

III. Local Taxation 398

TWENTY YEARS OF FINANCIAL POLICY, 1842— 1861.

Chapter I

I HE last twenty years have witnessed Chap. I. a great change in the financial introductory system of England ; and concur- remarks.

|- rently with that change we have seen a marked development of the wealth and prosperity of the country. It is as yet too early to pronounce an historical judgment upon these events ; for we cannot entirely divest ourselves of the feelings of actors, or of interested spectators ; nor indeed can we yet look upon them as matters belonging to the past, since ithe change alluded to is still in progress, and it may be some time before we can regard it as complete.

The very circumstances, however, which prevent the writing of a regular history of this

a B remarks.

Chap. I. financial revolution, appear to render a short and lntrodil7tory informal account of it desirable. A new generation of public men, and of men who, though not engaged in political life, are interested in the study of public affairs, are growing up, and find themselves in the midst of a work of which it is difficult to understand the nature without studying it from the beginning. But nothing is more troublesome than the study of a history which has not been written. It is very much easier to read up the reigns of the Stuarts, or of the Roman Emperors, than that of Queen Victoria ; and, though a writer, who attempts to deal with the events of his own time, is sure to commit a great many faults, it is not unreasonable on his part to hope that, in condensing and bringing together information, which is scattered over a large number of blue books, and a great many volumes of Hansard, he is rendering a service to some of his contemporaries, if only by inducing them to go over the same ground in order to correct his blunders.

The period reviewed is that commencing with Sir Robert Peel's imposition of the Income Tax in 1842, and extending to the Repeal of the Paper Duties in 1861. The fortunes of the Income Tax, its origin, the change which has taken place in its character, and the work which Chap. i. has been done by its aid, give a kind of dramatic introductory unity to this period, which would alone be suf- ^i^^rks. ficient to make the study of it interesting; but, in addition to this, we have in the course of these twenty years seen our financial system exhibited in all its bearings ; and examples have been given of almost every kind of financial problem. We have seen how large surplusses have been applied, and how large deficits have been met ; we have had peace taxation and war taxation ; loans of various kinds, contracted upon different principles; successful and unsuccessful operations upon the interest of the debt ; we have repealed an enormous mass of taxation with one hand, and have laid on a still larger amount with the other ; we have revised our Commercial Policy, and to some extent our Monetary Policy also. These proceedings render the history of the time worthy of the atten-, tive examination of us all ; and an indication of its main outlines, such as is here attempted, can hardly fail to render that examination less laborious and more compendious.

If individual opinions are too freely expressed in any part of the book, I beg pardon both of those whom they may displease and of the general

Chap. I. reader. It has not been my intention to enter Intr^iory i^to Controversy ; but there is something so reremarks. pulsive to human nature in the simple reproduction of defunct budgets, that I could not have got through my task v^^ithout stepping a little aside, from time to time, to touch upon questions of principle, or even of party, arising out of the narrative.

There is one more observation of a general character which I must make at the outset. I have attempted in the following pages to examine an important period of our history from a very limited point of view. I have treated of the policy of the last twenty years under ite financial aspect alone. This would be a serious error in a work which laid claim to the title of a history. Perhaps it may be thought a mistake even in so much more confined a treatise as the present. Financial policy can never be regarded as entirely distinct from commercial and social policy ; and if this be true as a general proposition^ it is peculiarly true when applied to the case before us. The financial measures of 1 842, 1 845, 1853, i860, and indeed of the whole period under review, were largely influenced, and sometimes governed, by considerations of commercial policy ; and even these were, to a great extend subordinate to others of a still higher character. Ghap. I. Mr. Gladstone, in his budget-speech of 1861, introductory pointed out in eloquent language that the policy ^^'^^'^ '' of the last twenty years should be judged by its political, social, and moral, as well as by its economical, results. I fully subscribe to this doctrine ; but I have not attempted so high a flight of criticism as would enable me to take a coniprehensive view of the whole of this great field of inquiry. I am content to act the part of the critic upon Garrick's acting, and to look only at the financial stop-watch ; but in doing so I think it well to guard against misconstruction, by saying, once for all, that I am quite aware how inadequate a test the stop-watch alone would be of the merits of the great performance to which I propose to apply it.

I will now begin at once with the account of Budget of Sir Robert Peel's financial statement of March '^"^^'3" II, 1842.

