The evolution of morality

Front matter

^1

I I

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE

Introduction

MODERN THEORIES OF MORALS.

PAGE

The Conception of Moral Obligation, . . . 1

Distinction between the Criterion of Morality and the Theory

of Moral Sentiments, ..... 3

The Intuitive and Inductive Theories of Morals,

The Intuitive School — Cudworth and Clarke,

Stewart, ....

Malebranche and Edwards,

Adam Smith,

Butler and Hutcheson,

Mackintosh,

Consciousness and Conscience,

Intellectual Element in Conscience,

The Inductive School — Mill, .

Bain,

Spencer,

Darwin,

Transcendental Morality,

PAET I.

CHAPTE

R I.

THE SENSE 01' RIGHT.

The Moral State of Primeval Man, .

Existing Races — ^Australians, Tasmanians,

63 66 76 xu

Contents

Existing Eaces— Polynesians, Papuas and Negritos, Boomeas of India —

Dravidians, .

Kolarians, The Assam Tribes, .

PAGE

78 95

109 133

CHAPTER II. THE SENSE OF RIGHT — (continued)

Existing Races — The Madecasses, .

Africans — East Africans, .

West Afrir.a,nR, .

Ashantees

Kafirs and Bechuanas, .

Poulahs and Mandingos,

Bomuese and Eezzanese,

Berbers,

Abyssinians,

Gallas and Latookas,

Wahtima,

Monbuttu and Zandey,

Hottentots and Bosjesmans,

CHAPTER III. THE SENSE OF KioHT — (continued)

Existing Races — Sottth Americans.

Indians of the Amazon, . . . .

„ Brazil, . . . .

„ Paraguay, . . . .

„ Patagonia, . . . .

„ Guiana, . . . .

Existing Races — ^orth Americans.

Indians of Virginia,

„ Louisiana, . . . .

„ the Missouri, . . . .

The Knisteneaux and Chepewyans,

CONTENTS.

XIU

Existing Eaces — North Americans— {continited).

PAGE

Indians of the Columbia River,

„ Mexico,

General Character of the American Indians,

Eskimos, .....

Greenlanders, ....

Tchuktchis and Koraka,

CHAPTER IV. THE SENSE OF EIGHT — {continued)

Existing Races — Siberian Tribes — The Aleuts,

Kamtschatkans,

Jakuts, ....

Samoyedes, ....

Lapps, ....

Ostiaks, ....

Kalmuks, Mongols, and Thibetans,

Malays — Sumatrans, ...

Dyaks, ....

Javanese, .....

Punishment for Crime among Uncultured Peoples,

Absence of the Idea of Immorality, ■ .

The Sense of Right founded on the idea of " Property "

Development of the Idea of Right,

The Instincts of Sociability,

The Idea of " Property " founded in the Instinct of Sel

f-

Preservation, .....

The Family versus Communalism, .

Chapter V. Genesis Of The Moral Idea

Interference with Personal Rights,

GeneraUsed Idea of Right, .

Fear of Retribution,.

The " Eights of the Dead,"

Burial and Adoption,

Totemism,

Earliest phase of the Moral Sense,

XIV CONTENTS.

TAG%

Belief in Eetributive Agency of Spirits entertained hj Australian Aborigines, . . . . . 319

Ditto, by Polynesians, ..... S21

Punishment has no relation to " Immorality," . • 322

Idea of Morality among the Sputh Africans, . . 327

Idea of Morality among the Madecasses, . . . 329 Dread of Spirit Eetribution for Social Offences necessary to

constitute them " wrong," .... 331

Subjective Moral changes, . . . . . 333

Grenesis of the Idea of Moral Obligation, . . . 335

Tribal and non-Tribal or external Morality, . . 337

The lex talionis, ...... 338

Enforcement of the lex talionis by tribal authority, . 339

Supernatural agency invoked, .... 341

Sorcery and Disease, ..... 342

Ordeals and Oaths, ...... 343

Supernatural sanction to Moral Conduct, . . . 346

The influence of Custom, ..... 348

CHAPTEE.VI.

GENESIS OP THE MORAL IDEA — (ccmtinued).

