... Sir William Hamilton

Front matter

M University Library ... Sir William Hamilton / by W.H.S. lUlon

The date shows when this \o\Jt was taken.

All books not in us^ for instruction or research are limited to foi^r weeks to all bor.- rowers.'

Preface

sidered imperative, of demolishing all previous systems of Philosophy before they commence the work of constructing their own. Of this work of destruction little will be found in these volumes; we propose to lay stress on what a Philosopher did rather than on what he undid. In the summary will be found a general survey of the main criticisms that have been passed upon the views of the Philosopher who forms the subject of the work, and in the bibliographic appendix the reader will be directed to sources of more detailed criticism than the size and nature of the volumes in the Series would permit. The lives of Philosophers are not, as a rule, eventful, the biographies will consequently be brief. It is hoped that the Series, when complete, will supply a comprehensive History of English Philosophy. It will include an Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, by Professor H. Sidgwick.

OXFOED, Nov., 1880,

Appendix

Hamiltonian Litebatuee 165

Glossaey of Philosophical Teems ....»• J68

Cornell University Library

The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text.

SIE WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Chapter I. Biogeaphical And Introductory

Sir William Hamilton was born at Glasgow in the year 1788. His birth took place in the College where his father, Dr. William HamiltoHj filled the chair of Anatomy and Botany, which had formerly been occupied by his grandfather, Dr. Thomas Hamilton. He received the names of William Stirling, the latter being his mother^'s family name ; but he dropped the Stirling soon after coming ot age, and it .-ippears for the last time when he passed his final ezamination at Oxford in 1810. He was only two years old when his father died at the early age of thirty-two, leaving his widow and two children — the future philosopher, and a younger brother named Thomas, who afterwards entered the army and attained some distinction in the department of literature. Dr. Hamilton appears to have left his family sufficiently (though probably not handsomely) provided for, and Sir William and his brother received an excellent education. He succeeded to the family baronetcy in 1799, but no estate accompanied the title, his right to which was only proved (with considerable trouble and expense) thirteen or fourteen years later ; so that during his school and college days he was known as plain William Hamilton. He con-

B

S/R WILLIAM HAMILTON.

tinued to reside in Glasgow after liis father's death until the year 1801, when he was sent to school in England, having previously it seems attended the Junior Greek and Latin classes of the University at the age of twelve. The figure of the venerable Reid, whose works he was destined to edit long afterwards, was no doubt familiar to him during early childhood, but the philosophy of Reid and Stewart appears to have been little studied at Glasgow until after he left that University. Notwithstanding his attendance at the classes mentioned, he does not appear to have entered the University of Glasgow until after his return from England in 1803. He then distinguished himself in the department of Logic and Moral Philosophy, and it is worth noticing that Reid's successor — Professor Mylne — under whom he studied, was a Sensationalist in Psychology and an Utilitarian in Ethics. Hamilton's subsequent hostility to these theories cannot therefore be ascribed to early training, and judging from the fact that he records the purchase of Reid's works in one of his letters while at Oxford, it would appear that he was not previously acquainted with that author. Being intended for the medical profession like his father and grandfather, his studies were naturally directed to that object, and in particular he devoted a good deal of time to Chemistry, the only physical science (except Physiology) with which he seems to have had much acquaintance, and which undoubtedly coloured (among other things) his theory of causation. After going to Edinburgh to pursue his medical studies, his mother decided to send him to Oxford, and he entered that University as a student of Balliol College in 1807. He obtained a Snell Exhibition — a prize instituted by a Scotchman for the purpose of assisting deserving youths of his own country to take Degrees at the leading English University — and by refraining from any considerable expenditure, except on books, his

