Moral values; a study of the principles of conduct

Front matter

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

Preface

This volume, which is offered for the use of college and university classes, has grown out of the author's experience in trying to introduce students to the fundamental problems of ethics. It is hoped, however, that the book may make an appeal to a wider circle of readers — to men and women of various callings to whom neither convention nor authority seems to offer satisfactory answers to the insistent problems of the moral life. If such readers do not feel an interest in the more technical questions of philosophy, they are certainly concerned with those universal human problems that arise out of all genuine experience in the business of living. The titles and divisions of chapters will indicate the portions of the work best suited to individual readers. The attention of the general reader may, however, be called to Chapter VII, the World of Values, to Chapter VIII, Individual and Social Values, and also to the discussions of Moral Law, Freedom, and Morality and Religion. Several sections of this last chapter are devoted to the problem of evil. Contemporary events have served to make this problem keenly felt in many quarters where its significance has, in the past, been sUghted or ignored.

The appearance of another book n the field of ethics may seem to demand justification by the presence of features that distinguish it from the many able works already extant. The most obvious characteristic of the present work is suggested by its title. All the problems of moraUty are here treated as problems of value. The principle of value is carried through from the first chapter to the last, where it is applied to the questions of religion. All human activities, it is shown, are judged to be good or bad, better or worse, vi PREFACE

according to the contribution which they are thought to make to the worth of human life as a whole. Man is indeed the only being we know that subjects his conduct to this test; he alone keeps accounts, and reckons the profit and loss of his transactions.

In making use of the concept of value I do not fail to remind myself that there is no magic in a word, and that no term must be allowed to conceal difficulties or to offer an escape from the task of rigorous thinking. But the choice of terms is not indifferent; and, quite apart from other advantages, the idea of value tends to bring ethics into more significant and helpful relations with the other sciences of value to which an increasing attention is now being given. I also recognize the inevitable abstractness which must mark every formulation of the moral ideal in terms of a single unifying principle. To avoid "vicious" abstractions, appeal has been made to the concrete interests of life, which alone furnish the specific content of value. The effort towards concreteness finds perhaps its most complete expression in the chapter on The World of Values, which is entirely devoted to the task of showing where this content must always be found.

In these days of the tragic conflict of warring human loyalties, when the supreme sacrifice has been unhesitatingly made by millions on both sides, it ought to become clear, even to the most ordinary intelligence, that no feeling of inner loyalty or conscientiousness can prove a sufficient principle of conduct. It has seemed worth while, therefore, to disentangle with care the inner and the outer, the subjective and the objective factors in moral judgment. Chapters II and X are devoted to this purpose. Chapter II offers a criticism not only of Kantian formalism but also of the more subtle forms of subjectivism, including Professor Royce's doctrine of Loyalty.

One conclusion at least will, it is hoped, be clear to every

PREFACE vii

reader — that morality is nothing more or less than the business of living, with aU the many-sided and complex interests which this business involves. Only confusion of thought and practical harm have resulted from the popular idea that morality is a special interest among other special and competing interests, and that "mere morality" can be satisfied by the observance of certain conventional virtues, as these are interpreted by current standards. What has been contended for is that moraUty is a regard for all human interests in just proportion and harmony. Wherever a narrower conception prevails there is sure to be, at essential points, a fatal divorce between morality and life. A solution of the pressing questions of the economic and social order, of political organization, and of international relations will never be found until they are recognized as of the very essence of morality.

In offering the book to teachers of ethics, two or three further remarks may not be out of place.

The text-book form has been deliberately avoided from a conviction that the elaborately subdivided and analyzed paragraphs of the traditional manual fail to tax adequately the powers of the student, and also tend to leave him with fragmentary ideas rather than to lead him to work through the meaning of fundamental principles.

For elementary classes whose work is limited to a single semester, it may prove desirable to make selections from the text. The topics into which the chapters are divided will in general provide a ready means of such selection.

Apart from the numerous references to the Uterature of the subject that appear in the foot-notes, no bibliography has been added. Useful bibliographies abound, and every teacher has his favorite selections of literature for the use of students.

I have endeavored to acknowledge, in the pages that follow, my chief obligations to various writers. But there viii PREFACE

are less tangible forms of indebtedness for which specific acknowledgment cannot so easily be made— the early guidance of teachers, the discussions with colleagues, and the ahnost unconscious influence of academic associations. I shall always feel deep gratitude to Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews for an initial impulse to the study of philosophy, and to Professor James Seth of Edinburgh University for valued instruction in the period of graduate study. The happy relations, continuing unbroken through many years, with President W. H. P. Faunce and Professor E. B. Delabarre in the department of Philosophy in Brown University have been full of encouragement. I am especially indebted to Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, President of Amherst College, for discussions, often of almost daily occurrence, during a close comradeship of fifteen years at our Alma Mater.

