Scientific fact and metaphysical reality

Preface

The main object of this work may be described as the furtherance of efforts to bring the developments of science into touch with the point of view of metaphysical thinking. It seems that the present divergence of opinion as to the nature of the universe as a whole is partly due to the very fact that the development of scientific specialism has greatly increased the number of intellectual men. But this tends to produce a separation between those who have the most accurate knowledge of certain types of facts and others who from their training are especially competent to interpret the facts in their relative importance, and from a point of view adequate to their nature as a whole. For we may define metaphysics as the theory of existence as a whole, as contrasted with the scientific investigations which deal with the world in detail. Thus a full knowledge of the functions of all the separate organs of the body would give us no hint as to the direction of its next movement as a whole, which we vaguely, in popular language, describe as controlled by " mind." The present work deliberately introduces concrete details and illustrations derived from science, but no fact is considered except with reference to its bearing on some metaphysical problem. We attempt to be scientific in letter and detail, but metaphysical in spirit and interpretation.

vi PREFACE

There is, no doubt, a vague idea afloat that the metaphysical idealist "shirks the facts of science." This criticism is not really justified in that form, yet the mistaken hint may be of value in a different shape ; hence we have devoted the first chapter to this point. We fully admit that the bright outlook, which is compatible with the idealist view of the universe, must be terribly darkened by a real understanding of the principles underlying biological science in particular. Metaphysicians do not always display such a comprehension, or it often has no proximate connection with their avowed purposes. The situation is perhaps only aggravated by the absence of any direct intellectual collision. The relative strength of alien trends of thought and strains of feeling cannot be thus measured, yet it seems to be no one's business to attempt an amalgamation in order to find out which would predominate in such a fusion. In consequence they have little influence upon each other : at best their representatives politely refer to the necessity of " difi^erent aspects of life," a necessity which may, indeed, be valid, but is hardly a reason for essaying no modification of a tacit antagonism. After all, there have been some evil aspects of existence which have now vanished from the world. In ordinary life may be found many parallels. When the Church is emptied the popular magazines naturally take their turn, the ruling idea of which at present is exactly expressed in the following quotation, which is quite gratuitously Introduced in the middle of an ordinary tale. " It may all be reduced to a simple formula : the instinct to acquire wealth is natural, the ability to do so is genius (Heaven save the mark !), and the accomplishment of it is happiness." In most contributions it is tacitly inculcated by our

PREFACE vii

" husders " that we should worship the strong and the successful, who are frequently, mutato nomine, the comparatively coarse-grained. We are not making the unpractical suggestion that men should not strive to make money. But we protest vehemently against the impudence of the open assertion that this is to provide our ideal and criterion. One might as well judge a man by his capacity for sound digestion, merely because some share of it, as of money, is obviously an essential condition of the higher life. It seems to us that the relation of metaphysics to science is not altogether dissimilar to this, though, of course, there is nothing inferior in the spirit of the latter. Indeed, nothing can be nobler than the characters of those who, without any hope of a happier existence, pursue their ideals to the end. But we wish to bring science and metaphysical idealism into closer connection, not that one " aspect " may abolish the other, but in order that we may become more clear as to which has the intellectual right to pervade and transmute the ultimate significance of the two.

A single example of our method may be quoted. We should start from the biological view that " mind " results mainly from physical structure and environment, and is no independent ego. In Adamson's metaphysical language such a conception is really confirmed as follows : — " The unity of consciousness does not first organise experience, but itself is only possible in and through the knowledge of objective fact." We wish to work out, if practicable, the possibilities of the somewhat isolated fundamental conceptions of the various sciences with reference to the general metaphysical standpoint mainly derived from Plato, Kant, and Hegel. But it is clear that