University career did not prove an expensive one. He does not seem to have become acquainted with many of the Oxford students (then unusually numerous) who made names for themselves in after-life, and excejit his countryman Lockhart, the names of his associates mentioned by his biographer call for no remark. As in one of his letters, however, he takes up the cause of Mr. Copleston rather warmly in his controversy with the Edinburgh Review, we may perhaps assume that he came to a certain extent under the influence of the man to whom the revival of Logic as a study at Oxford has chiefly been ascribed. He was undoubtedly a hard reader, and the number of books which he took up for his final examination in Literis Humani- ■oribus was regarded as unprecedented. They were mainly philosophical, and included almost all the writings of Aristotle, together with the philosophical works of Cicero ; but his books were certainly more numerous than his authors. His name appears in the First Class : but as the names in that class are printed alphabetically and not in order of merit, we are unable to ascertain the precise position which he occupied as regards his contemporaries, none of whom subsequently attained any remarkable distinction. He was not elected to a Fellowship at Balliol College, but that may have been owing to the disfavour with which Scotchmen were regarded at the time. He evidently acquired a high reputation at Oxford as a student of philosophy, but his attainments in that department were only tested indirectly by means of an examination in Greek and Latin philosophical works — the former limited to Aristotle and the latter to Cicero.

Leaving Oxford in 1811 (except for occasional visits) Sir William Hamilton changed his intended profession, and became an Advocate in the year 1813. His success at the Scottish bar was not brilliant, but there seems uo reason to doubt that if he had devoted his attention to his profession

B 2

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

he would have earned a respectable livelihood. Reading, however, seems to have been his chief oecupatioUj and in this respect the Advocates' Library had great attractions for him. He had become a book collector at a very early age, and his private library was already attaining considerable dimensions. In 1820 the Professorship of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh became vacant by the death of Dr. Brown, who had latterly been the colleague of Stewart. Hamilton does not appear to have been acquainted with Brown, though he had resided in Edinburgh since his call to the bar, and it seems to have been on the occasion of his present candidature that he first met Stewart. The appointment rested with the Town Council of Edinburgh. Mr. MacVey Napier, afterwards editor of the Edinhnrgh Review, was at first a caTididate with the support of Stewart, but does not seem to have persevered in his canvass: and the contest lay between Hamilton and John Wilson, better known in the literary world as Christopher North. Hamilton was a Whig, and Wilson was a Tory ; and as the latter party preponderated in the Town Council, Wilson proved the successful competitor. That the world would have gained much by the election of Hamilton cannot be doubted, but I think the Town Council has been unduly censured for its choice. Hamilton had hitherto published nothing. His prize at Glasgow sixteen years before had been awarded by his fellowstudents to a boy in his teens, while his Oxford distinction had been mainly won by his classical knowledge. He had been for several years a practising Advocate, and there was nothing to show (so far as I am aware) that during that period he had been an active student of philosophy. Wilson's philosophical credentials were probably not of a high order, but he was a man of undoubted ability. The selection was certainly not the worst instance of party-spirit that has occurred with respect to such appointments, nor perhaps are they much purer in the hands of the Government than of a Town Council. Hamilton and Wilson were friends, and the incident did not interrupt their friendship ; while many years afterwards Sir William took an opportunity of making a complimentary allusion to Wilson in his own Lectures.'

Soon after this, Hamilton was appointed to the chair of History in the University of Edinhurgh, the emoluments of which post only amounted to 100/. a year, and he also received a small law appointment as Solicitor of Teinds. He appears to have abandoned his practice at the bar and lived with his mother and his cousin. Miss Marshall, reading and making additions to his library, and occasionally astonishing casual visitors by the extent of his erudition. Phrenology had at this period become fashionable in Edinburgh under the auspices of Mr. George Combe. Hamilton made a great number of researches on the skulls of men and other animals (including some experiments on live animals) with the view of testing its pretensions, and afterwards published the result of his inquiries, which were decidedly adverse to the theories of Gall and Spurzheim. A summary of these researches appears in an appendix to the first volume of his Lectures, and if we may judge by them Hamilton would have proved a successful student of Physiology had he been able to devote more time to that science. He retained his interest in it undiminished up to the last ; and while his investigations possess the interest of being his earliest publication, I am not aware that his results have ever been displaced.