Negative character of early Morality, . . .351

"Moral progress accompanies General Culture^_ . . 352

Due to the ancestors of the latest-bornT^aces, . . 353 Moral condition of the ancient Thracians and the modern

The lex talionis among the modem Slavonians, . . 355

The lex talionis among the Circassians, Afghans, and Bedouins. 356

The influence of the right of Feud over Teutonic legislation, 357

Substitution of Pines for Blood Revenge, . . . 353

Mode of ascertainiijg Compensation among the Scandinavians, 360

Ditto among the Abyssinians, Germans, . . . 361

The Saxon law of Wergyld and Irish Eric, . . . 362

The liabilities of the " Pine," or Pamily, . . . 353

The Saxon system of Suretyship and Gilds, . . 355

Moral phenomena among the peoples above mentioned, . 368

Brigandage considered meritorious, ... 368

Hospitality highly esteemed, . . . . 371

Improved condition of Woman, . . . . . 375

CONTENTS. XV

PAGE

Establishment of tlie Paternal authority, . . . 384 The Tribe DersMs the Clan, . . . . .385

Supernatural sanction for punishment of Social Offences, . 388

Clan Morality founded on the idea of Brotherhood, . 391 Moral result of the application of the idea of Brotherhood

to the Tribe, ...... 391

General character of the Afghans and Bedouins, . . 394

„ „ Germans and Saxons, . . 398 „ „ Celts, . . . .390

„ „ Scandinavians, . . . 401

The Development of the sense of Manliness, . . 402 Source in the recognition by the father of his true relation to

Influence of " Manliness " over moral conduct, . . 408

Moral Strength the attribute "of Predatory Peoples, . 410

Chapter VII. The Altruistic Sentiment

The distinction between active and passive Duties, . 411

Origin of the idea of duty in relation to " Benevolence," . 412

Genesis of Emotions secondary to that of Ideas, . . 415 ^

The relation of Sjrmpathy to the Social Affections, . 415"^r The Altruistic Sentiment based on the Sexual Instinct

through the Maternal Instinct, . . . 418 Antagonism between the Maternal Instinct and the Instinct

of " Self-preservation," . . . . .419

Infanticide, its origin and moral consequences, , . 419 Sympathy towards strangers exhibited by women among

uncultured peoples, ..... 424

Mildness of manners appreciated by Savages, . . 426

Enlightened Chiefs, ...... 427

Influence of Woman over Conduct, .... 429

Criticism of Adam Smith's explanation of " Sympathy," . 430

Development of the feeling of general Benevolence, . 432

Admission into the Tribe, and Tribal Initiation, . . 433

Consequences of establishment of Paternal authority, . 437

Ancestor- worship and the Social Affections, . . 438

The Madecasses, ...... 440

XVI

CONTENTS.

Genesis of the Altruistic Sentiment,

Man the chief instrument in the development of Altruism, The system of " Brotherhood,"

Artificial modes by which the Fraternal engagement is entered into, .....

Sacred nature of the " Brotherhood " engagement, . Duty to the Stranger Suppliant among the Greeks, Fraternal Associations, ....

The Indian " Lodge," ....

The Areoi Institution of the Pacific,

Secret Societies of the American aborigiues.

The ancient " Mysteries," ....

Benevolence among the Greeks and Romans, Religious origin of the idea of General Benevolence, The Mexicans, .....

The Buddhists of Southern India — Siamese, „ „ Burmese,

The Hindus, ......

The Mohammedans — Arabs and Bedouins,

„ „ Persians and Turks, .

Selfish motive of Eastern Altruism,

PAGE

443 445 445

INTRODUCTION.

MODERN THEORIES OF MORALS.

