The study of ethics : a syllabus

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PASI.

The Nature of Ethical Theory t.

The Factors of Moral Conduct, 5

Section I. — Subject-Mattee op Ethics. «

Subject-matter of ethical theory is judgment concerning the value of conduct. Three stages. (1) Fractical encouragement and discouragement of certain acts. Reward and punishment primary forms of such judgments.^ Next stage, urging and restraint through speech. (See Plato, Protagoras, 325-26. )(^ Third stage, reflective judgment as to reason for such acts.

Ethical theory is simply (1) a systematic judgment of value. The way is prepared for this through the fact that primitive judgments relate not to isolated acts, but to habits of action, and to the types of character which are disposed to induce those habits. Necessary spontaneous generalizations. Codes, customary and legislative.

Demand for more systematic generalization arises when, through an extension of the area of life, former habits begin to conflict with each other. Illustrated by Athenian life^ by Roman ; by modern since the Renascence. Ethical theory is thus (2) a critical judgment upon conduct. Not systematic in the sense that it simply catalogues previous judgments, but in the sense that it attempts to reconstruct them on the basis of a deeper principle. (See Sec. 2.)

It is a matter of indifference whether we say ethical theory attempts to systematize (in the above sense) judgments about the value of conduct, or attempts to systematize conduct itself. lEvery act (consciously performed) is a judgment of value: the act done is done because it is thought to be worth while, or valuable. Thus a man's real (as distinct frjm his nominal or symbolic) theory of conduct can be told only from his acts. ; Conversely, every judgment about conduct is itself an act; it marks a practical and not simply a theoretical attitude. That is, it does not lie outside of the matter judged (conduct), but constitutes a part of its development; conduct is different after, and because of the judgment. 111. in education, where the main point is not so much to get certain acts done, as to induce in the child certain ways of valuing acts, from which the performance of the specific deeds will naturally follow. That is, the best education aims to train conseietice. Ethical theory is only a more conscious and more gen-eralized phase of conduct. - Analogy with place of theory in modern (experimental) science. A theory not a fixed or abstract truth, but a standpoint and method for some activity. It is in this (the activity as directed by theory) that the value of the theory comes out and is tested. (See Sec. 3.)

References: Definitions of ethics will be found in Murray, Introduction to Ethics, pp. 1-7; Porter, Elements of Moral Science, Introductory; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, chs. 1 and 2; Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, Introduction; Bowne, Principles of Ethics, Introduction.

Section II. — Rise of Ethical Theory

Cyrigln of reflective morality was in Greece. Other ethical codes were either customary or else conceived to be absolute emanations from a divine will. The Greek was in the habit of discussing questions regarding ends and means of life. This strengthened by growth of democracy. Also by methods of education, which (in Athens) relied upon appeal to individual's own intelligence rather than upon conformity to -fixed rule. (Davidson, Aristotle and Greek Education, pp. 11, 70, 86-87.) Development of commerce, and more general social intercourse among the Greeks, with growth of science and art, resulted in Sophist, who undertook to teach virtue and methods and. aims of political influence; he also discussed the moral standard, some denying any jjipral criterion whatever, holding it possible to prove arbitrarily an act either right or wrong; others holding the source of moral law to be the superior power of the ruler. Thus they raised the question whether moral distinctions exist in the nature of things, or simply by arbitrary enactment, or for convenience and expediency. While the Sophists themselves tended to answer the question in one of the two latter senses, the dramatists (^schylus arid Sophocles) had, amid the disintegration of the lower religious beliefs, attempted to maintain an eternal and intrinsic moral law and ideal. Socrates took the latter position, and attempted to uphold it* by means of the weapons of the Sophists themselves, i. e., by inquiry and reflection. He attacked the ideas that morality is based upon the will of the stronger, that it rests upon custom, and that it is adequately expressed in the more or less haphazard and external conclusions of the poets and ordinary moral teachers of the times. (See Plato, Republic, Books 1-3.) He insisted that the only adequate and sure basis for morality is knowledge of the Good,' i. e., true end of life, and ability to refer the value of particular acts and aims to this supreme end. He thus became the founder of conscious ethical theory.

