A text-book in psychology; an attempt to found the science of psychology on experience, metaphysics, and mathematics

Front matter

OfnrttfU Ittioeraita ffiihrarg

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE

sage' ENDOWMENT FUND

Part First

cnAPTER FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

I. — Condition op Concepts when they act as Forces 9

II. — Equilibrium and Movement of Concepts . . 11

III. — Complications and Blendinos 16

IV. — Concepts as the Source op Mental States . . 26 V. — The Co-operation op Several Masses op Concepts

OF Unequal Strength 30

VI. — A Glance over the Connection between Body and

Soul 32

PART SECOND. EMPIRICAL PSTCnOLOGT

FIRST division. — PSTCHOLOOICAL PHENOMENA ACCORDING TO THE

HYPOTHESIS OF MENTAL FACULTIES.

I. — A Survey op the Assumed Mental Faculties . 36 II. — The Boundary-Line between the Lower and

Higher Faculties 45

III. — Faculty op Representation 53

IV. — The Faculty op Feeling 74

XXX CONTENTS.

CHAPTER PAGE

V. — The Faculty of Desire 82

VI. — The Co-operation and Cultivation of the Mental

Faculties 93

second division. — mental conditions.

I. — The General Variability op Conditions . . 97

II. — Natural Talents 99

III. — External Influences 104

IV. — Anomalous Conditions 108

Part Third. Bational Psychologt

section first. — theorems from metaphysics and natural philosophy.

I. — The Soul and Matter 119

IL— The Vital Forces 122

III. — The Connection between Soul and Body . . 125

section second — explanations op phenomena.

I.— Concepts of Space and Time 129

II. — The Development op Ideas 140

III. — Our Comprehension of Things and of Ourselves 150 IV. — The Ungoverned Play of the Psychical Mechanism 163

V. — Self-control and especlally Duty as a Psychical

Phenomenon 178

VI. — Psychological Observations upon the Destiny of

Man 190

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR (p. 1).-^ 1. Material and work of psychology. § 2. Concepts in regard to the senses. Memory and imagination. Manifestations of intelligence and rationality. Opinions in regard to faculties. § 3. Self-observation. {Note. — In psychology the general ideas are clearest ; the particular most obscure.) § 4. Empirical physics has discovered certain laws. Psychology can not experiment with men. § 5. Comparison of representation, feeling, and desire with the psychological states of vegetation, sensibility, and irritability respectively. § 6. Man an aggregate of contradictions. All mental life a constant change. § 7. Solution of many of the problems of mental life to be found in metaphysics and higher mathematics. § 8. The old hypothesis of mental faculties is a tradition reflecting the total impression of psychological observation, hence can not be dispensed with. (Note 1. — The present treatise divided into — Part I. Fundamental Principles ; Pait II. Empirical Psychology : Part HI. Rational Psychology. Note 2. — In modern times, psychology has rather gone backward than forward. Psychology can not deal with the beautiful.)

PART FIRST.— Chapter I.— The Condition of Concepts when they act as Forces (p. 9). § 10. Resistance between concepts. Resistance an expression of force. § 11. Do concepts destroy one another, or do they remain unchanged? §12. A concept which has in part become transformed into an effort must not be regarded as a severed portion of the whole concept.

Chapter II. — Equilibrium and Movement of Concepts 3 xxxii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

(p. 11). § 13. Equilibrium depends upon a sufficiency of opposition between concepts. § 14. The sum of the resistances and the ratio of their limitations are considered in investigations into the statics of the mind. § 15. The sum and ratio of the mutual limitation depend upon the strength of the individual concepts. § 16. Two concepts never entirely obscure each other. " Threshold of Consciousness.'' (Note. — A distinction between " A concept is in consciousness " and " 1 am conscious of my concepts." g 17. Law underlying the movement of concepts. § 18. Effect of a new concept coming upon concept near equilibrium. § 19. " The mechanical threshold." § 30. Extension of time during which concepts linger on the mechanical threshold. § SI. Cause of changes in the laws of reciprocal movement. (Note. — Concepts which rise simultaneously.)

