The influence of Descartes on metaphysical speculation in England

Front matter

|ii,J.INDSAYPLAJE|| .ibittBimGli.

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE

SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND

Introduction

PAGE.

1. Philosophy and surrounding circumstances . . ix

2. Philosophy and History supplement each other . x

3. Man's relations to the world as treated by Philosophy xv

4. Man's relations to the world as disclosed by History xxii

5. Discarded scientific hypotheses contrasted with re-

futed philosophical systems .... xxvii

6. Each system contains a phase of Truth . . xxxii

7. The relative importance of these phases . . xxxiv

8. The logical order of Thought and chronological

order in time ...... xxxviii

9. Internal and external connection between systems. xlv

10. Bearing of preliminary enquiry on the Essay . xlviii

I. Internal connection of various systems

11. Need of this investigation i

12. The Protestantism of all modern philosophies . 2

13. Arrangement according to the Moments of the Notion 5

PAGE,

VI CONTENTS.

II. Pre-Cartesian Philosophy

14. The basis for estimating the influence of Descartes 13

15. Christianity, Scholasticism, and Aristoteleanism . 14 i6. Naturalism and the Revival of Learning . . 23

18. Bacon and the tendencies of his time . . 31

19. Lord Herbert of Cherbury . . . . . 37

III. Rene Descartes

20. The ground of the superiority of Descartes to

21. External circumstances, and the central idea of his

22. The example and criterion of certainty . . 50

23. The so-called proofs of the existence of God . 54

24. Conflicting tendencies in the system ... 58

IV. The contemporaries of Descartes

25. Thomas Hobbes and his mental environment . 63

26. Motion as the central thought .... 69

CONTENTS. VU

PAGE.

27. Similarities between Descartes and Hobbes . . 72

28. Joseph Glanville 77

29. The Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth and More . 80

V. John Locke and his school

30. How related to his predecessors . . . . 91

31. The immediate testimony of sense, and the double

problem which is raised ..... 95

32. Innate Ideas : Descartes and Leibnitz . . .100

33. The origin and validity of knowledge . . .103

34. His proof of the existence of God, and religious

35. His criticisms of Cartesianism . . . . 113

36. The English deists and their opponents . . 116

37. Ethical controversies . . . . . .127

VL George Berkeley.

38. What is the fundamental element ? . . . 135

39. Influences which modified his views . . . 145

40. English Idealists : Norris, Collier, and Edwards . 150

PAGE.

viii CONTENTS.

44. The reaction against the influence of Descartes . 168

45. The outcome of the movement in England and

Appendix

On the intellectualism of Locke 177

Index 187

INTRODUCTION.

\y. E. ErdmaiDi. Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, I, i — 99. K. Fischer. Geschichte der neurn Philosophie, Bd. I. Einleitung. G. W. F. Hegel. Vortesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosoplrie. Werke XIII, "—133]

§ I. ''The great revolution which Descartes pro- section 1. " duced in Philosophy was the effect of a superiority " of genius, aided by the circumstances of the times."* True, — but the question occurs, how far was it due to Superior genius

and circum-

superior genius, and how far to the circumstances of stances of the

time.

the times ? Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were classed by Reid as members of the " idealistic school " of Descartes ; but was there not also a spirit floating in the air which directed them all alike .■' How far were the later writers guided by this rather than by any individual author .■'

And indeed there seems to be a farther difficulty which must be looked into. Was not Descartes' system itself moulded by the circumstances of the time .' could it have been produced at another epoch in the world .'' If the success of the revolution was

* Reid, Intellectual Powers, i, p. e58.

X INTRODUCTION.

Section i. partly the cffcct of external wants, the form of the system was not less aftected by its surroundings.

What was true of the succeeding philosophies was

true of his own and of all. The science and the art

and the politics of the day all leave their mark on

the philosophy ; and we find that a still more geijeral

A philosophy, problem is confronting us, How is a system of phihow related to its

surroundings. losophy related to its surroundings ? What is the influence of its environment of former systems and present opinions on the development of a philosophy .' If we can find an answer to this question in its general form, we shall be at least one step nearer the solution of the problem in regard to the influence of Descartes upon his successors.

The Introduction will be occupied with the more general question, the Essay itself with the particular problems presented by the relation of Descartes to subsequent thinkers in England.

§ 2. What connection exists between a philosophy and the circumstances of this age .■' We must first look a little more closely at the two terms whose relationship we wish to detect. The circumstances of the ages, changing as time advances, embracing all the phenomena of growing science, of varying taste, of political crises, or of military successes, are the subject matter of History. But Philosophy claims to b6 altogether apart from these : its content is unchanging and eternal truth. It is

INTRODUCTION. XI

only as it can substantiate this claim that any system Section 2. has a title to be considered philosophical : and if this be so, it seems as if the conception of a history of Philosophy or a philosophy of History were almost a contradiction in terms. How can Eternal Truth have a history in Time .■■ How in the chaos of contending partisans shall we discover a guiding principle .'' Thus our analysis has led us one step farther, till we must ask, What is the relation of Philosophy Philosophy and

History

to History ? This is the most general form of the question, and how remote soever it may seem from the points which we are concerned to investigate, on the correctness of our answer must depend the possibility of completing the other task satisfactorily. It will help us to see the position in which Philosophy stands to the various systems ; and the relation which each of these systems holds to the circumstances of its age will be easily, apparent, if we can find the true connection between Philosophy as a whole, and phenomena in time as recorded by History.