See Sidgwick, History of Ethics, esp. ch. 2; Grant, Ethics of Aristotle, ch. 2; Paulsen, Ethik, bk. 1, ch. 1; Grote, History of Greece, chs. 57 and 58; Hegel, History of Philosophy (trans, by Haldane), vol. 1; Fairbanks, on Sophocle's Ethics, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 2, 77; and Butcher, Aspects of Greek Genius; Hellenica, essays by Myers and Abbott. Consult also histories of philosophy by Erdmann, Windelband, and Ueberweg, portions treating of Sophists and Socrates.

Section III. — Relation of Moral Theory to Practice. As already said, ethical theory arises from practical needs, and is not simply a judgment about conduct, but a part of conduct, a practical fact. (See Aristotle, Ethics, Book I., chs. 2 and 3; ch. 6; Book X., ch. 9.) The inference sometimes drawn from this is that ethics is not a science but an art. (For two strong statements of this view, see Mill, Logic, Book 6, ch. 12, and Martineau, Essays, vol. 2, pp. 6-9; strong statement of contrary view, see Bradley, Logic, pp. 247-249.) We have to ask, therefore, whether ethics is practical in value, because it is, or is not, a science,- The former position will be taken .

1. Moral value not equivalent to preaching or moralizing. TrIHh has its own moral value, all the greater because not deflected to serve some immediate end of exhortation.

2. Current antithesis between science and art not tenable. Science does not teach us to know; it is the knowing; art does not teach us to do, it is the doing. Art, of morality is practice of it, not rules laid dow'n. Same of art of dyeing, of mensuration, etc. Rules give basis for mechanical routine, not for art. Art is based upon insight into truth, or relations involved.

3. Question whether word ' science ' or word ' art ' is to be applied to ethics is of very little account. But question is as to whether ethics is to be regarded as helpful to morals because of scientific insight into truth afforded, or because of its fofmu-. lation ,of precepts for action. In the latter case, it " helps " the, moral life, only by depriving it of its freedom. 111. by physiology and hygiene. In former case, helps by freeing it: by making it more significant and effective — as knowledge of mechanics helps a bridge builder. Importance of . distinction illustrated by moral value of teachings of Jesus: Did he lay down rules for life, or did he give insight into nature of life ? That is, is 't salvation V conformity to some scheme laid down, or is it the freeing of life reached through knowledge of its real nature and relations ?

Summary. So far as agent needs rules, or fixed precepts, he does not perform his deeds from full personal preference, and hence is only imperfectly moral : so far as he understands and is personally interested in the acts demanded, he needs no rules. Hence the absurdity of defining ethical theory from the Standpoint of rules. Casuistry. Difference between a principle and a rule; former a method for action, la,tter a prescription for it; former experimental, latter fixed; former orders in sense of setting in order, latter in sense of commanding.

Practical value of moral theory is both destructive and constructive. Negative side always visible first. In ideal, destruction is only the reaction of the construction. So far as two are separated, reform becomes merely sentimental, or else mere fault finding.

On practical value of moral theory, see Muirhead, Elements, ch. 3; Lotze, Practical Philosophy, Introduction. Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 174-175. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 338-360; Hoeffding, Ethik, pp. 1-9; International Journal of Ethics, vol. I., No. 2, Art, by Dewey, on Moral Theory and Moral Practice; p. 835, by James on The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (a very strong statement of the practical character of the moral judgment); vol. 4, p. 160, by Mackenzie, on Moral Science and Moral Life.

CHAPTER n.— THE FACTOKSOF MORAL CONDUCT.

THE AGENT AND HIS SPHERE OF ACTION.

Section IV. — Conduct as Referred to the Agent. ' No fi,ct is a part of conduct except as it is a part of a system of plans (purposes) and interests. Theory arose (as already seen) when these plans and interests were reflected upon with a view to their unification. Thus (for all European peoples since Socrates) an act must express character if it is to have moral meaning; it must be considered as the outcome of some aim and interest on-the part of a conscious agent. (Spencer, Data of Ethics, ch. I.)