Before entering on the consideration of the process by which man has come to recognise certain fixed principles, according to which it is necessary that his moral conduct should be guided, it is advisable to examine somewhat at large the opinions hitherto held on this subject. Prof. WheweU,in his preface to Mackintosh's "Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy," observes that it is allowed on aU sides that we have a conception of moral obligation. This is admitted by Mr Mill who says : — " The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our own mind ;" and he adds, " this feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience." ^ Whether or not man originally had any conception of moral obligation will have to be considered hereafter. It is a weakness in the argument of most writers that they have never thought of asking this question, it being assumed that man's faculties are now the same as they have ever been. In the comparison of opposing systems however, this is of little moment, » " UtOitarianisin," 2nd Ed., p. 41. I. A since it vitiates more or less all alike. All are agreed, moreover, in the recognition of certain general truths, or principles of right moral conduct. There is little difference of opinion among modem philosophers as to the moral nature of particular actions. The question on of which they differ relates, not so much to the criterion morality, as to that which gives actions their special quality. Granting that the mind recognises the moral propriety or otherwise of certain conduct, what is the ground on which that character is assigned to it ? Mr Mill states this very clearly when he says that the intuitive, no less than the inductive school of ethics, recognises " to a great extent the same moral laws ; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. " ^

In this passage we have a classification of the several opinions that have been formed as to the source of the idea of morality. The eternal reason, or fitness of Cudworth and Clarke, the love of order and the love of being of Malebranche and of Edwards, the moral sense or conscience of Butler, Hutcheson, and Mackintosh, the sympathy of Adam Smith, and the intellectual recognition of moral beauty of Stewart, all are based on the notion of intuition. To the inductive school belong the several phases of the " happiness " or " utilitarian" theory held by Cumberland, Leibnitz, Hartley, Paley, and Jeremy Bentham, and by recent or living writers, as Comte, Mill, Bain, Herbert Spencer, and Darwin. Before critically examining the systems represented • op. cit. p. 3.

MODERN THEORIES OE MORALS. 3 by this dual series of thinkers, it may be well to consider the value of Mackintosh's oft repeated accusation, that most metaphysicians have " blended the inquiry into the nature of our moral sentiments, with that other which only seeks a criterion to distinguish moral from immoral habits of feeling and action." Mackintosh illustrates the distinction between the Criterion of Morality and the Theory of Moral Sentiments here enforced, by reference to Paley's representation of the principle of a moral sense as being opposed to that of utility. On this he observes, " it is evident that this representation is founded on a confusion of the two great questions which have been stated above. That we are endued with a moral sense, or, in other words, a faculty which immediately approves what is right and condemns what is wrong, is only a statement of the feelings with which we contemplate actions. But to affirm that right actions are those which conduce to the wellbeing of mankind, is a proposition concerning the outward effects by which right actions themselves may be recognised. As these affirmations relate to different subjects, they cannot be opposed to each other, any more than the solidity of earth is inconsistent with the fluidity of water ; and a very little reflection will show it to be easily conceivable that they may be both true. Man may be so constituted as instantaneously to approve certain actions, without any reference to their consequences, and yet reason may nevertheless discover, that a tendency to produce general happiness is the essential characteristic of such actions." After referring to the fact, that Bentham contrasts the principle of utility with that of sympathy, of which he considers the moral sense as one of the forms, Mackintosh continues : — " As^ these celebrated persons have thus inferred or implied the non-existence of a moral sense, from their opinion that the morality of actions depends upon their usefulness, so other philosophers of equal name have concluded, that the utility of actions cannot be the criterion of their morality, because a perception of that utility appears to them to form a faint and inconsiderable part of our moral sentiments, if indeed it be at all discover- , able in them."^

It is important to consider the distinction thus insisted on by Mackintosh, since it is endorsed by Whewell, who sees in it a ground on which the intuitive and the inductive schools may to a great extent be reconciled. The latter infers, that " if we could take into due account the whole happiness produced by virtuous feelings, we could commit n-o practical error in making the advantageous consequences of actions the measure of their morality." ^ Whewell adds, on the other hand, that if a reverence for general maxims of morality, and a constant reference to the common precepts of virtue, take the place in the utilitarian's mind, of the direct application of his principle, there will remain little diffe'rence between him and the believer in original moral distinctions ; for the practical rules of the two will rarely differ, and in both systems the rules will be the moral guides of thought and conduct." ^ This would no doubt be admitted by both schools, since Mr Mill affirms, that to do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as one's self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality;* But, although there may be a practical agreement between the intuitive and inductive systems, there is an essential difference between them which can be bridged over only by the adoption on the part of the latter of the fundamental idea, somewhat modified it may be, on which the former

