An outline of a system of natural theology

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Preface

Natural Theology, as a science, may be divided into five distinct subjects. First, the proofs of the existence of a Sovereign Intelligence. Secondly, of those attributes of the Deity which have been termed natural, viz., His unity, eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, infinity. Thirdly, the proofs of His moral attributes, as His goodness, benevolence, wisdom, and justice. Fourthly, the evidences of a future state founded on these attributes or on His works. Fifthly, our relation and consequent duties to Him. Not that it is usual to include all these divisions in any single treatise on the subject, for each writer has dwelt upon or omitted some of them, according to the principal design of his work ; whether simply to prove the existence of a God, or to endeavour to display His attributes ; or to impress a sense of our dependence on Him here and hereafter. As it

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is the chief aim of the present essay to place, in the strongest light, the natural evidences of future state, this object will be most effectually pursued, by confining the present discussion to two of these divisions, viz.

1st : The proofs of the existence of a Sovereign Intelligence.

2nd : The evidence of a future state derived from His works.

It is clear that the first step in the evidence of a futurity is, to prove that we are under the government of Intelligence, and if it does not immediately appear that, in such an inquiry we can properly omit the previous proof of the wisdom, the omnipotence, and the benevolence of the Deity, the writer trusts that, in the introdaction to the Second Part of this Treatise, he shall be able to show, that this previous step may be omitted : and if so, the evidence of a future life receives additional strength from the simplicity of plan resulting from these omissions ; and by drawing the proofs immediately from the character of God's moral and physical creation, rather than from those attributes which we must previously deduce from the very same phenomena.

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Perhaps it may be questioned whether, at this period especially, when a lively faith in the Christian revelation appears to be spreading widely at home and abroad, there be any practical benefit in multiplying the natural proofs of the existence of God and of another world. It may be thought that it is better that these truths should be conveyed only through that revelation which gives them an authority, without which they are liable to be wholly disregarded ; and that these natural truths ought never to be separated from those revealed tenets, without which we are taught they are unavailing. But surely as a science only (and if a science, the first of sciences) Natural Theology is entitled to any improvement that can be devised either in substance or in method. Independent of this minor consideration, however, there are cases in which the only probable means of bringing unbelievers to obedience to the revealed word, is by a strong conviction, that there is a Governor of the world who requires from them, on natural principles, nearly, if not all, the devotion and obedience which his revelation enjoins-:- a conviction that, by renouncing the faith of a Chr' ''xi

PREFACE.

escape the duties of a Christian, nor the penalties of a future award.

When a man doubts the truth of Revelation, he generally holds very feebly the belief in an awarding God ; and when the mind has proceeded so far in scepticism, it may be recalled by retracing the downward process, and the simple natural truths strongly imbibed, may become the first steps to all saving knowledge. But, admitting that it were always more practicable, as it often is, to bring a man to a belief in all essential truth through the evidences of revelation, yet it will be also admitted that there are multitudes who, on the assurance of that revelation, will retain their infidelity. There are, in every age, multitudes whose unbelief is as firm as if it were founded on truth ; and if so, it can scarcely be questioned, whether we regard the good of society, or the unhappy individuals themselves, that it is far better they should be convinced that there is a just and benevolent God, than to believe in nothing : that they should have a hope and fear of the future, hoAvever erroneous their creed in other respects, than live like those who say, " let us eat and drink," and defraud

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and murder, if it is necessary to our interest ; " for, to-morrow we die."

It has been recently contended that, the Natural Evidence for the existence of a Supreme Being is not sufficient to impart a conviction of that truth ; but this is so palpably contradictory to the plain language of St. Paul (Rom. i. 20, and Acts xiv. 17) and indeed to the general sense of mankind, that it requires little refutation. The vast proportion of evil and misery in the world, on which this opinion appears to be founded, could afford no valid objection to the conclusion from contrivance and design ; for if the creation exhibited only marks of cruelty, a designing Intelligence would still be inferred, and would be necessary to account for its order. But, in truth, there is no more evil than moral discipline requires. Thousands die in an impenitent state, apparently for the want of more suffering : and the world collectively is a giddy, thoughtless world, with all its chastisements.

With regard to the natural evidence of a future state I have little to observe, but that there seems to be a general impression of its inconclusiveness ; whereas, it appears to the

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writer to admit of demonstration only short of mathematical or physical proof, because moral evidence, in its very nature, cannot be so decisive.