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PREFACE such an attempt is beset with special difficulties. Science and metaphysics have grown up in complete independence, or even antagonism, yet any one who can really appreciate the love of truth, must sympathise with any effort to formulate a simultaneous use of these two great departments of human intellectual activity. It can hardly be expected that the combination of such discrepant elements should make easy reading. So many qualifications of each statement are needed, if we bear in mind both the scientific and metaphysical aspects of problems, that we can hardly avoid overweighted sentences. Those who are accustomed to expect the lucid and eloquent periods of Herbert Spencer should inquire what is said of his reasoning and analogies by the metaphysicians in the intellectual centres. Summaries are attached to the sections in this work, for we do not wish to omit any means of making our inquiry more lucid. It may also be rendered unfamiliar by the absence of any considerable recognised terminology and methodology built up by previous writers. We have, under such circumstances, a right to expect from an earnest critic that he should discuss the errors of fact, method, and reasoning rather than the inevitable stiffness of style and expression.

We also wish to refer to our attitude towards the anti-Absolutist tendencies among pure metaphysicians, which seem to be gaining considerable strength. It is stated in Personal Idealism that it is not intended to offer a direct refutation of Absolutism, but rather an independent construction. The purely metaphysical question at issue is not the chief goal of the present work, and we confess that the Absolutist or monistic views, so far as we are employing them provisionally,

PREFACE ix

do not seem to us to be affected by these recent criticisms. It is objected therein that human experience is judged from a vague and impossible standpoint, and that the volitional and personal aspect of life is not sufficiently appreciated. We find also that statement, so notoriously dangerous in metaphysics, that Absolutism is not adequate to the facts. The two latter points, however, receive special attention, particularly in the tenth chapter, in which the significance of our realisation of our own personalities becomes the pivot of the discussion. The vagueness of the Absolute is of course well known. But it seems to us that we can admit the logical necessity of monism, while avoiding, for the purposes of the present inquiry, a metaphysical discussion as to the value of " human experience" and the nature of its errors in a cosmic perspective. But we hope that from our earlier chapters, fuU of scientific details, some light may be shed indirectly on this difficulty. Therein we have attempted to work out the possibilities to which a reference was made in Mr. Balfour's late Presidential address to the British Association at Cambridge : "Eyes, ears, and all the mechanism of perception have been evolved in us by the slow operation of Natural Selection, working only through immediate utility. Our organs of sense-perception, upon which are based all intellectual powers, were not given to us for purposes of research ; nor was it to aid us in meting out the heavens or dividing the atom that our powers of calculation and analysis were evolved from the rudimentary instincts of the animal."

The Humanists urge that the unknown conditions, which for the Absolutist invalidate all experience in some degree, are truly irrelevant to many questions.

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X PREFACE

But it seems to us that metaphysical problems are seldom among such questions, and that in the examples quoted by the Humanists the answers are fully valid, just because they do not seriously claim application to the intrinsic nature of the universe as a whole. Again, Mr. Schiller would not be prepared to say that the universe is entirely " plastic," or as we make it ourselves. The Humanists, however, claim that their movement is intrinsically differentiated by reason of its novelty of method, which they assert to be psychologically justified to the exclusion of all others. Such application of a science (psychology), if impartially introduced, would be entirely in our own spirit, but the Humanists do not seem to us at present to have given their views a sufficiently definite shape, or to have clearly repudiated certain presentations of their doctrine, which we should regard as undoubtedly mistaken and tending to chaos. As a matter of psychology also, we doubt whether the original relation of will to idea is as yet satisfactorily elucidated. We have, however, said sufficient on this subject, since it is not in the main line of our inquiry, and we await its further development. It will be found that some work in Personal Idealism is utilised for our own purposes.

The eighth and eleventh chapters deal with subjects which are treated largely on grounds of probability, but in the last a final statement is given of the view taken of our psychophysical organisms, since it is desirable to consider mind not only as it is, but in reference to certain powers which it possibly exhibits some indications of acquiring. In these chapters, especially the last, which are of a less technical character, there are also introduced at intervals some

PREFACE

XI reflections on the bearing of the metaphysical views upon subjects of more popular interest.