Chapter HI.— Complications and Blendings (p. 16). § 23. Why opposed concepts resist one another. (Note. — Partially complete complexes.) § 33. An aggregate of force furnished by the complication or blending of several concepts. § 24 Problem : The encounter between two concepts and the blending of the remainders. § 35. Principles upon which the blending of concepts is based. § 26. Mediate and immediate reproduction. § 27. Mediate reproduction. § 38. Application of the theories of mediate and immediate reproduction. § 29. Keproduotion, or memory. Blendings existing between concepts in a series. § 30. Several series may cross one another. The same number may be held as a common point of intersection for many hundred series. § 31. Dependence of the foregoing upon the presupposed difference in the remainders. § 33. The blending of free-rising concepts. The conflict between things as we perceive them and as we think them.

Chapter IV. — Concepts as the Source of Mental States (p. 36). § 33. Objections against mathematical psychology. The soul as mind. The emotional nature. § 34. Esthetic judgment. (Note. — The series of true relations may be presented here. Conditions under which disharmony and harmony may arise.) § 35. A principle of contrast to be found in the complexes. § 36. The source of unpleasant feeling and of desire. § 37. The source of pleasant feeling, f? 38. The sources of feelings and desires always in particular concepts.

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Chapter V. — The Co-operation of Several Masses of Concepts of Unequal Strength (p. 30). g 39. The effect of a new act of perception upon combinations of concepts. § 40. Inner perception analogous to the outer. § 41. Inner perception always active. § 43. Difference between concepts in an active and in an inactive state. § 48. Conditions under which inner perception is interrupted. The inner perception seldom rises to its second power.

Chapter VI. — A Glance over the Connection between the Body and Soul (p. 32). § 44. Hitherto no question concerning the origin of concepts. § 45. Time required for each act of perception. Limit to the strength of a concept. § 46. Every human concept consists of infinitely small elementary apprehension. § 47. The largest supply of sense-concepts generated in early childhood. The susceptibility of the senses never entirely extinguished. § 48. The foregoing relates to concepts of the same kind. § 49. Influence of the body upon psychical manifestations shown in three ways. § 50. Conditions under which physiological pressure arises. This pressure often merely a retarding force. Oftener an arresting force. § 51. Conditions of physiological reaction. § 53. Origin of the co-operation of soul and body.

PART SECOND.— Empirical Psychology.— i^Vrsi Division : Psychological Phenomena according to the Hypothesis oj Mental Faculties.

Chapter I. — A Survey of the Assumed Mental Faculties (p. 36). § 53. Explanation of fundamental facts from the foregoing. A separation of that which does not admit of union implied in the effort to bring together a manifold. An original and essential differentiation of the human mind considered in the first division of the second part of this manual. § 54. The teachers of psychology present the social, the educated man. All higher mental activity potentially present in children and savages. A limited condition of man to be described. § 55. The division into higher and lower faculties. § 56. The extremes of the lowest and highest mental faculties ; sensuousness and reason. § 57. In the faculty of representation, we find imagination and memory; in reason, imagination and judgment. Esthetic and moral feelings and the emotions in the faculty of xxxiv ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS.

feeling. In desire on the one side, willing ; on the other, passion. § 58. (o.) These classifications were empirical groupings. The emotions not to be classified with the feelings. Morals and aesthetics are felt, cognized, and desired. (6.) The classifications made merely preliminary. The emotions not to be classified with the passions, (c.) The classified mental faculties exist side by side and in relation to one another. The work of memory, fantasy (or imagination), and desire upon the same material. The causal relation of the different faculties to one another. § 59. The first treatment of sensuous presentations. The lower sensuous phase of mental life to be met most frequently. The true Ego appears to us by a so-called process of apperception. Signification of apperception. The relation of a moral volition to free will. Assumption of transcendental freedom. Reason quite different from sensuousness. Reason and sensuousness the beginning points of two series. Idea of the Ego and of transcendental freedom contradictory. A faculty of reason not consistent with tnith. (Note. — The four principal kinds of mental diseases. The notions of mental soundness.)

Chapter II. — The Boundary-line between the Higher and Lower Faculties (p. 45). § 60. The line of demarkation in the representative faculties can not be drawn with precision. Msthetic faculty is wanting in uncivilized men. § 61. If a lower faculty be attributed to brutes, it is to be regarded as defective, arrested, or suppressed. We are not authorized regarding the human mind as an aggregate of higher and lower faculties. The educated man has power to apportion his attention to different acts. § 63. Wolff places voluntary attention between the higher and lower faculties of representation. Attention makes a notion distinct. Understanding is the faculty by which our thoughts are united, etc. § 63. All combination is a spontaneous act of the power of presentation. Kant's service to speculative philosophy. The combination of a manifold is the immediate result of unity in the soul. When thinking intensely, we feel ourselves active. Activity neither an attribute of the understanding nor a source of combinations. The concepts of space and time. The power to distinguish characteristics from the substance to which they are attributed belongs

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xxxr

to the higher faculties. § 64 The abstracting of the general notions from concrete examples belongs to the work of the higher faculties, as does the distinction between object and space, event and time. § 65. In savages sesthetic and moral apprehensions rare. The brute depends upon instinct. § 66. No series of fixed differences between humanity and animality, or between the higher and lower faculties. Very little is known of brutes. The brute receives training according to the inner laws of its nature. The differences between men more easily explained than those between brutes. Man has needed tools. Human activity not to be regarded as complete.