The elements involved in such reference of an act to an agent are: 1. Some knowledge of what he is about; that is, some end in view in doing the act. 2. Soms interest in the act; the act is chosen or preferred. The agent not only knows

6 THE STUBT OF ETHICS. •

^^hat he is about as a reasoning automaton might, but tbe act appeals to him, has value for him.

3. The insight and the interest must be more than momen- ,tary — they must express some stability. The act must proceed from a disposition, an established tendency, to act thus and so.

This analysis was begun by Socrates and practically completed by Aristotle. See Xenophon, Memorabilia, III., ch. 9; Plato, Protagoras, esp. pp. 352-359; Apol. 25; and Aristotle, Ethics, Book II., cb. 4. See also Green, Prolegomena, pp. 268-72.

The contact of Greek thought with Semitic conceptions (particularly through Christianity) emphasized the necessary reference of conduct to the agent. It made holiness of will (character, dominating idea and interest) the ideal, rather than the performance of certain acts: (compare idea of justification by faith ) and proclaimed the criterion of moral worth to be in the personal attijtude, rather than in the particular act. (See, e. g., I. Corinthians, ch. 13.) In its extreme forms, this emphasis made the act almost indifEerent; it was regarded as somehow " external," the ideal and attitude being all-sufficient per se.

The contact with the Germanic peoples, with their strong Romanticism, emphasized also the other factor in the analysis — namely the insistence upon the agent's own interest in his acts. It asserted the right of the individual to choose his own ends, and the worthlessnessi(the slavery) of all acts not performed because of this personal preference. In its extreme form, this spirit , became the demand for unliniited personal enjoyment — not mere sensuous enjoyment, but the right of the individual to realize to the uttermost the emotional value of his own acts.

See Green, Works, Vol. III., p. 92; Carlyle, Sartor Resartus. Book II., ch. 9 (on the happiness of the shoe-black); Roy ce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 110-126. Sett (editor) Essays in Philosophic Criticism, Kilpatrick, on Pessimism and the religious Consciousness.

TSE STUD? 01* ETHICS. 7

Section V. — Reference of Conduct to the Sphere of

Action. la analyzing conduct, it is just as important to consider * the situation as the agent. While conduct proceeds from an agent, the agent himself act with reference to the conditions as they present themselves. Conditions (environment) constitute action in the following ways:

1. The agent is moulded through education, unconscious t and conscious, into certain habits of thinking and 'feeling as well. as acting. His act, therefore, partakes of the aims and ^ disposition of his race and time. (See Grote, Plato, vol. I., p. 249, for a strong statement of this influence).

2. Our acts are controlled by the demands made upon us. • These demands include not simply the express requirements of other persons, but the customary expectations of the family, social circle, trade or profession ; the stimuli of surrounding objects, tools, books, &c. ; the range and quality of opportunities afEorded.

3. No idea, plan, wish whatever, can pass into action save through the forces of the environment. Unless, then, we mean to confine our definition of conduct entirely to inner states of consciousness, we must include the scene of action within the *' ' > definition. But the situation does more than execute the plan; through its acceptance or rejection of it, partial or complete, it reacts into consciousness, and strengthens or modifies the "^^ plan. All existing ideals of all practical (i. e., non-sentimental) agents are the outcome of such a struggle for realization.

Historic. — At the outset of reflection, equal emphasis was put into the reference both to the agent and to the situation. Ethics, dealing with conduct in its individual reference, and politics, dealing with it in reference to the scene of action, were t not separated. Plato, Republic, II. pp. 368-9, IV. pp. 427-445; Aristotle, Ethics, X., ch. 9; Politics, I., chs. 1 and 2; III., feh. 12. The term ethos meant the disposition or prevailing habit of the community (compare Lat. mos, mores), and it only grad-

8 iks STUDY O J ETHlds.