We must express our thanks to various scientific friends for suggestions of facts relevant to the inquiry, and especially to Mr. Charles Singer for his help in the discussion of biological problems. It may be thought that it is not possible for one man, however assisted, to utilise and select from the vast range of scientific knowledge for such a purpose as ours. This criticism, whether justifiable or otherwise, will be considered in detail in the first chapter.

Winchester, August 1904..

CONTENTS CHAPTER I

Contrast of permanent elements in science and metaphysics — Metaphysics and verification by reference to " fact "—Metaphysical criterion of self-contradiction can be combined with scientific accuracy in detail — Nature of scientific knowledge necessary to metaphysics — Science and metaphysics ideally inseparable — The present method, processes of activity, not entities, to be discussed — Essential elements of a useful definition of any fundamental conception— Effect of changes in scientific conceptions upon metaphysics — Degree of scientific detail necessary — Preference of activities to entities as subject-matter ; the former, under certain conditions, can be applied both to mind and matter — Recapitulation — No solutions of purely scientific problems involved — Illustration of the necessity of the present method through consideration of other types of thought — Prejudice induced by the material successes of applied science — Herbert Spencer's criticism of metaphysics — His philosophy mainly a history of the universe — Haeckel — Positivism — Recapitulation of remarks on philosophy " based upon science " — Certain modifications of pure metaphysics — Pragmatism — Isolated works by professors of special sciences — Pure metaphysics and its later developments — Metaphysics actually uses undeveloped scientific material . . Page i

Chapter II

Irrelevance of certain types of criticism — Problem of finite matter in infinite ether — Two types of infinite ether have existed on probable physical evidence — Abstract conception of the infinite xiv CONTENTS

is therefore too vague — Bearing of genetic psychology on the subject — Forms of the mind, or modes of all its apprehension, stereotyped in evolution long before such a problem could be even conceived — Comparison essential to all apprehension, sensuous or intellectual — Comparison implicit or explicit merely according to the relative size of the bodies with which it is concerned — Comparing and stereotyping forms of the mind are now inevitable to its activity — ^Their probable origin- — Evidence from the protozoa and the metazoa — Forms of the mind coincident with the forms of the activities of the " body," long before " mind " is explicit at all — Discussion of the forms of the mind should precede discussion either of mind or matter — Ordinary mode of comparison by concentration of attention on a sharply defined object in a vague background — Application to apprehension of ether as infinite — Importance of the fact that mind does not appear except in bodies of a certain size — Perception of the blue sky and conception of ether beyond a finite atmosphere — Earliest forms of mind best regarded as totalised activity in contrast to the atomic activities of physics and chemistry, involving a higher unit and an additional relation with the external — Forms of the mind express both the mental and vital aspects of the organism — Pure metaphysics has expressed the same in abstract terms — Central unity characteristic of mind is at first only apparent in motion-as-a-whole of the organism — Relation of knowledge to being ; the external world is apprehended as far as possible as though constructed on the principle which in the percipient being we call organic — Ether infinite because not admitting of being thus apprehended — Comparing and stereotyping forms applicable to sensation, perception, and conception alike, and inevitable in practical life, though challenged in the moral and intellectual activities — Difficulties of eternity in a higher degree insoluble than those of infinity, for intellectual activity is itself a temporal series . . Page 41

Chapter III

Three senses in which a ball might be regarded as individuated ; suitability to our special purposes — Liability to easy separation from environment — Capacity for acting as a whole — Contrast between action-as-a-whole of a ball and an organism — Question of physical individuality occurs only through observation 01 motion — Incompleteness of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities — Distinction underlying the separation of physics and chemistry, though not absolute, is relevant to the