Chapter III. — Faculty of Representation (p. 53). § 67. Conspectus showing the aspects belonging to the faculty of representation. § 68. The work of touch, taste, smell, hearing, seeing. Classes of sense-impressions greater in number than the organs of sense. § 69. Pressure, warmth, cold. Touch originally feeling. § 70. Taste furnishes distinguishable sensation. § 71. Apparatus of smell less under our control than that of the other senses. Odors mostly pleasant or unpleasant. § 72. Hearing richest of all the senses in variety of sensations. Probably every musical tone has its own peculiar place in the organ. § 73. Sight distinguishes colors. The color-sense is sometimes wanting. (iVo/e.— Every sense has its acuteness and delicacy, its extent and duration.) § 74. The inner sense an assumption from analogy with the outer sense ; the inner sense a somewhat defective invention of psychologists; the inner sense not able long to endure the strain of intentional effort ; the inner sense rises to higher and higher powers. {Note.— Question whether there are concepts without consciousness.) § 75. Theory of space and time incorrect. The tone-series ; the color-surface. Whether the color-realm requires a third dimension. (Note.— In the difference between high and dark, as well as between high and low tones, a concept of succession to be perceived. The series in every logical arrangement where the varieties are opposed and at the same time united in the species. The theory of intelligible space.) g 76. Concept of a series shown in the notions of integral positive numbers. Arithmetic an example of a series constantly becoming more abstracted. § 77. The geometrical concept of space not original xxxvi ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS,

in man. We habitually carry a standard of measurement with us. § 78. Philosophers in difficult cases copy the procedure of logic ; Kant's categories warning examples of this. Understanding, judgment, and reason correspond to notions, judgment, and syllogisms. Whether notions are logical ideals, § 79. What dictionaries and grammars reveal concerning notions. General notions can not be shown to exist, g 80, Human thought assumes the form of judgment. § 81. A wonderful psychological phenomenon. The representation as a copy should resemble the object itself; the painter in a sketch gives a more exact knowledge of an object than one who tries to describe it in words. The principles of logic only applied to judgments. (Note. — The ideal of an intuiting cognition.) § 83. The passive attitude of the subject. Judgment is manifested only in speech ; inclination to communicate with others influences the form of one's thought ; expression often a necessity : preference and rejection special kinds of judgments ; the union of the new with that which is already known ; the general often to be explained by the particular. (Note. — School formulas. Arching and pointing. Pleasure in judging injures constructive power.) § 83. Syllogisms progressive unfoldings of the steps of a thought ; such progressive unfoldings only met with in ordinary speech. Creations of thought rarely possess the accuracy of the syllogism. § 84. Power to infer an attribute of reason. § 85. Logical approval different from sesthetic approval. § 86. Difficult to detei-mine what transcends experience. Notion of substance not the same as notion of thing; notion of force depends upon the notion of substance, g 87. Notions of force and substance comprehending space and time, g 88. Pure geometric notions of bodies, g 89. Psychologists careless in regard to the question of reproduction. § 90. Vividness and accuracy of reproduction, g 91. Accuracy and vividness of reproduction seldom found at the same time in equal proportions. (Note. — With some psychologists memory implies reproduction and recollection.) § 93. Upon the association of . concepts and the way in which they reproduce one another, (Note. — In inventions, creation the essential element.) g 93. Agreement between memory and imagination, g 94. Difference between memory and imagination.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xxxvii