Probably no budget was ever awaited with Financial po-

. , sition of the

more interest, anxiety, or curiosity, than that country. of 1842. Serious financial difficulties had been accumulating for several years. Five times in succession the revenue had fallen short of the expenditure by amounts averaging about a million and a-half per annum. In 1837-8 the

Chap. I. deficiency had been 1,428,000/.; in 1838-9 it 1842. had been 430,000/.; in 1839-40, 1,457,000/.; in 1840-1, 1,851,000/.; and for 1841-2, the year just drawing to a close, it had been estimated at 2,42 1 ,000/. In each of the four years, 1 8 37- 1 840, the estimates of the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been falsified by the result, to an amount in the whole of no less than 3,569,000/. ; and in three out of the four the failure had been due to a deficiency in the anticipated income, rather than to the occurrence of any unexpected expenditure. In the year 1 840- 1 , the estimate of income had been 48, 591,000/., and the amount realized had been only 47,433,000/. ; showing an error of more than a million sterling in the estimate, and indicating a state of things which might well be thought alarming ; since the failure had occurred in that portion of our revenue upon which we mainly depended, and which then constituted about four-fifths of the whole, namely, the revenue from the customs and the excise ; it followed upon a wellmeant and, in its way, a bold attempt to obtain a balance of income and expenditure by an addition to taxation ; and it appeared to imply an exhaustion of the resources of the people, more serious than any deficit in the Exchequer, and which was unhappily but too much in accord- Chap. I. ance with other disheartening and distressing jg.j. signs of the times.

There was at this period a great deal of suf- Prevalence of fering among the lower orders, and especially among those engaged in manufactures; there was a scarcity of employment, and provisions were at a high price. As a consequence, there was much political discontent. Chartism was exciting serious uneasiness ; the new Poor Law, against which the Chartist movement was mainly directed, was pressing hardly upon the people ; who had not yet become fully accustomed to it ; and who were suiFering from it all the more severely on account of the badness of the recent harvests, the slackness of employment, and the growth of the population, which had not yet learnt to relieve itself by emigration.

To these causes of uneasiness were added Position of others connected with the position of the great ^ '""ry, political parties in the State. The Whigs had held office, with a short interruption, for ten years; they had gradually lost the popularity which they had enjoyed at the beginning of their administration ; and had for some time been maintaining themselves with difficulty, in an equally divided House of Commons, by the sup-

Chap. I. port of the extreme Liberals, and of the Irish ^. party, then led by Mr. O'Connell. They were popularly accused of sacrificing both their own convictions and the interests of the State to the necessity of conciliating these important allies ; and the measures which they brought forward were on this account regarded with suspicion and dislike, and were sure of being severely criticised. This was especially the case with regard to their financial projects ; financially they were in bad odour with almost everybody. Since the accession of Lord Melbourne to power, in 1835, they had found it necessary to increase our naval and military expenditure by several millions sterling ; we had been brought to the brink of a war with France ; to an actual war with China ; to a serious and, as it proved, a disastrous struggle in India ; besides having to deal with an insurrection in Canada, and a Chartist rising at home. All this had told upon the estimates ; and we had paid 1 5,536,000/. for army, navy, and ordnance in 1841, instead of 11,730,000/., the amount in 1835. This increase of expenditure was unpopular among the extreme Liberals; but they had been to some extent conciliated by the unwillingness which the Government had shown to add proportionately to the taxation;

age measure.

and especially by the concession made in 1839 Chap. I. of the Penny Postage, — a measure of undoubted 1842. social and general advantage, but extremely inconvenient in a financial sense ; and the adoption of v^^hich, at that particular time, was thought to be due to the political necessities rather than to the convictions of the Ministry.

This surrender of an important branch of our Penny Postrevenue had been opposed by Sir Robert Peel and the Conservatives generally ; and they regarded it both as financially wrong, and as an indication of a want of moral firmness on the part of the Government. Hopes had been held out by the- advocates of the measure, that the rapid increase which would take place in the correspondence, and the economy which might be effected in the management of the Post Office under the new scheme, would soon replace the revenue which was to be given up ; but a very short experience of the working of the system proved that this recovery of the revenue, though it might ultimately be realized, could not take place for many years. The lessons drawn from this experiment, therefore, were, — First, that the Government could not be trusted to resist a popular demand for a remission of taxation ; and, secondly, that the sanguine promises of the

Chap. I. advocates of remission, to the effect that the 1842. revenue they proposed to sacrifice would be speedily made up, were not to be relied on. These considerations had a powerful . bearing upon the much greater struggle of which the year 1 84 1 witnessed the commencement, and of ' which we feel the consequences to the present day.