CONTENTS XV

metaphysical problem of physical individuation — Some degree of justification for regarding the physical properties as existence and the ch«mical as qualities — Importance of the scientifically ascertained fact, that physical existence is not found apart from motion, is obscured by the forms of the mind — Problem of the meaning of the existence of matter in geological epochs before mind appeared to apprehend it — Mind on its appearance deals rather with the individuation than the existence of matter — Chemical and physical forces representative of diiFerent degrees of material organisation, wfhich seems synonymous with degrees of material existence — Molar changes would never have suggested this distinction to the eye — The electron as ultimate physical existence partly unsatisfactory, hence the advantage of discussing physical individuation rather than existence — Mere apprehension of changes, forces, and motions is a tacit admission that existence is not fully grasped — Contrast between physical individuation by theory of molecules and atoms with individuation of familiar objects by colours, sounds, etc. — Dependence of individuation by colour, etc., on a particular development of the senses — The senses respond only to certain of the physical forces — Illustration from a crimson rose — All parts of the universe contribute to its apprehension — Only combinations of physical entities are appreciable to the senses — Comparison of the crimson rose with molecules and atoms — Superiority of the atom in so far as it "explains" the observed changes, but change itself is ultimately a confession of failure — Physical forces can be active, when not actual as forces ; colours are actual or nothing — From the point of view of Nature, taken separately, the atom is a truer individual than the crimson rose, which results from our own ambiguous position — Result — Degree of material organisation exhibited in physics and chemistry, and corresponding to strictly physical individuation, is relevant to metaphysical problems of mind and the Absolute ....... Page 70

Chapter IV

This subject regarded for our purpose.s as one aspect of the earliest conditions under which mind appears — Ambiguities of the existence as opposed to the activities of mind — For mind and matter substitute temporarily and analyse the activities of the various physical objects and organisms — By considering types of activity in place of mental existence, we avoid the necessity of dating the beginning of mind — Life as a certain series of xvi CONTENTS

chemical activities — Vital individuation contrasted writh that of ordinary objects of the senses, and that of molecule or atom — Insufficiency of a particular internal interrelation as a description of life — ^Analysis of the conception of life as a selective series of chemical changes — Ordinary chemical action is selective in one sense — Vital individuation regarded as involving a more specialised relation to a limited portion of the external in addition to the ordinary physical and chemical relation — Life from a physical standpoint — Regarded as a particular chemical series, easily interfered with by singlechemical unions of an alien character — And as a particular type of motion as a whole of no physical significance — This is for us the beginning of mind — Intrinsic relativity of chemical and physical properties to those in other bodies ; vital q^ualities must be similarly treated — Illustration from inertia of matter — Primitive organisms regarded in reference to the atomic activities of their parts are " vital " ; in reference to their activity as a whole are potentially " mental " — By thus avoiding life and mind we can describe the universe as individuated by various types of activity which have elements in common, and thus give a basis for reasoning — Mind for human introspection, however, is not at present included, but only so far as it involves nothing more than a special activity as a whole of the organism — One-sidedness of the vital relation due to the fact that in life a serial process, not a single display of activity, is maintained — Nature of protoplasmic activity according to biological investigations — Cosmic forces produce no final material organisation or centrality — Mind is based upon a series of changes working on a fixed principle — Requiring a very complex physical organisation, which is easily upset, it could not persist unless based on the actual changes — Recapitulation ....... Page 98

Chapter V Formation Of Mind

Mind as an observed reality apparently separate from matter occurs

only in introspection ; otherwise it is active, but not actual

Various stages of the evolution of mental activity — Before introspection occurs, mind is best described as the relation of the organism to other objects taken as wholes — The truer distinction is not between mind and matter, but between an entity having relations with the external only and with what it regards as itself— Main problem : the reason for the differentiation of mind into conscious and sub-conscious activities