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is based. It is true that Mr Mill, while personallybelieving that the moral feelings are acquired and not innate, yet asserts that it is not necessary for the purpose of his argument, to decide whether the feeling of duty is innate or implanted. But, from the explanation given of the nature of this feeling, it is evident that the notion of " duty" can be attached to it only by a forced application of that terra. Thus, Mr Mill supposes the innate feeling, if there be such, a regard to the pleasures and pains of others.'^ Elsewhere he refers to a desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures,^ or the natural want felt by every individual " that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of bis fellow-creatures," a conviction which is declared to be the ultimate sanction of the "greatest happiness" morality.^ Such a feeling as this, however, is totally distinct from that which the thinkers of the intuitive school understand by " duty." This is an obligation, consequent on the moral character of the actions considered, and is comparable neither to a regard to the feelings of others nor to the desire to be in harmony with such feelings. It is difficult to understand how, according to the utilitarian system, the idea of duty can be formed, although its advocates admit, as the phenomena require them to do, the existence of the moral conscience. Nor could it well be otherwise, considering what constitutes the chief point of difference between the intuitive and the inductive schools. According to the latter, right and wrong are questions of observation and experience, actions " being right in proportion as " they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." There is no room here for the recognition of any original quality in actions apart from their consequences, or at all events .1 op. cit. p. 44. « Do. p. 46. = Do. p. 50.

from the intention which induced them, and hence, although the distinction enforced by Mackintosh between the two parts of moral philosophy, — the theory of moral sentiments and the criterion of morality, — is a iust one, its recognition has not the practical value which appears to be claimed for it. Whewell is quite correct when he says, that " we may hold that morality is an original quality of actions, and may still form our rules of morality by tracing the consequences of actions." •* But a thinker of the inductive school could not admit that actions have any such original quality ; and therefore, although the intuitionists are by no means justified in affirming that utility cannot be the test of moral propriety, yet their opponents may say that the standard supplied b'y utility may be safely applied " without acknowledging the independent value of morality," and moreover that, since " the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention — that is, upon what the agent wills to do," ^ there is no such independent value to acknowledge. It is evident that the advocates of the inductive theory are not fairly liable to Mackintosh's censure for not implicitly attending to the distinction between the theory of moral sentiments and the criterion of morality, seeing that the truth of their theory requires the non-existence of an innate moral sense. They affirm that actions are right because they " conduce to the well-being of mankind," whereas their opponents, while admitting the same criterion of morality, affirm that actions have an original quality which is indicated immediately by the conscience. The great value of the distinction pointed out by Mackintosh, consists in the fact that it reveals nearly the fundamental difference between the two schools, one of which is founded on the primary impor- ' loc. cit. p. 24. " Mil], op. cit. p. 27, note.

• tance of recognising an innate moral sense, while the other, ignoring this, admit only the existence of a criterion of morality founded on the teachings of experience, or, at most, a faculty which has been organised as the^ result of them.

It was said above, that the eternal reason or fitness of Cudworth and Clarke, the love of order and the love of being of Malebranche and of Edwards, the moral sense or conscience of Butler, Hutcheson, and Mackintosh, the sympathy of Adam Smith, and the intellectual recognition of moral beauty of Stewart, all are based on the idea of intuition. By this is meant the notion that the mind, by virtue of its own innate powers, at once passes judgment on the moral quality of any action brought within its cognisance. The belief in the existence of a special moral sense, which shows its activity in the minds of all men, as conscience, was the necessary result of the speculations which had preceded those of Butler. The distinction between right and wrong was supposed, by Cudworth and Clarke, to be discerned by reason, and hence it was said that " morality is the practice of reason." ^ But then, according to the former, the ideas of duty formed in the mind are necessary. The distinction between right and wrong has existed eternally in the Divine mind, and hence, when an action is performed; its moral character as thus established is at once discerned by human reason.* The Platonic ideas of Cudworth are exchanged by Clarke for the relations of objects, but otherwise their views of morality do not differ. The relations of all things to each other have always been present to the Eternal mind, which is determined in its

' See Mackintosh, op. eit, p. 147.

