Philosophy of mind; an essay in the metaphysics of psychology

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Philosophy of Minp I'j

AN ESSAY

IN

THE METAPHYSICS OF PSYCHOLOGY

BY GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN YALE UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

I

Copyright, 1895, by Chakles Scribner's Sons.

Uhland.

Preface

THIS book is an essay in the speculative treatment of certain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena. Inasmuch as these problems q,ll relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay may properly be called metaphysical. Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics, — in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. If, then, this demand is not made perfectly clear by the more detailed discussion which follows, it would be quite useless to put it forward unsupported, at the beginning of my task, in the hope of producing a favorable first impression upon reluctant intelligences.

As to the kind of metaphysics which it is designed to offer, two or three preliminary remarks seem important. And, first of all, it is to be open and undisguised. Of all " bad " metaviu PREFACE

physics, the very worst is liiiely to be that which is unavowed and concealed, — sometimes even from the author himself, while as yet he is engaged in criticising the metaphysical views of others, or in denouncing metaphysical essays in general. No one whose peace of mind is sure to be disturbed by any attempt, however carried out, at this form of reflective thinking should venture beyond the titlepage and table of contents of this volume. On the other hand, however, I wish to be held responsible for two things which are required in order to entitle to respect every treatise of a similar character. These are, first, the statement of the facts and laws, scientifically established, to which the speculative discussion constantly refers for its own grounds iti experience. And for metaphysics which has no foundations in incontestable experience, I have as little respect as has any one. But besides this constant appeal to facts and to laws empirically established, sound reasoning is indispensable for the derivation of acceptable conclusions in any metaphysical enterprise. Any reader, or critic, therefore, who will point out violations of either of these two requirements, will be entitled to grateful recognition for his service, no less by the author than by the readers of this volume.

A few words concerning the relations which this book sustains to preceding works by the same author will be helpful for its better understanding. In some sort the entire volume may be regarded as in continuation of a series of works ^ on psychology, or the science of mental phenomena. This science, which, as a science, is, and ever must remain, chiefly descriptive, starts many inquiries regarding the real nature and relations to the external world, and especially to the

1 Elements of Physiological Psychology, 1887 ; Outlines of Physiological Psychology, 1891 ; Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894 ; Primer of Psychology, 1894. (All published by Chas. Scribner's Sons.)

PREFACE ix

body, of that subject of all the phenomena, which we are accustomed to call "the mind." The partial consideration, at least, of such inquiries is extremely difficult to separate from the attempt at anything like a comprehensive treatment of psychology. But these very inquiries can be carried only a little way before they become so inextricably mingled with comprehensive problems in general philosophy as to make us aware that we are already at some distance from that form of discussion which is appropriate to a descriptive science.

The discovery just noted shows the necessity which every attempt at a metaphysics of mental phenomena feels of borrowing certain conclusions from the general field of philosophy. This necessity is made apparent, and it is also acted upon, in the chapters on the reality, the identity, the unity, and the permanence of the mind, and on the real relations of the mind to the bodily organism. Hence the discussions of this volume not infrequently refer to views briefly stated or hinted at in a work on philosopliy^ by the same author.

The nature of psychology, however, and the nature of philosophy, and especially the nature of the relations existing between the two, are such as to make it undesirable, if not impossible, to consider in one book all the metaphysical problems which this empirical science suggests. Indeed, the whole sphere of philosophical study scarcely does more than this. A somewhat but not wholly arbitrary selection of problems had, therefore, to be made ; and their detailed discussion was then brought under the one title, "Philosophy of Mind." The reasons for the selection are made sufficiently clear in the course of the discussion itself.

Finally, I do not believe that special students of psychology, whether beginners or advanced students, and thoughtful men 1 Introduction to Philosophy, 1890. Chas. Sniibner's Sons.