During the period subsequent to 1820, Hamilton seems to have become better acquainted with Stewart, and in a letter of the latter which is extant he acknowledges his indebtedness to Hamil-

' Lect. ii. p. 382. This passage, if not this whole Lecture, must have been written as late as 1854.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

ton for " much curious and valuable information about the later philosophers of Germany, whose merits and defects he seems to me to have appreciated with great candour and discrimination. -"^ If, however, this " curious and valuable information ■" was that which Stewart published a few years afterwards in his Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy, the incident does not redound very much to Hamilton's credit. Stewart, however, in the course of that Dissei tation, only refers to him on one occasion when alluding to Eschenbach, who unmistakably anticipated Sir William Hamilton's subsequent doctrine of Natural Realism, though Hamilton himself ascribes it to no modern philosopher except Poiret and Reid (with the possible addition of Sergeant).' Tliis doctrine evidently puzzled Stewart, who could not make up his mind as to whether Eschenbach was " right or wrong." I may here remark that Professor Veitch, in his Memoir, tells us that it appears from Hamilton's Common Place Book, that he had adopted the doctrine of Natural Realism, in all its essentials, as early as 1823, and therefore previous to the publication of Stewart'.s Dissertation ; but Stewart refers to him merely as the source of a curious piece of literary information and not as an authority on philosophy.

Sir William Hamilton's mother died in the year 1827, and two years later the future philosopher married Miss Marshall, the cousin who had resided with him and his mother for several years before her death. The union proved a happy one, though many ladies would have objected to the continual work as her husband's amanuensis, which Lady Hamilton cheerfully underwent. That she had much to do with his subsequent distinctions seems to be admitted, and I suspect it was in no small degree owing to her influence that the recluse student became an author for substantially the first time, six months after his ' Stewart's Works, i. pp. 584-6. Hamilton's Edition.

marriage, and when he had passed his fortieth year. The immediate cause of his coming before the public, however, was the appointment of his friend, Mr. MacVey Napier, as editor of the Edinburgh Review in succession to Lord Jeffrey, in 1829. Napier insisted on Hamilton's supplying an article for the first number of the Review which came out under his auspices, and the result was his famous Discussion on the Unconditioned, which revealed to Continental thinkers the unsuspected existence in this country of a great philosopher, who could look beyond the narrow confines of Great Britain. M. Cousin, against whom the article was chiefly directed, conceived the warmest feelings of admiration and respect for its author, with whom he soon after entered into correspondence, and in whose behalf he exerted himself to the utmost when the Chair of Logic in the University of Edinburgh became vacant. The friendship of the two philosophers, indeed, lasted up to Hamilton's death. This Discussion was followed by another on the Theory of Perception in 1830, and a third on Logic in 1833; and Hamilton likewise contributed a large number of articles on other subjects to the Edinburgh Review from 1829 to 1836, in which he showed himself particularly zealous in the cause of University Reform, and the admission of Dissenters to the Universities. It may here be remarked that Hamilton was an attached member of the Church of Scotland, in whose subsequent troubles he took much interest, and was always a sincere and consistent believer in Christianity. In politics he was a Liberal, and he adhered to his political views with such firmness as to estrange some of the most intimate of his early friends — for instance Lockhart. With Wilson, however, he always continued on good terms, although they were rival candidates for a chair of philosophy, which seems to have been in a great measure disposed of on political grounds.

S/R WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Hamilton had completed his forty-eighth year before his appointment to a chair of philosophy, and even then three or four articles in the Edinhurgh Review were the only contributions to that science to which he could point as credentials. ilow much more he might have accomplished if he had received the appointment earlier, it is vain to speculate; but it is perhaps the prevailing fault of all Academical patrons to select a middle-aged or elderly man who has already made a reputation, rather than a young man who gives every indication that he is prepared to make one whenever an opening presents itself. We cannot regret that such a choice was ultimately made in Hamilton''s case ; but the result was that the real scope of his philosophical activity was limited to a period of eight years, and after that period the paralytic man, who tottered down to read the lectures which he had written years before, would, if those eight years had proved less fruitful, have almost afforded a caution against such appointments for the future. Dr. Ritchie resigned the chair of Logic in the University of Edinburgh in I806. Hamilton's principal opponent was Mr. Isaac Taylor of Ongar, who, like Wilson, had displayed great ability in other departments, but had no special qualifications for the vacant professorship. Hamilton was elected by eighteen votes to fourteen ; but he received the chair, which was not a very valuable one, subject to the condition of paying Dr. Ritchie 100/. a year for the rest of his life — a serious deduction to one whose family was rapidly increasing.