Why the Judging from the antecedents of the two

Free^Traders Parties, I See no particular reason why the th*c '^f*" Whigs should have been the Free-traders, and atives. the Conservatives the Protectionists, of 1841.

If the questions raised had been simple questions of political economy, it is probable that the doctrines of Pitt and of Huskisson would from the first have found their supporters among the political descendants of those statesmen. But the discussion was complicated by the fact that the Anti-Cornlaw Leaguers belonged to the Radical party ; and that their language and proceedings alarmed the Conservatives; while the Whigs were supposed to be naturally anxious to conciliate so important a section of their political supporters, and were suspected of having political ends in view when they gave their assent to economical reforms. No doubt the partial adoption of a Free-trade policy by Lord Melbourne's Cabinet, in 1841, was in a great measure due to the progress of conviction, to the arguments Chap. i. which such men as Mr. Poulett Thomson, Mr. ,^^. Deacon Hume, and others, had for some years been addressing to the Ministry, and to the remarkable evidence collected by the Import Duties Committee of 1 840. But hov^^ever genuine their convictions may have been, they did not get much credit for sincerity. It was thought that they took up Free-trade as a last and desperate card, and played it for the sake of strengthening their alliance with the Radicals, and of getting up a cry in the country, which might be of service to them at a general election. The fact that the budget of 1841 was so greatly at variance with the principle of the budget of 1 840, added much to the grounds for suspecting that the Government were either swayed by some unavowed considerations, or else were in a difficulty as to their course, and were floundering in hopes of finding firm ground, without well knowing in which direction to look for it. In 1840 Mr. Baring had attempted to restore an equilibrium in the finances by a geneual increase of duties. In 1841 the same Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to effect the same object by the directly opposite course of reducing certain duties, with a view to obtain a greater reve-

Chap. I. nue from them. In doing so he was, in truth, il^. only acting upon a financial principle already well known, and generally, though not universally, acknowledged to be sound ; but the apparent inconsistency in his conduct gave an air of uncertainty to his proceedings ; and the recollection of the results of the Postage Reform, coupled with the general suspicion attaching to all policy likely to conciliate Radical support to the Ministry, deprived his measure of any fair chance of success. Accordingly, the budget of 1841 had proved the occasion for the ejection of the Melbourne Ministry from office ; and the reins of power had been transferred to Sir Robert Peel and a Conservative Cabinet, commanding a majority of more than ninety in the New Parliament.

Sir R. Peel's Sir Robert Peel had spent the autumn and speech winter in maturing his plan of finance, and on

March II. the nth of March, 1842, he laid it before the House of Commons in a speech of very great ability.

After slating his grounds for thinking that the deficiency for the year then expiring would be about 2,350,000/., he proceeded to lay down his estimate of Income and Expenditure for the year 1842-3, as follows: —

Income.

Chap. L

£ 1842.

Total Income £48,350,000

Expenditure.

Debt (funded and unfunded) . . . 29,427,000

Charges on Consolidated Fund . . 2,368,000

Expedition to China 675,000

Total Expenditure £50,819,000

The net result of this estimate was, of course, an anticipated deficiency of 2,469,000/. This, however, did not, in Sir Robert Peel's opinion, represent the full extent of the liabilities of the country. He pointed out that, although he had reason to think that the sum of 500,000/., which he had taken in the military estimates on account of the hostilities in China, would probably be suf-

Chap. I. ficient provision to make within the year, yet a 1842. further expenditure of 700,000/. or 800,000/, would in all likelihood be ultimately incurred, and must be met at some future time. He glanced at the possible demands from Australia and other of our colonies, and at the serious cost which the recent events in AfFghanistan were likely to entail upon us. Finally, for the purpose of bringing before the House a full and complete view of the financial position of the country, he referred to the growing deficit in the finances of India. " I am quite aware," he said, " that there may appear to be no direct and immediate connectibn between the finances of India and those of this country ; but that would be a superficial view of our relations with India, which should omit the consideration of this subject. Depend upon it, if the credit of India should become disordered, if some great exertion should become necessary, then the credit of England must be brought forward to its support, and the collateral and indirect effect of disorders in Indian finances would be felt extensively in this country."