X PREFACE

generally, lack interest in the metaphysical inquiries which are undertaken in this treatise. The fashion of denouncing the study of metaphysics, or of the theory of knowledge, or, indeed, of any group of the profounder philosophical problems, is more the scholastic "fad" of blas^ minds, or the refuge of weak and selfish spirits, than the result of any genuine lack of interest, on the part of the multitude of thinkers, in the earnest discussion of these problems. Such persons become agnostic, or resort to a demand for unquestioning faith, at the point where they themselves begin to be baffled or tired m the effort at thinking. As to the limits and validity of knowledge men will always eagerly inquire. To rebuke them for this seems, in the light of the history of human reason, like solemn trifling. In the face of the regnant agnosticism, no inquiries can be more obligatory or more important than those which concern a theory of cognition. And while so many, in the name of science, are denying the reality, unity, and possibility of a permanent existence of the human mind, and are resolving its entire being into a stream of mechanically associated " epiphenomena," thrown off from the molecular machinery of the cerebral hemispheres, it is not an inopportune time, or a wholly useless and thankless task, to propose a serious rediscussion like that undertaken in this volume.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

Yale Uniteksitt, New Haven, 1895.

TABLE OF CO:NrTENTS

Chapter I - Pase

The Opinion of Kant — Psychology "without Metaphysics" — Assumptions involved — The Course taken by the Physical Sciences — Inconsistencies of Mr. Huxley — Peculiar Difficulties of Psychology — Professor Hblfding criticised — Views of Professor James — M. Flournoy's Position examined — Principle of " Psycho-physical Pai'allelism " — Contrasted Views . . 1

CHAPTER II Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (continued)

Difficulties examined — The two Courses open — Views of Volkmann — Views of Wundt— The true Conception of Psychology — Use of Metaphysical Assumptions in Psychology — Psychology as a " Natural Science " — Nature of Philosophy — Relation of Philosophy to the particular Sciences— Mr. Spencer's View of Philosophy — Special Relations of Psychology to Philosophy — Branches of Metaphj'sics involved — The Probblems of a Philosophy of Mind 41

CHAPTER m

The Concept op Mind

Popular use of the term "Mind" — Standpoint for Inquiry — Psychology not mere doctrine of " Content " — All mental life an Activity — Nature of Conception in general — ■■ Nature of Self-knowledge — Formation and Development of the concept of Mind — False or inadequate Views examined — The higher Knowledge of Self xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV The Reality of Mind PAGE

The concept of Reality — Kuowledge and Eeality correlates — Of real Beings in general — "What is it to be " Real" ? — The Foundations in experience

— Reality an implicate of Self-consciousuess — Of recognitive Memory

— And of reflective Thinking — Sceptical and Agnostic Views criticised

— The contrasted Reality of Things — True Nature of the mind's Reality 113

CHAPTER V The Consciousness of Identity, and So-called Double Consciousness

The concept of Identity — The identity which Things hare — Immanent Idea an implicate of identity — The concept of Self as self-same — Permissible Changes in Personality so-called — Identity of Things and of Minds Contrasted — Phenomena of so-called "Double Consciousness" — And the true scientific Attitude toward them — Principle of ' ' psychical Automatism" — Phenomena of Inspiration, "Possession," "Obsession," etc. — " Dramatic Sundering of the Ego " — Play of Children — Phenomena of Dreams — Experience of Actors — Phenomena of Prophetism — Parallel from Ethical Consciousness — Explanation of Hypnotism — Loss of Pei^ sonal Identity 148

Chapter VI

The concept of Unity — The unity which Things have — Unitary Being of Mind — Development of mental nnity — Ethical Conclusions from the foregoing investigations — Possibility of Degrees of Eeality — And of mental Unitary Being — Teleological Principle involved — Simplicity and Indivisibility of Mind . . 189

CHAPTER VII Mind and Body

Reality of " Relations " in general — Attempts at a non-metaphysical use of the Principle of Causation — Current conception of Causation in the Physical Sciences — View of Phenomenalism — Iiaw of the Conservation and Correlation of Energy — Origin of the concept of Causation — Development of the concept of Causation — Work of Intellect upon the World of Things — Principle of "Sufficient Reason '— Summary of Results . 208