During the first session Hamilton wrote his Lectures on Metaphysics almost in the form in which they were published after his death. He had contracted that habit of procrastination which often accompanies the consciousness of unusual power, and many of these lectures only received the author's final corrections and alterations immediately before they were delivered. He often sat up almost the whole of the preceding night, husied in preparation, Lady Hamilton sitting up with him, and acting as his amanuensis. Written under such circumstanc(5s, the Lectures can hardly be regarded as finished expositions of his philosophical views ; yet, from the fact that they were delivered almost unaltered for nearly twenty years, we may conclude that they contain a reliable statement of the substance of the Hamiltonian doctrine. The Lectures on Logic were composed during the next session. The author considered them much more finished, as well as more valuable than those on Metaphysics, but posterity will, I think, reverse the verdict. They were in many instances prepared under the same pressure as their predecessors, and translations from Krug and Esser were often used to supply the unfinished portions of the author's ' sketches. He seems to have become aware at an early period that anything more recondite than these lectures would not be intelligible to his audience, and consequently to have resolved on bringing a detailed exposition of his system before the public in a different form. For this purpose he chose an edition of the works of Reid — a philosopher to whom, on the whole, he paid more deference than any other, with the possible exception of Aristotle. The selection of such a form of exposition was unfortunate, and circumstances aggravated the evil. First, he quarrelled with his intended publisher, and not having selected another, he got the work stereotyped as far as it had then been printed — thus precluding all correction, or reconciliation of his earlier and later views. Then followed a quarrel with the Town Council of Edinburgh about his lectures, which occupied much of his time, and prevented him from delivering a second and more advanced course of lectures. Then came the death of his brother, to whom he was greatly attached, and the threatened disruption of the Scottish Church, which he laboured hard to avert; and,

I o SIR WILL I A M HA MIL TON.

iinally, when the work was still incomplete, a paralytic stroke almost deprived him of the use of his right side for the rest of his life. This calamity overtook him i-n the year 1844.

Hamilton's mental faculties were still unimpaired, but he evidently lacked his former energy after his partial recovery, and, moreover, we hear of repeated illnesses from this period until his death, whereas he had formerly been remarkable for strength and activity, as well as for general good health. In 1846 he published his unfinished edition of the works of Reid, one of his supplementary dissertations breaking off in the middle of a sentence. It was never completed; and the materials which his editors collected and published after his death probably form but a small portion of what before his illness he intended to add. The work, however, even as it stands, is one of marvellous labour and research, and though not always containing the author's latest views, is that to which his disciples usually refer as the best exposition of his system. All idea of revising or altering his lectures, except by occasional oral interpolations, was now abandoned, and neither of the works which he announced as preparing for publication at the end of this edition of Reid ever appeared. How much of what he subsequently published was written before 1844, it is difficult to ascertain; but his later publications, in any event, were not extensive. In 1852 he republished his Discussions from the Edinburgh Review, with additions and alterations, and shortly before his death he published an edition of the works of Stewart, in brincrino- out which, however, he confined himself to the task of an editor, and added very few philosophical annotations. He still lectured to full classes, using his old lectures, and the effijrt of delivery having become painful, these were not unfrequently read by an assistant. He died very shortly after the close of the Academical Session of 1856, after a brief illness ; but his

BIOGRAPHICAL AND INTRODUCTORY, ii

health appears to have heen continually becoming worse since his terrible attack in 1844. Latterly he enjoyed a small pension from the Civil List ; but he was never in affluent circumstances, and it required great care on the part of himself and Lady Hamilton to bring up his family respectably, while making the additions to his library, which formed almost his sole personal expenditure. His eldest son entered the army some years before his death, and the philosopher seems to have watched over him with almost more than parental solicitude.