If, then, these two all-important questions are capable of natural proofs, and, in fact, have been repeatedly demonstrated, it only remains to assign a reason for another Treatise on the subject : but as that will be best explained in the Introduction, I shall only here state, that the proof of the existence of a Supreme Being in these pages is founded upon the principle of the original independence of multitudes of phenomena in the different departments of nature associated in one system ; a principle clearly recognized by Natural Theologists, but not, that I am aware of, ever made the leading argument of any Treatise on the subject.

But, independent of that novelty of design, which, in a certain sense, this volume may claim, and even after the rich stores opened by recent writers on these interesting subjects, a short and methodical treatise is perhaps wanted, embracing arguments both for the existence of God and of a future state, embodying the principal objections in the sub-

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stance of the proof, instead of detached answers — pursuing the arguments on a unity of plan, through each subdivision, and employing the plainest language of which the subject admits.

In the following attempt to execute such a plan, the writer has borrowed somewhat copiously from some very recent publications. He conceived that any light which could impart the least additional evidence to the most important of all natural truths, would be willingly lent by their distinguished authors. He has, therefore, quoted generally from Drs. Crombie, Southwood Smith, Roget, Buckland, Prout, MaccuUoch, and Mr. Whewell, when the argument required illustration, and his own knowledge could not supply it. On subjects, whose attraction in a great measure consists in method, and style, and language, profuse quotations admit of little excuse ; but when questions of momentous importance are debated, it would be well, perhaps, if it were more usual to strengthen the argument by passages from those writers who have treated each point in question with the greatest ability.

This little essay has received the encou-

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ragement of several distinguished literary friends, and some very material corrections by two eminent writers, without which it would have been extremely faulty. Should it so far succeed as to arrive at another edition, he will gladly take that opportunity to acknowledge to whom he is thus indebted ; but it would be an ungrateful return to commit names before there is a security that those names will not be discredited.

When, in the Introduction which follows, it is assumed that the principle there described will bring the great points of Natural Theology (yet questioned) to a final issue, it will not be supposed that I mean to arrogate for this individual exposition such a necessary effect ; the term outline, applied to this volume, will exculpate me from such assumption. But I believe, that if the principles here pursued were fully developed by writers of extensive scientific knowledge, atheism and disbelief of a future life would be comparatively rare.

Bredfield, January 24th, 1840.

Part I. Proof Of The Existence Of God

Page

Chapter I

Sect. I. Necessity or Design the only Alternative 24

H. The Argument of Independent Correspondencies . 27

CHAPTER n.

Sect. I. Physical Proofs of the Beginning of the present

Order of Nature on this Planet 40

II. Inference from the Beginning of the present Order of Nature 52

Chapter III

Sect. I. The Physical Causes now in action, and the Causes supposed to be extinct, both inadequate to account for the co-operation of different Phenomena in one Design 65

II. The Theory of La Place.— The Atomic Theory., .. 73 in. Supposed Spontaneous Formations of Organic

Creatures 88

IV. The Theory of Lamark 107

Chapter III

Sect. I. Proofs that the Moral World is a System of Moral Government commenced, but incomplete if it terminate here 326

II. Proofs that the Moral World is a System of Moral Discipline, abortive if it terminate here 350

III. Belief in a Revelation on Evidence which cannot be controverted by the Believer, a presumptive Proof of a Future State 389

Chapter IV

Sect. I. Proofs that there are incongruous Faculties in

Human Nature, if there be no Future State 404

II. Proofs that the Human Mind would not be fully developed except through the Belief in a Future State 418

III. Whether the Moral Scheme, if incomprehensible, may not be complete although it terminate here. . 433

PART I.

PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME

BEING FROM THE COOPERATION OF

INDEPENDENT PHENOMENA

IN ONE DESIGN.

Introduction

IT is one of the most singular circumstances at this period of great intellectual proficiency, that the important question of the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, on natural principles, is apparently not yet decided. Notwithstanding the many abstruse works that have been written to prove the Being of God, and the vast mass of recently discovered facts by which such argument is sustained, many of the most acute reasoners on the continent profess Atheistic, or, what is virtually the same. Pantheistic opinions ; and no small number of our own countrymen are silent converts to the same doctrine. On this strange want of decision of a point which common sense settles without difficulty, a question naturally occurs : Cannot the argument be brought to such a crisis that there shall be universal assent or dissent? It appears to the writer, that the undecided state in which the natural evidence is left, arises from the want of a common principle of debate. If it could be ascertained first, where

INTRODUCTION.

the jut of the question rests ; and it were further agreed to argue on that ground only, the controversy must come to some decisive conclusion. But if a number of different proofs, a priori, a posteriori, metaphysical and physical, be brought into the debate by both parties, and opposed, not argument to argument, but collectively, the strength may be vastly superior on one side, but yet it may be to a spectator as a drawn battle.