Chapter IV.— The Faculty of Feeling (p. 74). § 95. Necessity for assuming faculties in addition to the representing faculty, g 96. Boundary-line between feeling and desire drawn near representation. (i\^oie.— Explanation of feeling.) § 97. Difficult to separate feelings from desires and aversions. Three kinds of feelings ; indifferent feelings. § 98. Peelings which depend upon the nature of that which is felt. § 99. Difference between unpleasant feelings of this kind. § 100. Analogy of the above feelings to iesthetic feeling. (iVb/e.— Sense of the sublime; sense of the ridiculous; comic sensations; laughter.) t? 101. Peeling the source of desire and aversion. Desires which are independent of the pleasure or pain of their object. § 102. Intermediate feelings. § 103. Mixed feelings. (Mote 1.— False speculations in regard to feelings. Note 2. — Poets mingle feelings in their works of art.) g 104. Emotions not merely stronger feelings. § 105. Kant's classification of the emotions. § 106. Emotions to be regarded physiologically as well as psychologically. (Note 1. — Action and reaction between soul and body. Note 3. — Effect of emotion upon physical organs.)

Chapter V.— The Faculty of Desire (p. 82). § 107. The faculties of representation, feeling, and desire should furnish an exhaustive classification of mental activities. Difference between a strong will and a strong desire, g 108. Desires to bo distinguished according to the above classification of feelings. g 109. The most important distinction is between the lower and higher faculties of desire, g 110. Impulses and instincts implied in the lower faculties of desire, g 111. Psychologists have placed the impulses of self-love, imitation, etc., side by side with the organic impulses. The assumption of special faculties frequent in the theory of desire. § 112. Inclinations different in different people, g 113. The passions the most striking spectacle in psychology, g 114. Deliberation precedes judgment and action. § 115. Reason is not a source of willing nor of knowledge, g 116. The connection between means and ends complicates moral deliberation, g 117. Circumspection the mental condition of a man who reflects. The work of deliberation is to make prominent the assthetic judgment upon the will. The ideas of inner freedom, of perfection, of benevolence, of right, and of equity. § 118. Freedom of the will. A man's xxxviii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS.

choice a co-operation of reason and desire. {Note 1. — The ground for illusion is in regard to freedom. An act is responsible in proportion as it discloses a weak or a strong will.) (Note Z. — Transcendental freedom a stranger in psychology.) § 119. Reason regarded as the seat of freedom. The passionate man a slave.

Chapter VI. — The Co-operation and Cultivation of the Mental Faculties (p. 92). § 130. The assumption of faculties defective. § 131. Reproduction the chief seat of mental life next to the senses, g 133. Value of reproduction in regard to habits and accomplishments. § 133. The two directions of cultivation determined by the inner sense and the outer action. Self -consciousness necessary to self-control. External action includes desires, observation, and judgment. Effect of external deeds upon a man's character. Employment pursued determines character. § 134. Permanent feelings rise from inner thinking and external action. § 135. Disastrous effect of passions upon development, upon imagination, and understanding.

Second Division : Mental Conditions.

Chapter I. — The General Variability of Conditions (p. 97). § 136. No one condition of human life resembles another. § 137. Reproduction proves that no concept once found is ever lost. § 138. A change of concepts in consciousness a necessity to man. The need of change increases through gratification. § 139. Hunger and satiety, waking and sleep, have a well-known cycle. § 130. The physical life has its period of growth, full strength, and decline. Variations to be observed throughout the life of the child, the boy, the man.

Chapter II. — Natural Talents (p. 99). g 131. The course of life modified through difference of sex. Girls develop earlier than boys. § 133. The temperaments in connection with the feelings and the emotions. The mingling of temperaments. (Note. — A physiological view of temperament.) § 133. The emotions strengthened or weakened by the responsiveness or the imperturbability of the body. (Note. — Physiognomy and craniology too indefinite at present to have any value in psychology.) § 134. The natural talents of humanity, g 135. The question concerning the races comes between those concerning the talents of the individual and of humanity.

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Chapter III. — ^External influences (p. 104). § 136, Prom the empirical standpoint no decision concerning the original talents of human nature. § 137. Influences of climate, soil, etc., upon man. § 138. The nation has a predominating temperament and a history. § 139. Difference of ranks or castes in every civilized nation. § 140. The youth is influenced by his family, his education, his surroundings, etc. § 141. The freedom that remains to a man in the midst of external influences- Kant endeavored to secure responsibility. The force with which a man works on himself or against himself.