CONTENTS xvii

Struggle for existence tends to develop sensatory capacities on the surface of the body — The senses, for practical value, should not apprehend the myriad ethereal or other vibrations singly — Dangerous objects can pnly be localised by reference to harmless ones, yet attention must be concentrated on the former — Such localisation is temporal as well as spatial— When by its actions an organism shows that it learns by experience, differentiation of the conscious and the sub-conscious is achieved — Consequent essential partiality of mind ; any flash of consciousness for us is an arbitrary selection from the stream of external vibrations apprehended as indivisible. In conceptual reasoning this partiality is emended late in evolution, but emotion and sensation retain it — The production of mind by the " material " world is as significant in reference to the nature of the latter as the mechanical activity of physics — Purpose in the separate parts of Nature an absurd problem — Psychological relation of the sub-conscious to the conscious illustrates the problem of the universal and the particular in pure metaphysics — The sub-conscious indicates that the natural sciences, taken alone, do not fully describe matter — The conscious is the organisation and making finite of an indefinite potentiality of matter. Comparison of the relations of matter and ether — Reason while correcting the results of mind's apprehending cannot alter the forms by which mind apprehends, but only exhibit their inadequacy — Thought and reality unseparated in the spermatozoon, as in the Absolute, but with other differences — Criticism of the use of the potential — Distinction between matter together with mind as far as acting mechanically, and mind as teleologically active superior to distinction between mind and matter — Error of the sub-conscious " entity " or self — Psychological nature of consciousness dependent on continuous change at a rate determined by external conditious acting on a body of a particular size — Recapitulation ...... Page 124.

Chapter VI

Advantages of a provisional materialistic description of mind before introspection occurs — Vindication of the term " transcend " and concrete illustration — Pain and introspection — Acceptance of the double-aspect theory in principle — Illustration of the " material image " of apprehended objects as the external term of the teleological relation — ^The material image or mantle of totality is the prototype of visual imagery, and is the first xviii CONTENTS

product of mind, the externaliser or objectifier — Quality and quantity in connection with the material image and the forms of the mind — Statement of the problem of psychophysical interaction in terms according with the present method — Totalised activity of the brain cannot alter its atomic activities ; there is need of some additional atomic activity — The living organism is such that the least quantity of atomic energy, transferred from without, as by ethereal vibrations, can ultimately act as a lever — In the case of introspection, which only occurs late in evolution, some parts of the brain play the necessary r61e of " external " to other parts — Thus the " conscious will " cannot control all the somatic functions, for it becomes differentiated as such only by losing control over some of them — Problem of the method of guidance of such externally derived energy — Biological priority of the attractional relation over the evasional — The choice is not between attraction and evasion but between attraction and its inhibition by any other causes — This inhibition is possible owing to the fact that the original protoplasmic mass is presently differentiated, and it becomes possible for totalised portions writhin it to act mechanically in contrast to its teleological activity as a whole — Thus a certain retrogression occurs in the type of activity exhibited by totalised portions of the organism especially connected with the motor apparatus. Similarly, large portions of organisms are non-living — Psychological illustration of the priority of the attractional relation over the evasional . . Page 147

Chapter VII

Pure metaphysics has usually considered mind in man only — Neither mind as it is objectified for psychological introspection, nor the material atom, as existing for physics, is full reality — With advancing development, the externalising or objectifying character essential to sentient beings, who are not the whole, causes them to objectify a new aspect of themselves. This is the psychical stream, the subject-matter of psychology — Governed by the same mental forms, it appears as a number of discrete ideas, etc., as the material world consists for us of discrete objects— Ambiguous character of the psychical stream, due to long habit of material objectification — ^Why is the psychical stream especially regarded as the self? — Personality developed by contrast, and its essence is the omission of parts of the available mental content — Pain in the first instance at least is involved in such a contrast — Anthropological evidence Con-

CONTENTS xix

trast of " mental " and " physical " pain : Why is the former felt in the region of the heart ? — Reference of such pain to the heart exemplifies the externalising forms of the totalised activity of the organism, whether self-conscious or otherwise — Comparison of mental and physical pain experienced in the same region ; their meaning and effects — Bradley's analytical criticism of the empirical self is also genetically inevitable — Psychical stream preferred to the physical body as the self, since it is less exposed to that which is experienced as external limitations — Illustration from " demoniac possessions " and obsessions — Further differentiation of the ideal self — Psychical stream at present is the result partly of half-formed character, partly of mere contiguity of events in space and time — Implicit self-consciousness of the savage — Recapitulation and first contrast of .mind with the Absolute . . . Page 178

