On Mr. Spencer's unification of knowledge

Front matter

Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library.

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Preface

This workj taken in conjunction with a previous one "On Mr. Spencer's Pormula of Evolution," must be regarded as a criticism of the general logical construction of Mr. Spencer's philosophical system. The writer is not opposed to the author he criticises as regards the scientific doctrine of evolution or natural development, so far as it is known to us ; but he sees great blanks in the deductive treatment, and great failures of explanation, which cause him to regard Mr. Spencer's presumed fulness of exposition as merely illusory.

In so far as Mr. Spencer's work is viewed as an attempt to show the A priori reasonableness of evolution by gradual development already established in various departments of science by <l posteriori methods, it may be held to have accomplished its object ; but in so far as it claims to have put together a framework of thought commensurate with all the sequences of the cosmos, it must be considered a disjointed structure, from which as yet several connecting parts are missing. And it will be found that the deductive system which Mr, Spencer attempts is so mystical in its fundamental ideas, as well as so incomplete in its logical connections, that, regarded vi PREFACE,

as a system of Philosophy, it is as vague as it is ill constructed.

Thus, although the writer is fundamentally in sympathy ■with the goal of Mr. Spencer's attempt, and although he accepts the same d^ 'posteriori truths, he is nevertheless compelled to criticise adversely the ambitions claims of the system, with the faultiness of reasoning and general bad workmanship entailed by the supposed accomplishment of the endeavour. Although it is important that established truths should be frankly accepted, however inharmonious with previous beliefs, it is equally important that imperfections of theory should be freely acknowledged. The attempt to outrun the gradual growth of knowledge by filling in every hiatus with theoretical explanations is a positive obstruction to the progress of science.

Although the first principles of a science are the first in logical order, they are generally the last in order of discovery. They are arrived at by generalisations of extended experience. They mark the attainment of true scientific inductions, and manifest their correctness by the explanations they are able to afford. They enable ns to discern the coherence of large classes of facts, and give ns the power to forecast a line of sequences whereby we may direct them to the accomplishment of desired ends, or shape our actions to those coming events which are beyond our control. As an instrument of discovery, first principles are of very little value, and, on account of the many chances of error, and of the fascination which the idea of a completed system exercises over the imagination

PREFACE. vii

of great minds, the search after them has been fruitful of error.

The present undertaking, therefore, is to be regarded not as an attack upon the evolutionism of Lamarck, nor as an attack upon the evolutionism of Lyell or Darwin, nor yet upon the evolutionism of Spencer as regards the development of intelligence, but as an attack upon the theory which attempts to combine all these into one continuous process. Moreover, the criticism is not made > upon the ground that such a theory, in the nature of things, cannot be established, but that as yet it is not established, and that in the endeavour towards its accomplishment Mr. Spencer fails. It may even be asserted that there is not anywhere discernible the probable or possible grounds of such an universal connection of sequences.

The writer finds himself in accord with Mr. Spencer in maintaining that any merely materialistic or mechanical interpretation of the universe is beyond question insufficient to account for what we find in it. He is not in accord with him in supposing that the theory of the "double aspect " is intelligible and capable of completing a logical explanation. He is not in accord with him in supposing that mysticism completes explanations partially effected by intelligible methods. And he is not in accord with him in his estimate of what can be accomplished by means of the concrete factors he actually employs, more particularly in the deductions of biology.

So curiously inconsistent is Mr. Spencer's position, as at the same time that of the scientific man giving conviii PREFACE,

Crete explanations of concrete sequences, and that of the mystic basing his explanations on symbolism, that the whole course of the criticism may be taken as a vindication of Mr. Spencer's final conclusion that : —

" Matter, Motion, and Force are but the x, y, and % with which we work our equations, and formulate the various relations among phenomena in such way as to express their order in terms of x, y, and z — though I have shown that the realities for which x, y^ and z stand, cannot be conceived by us as existing thus or thus without committing ourselves to alternative absurdities." ■*

In the predicament thus described we actually find ourselves whenever we pursue to their logical results any of Mr. Spencer's formulas of explanation, if we attach to the terms employed any definite meaning; and in this verdict of the author himself is to be found the most' potent vindication of the course of the present criticism.