The first question on this subject then, is. Where lies that principle of argument which both parties would acknowledge as the true ground of controversy, — as containing in itself the vital point of the question ? It is easy to shew where it is not. It does not lie in " the high priori road," for there the contest is endless, and the community at large scarcely capable of understanding a single proposition. It has long been decided, that the a posteriori argument is the proper ground of the debate : but this in its largest extent is still too wide for the hoped-for decision. There must be some particular proposition or propositions which contain the kernel of the proof; and if it were agreed to confine the discussion to these, then such a principle of argument would be necessarily followed by some decisive result. To say that this point of debate should be purely physical, is palpably erroneous. It should of course be deduced from, and supported by, physical facts ; but all such physical

INTRODUCTION.

proofs must appeal to general principles, and if they be not axioms, they admit of some dispute, and thus introduce some metaphysical discussion. But the propositions may be so plain and clear, that the question cannot remain undecided. Surely then such a concentrated argument might be found.

It may be said that this course has been virtually adopted by all the writers on Natural Theology ; and that there is a sufficiency of fact and argument in many recent works on this subject to decide the question in every unbiassed mind capable of understanding them fully ; and this is entirely admitted. But the method adopted has not been such as to produce universal assent. The subject is not brought to an inevitable decision, as it probably might be, by the method here suggested. There is much more atheism even in this kingdom than the public are aware of.

That these admirable works have not apparently produced that general assent, for which they contain ample materials, is, I think, to be attributed to this want of simplicity of plan.

While the scientific and logical reader understands and appreciates every valid argument, and can arrange in his own mind this multifarious evidence in one consistent scheme, those unaccustomed to abstract truths are confused by the depth and variety of the mass of testimony.

INTRODUCTION.

They cannot commence with the profound metaphysical considerations which are involved in the principles of this sublime science,* nor can they always unite distinct propositions, or identify the same under different enunciations; so that the very splendour of the combined proof, in which the scientific eye rejoices, oppresses an unpractised vision ; and hence it is, that amidst proof far more solid than Paley's justly celebrated work contains, there is probably on the whole less conviction produced in the minds of the community in general, (I mean, where a doubt existed,) than by his treatise. Although there are therefore in these noble works individual arguments sufficiently decisive, yet, not proceeding on the principle of unity and simplicity of plan, they do not bring the point to a decisive issue. Paley's Natural Theology is indeed distinguished by the most admirable simplicity and unity of design, and by many detached proofs equally clear and convincing; but there is unfortunately a defect in the first principles, on which the whole conclusion is founded. The consequence of which is, that we may admit all he asserts to be true, and yet ultimately question his inference. He has not gone sufficiently far into the first principles of the inquiry. The hope, then, of bringing the argument to a point at which some decision must ensue, may perhaps be allowed as

* See Dr. Crombie's Natural Theology, vol. i. chap. 1.

a fair plea for another Essay on Natural Theology ; for attempting a treatise which shall preserve as much of the simplicity of plan which distinguishes Paley's work, as a more solid and comprehensive argument will admit. Such is, briefly, one portion of the design of the following pages.

But there is another motive for this attempt. There is a strong conviction in many minds that some theories of physical or natural formation have been dismissed by theistic writers rather too hastily. There is, for instance, an increasing persuasion in inquiring minds, that there are in nature certain spontaneous organizations : * at least that there has never been full and satisfactory proof that such phenomena do not exist to a limited extent. I do not allude to the supposed formations in the phials of Mr. Cross, but in the laboratory of nature. This entitles the subject to a place in all such investigations. The nebular theory of La Place has also recently gained strength from the admissions of two or three of our leaders in science ; and if we dare not affirm its absolute truth, it can no longer be treated as visionary. I These circumstances would alone

* Dr. MaccuUoch has given some very strong reasons against a denial of such spontaneous productions, in his posthumous work on the Attributes of the Deity.

t This theory is said, in a recent number of the Edinburgh Review, to have been physically proved by M. Comte. — Edinburgh Review, No. 136, 1838.

o INTRODUCTION.

sanction another view of the evidence. But, strong as the facts are to which the writer refers, he wishes distinctly to disavow all intention of deciding on the validity of the hypotheses to which such facts have led. It is as atheistic evidence that they are here impugned. We may, however, admit hypothetically , that nature has powers acting as secondary causes that were unsuspected till recently, and thus meet the atheist in his strong holds.