CONTENTS XUi

CHAPTER VIII Mind and Body (continued') PAGE

Classes of Phenomena discussed — Phenomena of "Concomitant Correlation '■ so-called, rejected — No absolute Concomitance demonstrable — Formation of two concepts, Body and Mind — Development of this " Bipartitiou " or " Diremption " — The concept of Body an Abstraction — The Body only formally distinct from Nature — All Metaphysics involved in the Validity of this " bi-partition " — Influences of body on mind — Factors in mental Life not represented in the bodily Basis — Influences of mind on body — "Dynamo-genetic" Influence of Ideas — The Principle of " Suggestion " — Influences from Feeling and Will 237

Chapter IX

Use of Terms defended — Limits of the Discussion — The four Forms of speculative Opinion — Materialism, Spiritualism, Monism, and Dualism defined

— Position of Materialism stated and discussed — Incomparability of physical and psychical phenomena — Positions of Biichner, Vogt, et al., criticised — Outcome of Materialism unintelligible — Metajihysics of Materialism examined — Position of monistic Spiritualism stated — And its Tenets criticised — " Animism " examined and rejected — Materialism and Spiritualism mutually destructive 283

Chapter X

Method of current Monism — The Agnosticism of Monism — The assumption of Absolute Mind justified — Views of Professor Hbffding criticised — The principle of "Parallelism" examined — And its Terms found either inadequate or unmeaning— "Proportionality" an inappropriate Term — Facts incompatible with the complete Extension of this Principle — The " Identity-hypothesis" ends in the unintelligible — The Case against psychological Monism summed up — Position of speculative Dualism — Objections to this position examined 314

CHAPTER XI Origin and Permanence op Mind

Nature of the following Discussions — Problem of the Origin of Mind stated

— Application of terms of Locality to Mind — Traducian Theory examined

— ' ' Transmission " of Mind an absurdity — Creation Theory examined — xiv CONTENTS

PAGE

Problem of the Permanence of Mind stated — Concept of Permanence as applied to Mind — The " Tripartite " division of Man— The permanent Unity of the Subject of all conscious states — Principles of all abiding Reality of Mind — Possibility of really existent bat Unconscious Mind —Phenomena of so-called " unconscious Cerebration " — Only possible unconscious Existence of Mind — Being and Becoming of Mind — Relation of finite mind to Absolute Mind 356

CHAPTER XII Place op Man's Mind in Nature

Kant's criticism of the Doctrine of Immortality— Nature of Arguments for Immortality of Mind — Existence of unconscious " Mind-Stuff" of no value — Views from the psycho-physical standpoint — Necessity for introducing other Considerations — True Nature of Mind-Life — Relations of man's Mind to physical Nature — And, finally, to the Being of the World, considered as Absolute Mind 896

Index 413

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND

Chapter I

IT is now somewhat more than a hundred years since the philosopher Kant expressed himself in despair over the possibility of psychology ever securing title to a place among the exact sciences. One reason which influenced this great thinker to such a state of mind was the inherent lack of power -^ as he thought — on the part of psychology to put off the traditional incertitude of metaphysics, and to put on the robe of mathematics. It is certainly a significant fact to find at the end of the century an almost complete change of view as to the nature of this study. For perhaps the majority of those students whose opinion is best worth consideration now hold, not only that the science of mental phenomena should dispense with metaphysics, but that in its modern form it has actually shown that it can do so ; while an essential characteristic of the " new " psychology is undoubtedly the large and methodical use which it makes of experimentation and statistics. This experimental and statistical study of mental phenomena implies, of course, the exercise of that ann by which alone all the exact sciences triumph, — namely, measurement and mathematics. It would seem, then, that this for a time dethroned but now reinstated queen has succeeded in changing her vesture, in a manner which Kant considered her very nature to render forever impossible.

