Knowledge, duty, and faith : suggestions for the study of principles taught by typical thinkers ancient and modern

Front matter

H

ANCIENT AND MODERN

SIR T. D. ACLAND.

Introduction

General Questions.

What is Philosophy ?

What do we know of the world without ? . . . .

What do we know of our own minds ? .

What do we know of a higher Spiritual Being ? . . .

Historical Sketch — ^The preparation for Christianity

The Grecian Philosophy, the Roman Empire and the Jewish

Religion

Greek Thought in the first centuries .....

Latin influence of Augustine

Introduction to Logic

Deductive Logic

Syllogism

.

Definition and Classification

Inductive Logic ....

U

Modern Systems of Logic .

.

Laws of Thought

.

Limits of Logic on Spiritual Subjects

CHAPTER 11.

Socrates .......... tit'

Personality of S^icrateo T3

VI

CONTENTS.

Gorgias and Thesetetus The Republic .....

Platonic Ideas : their different Meaning . Influence of Plato on successive Thinkers

FAOS

78 81 89 96

OHAPTEB III.

Aristotle's Ethics Rational or Intellectual excellence Standard of Moral Virtue .

The Will or Voluntary Action Lessons from the Ethics

105 111 120 126 129

CHAPTER IV.

Mediseval Principles of Thought Aristotle's Categories .

Realism and Nominalism Realism and Idealism . .

CHAPTER V.

Modern Principles of Thought . liacun and Descartes ....

Two lines of Thought in a Tabular form Classification of Modern Writers .

. 139

. 139

146, 147

. 148

CHAPTER VI.

His Doctrine of Ideas

149 152

CHAPTER VII.

Berkeley .....

His Three Impuitimt Diecoveries .

155 157

CONTENTS.

vil

CHAPTER Ylir.

TAGK

Hume 161

Philosophy based on Psychology , . . . . .164 Hume's Distinction between Facts and Relations between Ideas. 169

CHAPTER IX.

Three Stages of Revelation .

174 179

CHAPTER X-

Scotch Reaction . . ,

Grerman Reaction S. T. Coleridge .

Understanding, Reason, and AVill Spiritual Philosophy .

185 187 183 189 191

CHAPTER XI.

Kant

The Categories .

Practical Reason Post-Kantians .

Green's Spiritual Principle

199 204 215 217

CHAPTER XII.

Butler

CHAPTER XIII.

Herbert Spencer.

Persistent Force .

On Education

Miss Shirreff on Moral Training

230 232 233 viii

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIV.

PA OB

Validity and Reality .

Doctrine of Worth The MicrocosmuB Philosophy of Religion Criticism of Lotze

CHAPTER XV.

Result of the Retrospect Conclusions

. 244 . 247

List of Books . . 249

Chronological Table of Modem Philosophers . facing page 250

INTEODUCTION.

General Questions.

In offering suggestions for the study of principles on the foundations of Knowledge, Duty, and Faith, I am inviting students to enter on what is now called Philosophy; though I hardly like to use that word for anything I can say. It is needful, however, to enquire into the meaning of the word Philosophy, which may be said to date from Socrates, and is now in common use.

In the last century it was usual to speak of what is now called physical science as natural philosophy. Science in those days was limited to mathematics and other branches of knowledge, which were supposed to admit of logical demonstration.

In Scotland, the phrase "philosophy of the human mind " was adopted by the common-sense school-=Eeid, Stewart, and Brown — ^to take the place of metaphysicF. This phrase is now superseded by the term psychology.

Various systems of philosophy ia Germany may be described, or denoted rather than defined, by the epithets, rational, sceptical, critical, transcendental. Rant's critical philosophy was followed by what are called philosophies of the absolute. More recently, reaction against Germany has given rise to the positive philosophy. Now the syn» thetical philosophy of Mr. Spencer claims the definition of " perfectly unified knowledge."