I have said that it was my wish to combine the unity of plan which marks Paley's Theology with a more sound and comprehensive proof than that delightful work affords. It is necessary to explain in what respect Paley's proof is deficient. It will probably be at once admitted by all, that, as far as his principle goes, he has executed it in a manner that has rarely, if ever, been equalled. In united strength and clearness of argument, and in aptness and dexterity of illustration, he is indeed almost matchless ; but in such momentous discussions, the important point at last is validity of proof, and here it is now generally admitted that the master has failed.* His proof is too simple to be effective ; not because he has omitted those abstruse metaphysical points

* The defect in Paley's argument was, I think, first explained in the Quarterly Review, No. 101, in the article on Dr. Crombie's Natural Theology.

INTKOUUCTION. !»

which properly precede the physical evidence, and which are treated with such consummate skill in Dr. Crombie's Natural Theology ; (for it is not necessary in all cases to take up the subject quite so high ;) but because he has imperfectly treated his own proposition, viz. : That the phenomena of order and fitness are infallible indications of design. He premised that he had only to shew unequivocal instances of order and mutual fitness in the works of nature, to bring an instantaneous assurance that they proceeded from a Sovereign Intellect ; whereas this is the very point that many atheists deny, who fvdiy admit the aptitude and order. It was necessary, therefore, to the completion of such a proof, that he should have not merely asserted, but verified this proposition. His evidence rests on the strength of the assertion, that order can be the product of intellect only — an assertion which itself requires to be substantiated. The arguments against the necessity and eternity of that order (inconclusive in themselves) are not stated as necessary to enable us to infer design ; but the design is assumed from the order of the phenomena, and the objections answered, on the strength of that assumption : the consequence is, that those readers who do not see this, his leading position, in the light of an axiom, are not convinced by his argument. As an instance of the truth of this charge, if the reader turn to Chap. ii.

of his Natural Theology, he will find that the eternal succession of the human species is denied, on the principle that the design it manifests is not evaded by lengthening the chain of parentage to eternity. But this conclusion is founded upon the assumption, that because there is order and fitness, there is necessarily design, which is, as I have said, denied by his opponents ; for if they granted that point, his argument would be unassailable.

Such, then, being the insufficiency in Paley's proof, it may be asked what supplementary argument is required to remedy the defect, and establish the proposition, — that the phenomena of order and aptitude require an intellectual cause ?

In adding what he conceives to be the completion of the proof derived from order and fitness, the writer has only placed, in an unusually prominent light, a clause in the argument for design, which has been often expressed, and must always have been implied even by Paley himself, viz. that the several parts constituting any system of order and adaptation, were originally independent of each other* It is only by premising this

* This constituent clause in the proof of design has been distinctly recognized in several recent works on Natural Theology; in Dr. Crombie's Natural Theology, chap. ii. sect. 2, 4, passim ; in Dr. Macculloch's Attributes of the Deity, vol. iii. chap, xlvii. p. 240; in the Introduction to Dr. Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise ; in Mr. Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise, chap. xiv.

original independence, that the inference from choice can have any basis. If there were not a previous absence of all necessary connection between the parts of any harmonious whole, there could be no evidence of choice, nor consequently of design in the union of those parts.

If the existence of a Supreme Being be premised, it is not meant to assert that any thing can be independent of him. The independence here signified is when one thing, not necessarily by its nature produced by or joined to another, minutely corresponds with it ; or, in other words, when many correspondencies occur without any associating physical law : and if this be proved in instances too numerous to admit of a chance affinity, we justly infer that the union or connection was produced by a power ab extra ; and the nature of the uniting cause is inferred from the phenomena. As they exhibit order, we ascribe it to intelligence. That a point so obvious will be disputed is not probable ; but as this is that portion of the popular proof of design which forms the principle of the present inquiry, it may not be altogether useless to shew its necessity, by separating the common argument for design into

xvii. xviii. ; and doubtless in many other works which the writer has not seen, or which have escaped his memory. The only novelty which he claims for this view of theistic evidence is, that the independence, instead of the correspondence of the different parts, is made the leading principle of the argument.

its two legitimate clauses. The assertion that order and fitness must proceed from intelligence, used as an argument for a Supreme Being, contains the two following positions, one expressed, the other implied :

1st: That there are this order and fitness of

parts in the works of nature. This is

always expressed. 2nd : That the parts were originally independent

of each other. This is always implied, but

not very often expressed.

First : That there are in nature order, adaptation, and relation of means to ends.