Chapter IV. — Anomalous Conditions (p. 108). § 143. Man subjected to anomalous conditions. Difficulty in contrasting the well man with the mentally diseased. § 143. Anomalous conditions to be compared with the mental disorders, illusion, madness, dementia, idiocy. § 144. Illusion depends upon a flxed idea. Intervals of sound health in a diseased imagination. In delusions the disorder not purely mental. § 145. Madness an impulse to bodily action without aim. In healthy men, action occasionally appears at the same time voluntary and involuntary. (Note. — Madness without delusion.) § 146. In dementia, a mingling of concepts without regular connection. The fool resembles the stupid child. The proper cure of dementia is bodily. § 147. Idiocy or imbecility is general weakness of the mind. § 148. The classes of mental disorders are extremes under which modified disorders may be subsumed. § 149. Anomalous mental states analogous to mental disorders, The peculiarities of the dream. Concluding Remarks. — The opposite of mental disorder is a healthy mental condition. The same degree of mental health not to be found in all mental faculties. Comparison between insanity and the passions. No passion is a pure force. The kinds of passions belonging to the different kinds of insanity. Concepts manifest themselves at one time as passions, at another as reason.

PART THIRD.— Rational Psychology.— ySecfo'on First: Theorems from Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy.

Chapter I.— The Soul and Matter (p. 119). § 150. Notion of the soul to be restored. The soul a simple essence with no space relations. § 151. The soul has no time relations. § 153. The soul has no immediate natural talents. § 153. The nature of xl ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS.

the soul unknown. § 154. Eesistance' among essences. §155. The self-preservations of the soul. § 156. The difference between soul and matter. Space conditions belong to essences. Matter does not fill space as a geometric. Matter always penetrable by its solvent.

Chapter 11.— Vital Forces (p. 122). § 157. Vital forces. § 158. Each element has its own vital force. (Note. — No matter entirely inorganic.) § 159. The source of vital force referred to Providence. § 160. The soul an example of the internal development of a simple essence. The relation between psychology and physiology. (Note. — A characteristic of vitality is assimilation.) § 161. Vital forces differ in kind as well as in degree. The difference between parts of the body nourished by the same kind of food. Causality depends upon the dissimilarity of the elements.

Chapter III. — The Connection between Soul and Body (p. 135). § 163. Connection between mind and matter in brutes and in man. § 163. The location of the soul. (Note 1. — The spheres of the physiologist and metaphysician differ. Note S. — No reason for assuming the soul of brutes and man to be in the same place. § 164. The nervous system in the human body serves a single soul. § 165. The dependence of the mind upon the body not to be regarded as strange. § 166. The theory concerning a general organic connection of the whole universe.

Section Second : Expla/iiafion of Phenomena

Chapter I.— Concepts of Space and Time (p. 129). g 167. A psychological disclosure needed as to how the world and we ouTselves appear to ourselves. § 168. Investigations into the nature of series of concepts necessary to explain things in the relation of time and space. § 169. The limitation of the reproduction depends upon accompanying conditions. The relation of intermediate concept between two others will never be changed. § 170. The general form of the concept depends upon a definite starting-point. § 171. If the beginning point be dispensed with, the perception and the reproduction seen constantly in one direction. § 178. In the soul the concept of space is intensive. The fimdamental idea of number is that of more or less. True and complete symbols for the notion of number. § 173. The original apprehension of the eye not spa-

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. xli

tial. The movement of the eye furnishes the spatial concepts. § 174. The concept of space relations depends upon reproductions just occurring. (1.) Succession in representation not a represented succession. (3.) Only an imperceptibly short interval of time required to furnish a concept of space relations. § 175. Distinction between time and space perceptions. Propositions 1 and 3 in § 174 apply to the representation of the temporal. § 176. Only educated people can comprehend long extensions in time, g 177. In a psychological sense everything temporal and spiritual is infinitely divisible. {Note 1. — Geometry needed in commensurable quantities on account of the infinite divisibility of space and time. Note Z. — Spatial and temporal relations not dependent on space and time. Note S. — The beautiful in space.) § 178. Concepts of intensive magnitudes. Origin of the standard by which we characterize our sensations of strong and weak.

Supplement. — The Difference between Series (p. 1S8). The differences in the series in general. 1. The series are longer or shorter. 3. Degree of union among the terms stronger or weaker. 3. The series similar or not in regard to strength of terms as ■well as in degree of combination. 4. Several series often serve for one. 5. Many series return into themselves. 6. Strong among dissimilar often form a series among themselves. 7. A term often has a side series. 8. Side series may progress simultaneously. 9. Bach element of a complex may be the beginning point of a series. 10. Series may start simply, and later may form a complex. Reproduction fluctuates between two kinds of opposed possible influences.