" " The Intellectual System of the Universe," (Snd ed.), p. 888, seq.

choice by the fitness or unfitness of things to each other. The eternal differences of relation on which depend this fitness or unfitness, render it proper that man should so act. Moreover, as he can conceive nothing without at the same time conceiving its relations to other things, " those differences are necessarily discerned, and, being eternal, they lay an obligation on man so to act independent of the will of God."^ These theories are vitiated by what Mackintosh calls " the abusive extension of the terra reason to the moral faculties," but they clearl}'^ possess the intuitive element which is at the base of the system of Butler and Hutcheson, although they steer clear of the difficulties attendant on the doctrine of the moral sense.

Dugald Stewart's system constitutes a considerable advance on those just considered, but while describing the moral faculty as an original principle of man's nature,^ it refers the origin of our moral ideas to the intellect. Thus, " right, duty, virtue, moral obligation, and the like, or the opposite forms of expression, represent, according to him, certain thoughts, which arise necessarily and instantaneously in the mind (or in the reason, if we take that word in the large sense, in which it denotes all that is not emotive), at the contemplation of actions, and which are utterly incapable of all resolution, consequently of all explanation, and which can be known only by being experienced. These thoughts or ideas, or whatever other name they may be called, are followed, as inexplicably but as inevitably, by pleasurable and painful emotions, which suggest the conception of moral beauty, a quality of human actions distinct from their adherence to, or deviation from, rectitude,

' " A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God" (6th ed.), vo). i., pp. 106, 115.

^ "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," vol. i. p. 171.

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though generally coinciding with it."^ The connection between this theory and the theories of Cudworth and Clarke is evident. The introduction, however, of the conception of moral beauty derived from pleasurable and painful emotions, sufficiently distinguishes Stewart's views from those of his predecessors, although it does not meet the difficulties which render the theories they formed untenable.

Malebranche and Jonathan Edwards differ widely from the intellectual school of moralists. With them emotion takes the place of reason as the guiding principle of action. The observations of Mackintosh on these two thinkers are so just that they can hardly be omitted. He says : — " They both introduce an element into their theory foreign from those cold systems of ethical abstraction, with which they continued in other respects to have much in common. Malebranche * makes virtue consist in the love of order, Edwards^ in the love of being. In this language we perceive a step beyond the representation of Clarke, which made it a conformity to the relations of things ; but a step which cannot be made without passing into a new province ; without confessing, by the use of the word love, that not only perception and reason, but emotion and sentiment, are among the fundamental principles of morals." * Apart from the fact, that it cannot be shown that the mind has any special love of order or being, it is an objection to the systems of both Edwards and Malebranche, that morality contains an element which love,

• Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 331 ; Stewart, op. cit., vol. i., pp. 262, 270 Keq.

^ Malebranche says, that the knowledge of the truth and the love of virtue constitute the union of ipind with God, and when we love truth according to the rules of virtue, we love God, who is always governed by order. De la Recherche cle la Verite, lAv. Cinqm^- chap. 5.

" See " An Essay on the Nature of Virtue," p. 7 et seq.

whatever its objective operation, cannot supply. This is DO less true even if love be resolved into sympathy, of which it is evidently only a specialised form. In this fact we have the great defect of Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments. Mackintosh says : " That mankind are so constituted as to sympathise with each other's feelings, and to feel pleasure in the accordance of these feelings, are the only facts required by Dr Smith, and they certainly must be granted to him." ^ The great merit of this system is, as pointed out by Mackintosh, that, whereas Butler, Hutcbeson, and Hume' in his later writings, derived sympathy from benevolence, Smith inverted the order, making the latter dependent on the former. Its defect is that, like so many other systems, it provides no real basis for a perfect morality. Benevolence, which is only sympathy in action, is no doubt essential to a high morality, but some other source is required for the feeling of obligation which is essential to the moral idea. Mackintosh saw this defect, and although, as we shall see, he was not successful in remedying it, yet his criticism, that " in many, nay in most, cases of moral approbation, the adult man approves the action or disposition merely as right, and with a distinct consciousness tha.t no process of sympathy intervenes between the approval and its object,"^ reveals the great difficulty which has formed the stumbling-block of all moralists. It is on that moral quality obligation is founded, and Smith was not successful in explaining its origin. It is quite true that " the man of the most perfect virtue, the man whom we most naturally love and revere the most, is he who joins, to the most perfect command of his own original and selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility to the original and sympathetic feelings of " op. eit., p. 234. « op. cit., p. 240.