Perhaps the simplest account of philosophy is that it aims at discovering the general princ pies which regulate

2 INTRODUCTION.

the action of the mind in the search for truth, both intellectual and moral. It is distinguished from all other studies by the difference that it is not occupied with anyspecial province of things. Ueberweg gives as his definition, " philosophy is the science of principles." We shall see further on that a great English philosopher,* speaking through an eminent member of the medical profession, said that "principles are the postulates of science and the problems of philosophy." t

It is, I think, generally admitted that every system of philosophy has grown out of the thoughts of previous ages, and been modified by more recent influences. In this sense it must be admitted that the principle of evolution especially applies to philosophy. It follows that to understand philosophy in our own time we must try to know something of its history.

There are now many histories of philosophy of acknowledged authority in the English language; to some of them I shall have occasion to refer. But I wish to make it quite clear to my young readers that I am not going to attempt to give a critical history of the different systems put forth by the teachers of philosophy in successive periods ; I am not competent to such a task, and, if I were to give a summary of what I have endeavoured to gather from historians and critics, I should only serve up a meal of dry bones which, to drop metaphor, would be neither interesting nor instructive. All that I can attempt is to state fairly the questions which at the present day are brought before the rising generation in popular literature,

* Coleridge.

t ' Spiritual Philosophy." Green. Vol. 1. p. 167.

THEEE MAIN QUESTIONS. 3

and then to try tack (as sportsmen say), and see what we can learn from the searchings of heart and head which are to be found in classical, mediseval, and modern records. Stated in a very general form, the following three questions present themselves to all who begin to reflect on the principles of knowledge, duty, and faith : —

(1) Is there any fundamental and permanent truth or reality which can be known, as distinct from transitory opinion ? The reality which we are asking for being twofold : reality of what is, as truth to be known ; reality of what ought to be, as duty to be done.

(2) Is the knowledge of such reality and is the standard of truth or of practice to be found in the human mind, or in the study of things around us — that is, in logically consistent thought, or in verified experience ?

(3) Is there any source of light other than the mind of man, and the world of experience, on which reliance can be placed ? And does the answer to this question depend on facts historically recorded (if not within present experience), or on principles inherent in our mental and spiritual constitution, or on facts and principles combined ?

These questions may be put in a different form. I wiil^ use tlie words of two writers of great authority.

Dr. Martineau says, " The speculative curiosity of men moves about through the circle of three great objects, God, Nature, and the Soul, and is ever attempting to determine the relations subsisting between them." *

• ' Types of Ethical Theoiy,' i. p. 123 ; ii. p. 122.

B 2

4 INTRODUCTION.

Mr. Lewes opens his History of Philosophy with these words : —

"Theology, Philosophy, and Science constitute a spiritual triumvirate." In the second page he adds: ♦' While Theology claims to furnish a system of religious conceptions, and Science to furnish conceptions of the order of the world. Philosophy (abstracting their widest conceptions from both) furnishes a doctrine which contains an explanation of the world and of human destiny." *

The writer of these last quoted words was avowedly a (^isciple of Comte. He considered that theology and philosophy are both absorbed in modern science ; theology, whether in the form of mythology, or of the Hebrew belief in a Creator and Lawgiver, he regarded as suited to the infancy of the race ; philosophy, as struggling to emancipate itself from theology during the later middle age and succeeding in the sixteenth century.

Dr. Martineau points out that from the first dawn of human thought Man found himself in presence of Nature and of God, understanding by Nature the totality of perceptible phenomena ; and by God the Eternal Ground and Cause Whose existence those phenomena express. These two, Nature and God, are ever present to man ; the questions what they are and what they have to do with man cannot but affect the decision of what man ought to be.t

Dr. Martineau shows clearly that the difference between ancient and modem philosophy turns on the question whether man begins by looking out of himself to Nature and Nature's God, or whether he begins by looking into the human mind and its own working, » uevrea vol. i. xvil. f ' Types pf Ethical Theory,' i. p. 2.

ANCIENT AND MODERN METHODS. 5

The ancient Greeks were occupied with the Cosmos, or the order of the world around them, distinguishing between existence and appearance, between being and phenomena.