Hamilton was much loved by his pupils, and to all who came to him for information he was kind and condescending. His temper, however, was imperious. He was impatient of opposition, and being an ardent reformer, was pretty often opposed; but he was more frequently engaged in a quarrel with some public body than with private individuals. He had all the waywardness of genius, and such were his eccentricities in connexion with his famous articles in the Edinburgh Review, that his connexion with that periodical would probably have terminated even independently of his appointment to the chair of Logic. He would at the last moment send in an article far exceeding the limits agreed upon, thus compelling the editor to exclude something else to make room for it, while from the time of its arrival it was impossible to modify its language where the editor deemed it too strong. Afterwards, under the pressure of his infirmity (which he otherwise bore with great fortitude), his temper seems to have become more acrimonious, and those who ventured to enter into controversy with him had no pleasant time of it. He was, however, always a strictly honourable, and sometimes even a generous opponent, and he enjoyed the respect and esteem not only of his friends, but of the public np to the last ; and if

" He can't be wrong whose life is in the right," we have a strong testimony to the correctness of the Hamiltonian theory.

Something has been already said of the extent of Hamilton's reading. He was from his early years an ardent student of classical literature, and his subsequent speculations were no doubt largely influenced by this fact, and by his having been sent to comiDlete his education at the University of Oxford, where the writings of Aristotle were then held in high esteem. Hamilton's studies, however, soon extended far beyond the limits of the Oxford curriculum. Not content with the works of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, he turned with avidity to those of the Schoolmen, and thence to those of the modern Continental philosophers. The Scottish School had hitherto attached too little importance to the writings of its predecessors and foreign contemporaries. Hamilton undoubtedly went into the opposite extreme. lu turning over his pages we might frequently imagine that we were reading some curious volume of anti- -quariau research, rather than a treatise on a science by a professed expositor. His philosophical erudition has probably never been equalled, but it was far too vast to be accurate. It would be difficult to name a philosophical author whose system he had thoroughly mastered, with two exceptions — Aristotle and Reid. If he erred in any respect in his exposition of these writers, it was not from want of acquaintance with their works, but from his desire to assimilate their systems to his own. But even as regards Stewart, I think he cannot always be acquitted of errors of another kind.

His great erudition had another ill effect. When about to write on any subject, he consulted so many authors, and made •60 many extracts, that the work soon extended beyond all reasonable dimensions, and unless compelled by the pressure of necessity (as in the ease of his lectures) to give the results to the world, he ultimately became disheartened, and abandoned the effort in despair. There can be no doubt that if he had read less he would have produced more, and with his powerful intellect I doubt if his productions would even have beea deteriorated in quality. I venture to suggest one more bad consequence arising from the peculiar bent of his studies. His wonderful acquaintance with Formal Logic led him almost invariably to seek for some logical fallacy in an opponent's argument, and when he hit upon a careless expression (arising, perhaps, from a studied disregard of the technicalities of Logic), he imagined he had found it, whereas a more careful examination would have shown him that all appearance of logical irregularity could have been got rid of while leaving the argument intact. The truth is that investigators very seldom really fall into any logical fallacy, though disputants often do so.

Hamilton's latest philosophical writings published in his life-time are to be found in the Appendices to the last edition of his Discussions. After his death his editors published all the materials for his edition of Reid which they could collect, and also his Lectures ; and some of his very latest contributions to philosophy — found on his desk after his death — are printed as Appendices to the latter. The Lectures are the only part of his works that can be regarded as in any sense complete, and even they obviously fall short of his original design — partly owing, no doubt, to his quarrel with the Town Council. Most of his logical theories, too, occurred to him after the Lectures on Logic were written. He has left no systematic exposition of his philosophy, and his readers must be satisfied to make the most of the materials he has left. But the imperfect is often more suggestive than the complete, and the real student of philosophy will not, perhaps.

regard the state ia which Hamilton's works have come down to us with unmingled regret.

The fundamental principles of the Hamiltonian Philosophy may, I think, be thus enumerated: — 1st, His theory of External Perception, or Natural Realism ; 2nd, His doctrine of Native, Necessary or a priori Truths, and the tests by which they can be discovered; 3rd, His law of the Conditioned, including its application to the Principle of Causality; and, 4th, His consequent views concerning the impossibility of knowing the Absolute and the Infinite. I do not include his doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge,' of which so much has been said. So much of that doctrine as is relevant and characteristic of Hamilton falls, in my opinion, under the remaining heads, as is also the case with his polemic against the Association Psychology.