ually shaded 6ver into the idea of individual character. The exclusive reference of conduct to the individual came later, and was due, partly, to the influence of Christianity already referred to, and partly to the general disintegration of local customs and interests, consequent upon the growth of the Eoman Empire. (See Eenan, Hibbert Lectures, 1880. ) The result was that the individual was thrown back into himself, the conditions of action seeming indifferent and even hostile to the realization of moral aims. Stoic, Epicurean, and Sceptic all agreed in setting up as their ideal the individual, selfsufficient to himself, independent of everything beyond himself-^-that is, everything beyond his own consciousness. (Sedgwick, History of Ethics, pp. 70-73; Windelband, History of Philosophy, pp. 164-170). The identification of the highest ideal with a good capable of realization only through, supernatural assistance, and, as to content, only in another world, led in the Middle Ages to considering the present conditions of- action as indifferent or profane, the state as the realm of force, not moral aims; and there was a corresponding exclusion of objective factors from the theory of conduct. Since the Reformation, however, the tendency has been steadily the other way. It has culminated in the present generation through. the development of the idea of evolution and of the historical method, on the scientific side; and through thie growth of reforming and philanthropic interest on the practical side. The former have shown the immense part played by historic antecedents and by environment, physical and social, in shaping conduct. The latter has revealed that one of the chief obstacles to general: and permanent moral reforms is unfavorable institutions and habits of living.

Herder, Philosophy of History Book IX. , and Comte, Positive Philosophy Book VI., are important references in the historical development of the present point of view. For various ideas on the social nature of ethics, see Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, pp. 5-15, 81-96; Yale Review, vol. I., pp. 301 and 354, Hadley, Ethics as Political Science; Mind, vol. II., a?HE STtrbt OF ETHtoS. , §

p. 453, Bairatt, Ethics aud Politics; vol. VIII., p. 222, Wallace, Ethics and Sociology; International Journal of Ethics, vol. III., p. 281, Mackenzie, Ethics and Economics; vol. IV., p. 133, Hibben, Ethics and Jurisprudence; Journal Speculative Philosophy, vol. XXII., p. 322, Patten, Economics and Morality. The necessity of including social conditions and relations in the idea of conduct is brought out, from different points of view, in Spencer, Data, ch. 8; Stephen, Science of Ethics, ch. 3; Green, Prolegomena, pp. 191-201; Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 148-156.

Sec. VI. — Twofold Fokmula for Conduct.

We may sum up the foregoing, on its practical side, by saying that in order to secure right conduct we find ourselves under the necessity of paying equal attention to the agent and to the conditions with reference to which he acts. No amount of external pressure or influence can secure right conduct of an agent, except in so far as it ceases to he external; except, that is, as it is taken up into the purpose and interests of the agent himself. But, on the other hand, there is no way to develop within the individual right plans, and to attach right values to ends, save as these plans reflect the requirements of the situation in which he finds himself.

A business situation gives an illustration. The agent, to be successful, must form his plans with reference to his conditions — state of raw material, transportation facilities, demand in market, and others competing to supply this demand. His purposes, so far as rightly formed, are a synthesis or co-ordination of the prevailing conditions of his scene of action. But this situation is not something hard and fixed, outside of the agent. What the situation is to him depends upon his own capacities^-Ms resources, skill, etc. He himself is a part of the conditions to be taken into account. Inferior raw material will yield to an invention which enables him to get more out of it, remoteness from market to his ability to contrive new methods of transportation, &c. In other wordg, the situation i5 ' TflE StUDY OF ETSicS.

is nothing but the complete co-ordination of all his powers [abilities) and relations.

Thus it is with that larger success ia conduct, termed morality. Prom the standpoint of the individual agent,

Conduct is the co-ordinating, or bringing to a unity of aim and interest, the different elements of a complex situation.

From the standpoint of the scene of action,

Conduct is co-ordinating, in an organised way, the concrete powers, the impulses and habits, of an individual agent.

(See Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 97-130.)

Sec. VII. — MoKAL Functions.

Conduct may be considered as the same consciously that a biological function is unconsciously. It is the nature of every function to include within itself both organ and environment. The act of respiration is a co-ordination of lungs as organ and air as environment. So digestion, locomotion, etc. We are apt at first to identify function with the organ alone, and conceive of environment as if it bore a more external relation to it. . But the reference to environment is absolute and intrinsic. The organ is the point of initiation for the function, and is more permanent than any particular portion of the environment. It is thus of more immediate importance. But it is the environment, comprehended in the exercise of the function, that finally fixes the organ (as food builds up the organism), and thus, indirectly or mediately, the environment is of the most importance. (Compare the mutual dependence of "appreciation " and " retention." Psychology, p. 149.)