The moderns begin by introspection of what passes in the mind, and distinguish between inward sensation, impressions, or states of consciousness on the one hand, and, on the other, reaKty apart from the mind; or between self and not self, subject and object. I must not anticipate the consequences to be drawn from this distinction between ancient and modem thought.

But I may suggest that owing to the advance of modern thought, both in the study of psychology or the working of the mind, and in the study of physical sciences, two questions besides those already mentioned present themselves to thoughtful persons.

The first is from the subjective point of view ; How do we know that impressions, ideas, or states of consciousness enable us to know anything of reality outside or beyond or above our minds ?

The second question arises from the great progress of physical science, especially in reference to the action of the nervous system and the brain ; How do we know that we have minds and souls distinct from our bodily organism ?

I do not at present offer any suggestion as to the answers to be given to these questions ; I mention them only that I may not seem to pass them unnotieed. They are, in fact, implied in the three questions already stated.

If full and satisfactory answers can be given to those three questions, they will cover the ground marked out by these twa

HiSTOEiCAL Sketch.

Before we enquire what is to be learned at the present time from the special leaders of thought during successive periods, it may be well to attempt a general sketch of the influences at work on a large scale before the Christian era, and, in special directions, since that unique crisis. Whatever doubts on physical or literary subjects may have been suggested by science or by criticism in recent years, as to the infallible authority of documents generally accepted by Christians, no one, however agnostic, doubts that the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, followed by that of Paul of Tarsus and other Apostles, i ntrod uced new elements into the moral conditions of human society over a large part of the civilized world.

The development of intellectual activity and of political influences in successive ages has led to the embodiment of those new ideas in institutions and schools of thought and feeling which are now the subject of critical study.

Before the Christian era there were three nations, the Greek, the Koman, and the descendants of Abraham, each of which has left its mark on the history of the world.

The Greeks developed a perfect language, grammar, and literature, and traced the outlines of human reasoning and the fundamental laws of thought.

The Eomans built up a gigantic Empire, based on principles of administration and law which are still in force.

The Israelites received through their ancestors an unique account of the origin of the visible universe, and the first clearly recorded writing on the Unity of God and His

ISRAELITES, GEEEKS, AND ROMANS. 7

government of tlie world. This may be said without entei'ing into the question of the authorship of Moses, or the date of the written record, as it has come down to the present time.

As to the influence of Greece, authentic records are of later date. How far Greece may have been influenced by previous learning in Egypt, or by Aryan speculation in the further East, is a subject for interesting enquiry, which has only a distant relation to modern convictions or aspirations.

From the age of Socrates, or rather from the earlier speculations of his predecessors, there was a constant progress of thought, on tlie foundations of knowledge, and the principles of duty, both as regards the individual and the social state, with anxious searching into the ideal of the universe.

It is worthy of note that the learning of Alexandria, and the connexion of the Jewish race with that city, led to a tremslation of the Old Testament into the Greek language, which had become (like French in modern times) the common speech of educated Europeans. Thus a language somewhat different from the old Attic Greek had been prepared for the reception of the Gospel, and its transmission as a treasure for all time.* At a later period Alexandria became the headquarters of Christian philosophy.

The whole of the Mediterranean Sea, and of the lands

around it, were under the Imperial rule; consequently

* The change in the Greek by the introduction of Hebrew thought, is shown in detail in an interesting and instructive book, 'Biblical Study, its Principles, Methods, and History,' by Dr. Briggs, Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York; chapter iii. on the languages of the Bible, Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek, pp. 42-7i.

8 HISTORICAL SKETCH.

communication was uninterrupted, and the dispersion of the Jews throughout the Empire prepared the way for the spread of the Gospel.

But while the intellect of Greece, the political administration of Rome, and the strict monotheism of the Jewishrace, combined, contributed in the way of preparation to the spread of an universal religion, it was evident that these three forms of human thought and action had all proved their inability to find an adequate response to the wants of mankind.