The present work may indeed be regarded as undertaken in the interests of the purity of scientific thought, and for the promotion of correct methods of scientific investigation, by showifig the futility of those methods which anticipate the results of study, and by exposing the consequent abuses of logic and of words, more particularly in the employmentof the latter as more than merely representative of certain concrete facts. This, and any actual clearance of imperfect theory, constitute the only claim which the present book may have upon the attention of the student. To the higher claim of positive accomplishment it does not '

PREFACE. ix

aspire. The uses of critiGism are negative only. Nevertheless this subordinate task has its own place in the elucidation of truth.

It is not to be expected that Mr. Spencer should reply to these criticisms. The public will fully appreciate his objections to the controversies attendant upon replies and rejoinders, as well from their unsatisfactory results as from the interruption of work which they entail. The public will fully understand that silence does not imply the lack of any answer to our positions, but that Mr. Spencer is occupied with work having greater claims upon his attention.

CONTEIfTS.

CHAPTEE I

ON MR. spencer's unification OF KNOWLEDGE.

PAGE

\ I. The ITnification of Knowledge as the Main Object of Mr.

Spencer's Works ■ , . . i

} 2. The Form of the Unification of Knowledge * . , . 6

) 3. Mr. Spencer's Unificatory Predicates , , * . . 8

\ 4. The Mystical Methods of the Unification of Knowledge . . 9

I 5, The Psychological Methods of the Unification of Knowledge . 22

I 6, The Metaphysical Methods of the Unification of Knowledge . 30

I 7. The Physical Methods for the Unification of Knowledge . 37 \ 8. An Enumeration of Mr. Spencer's Physical Methods for the

Unification of Knowledge .41

{a) Hypothesis of the Seventy Factors ... 41

(6) Hypothesis of the One Pactor .... 43

i 9. The Supraphysical Methods for the Unification of Knowledge 50

(a) Supraphysical Hypotheses Strictly Considered . 51

(6) Hypotheses Including Feeling .... 53

(c) Other Supraphysical Hypotheses .... 56

(d) The Hypothesis of Three Factors ■ ■ ■ • 59

(e) The Hypothesis of One Factor .... 63 (/) The Hypothesis of Two Factors , ... 70

1 10. The Supraphysical Methods and Mr. Spencer's use of them * 78

i II. The Method of Cumulative Factors . , . , . 79

\ 12. The Symbolic Method for the Unification of Knowledge , 82

] 14. General Summary 89 xii CONTENTS.

Chapter II

REPLY TO MR. SPENCER's CRITICISM.

PAGE

§ I. Justification of Previous Criticism 93

§ 2. Considerations Leading up to a Study of Mr. Spencer's Position as restated by him in the Appendix to " Pirst Principles" 99

(a) On Theories of Knowledge 99

(6) Digression : being an Examination of the Second Chapter of Mill's "Examination of Sir "W. Hamilton's Philosophy," entitled the "Relativity of Human Knowledge " . . . Iio

(c) On Conceptions 117

(d) Mr. Spencer's Scheme as restated in his Appendix

to " First Principles " 121

(e) On the Algebraical Illustration of the Theory that

Knowledge can be Unified by means of the Formulation of the Relations of Factors, the Factors themselves being Unknown . . 130

§ 4. Criticism to which Mr. Spencer has not Replied . , . 143

CHAPTEE III.

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. The Continuity of Motion .145

2. The Ultimate Problem 153

3. Mr. Spencer's Admissions of his Failure to Accoiint for Con-

sciousness 155

4. Does Mr. Spencer Profess to Explain the Universe ? . . 158

CONTENTS. xiii

CHAPTEE IV.

AN EXAMINATION OP THE " PEINOIPLES OF PSTOHOLOGT " WITH REGARD TO ITS POSITION IN THE SYSTEM FOR THE UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

PAGE

§ I. The Psychological Method for the Unification of Knowledge . 163

{a) Study of Part VIL of the " Principles of Psychology" ........ 163

(c) Resumption of the Study of the "Psychology" , 178

{d) The Final Question iSl

(e) Summary of this Section 195

§ 2. The Problem, of the "Psychology," being a Consideration of the Science of Psychology with Regard to its Place in Mr.

Spencer's Constructive Scheme 196

(a) What is Psychology ? 196

(6) What is Evolution ? . . . . . . 204

(c) Digression on Verbal Modes of Identifying Pro-

cesses 205

(d) Psychology Considered as a Direct Deduction

from the Persistence of Force . . . * . 212 (c) Psychology Considered as an Indirect Deduction

through Physical Histories * . . .213 {/) General Considerations with Regard to the Unification of Knowledge ... . . . 21S