It is equally an error then to consider either organ or environment as fixed in itself. Function is not the exercise of a predetermined organ upon an external environment, nor is it the adjustment of an organ to a predetermined Avironment. The nature of the function determines both the organ and the environment. Two animals in whom the function of nutrition is differently performed have, in virtue of that fact, different environments as well as different organs. Spencer, (Biology,

THE STbDY Oi" ETHICS. 11

I'art I., ch. 4; Psychology, Part III.; Ethics, pp. 75-76) has defined life, mind, and conduct as adjustment of inner relations to outer; but the separation involved in calling one "inner" and the other "outer" marks the failure to recognize that function is not a parallelism between organ and environment, but includes and determines both.

Sec. VIII. — Ethical Postulate.

Interpreted in moral terms, the foregoing means that moral conduct cannot be adequately conceived as the property or performance of the agent alone. The agent corresponds to the organ biologically, and is thus, in itself, simply an instrument for exercising certain functions. Its structure, its aims, its interests, are controlled by the ends to be reached, and these ends include the conditions of action as well as the instrument. In other words, we cannot ta^e the agent as final in defining conduct, because we demand a certain structure of the agent.

Conversely, we require that the conditions of action be modified so as to permit the exercise of functions, so as to become the means of the realization of ends. The exercise of function itself tends to this transformation of environment. (Illustrated by nutrition, by industry, by valor, etc.)

Defining conduct from the standpoint of the action, which includes both agent and his scene of action, we see that

The conduct required truly to express an agent is, at the same time, the conduct required to maintain the situation in which he is placed; while, conversely, the conduct that truly meets the situation is that which furthers the agent.

The word " truly " in this statement means with reference to the exercise of function.

This statement may be termed the ethical postulate. Its analogy with the scientific postulate — uniformity of nature, reign of law, etc. That is, we demand order in our experience. The only proof of its existence is in the results reached by making the demand. The postulate is verified by being acted upon. The proof is experimental.

The ethical postulate, in other words, expresses the fact that moral experience continually demands of every agent that he shape his plans and interests so that they meet the needs of the situation, while it also requires that, through the agent, the situation be so modified as to enable the agent to express himself freely.

See Dewey, Outlines of Ethical Theory, p. 131.

The discussion of conduct in relation to the agent constitutes psychological ethics: in relation to the conditions of action, social ethics. It must be borne in mind, however, that this distinction is one of point of view taken, not of material involved: the agent, that is, is a social fact as well as a psychical fact, and the conditions of action have a psychical as well as a social meaning.

It should also be borne in mind throughout the whole discussion that the aim is not to discover the ideal at which all conduct aims, nor the law which it should follow; the aim, once more, is not to find precepts or rules, but to jjoaJhfzeconduct. The question is concerning the nature of any ideal and the part which it plays in conduct; the conditions which must be met to entitle any fact to the name of law, etc.

CHAPTER III.— A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF CON- DUCT. Section IX. — The Nature of Impulse

All conduct is at first impulsive. It has no end consciously » in view. The self is constantly performing certain acts more or less determined in results, but without distinct consciousness of their significance. The food impulse; following light with eyes; handling; reaching; locomotion; the talking impulse. All activity is impulsive so far as containing new elements — so far, that is, as it is not purely habitual. Impulse is not used as synonymous with instinct. The latter is a defined or limited impulse; the physical mechanism for the act is pretty definitely^ prearranged. In man, there are very few instincts pure and simple, but rather the loose beginnings and ends of very many instincts. Hence the range and variety of human, as compared with animal, actions. Hence also the impossibility of a systematic classification of fundamental impulses to action. (Such classifications were frequent in the older psychologies : see also Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. II., pp. 120-256, esp. p. 246). While the acts which have proved themselves necessary in the previous life of the race have become so organized into the structurer of the individual that they now assert themselves spontaneously as appetites and aversions, each of these is so modified by the experiences and circumstances of the agent that it is meaningless when separated. Such impulses as love of gain, love of fame, etc., are either pure abstractions, there being in the normal man no such thing as love of gain in general, (that is, unmodified by the make-up of his entire experience) or else they represent an abstract classification of the various ends to which impulses may be directed.