A more careful examination both of the current practice and of the history of opinion, however, shows that the real state of the case is by no means so clear or so satisfactory. For the obvious truth is that not a few of those writers who cry out most loudly and unsparingly against the admixture of metaphysics with scientific psychology are themselves often the greatest transgressors in this very regard. Indeed, their practice suggests the not unkindly sarcasm that the metaphysical hypotheses and tenets which they think it indispensable to exclude from the " science " of mental phenomena are solely those of their opponents. And so it comes about that in some treatises by such writers on psychology the soil is first of all cleared, with more or less declamation, of all those noxious weeds of philosophy which might otherwise mix in and spoil the purity of the empirical science ; then, next, the seed of this pure science is diligently sown before our delighted eyes, as it comes fresh from numerous physiological and psycho-physical laboratories, or from the brains, fertile in conjecture, of the author himself. Yet somehow, when the total crop is ready for the harvest, not a few sprouts of metaphysics are still found to have crept into it. Strange to tell, however, they are chiefly of species which flourish best on just that soil, whenever room has been made for them by the clearance of pre-existing species.

It can scarcely be claimed, then, that the practice of the advocates of a scientific psychology which shall keep itself clear of all metaphysical implications has as yet taught us precisely how to secure so desirable a result.

And if we turn from example to theory (for who does not incline to teach others better than he himself practises in matters of this kind ?), the case does not even then seem much better. For, in general, it is those very psychologists who have been most confident of the possibility of freeing scientific psychology from all investiture of metaphysics who have given us least intelligent and calm discussion of the real and permanent relations between the two. Their practice, therefore, too often seems dependent on a lack of consistent theory.

There are several forms of such inconsistency which are connected with different forms of concealed or repressed philosophical opinion. As against the metaphysics of old-fashioned "rational psychology," so-called, some writers advocate empirical " psychology without metaphysics, " or " psychology without a soul. " But in half-conscious recognition of the truth that to walk consistently along this line of abnegation would bring them to the realm where there exists nothing but ghosts and dreams of ghosts, they soon show a disposition — to use Professor James's expressive words — to " pull the pall over the psychic half " of the phenomena. They require for the effective working of their psychological theories at least so much metaphysics as consists in the assumption of an entity_called the brain, on whose j,ctivity or influence they can lay the responsibility for mental phenomena. They also take their views of causation seriously and in a truly ontological way, so long as they are dealing with states of consciousness in systematic dependence upon preceding states of a physical or chemical sort. But when they are faced about by the acknowledged sequences of other phenomena, and are compelled to consider whether states of consciousness can, as is ordinarily supposed, be real causes of subsequent physical and chemical changes, then their entire theory of causation is deftly adapted to the claims of the shallowest phenomenalism.

Other writers, indeed, set out with the pronounced and honest attempt to hold fast to the purely scientific point of view, in whichever of the two possible directions we consider the allied yet disparate series of mental and physical phenomena. If, for example, the question be as to what nerve-commotions or local impairments in particular areas of the cerebrum are regularly followed by changes in the phenomena

4 PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY O? MIND

of consciousness ; or as to what kinds, amounts, and timerates of various stimuli, when applied to the periphery of the nervous system, are succeeded by definite known changes in the quality, intensity, and time-rate of mental states, — then these investigators propose faithfully to state the facts, and to let the generalizations from them stand as mere orderly sequences between the two classes of phenomena. But if the question be as to what movements of the muscles, innervations of organs of sense, determinations of qualities and changes of perceived things, disturbances of cerebral' functions; or of the circulatory, respiratory, and digestive systems, with all the capillary and secretory activities connected therewith ; or as to what more subtile organic changes and modifications of every form of tissue (such as birth-marks, stigmata, and epileptiform hypersesthesia or hallucinations, reactions of the " psychic cells" so-called) follow certain forms of consciousness called emotions, passions, desires, deeds of will, and " suggested " or " fixed " ideas, — why then, too, these writers accept the obligation to be equally ready to acknowledge mere sequences in fact between different classes of phenomena. It is the business of science, say they, simply to discover actual orderly correlations between phenomena. And if this be true of all science, as such) why should it not be true of the particular science of psychology ?