So important to the argument have these facts always appeared, that their elucidation has constituted almost the sole object in many vrorks on Natural Theology. It is the striking display of this order and adaptation in nature, that, as I have said, distinguishes the celebrated work of Paley. That there is such adaptation is the one position, to the establishment ofvrhich almost all his beautiful examples are enlisted ; which position has lately received a vast accession of new and splendid illustration, according to the advance of the natural sciences, in the Bridgewater Treatises. But it is not an unfrequent remark, that, deeply interesting as multiplied examples of order and fitness are whenever they are found, they bring no additional conviction to the mind of the existence of God, and for this reason, — the harmony and relations of organized nature are so palpably evident, that we have but to open our eyes to see many more examples than are necessary, to shew us that the universe cannot be a work of accident or planless confusion. Even a straw, or a blade of grass, well known and considered in all their bearings, would alone convince us of that truth. Indeed, so evident is this position, that no atheist in modern times disputes it ; on the contrary, atheism ascribes this order lo a cause that implies order in its very nature, viz. a law or principle ; and, resting in that supposed cause, the more perfect regularity these examples display, the more they confirm him in the belief that they are not the works of will or choice, but of arbitrary and necessary principles in nature itself.

But the second clause in the theistic argument of design, which, though always implied, is not always expressed, directly meets such objection, while it gives to each example of aptitude the complete indication of an intellectual origin, viz.

Secondly : That the constituent parts of this order and adaptation were originally independent of each other.

This is an essential clause in the proof of design. If the several parts were not independent, there could be no indication of intellect in their junction. This independence is necessarily implied in the argument of design, and has been often mentioned as well as implied, yet it requires to be impressed; for it is precisely through the assumed dependence of the phenomena that the schemes of modern atheism have an appearance of consistency ; and some very ingenious theories which, though by no means essentially atheistic, may be used atheistically, (as the nebular hypothesis of La Place, and the community of species of Lamark,) are especially founded on the principle of the necessary connection of diverse natural phenomena in one plan. Moreover, this clause of independence alone meets the most consistent form of atheism, which is so prevalent on the continent at this period, viz. Pantheism. This atheistic theory is founded on the principle that all nature is a varied unity, and on the assertion that we cannot prove this unity is not God. We must therefore disprove or confute the unity of nature, in order to meet this assertion. But this would never be done by accumulated instances of correspondence and adaptation only, throughout the several parts of nature, even if the examples were multiplied ad infinitum. The reply would be : " Yes, doubtless, the parts of a varied unity correspond. It were strange if they did not." There is, therefore, no progress made against the pantheistic hypothesis, as long as we disprove not his leading principle, — that nature is a great unity. A million instances of the nicest correspondence, urged alone, do not bear vipon this point. One actxial independence meets it. A few instances of decided independence, that is, as many as are necessary to remove the correspondencies from all suspicion of a chance concurrence, entirely overthrow it. These circumstances render it expedient to dwell upon the evidence of independence, and not correspondence only, in the constituent parts of any combination adduced as an example of design. If it be contended that this argument is not necessary, because every law of nature implies a lawgiver, this assertion is easily evaded by the atheist, by merely calling the regularity of the phenomena not a law of nature, but a principle in nature. And if it be further asserted, that every regular arrangement bears in its very order a testimony of design, we would ask, if he who argues thus would be satisfied to rest his evidence of a God on the regular phenomena of gaseous compositions,* or the peculiar rate of gravitation, which is inversely as the square of the distance, or on any other single orderly principle in nature ? If not, then he admits that order and regularity are not alone sufiicient proofs of design. I do not mean that such a simple exhibition of order, rightly considered, affords no proof of design, but that it is unsatisfactory, and denied by the pan-

* Gases combine only in equal, double, treble, or halfjquarter, and such like parts, never in fractional relations of their respective compounds.

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theist ; whereas, if two simple and di s tinct causes contribute to one end or purpose, the proof is not merely stronger, but of a different kind. It is a union of palpable independencies. If it be said that though order and regularity may not alone indicate design, yet that aptitude does, it will not be denied that all the virtue derived from the argument of aptitude, must rest on the natural independence of the parts adapted ; for, as it was observed before, where there is no choice in the selection, there is no indication of mind in the composition. But almost every accession to our knowledge of nature shews the intimate connection and mutual influence, instead of the independence of nature's works ; for instance, the nebular hypothesis (all but admitted by the scientific), if valid, accounts for numerous and nice supposed independent adjustments of force, quantity, and direction in the planets, by the simple law of gravity acting upon gaseous matter scattered irregularly. Not that this theory would explain more than the framework of the planetary system, but it would preclude the necessity of much independent arrangement, which, on the supposition that solid globes were projected at a given time round the sun and each other, must have been calculated by intelligence.* And