Sectxon X. — The Expression op Impulse and its Consequences.

The various impulses of the individual are not a loose bundle of tendencies existing side by side. Because they have been evolved ijn relation to the one raorejnclusive activity oL raamtaining life,, they are interconnected. One impulse in its utterance tends to call up others, and this excitation or stimulation is not wholly dependent upon the circumstances of the moment, but follows (within widely variable limits) certain lines. Thus the movement of the eye in following light and of the hand in grasping an object tend to co ordinate, etc. The difference again between the lower animals and man is that in the former this co-ordination is predetermined quite specifically, while ia man only the very general lines are laid down, thus leaving room for great variation and experimentation — implying possibility of new combinations, and thus the performance of new acts almost without limit. The acts, which to the animals are well defined ends, are, in the human structure, freed from their adjustment to predefined ends and made flexible instruments for a large number of different and much more complex ends. The definite co-ordination of acts is thus, with man, not a datum but a problem.

Each .impulse in its expression tends to call up other impulses; and it brings into consciousness other experiences. A child puts forth, by natural impulse, his hand towards a bright color; his hand touches it and he gets new experiences — feelings of contact; these, in turn, are stimulus to a further act; he puts the thing in his mouth, and gets a taste, etc. lu other -v^ords, the expression of every impulse stimulates other experiences and these react into the original impulse and modify it This reaction of the induced experiences into the inducing impulse'is the psychological basis of moral conduct. In the animals, so far as we can judge, the stimulus and the response

THE STtTDT OP BTHICS. ' 15

seem to assume purely serial order, one impulse calling forth its appropriate act, this its proper sequence and so on. The latter acts or experiences do not return into the earlier; they are not referred or reflected back. The animal life is one of association, not of thought or reflection.

SBCTroN XL — Will, or the Mediation op Impulse.

This back-reference of an experience to the impulse which induces it, we may term the mediation of impulse. If we suppose that the series of experiences used in the previous illustration give the experience of an orange, then the next time the same impulse of following light occurs it is modified by all the experiences in which it previously resulted. It is qualitatively different; the image or idea of the pleasant contacts and tastes is now a part of the impulse. A child follows a purely natural impulse in making more or less articulate sounds; these souads, through the response which others make to them (a response as natural as the sequence of contacts upon the following of light with the eye) set up other experiences of the child, and these induced experiences mediate the original babbling impulses. He finds that, expressing one impulse, he gets attention when he falls down; by another, food when he is hungry, etc. It is not simply that these results do follow, but that the child becomes conscious that they follow; that is, the results are referred back to the original impulse and enter into its structure in consciousness. It is evident that these mediations, or conscious back-references, constitute the meaning of the impulse — they are its , significance, its import. The impulse is idealized. The impulse mediated, that is given conscious value through the reference into it of the other experiences which will result from its expression, constitutes volition proper.

Section XII. — The Ethical iNTERjeRETATioN of this Process.

As the primary poinit to understand, in ethical psychology, is the return of induced experiences into the stimulating impulse, so the fundamental fallacy to avoid is the separation of impulse and induced experiences. It is too common an error to think of the expression of the impulse as an independgnt act and of the induced experiences as simply certain external consequences which follow upon the act, but which have nothing intrinsically to do with it — which in themselves are indifEerent to the act. (See Martineau, Types, vol. II., p. 24) So we hear of the act and its consequences. In fact, the consequences, so far as they refer back, are the act as a moral or conscious (not simply physical) act. Differences of moral value (as we shall see later) depend simply upon the range and thoroughness of this mediation — the completeness with which the "consequences" of an act are returned into the structure of the natural impulse. We thus see again the mistake of the systems which attempt — like Martineau'e — to build up ethical theory on the basis of separate natural impulses. Their moral value is in their interactions, not in themselves as independent. (Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. I. of Works, pp. 49-55, brings out this truth very clearly; he uses, however, the term ' motive' to denote what I call natural impulse, while I shall use the term motive to designate the mediated impulse.)