It will be our purpose later on to consider in detail the various assumptions involved in the last of the positions just mentioned. It is far from our present purpose to find fault with such a position. It has its own justification; although this justification will be seen to be only temporary and partial. Nor are its advocates to be blamed because they habitually use language and assume subordinate premises that are thoroughly suffused with metaphysics ; for all this belongs to the very necessities of the case. No one can even talk about mental phenomena and about their dependence upon brain-states or upon changing stimulations under psycho-physical laws without assuming the real existence of both minds and things, and the reality of interaction between them. What is meant by such a complex network of assumptions,

— that is something which one may pursue psychological science without knowing and even without considering at all. It is precisely this question of meaning which a scientific, as distinguished from a naive and natural metaphysics, aims to investigate.

Grave fault is to be found, however, with a considerable number of this latter class of writers on the science of psychology for the unthinking way in which they adopt the so-called purely scientific point of view, — yet graver fault, as has already been indicated, for their failure to abide by it consistently. For they, too, as a rule, fail to keep the adopted point of view of a dualistic phenomenalism. And, after all metaphysics has been thrust out of the front door of the temple of science, they are found somewhat clandestinely admitting some one favorite form of metaphysics by the rear door.

The sacred precincts have indeed been industriously rid of that metaphysics of Dualism which all unsophisticated science adopts. But the high-priest of the establishment is finally discovered on his knees, — if not in the main scientific aula, at least in some ante-chamber or side apartment,

— before the altar of Monism. Now, for an avowed metaphysician there is nothing shameful about this; but it is scarcely the right thing to be done by one who has lifted up his voice before the very threshold of the temple in warning against all metaphysics. Such conduct certainly leads the bystanders to the suspicion of ulterior motives of a concealed philosophical kind. What these motives usually are will be made more clear later on ; and how far they seem to us sufficient to justify such an attitude of worship will also be explained. We are now simply arguing in the interests of intelligence and candor; and we believe that these twoqualities ought to characterize the study of the science of psychology as of all the other sciences.

It would seem, without special research, as though a certain form of metaphysics were the natural and necessary accompaniment of every scientific approach to the study of mental phenomena. This form is of course an uncritical, common-sense Dualism. Psychology assumes that " things " are and "minds" are; and that, within certain limits determined by the so-called " nature " of both, they act causally upon each other. Those happenings which are ascribed to things, and those which are ascribed to minds, are never regarded by " science without metaphysics " as mere phenomena ; or, rather, the very word " phenomena " necessarily suggests and implies beings of which and to which the phenomena are. That is to say, what science calls "the phenomena" are, after all, in fact, regarded as the observed modes of the behavior of real beings, both of minds and of things. And so long as the student of mental science maintains this attitude, he remains on the ground occupied by the students of all the natural sciences. The study of psychology as a natural science is not really, then, the pursuit of a knowledge of correlations between phenomena wholly without any metaphysics whatever; it is rather the pursuit of this science with only such metaphysics as is naively assumed in all scientific inquiry. Psychology may then, for the time being, — if one is only willing to leave it so, — be called " a natural science ; " but only as it is founded upon a natural, uncritical, and unreflecting metaphysics. How far psychology can successfully be pursued in this way we shall also consider later on.

It is instructive, although somewhat disheartening, for the ardent advocate of a purely scientific psychology to contrast the practice and theories of his colleagues with those of the students of the principal physical sciences. All remember how Newton — who himself dabbled somewhat too freely in rather poor metaphysics — issued to physics a warning against all metaphysics ; and no doubt his successors in physical investigation at the present day suppose themselves, in the main, to be carefully observing the warning of this great master. At any rate, they are sensitive enough to what they consider the immeasurable superiority of their own sciences when contrasted with even the modern endeavors, in this regard, of the most advanced psychological science. Occasionally, however, while speaking with ill-concealed contempt of the " old psychology " as mostly composed of worthless metaphysics, they hold out the hand with a charming show of cordiality toward the " new psychology ; " and this because the latter offers to them the promise of exhibiting, in scientific form, what it can accomplish by use of scientific methods, "without metaphysics."