' But surely it is competent to a philosopher to maintain the relativity of our knowledge of the external world without limiting himself to the " one special relation " of cause and effect which Mr. Mill insists on.

CPIAPTER II.

THE EXTERNAL WORLD — NATURAL REALISM.

It is perhaps by his solution of the problem of the existence •of Matter — by his Natural Realism — that Sir William Hamilton is best known. The question had long previously attracted the attention of Philosophers.

All men naturally believe in an external world ; but when the reasons of this belief came to be inquired into, the answers given have often been very unsatisfactory. All men, it has been alleged, naturally believed that the sun, moon, and stars, went round the earth every twenty-four hours; but when the grounds of this belief came to be examined, it was found to be an illusion arising from the rotation of the earth upon its own axis. Many philosophers arrived at the conclusion that the belief in an external world is a similar illusion. Nothing existed, they said, but minds and their various states of feeling. Sensations and other feelings succeeded each other according to certain laws, but these laws did not imply the existence of anything but minds, and we had no reason to believe that anything else existed. The best known advocate of this doctrine in modern times was Berkeley, and his denial of the external world was the source of almost all modern speculation on the subject. Hume carried Berkeley's theory farther, and applied it to subvert the substantial reality of Mind as well of Matter. Reid, startled by the i6 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

deductions of Hume, abanddied the doctrine of Berlceley which he had at one time accepted, and argued strenuously in favour of an external world. He was followed by Stewart, but vigorously assailed by Brown, who, however, continued to declare his belief in an external world, while rejecting almost all his master's arguments in its favour. Meanwhile Hume had roused Kant to speculation in Germany, and was perhaps the true originator of the English School of Philosophers which seeks to explain the belief in an external world as a natural illusion arising from the operation of the principle of Association of Ideas on original sensations — sensations which they describe as mental feelings and nothing more. In this state Sir W. Hamilton found the controversy, and with the ardour of a true philosopher he resolved, if possible, to clear up the point in dispute,

I am using the phrase External World in the vulgar sense. The vulgar believe that the external world is something real,, which exists independent of me or of any other mind (except possibly that of the Creator), and which would equally continue to exist if all finite minds were annihilated. They also believe that this world exists in space, and that the space which contains it, and which it occupies, is equally independent of my own, or of any other mind. No man who has not been instructed in philosophy believes that space, as it exists in bodies, is nothing but the unknown cause of certain sensations in us, and that space, as we perceive or represent it, is purely and exclusively mental. This preface is necessary, because it has lately become fashionable with Idealists, instead of denying the existence of an external world, to admit that in a certain sense it exists, and then to give an explanation which denies its existence in the only sense which the vulgar attach to it. But the question is further perplexed by the introduction of ambiguous and indefinite language, which is perhaps understood in one meaning by the writer, and in another by the reader. Thus we are told that Matter is admitted to exist in the sense of a Permanent Possibility, or Potentiality, of Sensations. This expression is susceptible of two contrasted meanings. It may sig'nify a i/iiiiff which renders sensations permanently possible '—a thing that causes sensations — which is probably what the casual reader would understand by it ; or it may mean only that it is permanently possible for my mind (or some other mind) to feel certain sensations when certain conditions (these conditions being purely mental) are supplied. It may, in short, mean either Permanent Possibility oi producing i\iQ sensations, or a Permanent Possibility of ytfe/iw^ them. In the latter sense it can exist nowhere but in a mind, and its existence there was probably never disputed by any Idealist. The vulgar belief undoubtedly goes beyond this. But if it be asked whether the external world in which the vulgar believe is substance or attribute, the answer is not so clear. The distinction of substance and attribute is one about which the vulgar give themselves little concern, and if an external world be conceded to them, they would not perhaps care ver}- much whether it was called a substance, or a collection of qualities or attributes — always assuming that these attributes or qualities are admitted to exist independently of the peiceiving mind.