Having thus shown both the actual deficiency j to be met, and the circumstances under which it was to be met, and having pointed out that, unless an exertion were now made, the aggre- Chap. r. gate deficiency of the six years, 18 37- 1843, 1842, would amount to 10,072,000/., Sir Robert Peel proceeded to state his views as to the various modes in which the necessary amount of revenue might be provided. His statement is a good instance of that exhaustive form of argument in which he excelled, and which he sometimes pushed so far as to provoke a smile. On the present occasion he used it like a master.

First, he swept away all idea of meeting the difficulty with financial nostrums, disguised loans, application of savings' banks' monies, issue of exchequer bills, or any other expedient for easing off the crisis. Then, having expressed •his conviction that matters could not be brought round by a reduction of expenditure, and having thus arrived at the conclusion that there must be an addition to our taxation, he opened the question, what the nature of that addition should be. Not increased charges on articles of consumption, he said; for, besides that he felt great reluctance to add to the burdens of the labouring classes, he was convinced, by the results of Mr. Baring's experiment, that we had " arrived at the limits of taxation on articles of consumption." Mr. Baring had expected, by

Chap. I. adding 5 per cent, to the customs and excise il^I. duties, to gain 1,895,000/. and he had only gained 206,000/. To repeat Mr. Baring's attempt, therefore, would be to repeat Mr. Baring's failure.

But if this could not be recommended, what then ? Should he revive some of the abandoned taxes ? Should he increase the rate of postage ? No; he was unwilling to disturb the working^ of an experiment fraught with so many advantages to the labouring classes. Nor would he re-impose the duties on salt, on leather, or on beer ; nor lay taxes on railways or on gas. To all such modes of raising the revenue he objected, partly on the ground of unwillingness to interfere with the comforts of the labourer, partlyon that of respect for the interests of manufacturing industry.

One more method remained to be examined, before he came to his own conclusion. Should he follow the example of his immediate predecessors, and attempt to increase revenue by diminishing taxation.? Upon this question he argued at some length, expressing his concurrence in the opinion, that reductions of duty on articles of consumption have a tendency to replace the revenue surrendered in order to make

Financial Policy. \*j

them, and that increased revenue may ultimately Chap. I. be realized from diminished taxation ; but adding, ,g.j that a long period must elapse before that end could be attained, and that a plan for reducing taxation with a view to ultimate improvement would not provide the means of meeting the existing deficiency. This view he confirmed and illustrated by referring to the reductions which had been made in the duties on wine, tobacco, coffee, hemp, rum, and sugar ; in only two of which cases, (those of coffee and rum), had the revenue recovered to the extent of the reduction of duty; and even in the case of coffee, which was by far the most favourable, it had taken three years to do so. If, therefore, we were to have recourse to the reduction of taxation as the only means of supplying the deficiency, it would be necessary to resort for a time at least to the objectionable system of loans and other devices, to which he for one could not consent to be a party.

Having thus exhausted all other alternatives. Sir Robert Peel addressed " an earnest appeal to the possessors of property, for the purpose of repairing this mighty evil," He said, " I propose, for a time at least — (a;nd I never had occasion to make a proposition with a more thorough con-

c

Chap. I. viction of its being one which the public inii^. terest of the country required)— I propose that, for a time to be limited, the income of this country should be called on to contribute a certain sum for the purpose of remedying this mighty and growing evil, I propose that the income of this country should bear a charge not exceeding ']d. in the pound, which will not amount to 3/. per cent., but, speaking accurately, 2/. 1 8 J. \d. per cent., for the purpose of not only Supplying the deficiency in the revenue, but of enabling me with confidence and satisfaction to propose great commercial reforms, which will afford a hope of reviving commerce, and such an improvement in the manufacturing interests as will react on every other interest in the country ; and, by diminishing the prices of the articles of consumption, and the cost of living, will, in a pecuniary point of view, compensate you for your present sacrifices ; whilst you will be at the same time relieved from the contemplation of a great public evil."