The connection between them is due to the fact ^joth treat of

Man in his rela-

that both treat of Man. Philosophy endeavours to ''m'o 'he Universe,

solve the problems of Man's existence, and the way in which he is related to the physical world, as a part of it, or as controlling it. What is the sort of contact between Man and his environment ? Farther, Philosophy seeks to determine the relation subsisting

Xll

INTRODUCTION.

Section 2

but from two different sides between human intelligence and other intelligences, between human will and the Will. Man in his relations is the subject matter of Philosophy, and also the subject matter of History. In her pages we read how Man has spread through the physical world and brought one and another country into his possession ; how he has used the various physical forces for his purposes, and how his character has been moulded by the circumstances where he found himself Man in his relation to the physical world is certainly the subject matter of the history of civilization ; and historians have found that there are facts to be dealt with in the progress of humanity which cannot be treated from the purely physical side. There have been epochs of intellectual and moral advance which had no evident antecedent in physical circumstances, as well as vast differences in the type of mind between nations similarly situated with regard to climate and soil. So that History has also touched on the other side of the problem, and has roughly delineated the course of the relations between the Thinking Principle and Man. The subject matter of the two studies seems to be the same.

The fundamental difference lies in the points of view from which the subject is regarded by the philosopher and by the historian. Shall we think of Man as he is in his own nature apart from this or that little influence which may modify him here and

INTRODUCTION. Xlll

now, — of man as apart from special conditions of section 2.

space and time ? Then we are seeking a philosophical solution of the problems. But if on the other hand we deal merely with these special conditions, recounting them, and then arranging and classifying them, we are engaged on History. Philosophy deals with the universal. History with the special and particular. The relations under which Man must stand to the World and God are the subject of Philosophy, the relations in which some particular men did stand at some particular time are described to us in History. Man in his universal relations is what we see from the one position ; Man in his particular relations is what we principally find in the other. The two sides are requisite to complete each other : there is no contradiction, no opposition between them : each Juppfement supplements the other.

Although then the two sides fall apart, we may see that they cannot be treated apart without considerable difficulty. They are inextricably involved in one another. There is no human action which does not partake of the nature of both ; which is not the expression of Man's thought, and occasioned by his circumstances ; there is a universal element running through the particulars, traceable in them all. And it is equally true that we can never find the subject of Philosophy by itself; Man with no special relations modifying his being. There is another way which supplen each other

XIV INTRODUCTION.

Section 2. jjj vvhich we Can see their mutual dependence, — as as can be seen in delineated in time. We find Philosophy at first

the progress of

''^'^^- altogether apart from the events of life, seeking an

explanation of Being pure and simple, and finding it in some natural elements . outside the range of thought. This was her birth ; since then she has grown indeed, till in these days she finds that she cantrace out the universal element in all matters of human study or interest, in the researches of the physiologist, the principles of the economist, and the discussions of ecclesiasts. Philosophy no longer aims at an explanation of abstract Being, but of actual life : it has advanced nearer the domain of History. On the other hand the historian had a very different task in chronicling the feuds of petty monarchs or even of petty states, and in describing modern life. We have no longer mere muscular contests to record, but a conscious battling for ideas. The consciousness of his freedom and individuality has abundantly modified Man's action, and thus his particular circumstances have become a far more accurate exhibition of his universal relations than was formerly the case. If Philosophy is more closely entwined with particular phenomena than it once was, History finds that events are the expression of Man's universal relations. The two sides are coalescing into one truth. When human beings shall be fully conscious of their nature and its relations, when they

INTRODUCTION. XV

shall wholly and constantly guide their conduct by a reference to the conditions of their existence, the knowledge of these universal relations will give us an explanation of all events of human conduct ; and the study of these events will lead us directly to the truths which they reveal.

This then is the ground of the connection between the two — they have the same subject matter, 'but they consider it in different, too often in abstract ways. And this will become more apparent if we adopt one point of view. Let us look for a little at Man in his universal relations (with the World and God), and endeavour to work onwards to the other side of his life — the particular circumstances — from Man as a thinking being to Man as surrounded by phenomena in time.