Grecian philosophy had sub-divided itself into various Schools, and it may be said that the result was general scepticism.

The Roman Empire had fallen into a state of social corruption, which ended in military despotism and ultimate anarchy.

The Jewish nation, with its intense tenacity of exter&al traditions, had lapsed into Pharisaic formalism or Sadducean rationalism. The destruction of Jerusalem which followed within the first century of the Christian era, put an end to the public influence of the nation, though the Stubborn adhesion of the race to its traditions and future expectations is to the present day a standing witness to the belief of one Creator and Governor of the world, from the earliest historic times.

The outcome of this short historical retrospect, from the Christian point of view, may be stated to be that the "fulness of time" was the result of Providential preparation for an universal religion ; and that the insufficiency of speculative thought and social prudence, without faith

EARLY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. 9

in a personal God, and in His relation to man, had been made evident.

If after this retrospect we look forward from the same point of time, we shall see that the Greek mind directly influenced the formulation of Christian Theology for at least three centuries.

In the fourth century the freshness of Greek thought was cramped in the Latin language by the powerful intellect of Augustine. About the same time, when hordes of uncivilized races had overwhelmed the Western Empire, a new power arose at Eome, in the hands of its Bishop, and of the Diocesan liierarchy under his control.

The lofty aspirations of Greek thought showed themselves in various tendencies during the earlier middle ages. But in the thirteenth century the logical philosophy of Aristotle took possession of the minds of the educated men in the Western World, while the East became stagnant, and has so remained. The Eenaissance awakened interest in Plato, but Aristotle again in a Latin garb dominated over Europe, as was shown in the development of TTltramontanism in the Latin races, with the highly wrought Jesuit education, and of Calvinism (in a wide sense of the word) among the Protestant communities, chiefly Teutonic. Nor can the divinity of the Established Churches of England and Scotland be said to have been otherwise than afiiected by this Latin and logical atmosphere, especially during the eighteenth century.

I have ventured to offer to the young reader this superficial sketch of thought in former times, for two reasons.

10 INTRODUCTION.

I wish to show that questions, which are now interesting thoughtful persons, have in some form or other occupied the human mind for nearly three thousand years; and to suggest that we can hardly understand them as they are now presented to ourselves, unless we take into account the steps which have brought us to our present position. The study of Plato and Aristotle may help us to form a better judgment on the principles which are assumed in modern thought and science.

But I must also ask the indulgence of my readers for inserting a short introduction to the subject of Logic, as understood in the present day, before I attempt to state the lessons now to be learned from Plato and Aristotle.

The progress of physical, mental, and moral science in the present century, though it has not altered the fundamental principles of reasoniag, has compelled us to reconsider some of the deductions from those principles, and has taught the need for more caution in the pre-suppositions to be taken for granted.

What follows on the subject of logic was written nearly two years ago, in response to the questions of friends, and has been submitted in type to competent instructors and intelligent students, to whom I am much indebted for encouragement and for suggestions.

I hope I may have succeeded in directing attention to the need for caution in the use of language as an instrument of thought, to the lessons to be derived from experience, and above aU, to the limits imposed on finite minds, in reasoning about what is infinite or spiritual.

CHAPTEE I.

INTEODUCTION TO LOGIC.

Before we attempt to consider what are the foimdations on which knowledge rests in the present day, whether the superstructure be science or duty, or even faith (if that wonderful spiritual power may be included), I propose to say a few words about Logic. We have heard in the lectures of a very able teacher Bacon's depreciation of the syllogistic or deductive Logic of the ancients, and his praise and partial anticipation of the inductive path of the moderns in quest of new powers over Nature to be gained by first submitting to its laws.

But Logic in some form, whether deductive or inductive, is not dead. Our language is full of logical phrases. Everyone is inclined to say when he takes up what he deems an impregnable position that it " stands to reason," or tlmt some doctrine which he dislikes is " iUogical."