Chapter VIII

Conclusion of the genetic treatment of the subject — Illustration from the relation of metaphysics to the historical aspects of religion — Meaning of mind, as illustrated by " mental " pain in contrast with the " senses " — Ideal instincts are those which correspond with wider totalisations, spatial and temporal, than are directly needed in the struggle for physical existence — ^The ideal and the strenuous life — Ideal instincts in various ways all tend to unity — Laws of Nature, moral ideals, and Esthetic canons of taste — Analytical contrast of the ideal and the biological instincts — Criticism of the morality of the dog, the bee, and human traditional codes — Illustration of the relation of the ideal to the biological instincts in the passion of love — Analysis of the meaning of instinct — Knowledge of the origin of life is not absolutely necessary for solving this difiiculty in part — Application of pure metaphysics ; a differentiated whole, whose totality is not merely the sum of its parts, is in one sense a true existence as such — If such a whole is dependent on external conditions, unlike the Absolute, and thus experiences time and change, its existence necessarily exhibits itself as the self-preserving instinct, namely as an activity upon the external, for activity involves succession, time, and change — Each instinct in turn, originating as a means to some end, necessitated by external conditions, is presently mechanised and stereotyped as an end in itself — Illustration from the sexual instinct and Sully's work on Laughter — Finally, the ideal instincts are stereotyped, making possible a

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mental relation to the universe as a whole — Problem of the reality of the progress of mind — Instincts hitherto have always been developed in reference to some existing object — If the ideal instincts have an object, it is the Absolute in its various aspects, since their relation is a universal one — The universal relation of the ideal instincts could only be expressed in us as willingness and effort, since mind itself is a temporal series — It is intrinsic in the universality of the ideal instincts that their activities, unlike the self-preserving and sexual instincts, do not interfere with similar activities in others — Recapitulation : instincts evolved before the appearance of self-conscious reflection should be regarded as inevitable cosmic activities intrinsic in certain degrees of cosmic organisation, just as iron cannot be imagined scientifically without certain physical and chemical properties or activities — Remarks on the apparent collision of the ideal instincts, " heart " and " brain " popularly — Statement of the exact conditions under which the ideal instincts might be regarded as valid in their claim to represent ultimate reality and discussion of the argument that we could not even form an "idea" of that which does not exist in some sense . Page 197

Chapter IX Ether, Matter, And Mind

Final comparison and its purpose — Various descriptions of matter — A conception which would apply both to mind and matter must be highly abstract — Plurality is intrinsic in finite matter, as apprehended by us — The apparent infinity of ether and the plurality of finite material bodies are essentially complementary to each other and equally due to the forms of the mind — Is plurality equally intrinsic in mind? — Discussion of social development and of mental solitude — Late in evolution higher minds become capable of solitude realised as such in some degree — Plurality is not intrinsic in the mental as in the material sphere — Every manifestation of consciousness intrinsically consists of a number of sub-sensations, etc., acting as a whole, though not experienced separately as mental events at all — Comparison with Platonic view of the simplicity of the soul — Illustration from mental pain — Totalised activity is intrinsic in mind, but is accidental in matter, science always working by reduction to atoms— The entire physical world also cannot be active as a whole, which would be incompatible with infinity or incompleteness— Thus a common ground for a direct comparison of mind and matter is obtained, from which it

CONTENTS xxi

appears that there is no absolute distinction, but they are factors in one process — ^Application of the scientific evidence to the metaphysical conception of ultimate unity — Existence of this unity, which is not necessarily synonymous with God, to this extent is not unknowable ; the nature of its special relation to ourselves can be illustrated from the relation now described of mind to matter — Recapitulation and result : to exist for oneself (partly illustrated in self-consciousness), to transcend, and to be capable of exhibiting relations, which are universal in scope but unique in type, are synonymous ....... Page 235