8 T,. We may find it very hard to analyse the 'i'hc common

'^ ^ ■' -^ subject niiiucr

crowd of circumstances and objects around us so ^^ |''=eardcci by

^ Philosophy.

as to get an element which is common to all : yet it is by no means impossible to do so. There is this starting point : the various circumstances get their influence because they are mine : they act on the mind because they are represented by my cognitions. There is one permanent self within, to which they arc all related : and their influence is conveyed through the medium of thought. It is when I reflect upon them, and compare them, and weigh them together, that they have their influence on me. My thinking

XVI INTRODUCTION.

Sectiun 3. power is the common unity which runs through all Man as a my dififerent sensations. It is as a thinking being,

thinking being

nay more as a self-conscious being, that Man is related to the Universe. Apart from his thinking and reflecting power all these particular elements would be changed. It is only when we keep our eyes fixed on this side of his life that we can hope to comprehend Man's relations to the World.

Is it possible to find any similar property which is common to all the objects which arouse his interest or stimulate his activity .'' If we could detect something which is found in them all, however diverse they may be, we should have solved the difficulty by knowing how we must regard the World. But where shall we look for this ? It was easy enough to see that when these circumstances were taken up into the mind by Man, and dealt with by him, they must have a common form to suit his activity : that subjectively and for him they are known as his cognitions and that all his knowledge is merely of objects as related to his thinking power. In their relation to him. we find a similarity, but what is there common to them all, in themselves, and as apart from him ? Of course if we like we may predicate the category of Being, but this does not add much to our information. What-is-related-to-us is, does not seem to be a valuable truth or to take us much nearer a solution of the difficulty. We should never have supposed for a

INTRODUCTION. XVII

moment that it was not : the mere fact that we predi- section 3 cate relationship to ourselves involves the idea of Being. We do not want a mere abstract assertion like this, we want to understand what this Being, which is common to all things, is, and wherein they have their Being.

It appears to me that the notion which we desire '* ■'«'»'='* '<> »

coherent

to express is that of coherence : what we mean in ordinary talk by reality, is something that is part of a definite order. The phrase, common in these days, " He is really changed" surely means that a change has occurred which marks many side's of his character. It is not mere presence to our senses, that is at the root of what we mean by existence. This has been often pointed out with regard to dreams. They are distinguished from what is because they are incoherent. They give- rise to vivid sensations, but since they never continue to present them in a definite series, men do not regard their dreams as having any correspondence to external things. We do not dream what is, as we perceive it.

What then is the element in the various objects around us, which gives them this coherence, the one quality that is common to them all ? It is certainly not to be found in the mere impressions raised in us : subjective impression and external object we can distinguish by vividness, as Hume did : but do we find much permanence in each external object ? Do not

XVin INTRODUCTION.

Section 3. ^.jjgy change and pass away ? To-day's roses will wither, the colours fade, the petals drop, and the seeds ripen. There is no permanence or persistence in them. But the roses next year will be as bright as the ones that have passed : the individuals pass and perish, but the type remains. It is the type, the ideal which remains and persists while the roses that exhibit it pass away. It is not in any individual presented to the senses that we know the true object : it may be a monstrosity : it is only in the type which moulds the individuals, and to which the various individuals all more or less closely conform, that we find a true persistence : not in the things presented to our senses, but in the type to which these things conform.* and therefore Nor indeed is it merely in rising from individual

intelligible °

objects that we find our conception of permanence in the idea to which they conform. It is only on this that we can rest our assurance of the invariability of the natural order. We may assume this invariability with Mr. Mill, and climb with its aid to generahzations of constancy in the phenomena : but unless we are prepared with him to imagine that this gives a proof of the original assumption, it is impossible to find any rational ground for it in mere empiricism. It is by passing beyond individual

* Gegenbaur, Grundziige der vergleichenden Anatomie, 2nd Ed., P- 73-

Universe

INTRODUCTION. XIX

sensations to find the laws according to which the section 3.

■ sensations occur, — to find an order of thought, —

that we can come to have any reason for expecting the recurrence of these sensations. It is when we recognise them as following an order that can be thought, or as concatenated in groups whose connection is intelligible, that we find a permanence in objects, and coherence in the order of nature.

It may indeed be objected that the fact which is }^° material

■ hypothesis

common to all objects, which gives them all their <=»" ='T'»in*e

J ' ^ phenomena

being, is that they are material. But even if this were true, it is no explanation of the kind we seek. It is a mere abstract assertion, like the predication of Being. We cannot define matter so that it shall add to our knowledge at all, or that it shall give us a consistent explanation of the phenomena around us. How are we to account — by that mere abstraction, matter — for persistence of type or for the order of the laws according to which matter is altered into the various forms. We find throughout all a ceaseless living motion, a perpetual flux, and we can never formulate it by the assertion of an abstract identity and materiality. If we regard material phenomena as comprising all the circumstances to which man is related, the assertion of materiality is a barren abstraction that adds nothing ; if we believe that there are phenomena which have no material side, the explanation is insufficient. Matter there undoubtedly

XX

INTRODUCTION.