I have been asked by several of my young friends. What is the difference between deduction and induction ? What is a syllogism ? What are the major and minor premisses ? What is the difference between arguments a priori and a posteriori 1 What are generalization and abstraction? and, worst of aU, what is the meaning of synthesis, which seems to be in the hands of some persons the wand to charm with in cases where ideal or spiritual convictions are to be put aside as obsolete ? These are all logical terms on which I hope to throw some light.

There is another family of words such as sensation, perception, conception, ideas, concepts, notions, essences, each of which is a monument of long controversy, rather perhaps metaphysical than purely logical ; but such words need to be defined and arranged in some sort of order and relation, before we can even state the problems of thought and life which are now exercising young minds, to say nothing of the attempt to find solutions.

It may suf&ce before going into more detail as to the meaning of technical words — to say generally that there are two modes of reasoning, or drawing conclusions from what is already admitted.

We sometimes assume certain general principles and apply them to particular cases ; at other times we appeal to facts of experience and from particular cases draw some general conclusion. The first kind of reasoning is called deductive, and sometimes a prion. The reasoning from particular cases is called reasoning a posteriori or inductive. As this mental process involves the distinguishing between particular facts, and finding in what respects they agree and in what respects they differ, inductive reasoning is sometimes called analytical. Deductive reasoning, such as that in Euclid, is called synthetical, as bringing together admitted truths, and so adding to our previous knowledge; but both the terms synthetical and a priori will require further explanation.*

Whatever opinion some persons may entertain as to the * See page 44.

TWO MODES OF EEASONING. 13

barren results of Logic as the means of discovering truth, I tliink no one who has the very slightest acquaintance with the principles of reasoning will deny that accumte reasoning requires the clear definition of the meaning of words. Words have much to do not only with expressing thoughts, but with creating and perpetuating impressions of tilings whether fanciful or real. It is to this function of Logic, as defining the meaning of words, that I wish to direct special attention. I will avoid as far as possible a number of technicalities, which, I confess, are to me most wearisome, and wliich, I venture to think, are, except as a gymnastic exercise for tlie brain, very unprofitable.

Logical treatises are generally arranged under three heads, including the treatment of —

1. Words or terms.

2. Propositions or judgments.

3. Eeasoning or inference.

A fourth head is sometimes added, called Method or Metliodology, but that runs into Philosophy or Metaphysics, and for the present may be left out of sight.

K I were so imprudent as to attempt to write a new text book in addition to the excellent treatises already in use, I must begin in the regular way, first, vnth names or terms, then go on to the junction of subject and predicate in propositions, and thirdly, grapple with the barbarous nomenclature of all the possible forms of syllogism. But I have no such intention. I will refer to the traditional account of reasoning only so far as to indicate a few leading principles, which are implied in the exercise of our reasoning powers, and, in some sense, also of our moral powers and responsibilities ; and finally I will endeavour to point out the due limits of Logic with reference to the realities of our material and spiritual life.

In teaching children to read, it is sometimes found expedient to begin by showing them a familiar word (with a graphic illustration) and then to lead them from the word to the letters of which it is composed. I propose to select a few ordinary arguments, to take them to pieces, and then to put the pieces into logical order. In othier words, I will offer an analytical outline of the method of reasoning, for which course I am able to quote the high authority of a kind friend of my youth. Archbishop Whately, of whom John Stuart Mill generously said " That he had done more than any (then) living person to restore logic to the rank from which it had fallen in the estimation of the cultivated class in this country." As I proceed I hope to refer my young readers to portions of the best modern books in which they may find full information.

We will begin by examining one or two common forms of speech and argument such as might occur in ordinary conversation. We shall see that in order to state the arguments fully enough to distinguish between what is asserted, or taken for granted, as the basis of the argument, and the conclusion, we must have three sentences or propositions. The two first are called Premisses, distinguished as Major and Minor (for a reason to be explained further on*) and the third is a Conclusion. The first or Major premiss usually assumes a general truth or • See page 25.