If it were our present purpose to discuss problems in the philosophy of nature or the metaphysics of physics, rather than in the philosophy of mind or the metaphysics of psychology, we should profit by giving a detailed critical examination to these claims of superiority on the part of the physical sciences. It is enough now to affirm that the modern physical sciences are very far indeed from being capable of exhibiting themselves systematically as stripped of all metaphysics. On the contrary, the most stupendous metaphysical assumptions and implications are woven into their structure throughout. Instead of being mere formulas for stating uniform sequences among phenomena, they are descriptions and explanations of experiences which appeal at every step to invisible and mysterious entities, to hidden and abstruse forces, to transactions that are assumed to take place among beings whose existence and modes of behavior can never become, in any sense of the words, immediate data of sensuous knowledge. A high place of honor, although doubtless one to be obtained only after enduring the pangs of a prolonged crucifixion, awaits that philosophical biologist, or that philosopher sufficiently acquainted with scientific biology, who subjects the modern doctrine of evolution to a thoroughly critical analysis, with a view to detect and to estimate its metaphysical assumptions. When such a one appears, if his criticism turn out mainly destructive, it will be interesting to know how much will remain of the so-called "science" of evolution; but if the criticism be favorable and conservative in result, it is safe to say that this result will be attributable to the fact of the " scientists " having builded better as metaphysicians than they knew as mere "scientists."

It is vain to endeavor to break the force of the present contention by reminding ourselves that the students of natural science regard all so-called entities, real causes, and transactions, which never have themselves become or can become phenomena, in the light simply of permissible and helpful hypotheses. Let this be at once conceded ; and let it also be conceded that this way of introducing hypotheses, in the effort to find a more complete explanation of actual experience (of the "phenomena," if one is pleased by insisting on this word), is scientifically legitimate. It will scarcely be seriously maintained, however, that by hypothetical entities, causes, and transactions, the men of science mean mere hypotheses, — that is, assumptions as pure and simple states of the hypothesizing mind, as nothing more than the consciousness of ideating and reasoning in a certain way, and of feeling better satisfied if only able to hit upon a certain way of ideating and reasoning. For example, one may call the " luminiferous ether" a hypothetical entity. But by this one only means that it is an entity about the existence of which, and the transactions in which, we have no immediate and certain knowledge. One Cannot see it, hear it, taste or smell or touch it. But if one is permitted to assume such an entity, and such and such transactions in this entity, then one can the better account for existences and transactions of which one has indubitable knowledge. The assumed entityis assumed as an entity; and such an assumption cannot be made "without metaphysics."

Or to take another example : What physicist thinks of the so-called " atoms " as mere ideas in his own mind, introduced into his dream about a real, an " extra-mental" world, in the interests simply of an ideal consistency? The rather does science incline to maintain that the things seen, heard, smelled, tasted, and touched are themselves — at least relatively — phenomenal ; and that the beings between and in which the relatively real transactions occur are just these transcendent and permanent, these all-potent but yet hypothetical entities. It is, says this natural science, these non-phenomenal and never -to-be-phenomenal entities which do the real work of the real world.

It is in this frank and courageous but totally uncritical metaphysics, rather than in its success in dispensing with all metaphysics, that the present superiority of the physical sciences to psychological science largely consists ; for it is such metaphysics, and it alone, which is the appropriate outfit of the student of nature who wishes to confine himself to scientific investigation, without avowedly making excursions into the fields of philosophy. Its fundamental and unquestioned epistemological assumption is briefly this: Knowledge is to be had by working in the right way for it ; and by " knowledge " is understood the mental representation of things and events as they really are. And if the question is raised. What, then is the " right way " to work for knowledge ? the sufficient practical answer conslBts in pointing out the way in which others have already attained knowledge.