Chapter II.— The Development of Notions (p. 140). § 179. All concepts subject to the laws of blending, etc. Notions, as such, exist only in our abstraction. The union of the practical with the theoretical understanding, g 180. That notions are a peculiar class of concepts, a delusion. General notions and logical ideals. How are they constructed^ § 181. Why do concepts so often occur in the form of judgments % Judgments not mere complexes or blendings. § 183. Collective impressions from similar perceptions. § 183. Reproduction of concepts through similarity. § 184. Collective concepts in which series lie infolded to be regarded as subjects, etc. § 185. The place of the subject. § 186. Each word in the language fitted to be the xlii ANALYSIS OP CONTENTS.

subject of a judgment. § 187. In an expressed judgment, for the hearer, two cases possible. § 188. Intelligible speech must be connected. (Note. — In music, distinctions between the intelligible and the senseless to be made. The intelligible not also the beautiful.) § 189. The deyelopment of ideas the result of continuous judgment, § 190. The relation between a genus and its species. § 191. The determination of the content of complexes, or the definition of ideas. § 193. The definition and separation of general notions are problems to be solved, etc.

Chapter III. — Our Comprehension of Things and Ourselves (p. 150). § 194. Concepts become combined so far as they are not arrested. For a child there are no individual objects. The first chaos of concepts subjected to a separation. Movement of objects aids in making distinctions. § 195. Objects separated into individual things ; things separated into their properties. The question concerning substance, g 196. Contradictions in the notion of the thing with several properties. § 197. Differences in the human apprehension of things to be considered preparatory to the theory of self-consciousness. The object in motion occupies more attention than the object at rest. § 198. The brute as well as man occupies himself less with the inanimate than with the living object. (Note. — That the Ego opposes to itself a non-Ego, an error of idealism.) ij 199. The origin of the concept of a concept. § 300. The concept of self-knowledge. The possibility of apprehending two opposite concepts, the representing and the represented, as one and the same. The identity of self. § 201. The concept of the Ego. Man the movable central point of things. (iVbfe — The concept of the we.) § 203. The unity of personality depends upon the Mendings of all the concepts which in the course of life are added to the complex which makes up the self of each person. The Ego develops differently in different concept masses. § 203. A correct notion of ourselves to be obtained through the notion of the soul. (iVoie.— The Ego as a metaphysical principle. § 204 The meaning of intuition. Intuition a complicated process. Passivity in intuition.

Chapter IV.— The Ungoverned Play of the Psychical Mechanism (p. 163). § 305. The mental activity may originate in concepts themselves in the psychical organism or in external

impressions. § 206. A small number of concepts would soon approach a statical point. This movement toward the statical point is influenced by the number of concepts. § 207. Changes in the arrest of concepts occur in consequence of new complications. Hence changes in mental conditions. § 208. The statical threshold is developed from the mechanical. § 209. Older (earlier) concepts are stronger than later ones. § 210. The purpose of the reproduction determines the purpose of the elaboration. {I^ote. — Distinction between analytic and synthetic instruction.) S 211. Concepts become more firmly and more variously interwoven in following the tendency toward equilibrium. The intelligence has its seat in the general connection among concepts. § 212. Conversation is the ordinary stimulant to the imagination. § 213. A man's sense-perception and attention depend upon his imagination and thought. Attention partly involuntary, partly voluntary. Pour circumstances to be observed during the act of attention. Keproduced concepts may be unfavorable to involuntary observation. {Note. — Attention belongs to the fundamental notions of general pedagogy.) § 214. Every physical feeling is in a condition to bring the series of concepts complicated with it into consciousness. § 215. Changes in the physical condition must correspond to changes in the mental state. (Note. — An increased velocity in the changes of bodily conditions renders the play of the psychical mechanism diflScult of control.) § 216. The effect of emotion should not be apparent upon the healthy body. A system of possible emotions exists in every human organism. The effects of physiological pressure are to be ascertained from a knowledge of the psychical mechanism. (1.) Under physiological pressure obscurity arises. (2.) This pressure retards the vaulting and tapering of a series of concepts. (3.) With many this pressure is not constantly effective. (4.) A constant pressure acting upon free-rising concepts disarranges their movement. § 217. Different concept masses depend upon outside impressions. § 218. The external world regarded as the sphere of action. The functions of body and soul combined in movements in different parts of the body and the feelings arising therefrom. § 219. Illustration of § 218 by a series of concepts, a, b, c, d, etc. § 220. The position of a hindrance often reprexliv ANALYSIS OF COl^TBNTS.