MEANING OF SYLLOGISM. 15

principle. The second or Minor premiss asserts a fact, showing that a particular case comes iinder that principle. The three sentences taken in regular order are called a Syllogism.

Syllogism.

Whenever anyone argues or reasons in the ordinary way, provided he does so correctly, he states a conclusion for which he gives a reason, "What I say is true lecav^ something else is true," or "A certain proposition is admitted to be true, therefore my conclusion is true." But there is generally another statement which connects the conclusion with the reason given; this connecting proposition is usually implied and not expressed. The value of the argument in either case mainly depends on whether the proposition which connects the two statements is really binding, and especially on whether some important word which occurs in the two premisses is used in precisely the same sense in both. Some words in domestic economy are especially liable to be used in a double sense. Food is spoken of as "light," or "rich," or "nourishing," when feeding power and digestibility are hopelessly mixed up in the mind of the speaker.

By way of illustration let us begin with an argument on the utility of Logic. One person says, " Logic is useful because it teaches the art of reasoning." This argument may be formally stated thus : —

Major. — ^An Art which teaches us to reason well is useful.

Minor. — Logic is an Art which teaches us to reason well.

Conc/wsioM..— Therefore Logic is useful.

Here we have a general principle and its application to the subject in dispute, namely Logic.

Supposing some one to raise an objection to the second statement and to reply that Logic is not an Art, but a Science; then the conclusion does not, in his opinion, follow from the principle. This objection admits the principle but denies its application to Logic.

Let us try again.

Major. — A Science which theoretically explains the laws of argument or of thought is useful.

Minor. — Logic is such a Science,

Conclusion. — Therefore Logic is useful.

Another objector may now say, " Logic no doubt is a grand Science ; but I don't see any use in theorising about what comes by nature." This objector denies the truth of the general principle, so the argument falls to the ground.

The first two sentences in each of these arguments are, as we have said, the premisses — ^the principle is the Major Premiss, the application the Minor Premiss, and the three sentences taken together form the Syllogism,

Let me now interpose a few words as to the use of Logic, a point which our disputants have left undecided.

For our present purpose we need not settle whether Logic is an Art or a Science. Archbishop Whately, in the opening sentence of his Elements of Logic, a book which used to be considered as a model of clearness, says.

MEANING OF SYLLOGISM. 17

" Logic, in the most extensive sense which the name can with propriety be made to bear, may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Eeasoning. It investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions." *

It may be worth while here to introduce Whately's explanation of the difference between a Science and an Art: — "It is to be observed that a scieiice is conversant with knowledge only ; an Art is the application of knowledge to practice; hence Logic (as well as any other system of knowledge) becomes, when applied to practice, an Art; wldle confined to the theory of reasoning, it is strictly a science. It is as such that it occupies the higher place in dignity, since it professes to develop some of the most interesting and curious intellectual phenomena." t

Sir W. Hamilton treated Whately with sublime contempt, and accused him of self-contradiction, because he laid stress on the fact that Logic is specially conversant with language; but language is undoubtedly the instrument of thought and of reason. Sir W. HamUtou considered Logic as a science conversant with thought as thought (rather a forced expression), by which he meant the form of thought as distinct from the matter thought about.

Sir W. Hamilton was a man of prodigious learning in Logical Literature. Whately may not have been a

* Whately's ' Logic,' Introduction, p. 1. t Ibid., p. 56, note.

learned man, but he was a man of -wonderful shrewdness and good sense, with a keen interest in the practical affairs of life. Perhaps the opinion of Mill as to the value of Whately's work wUl be considered nearer the truth than that of Hamilton.

It may be well to state at this point that Logicians attach great importance to what they call laws of thought — that is, formal rules having no reference to special facts, but assumed to be the test of all true reasoning. These laws are stated further on.* It may suffice to state here that the main principle of these laws is that statements which are contradictory cannot both be true. Consistency or absence of contradiction is to a certain extent a test of truth. This principle is quite distinct from the principle of judging or verifying by experience.