others." ^ But the supposition on which the explanation of this fact is based is far from admissible. When man was formed for society, he certainly was not endowed " with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren," nor with the desire to be what others ought to approve of, or " what he himself approves of in other men." ^ Whatever it may be in after-times, in the early conditions of society to which we must trace the roots of morality, such feelings have very little influence over human conduct. The great error which Smith makes is in supposing that pleasure and pain are the real objects of desire and aversion. Undoubtedly man wishes for pleasure and eschews pain, but he in reality seeks, not the pleasure, but that which gives it. Smith confounds the two, as is evident when he says, " Pleasure and pain are the great objects of desire and aversion : but these are distinguished not by reason, but by immediate sense of feeling. If virtue, therefore, be desirable for its own sake, and if vice be in the same manner the object of aversion, it cannot be reason which originally distinguishes those different qualities, but immediate sense and feeling." ^ Here, first pleasure and then virtue is \ said to be the object of desire, and hence, although feeling distinguishes between pleasure and pain, it by no means follows that it also distinguishes between vice and virtue. These in themselves are purely relative terms, and under the influence of sympathy they have been too often inverted in their application to authorise us to look to that emotion as the true basis of morality. In combination with some other principle it may be effective ; alone its action might be pleasurable, but could never give the idea of duty.

> " Theory of Moral Sentiments " (Bohn), p. 214. ^ Do., p. 170. ' Do., p. ill.

1 2 INTEODTJOTION.

The only other writers of the intuitive school necessary to be here referred to, are Butler, Hutcheson, and Mackintosh. The emotional part of man's nature had gradually been taking the place of the intellect as the supposed source of moral distinctions, although even the later writers could not but admit that reason was largely concerned in the origin of moral ideas. With Butler, benevolence guided by reason includes all virtues, and therefore " a disposition and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of all the obligations we are under to them." ^ Coincident with benevolence is self-love, which leads man " to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world." In addition, however, to these principles and certain passions and affections, man possesses a principle of reflection, " by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions." * This is conscience, which not only has influence like the passions and appetites, but is superior to them, " as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others ; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintend ency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it."^ Butler's idea as to the nature of conscience is, as Mackintosh points out, somewhat vague ; and it was reserved for Hutcheson to express clearly the nature of that principle, which he characterised, following Lord Shaftesbury, as the moral sense. By this was meant a natural sense of immediate excellence in certain affections, and actions consequent

' Sermon XII. (Bohn's ed.), p. 509.

MODERN THEOEIES OF MORALS. 1 3

• thereupon.^ According to this view, conscience is an independent faculty, and not, as Butler perhaps supposed, a state or act of the understanding. Hutch'eson agreed with Butler in regarding universal benevolence as the object of moral approbation, and in viewing disinterested affections as essential parts of human nature.^ But both Hutcheson and Butler are declared by Mackintosh to be chargeable with a vicious circle, " in describing virtuous actions as those which are approved by the moral sen?e," while at the same time the moral sense is described as " the faculty which perceives and feels the morality of actions." ' How far, however, the charge is well founded is questionable. It is probable that the disregard of the distinction between the two divisions of moral philosophy alluded to in this passage was intentional. The moral quality of an action does not actually depend on that — utility for example — - which is employed as the test of morality. Thus, conduct may be proper as giving happiness, but it is not moral merely because it has that effect. Instead, therefore, of dwelling on the standard of virtue, which Butler described as "justice, veracity, and regard to common good," * the writers in question went at once to the source of the moral attribute, Thus Butler declared that virtue consists in following human nature,^ and although in the sense intended by him this assertion is not correct — seeing that as human nature is a variable term, virtue also must be variable — yet it marked an approach to the truth. In fact, if the progressive development of man's nature be supposed, and if agreement with the universal conscience of humanity were substituted for that with the individual conscience, as the ground of moral attribution, the vicious circle com-