During a year spent at Berkeley, California, in the final preparation of this volume, I received many kindnesses, and not a few helpful suggestions, from colleagues in the department of philosophy, and from former pupils now teaching in the University of California.

My thanks are due to my daughter, Mrs. C. D. Mercer, and to several friends for kindly assistance in proof-reading at a time when circumstances made it impossible for me to give undivided attention to this part of the work. To my colleague. Professor Alfred H. Jones, I am especially grateful for many valued criticisms made both in the manuscript and proof. But my cliief indebtedness has been to my daughter Helen, whose untiring devotion, clear insight, and rare enthusiasm for these problems have made possible the completion of the work at this time.

Walter Goodnow Everett.

Brown University, October 25, 1917.

Chapter I The Scope And Aim Op Ethics Page

I. The Field of Ethics i

II. Ethics a Science of Value 6

III. The Relation of Ethics to Philosophy g

IV. Descriptive and Nomlnative Sciences 14

V. Nature of the Humanistic Sciences 20

VI. Moral Theory and Moral Practice 25

Vn. Ethical Reflection Constructive 30

CHAPTER 11

THE LOCUS OF MORAL VALUE; TELEOLOGICAL AND FORMAL

THEORIES

I. Meanings of the Term Value 36

II. Teleology and Formalism 38

III. Kantian Formalism 40

IV. The Inadequacy of Formalism. Criticism of Royce's Loyalty. ... 45 V. Necessity of a Doctrine of Ends 49

VI. Teleological Character of the Virtues 54

vn. Does the End Justify the Means? 57

Chapter III The Development Of Hedonistic Theories

I. Hedonism Among the Greeks 60

II. Modern Development of Hedonism 64

HI. Mill's Utilitarianism 67

IV. Sidgwick's Contribution to Hedonism 69

V. Hedonism in Evolutionary Ethics 72

Chapter IV Historical Sketch Of Some Perfection Theories

I. Rise of the Perfection Theory Among the Greeks 77

II. Plato 79

ix

X CONTENTS

PAGE

III. AEISTOTtB ^

IV. Stoicism ^^

V. Spinoza ^^

VI. Hegel 97

VII. Self-Realization and Energism i°i

Chapter V Happiness As Ultimate Value

I. Psychological and Ethical Hedonism 105

II. Criticism of Psychological Hedonism 108

III. Ethical Hedonism and a Theory of Value 112

IV. Feeling and the Value Experience 117

V. Hedonistic Implications of Optimism and Pessimism 128

VI. Happiness an Element in Every Value 134

Vll. Some Criticisms Considered 137

Vin. The Hedonistic Paradox 142

IX. The Inadequacy of Hedonism 143

Chapter VI

I. Meaning of Perfection 147

II. Value a Union of Objective and Subjective Factors 151

III. Organic Relation of Feeling and Function 154

IV. Progress and Happiness 158

V. The Content of the Good Life 161

VI. Some Conditions of Progress 165

VII. Relation of Happiness and Perfection 168

Chapter VII The World Of Values

I. The Task of Morality Illustrated by Plato's Myth 178

II. A Table of Values 182

in. Narrower and Wider Interpretation of Morality 184

IV. Economic Values 188

V. Bodily Values 193

VI. Values of Recreation ig6

VII. Values of Association 199

CONTENTS xi

PAGE

Vni. Chakactbr Values 202

IX. Esthetic Values 203

X. Intellectual Valltes 208

XI. Religious Values 214

XII. Definition oy Civilization 218

Xni. The Organization of Values 219

Chapter VIII

I. The Truth of Individualism 225

II. The Individual a Social Being 227

in. Egoism and Altruism 232

IV. Conflict of Individual and Social Interests 235

V. Science and Social Organization 241

VI. The Fallacy of Numbers 243

VII. Problems of Social Betterment 245

CHAPTER IX DUTY AND CONSCIENCE ' ^i

'I. Duty Dependent on Value 250

n. Can a Man Do More than His Duty? 253

nr. Theories of Conscience: Intuitionalism and Empiricism 256

IV. Criticism of Intuitionalism 262

V. The Historical View 267

VI. The Authority of Conscience 274

VII. The Social Conscience 277

VIII. Coercive and Spontaneous Elements in the Moral Life 280

V

Chapter X

I. The Two-fold Judgment of Conduct 284

II. Virtue as Subjective or Formal Goodness 286

in. The Place of Virtue in Ethical Theory 290

IV. Knowledge and Virtue 295

V. The Unity of the Virtues 299

VI. MH-IT.4NT AND Spontaneous VotTUE 302 xii CONTENTS

Chapter XI Page

I. Meanings of the Word Law 3o8

11. Moral Law and Jural Law 3°9

III. Moral Law and Natural Law 312

rv. The Natural Sanctions or Morality 318

V. Moral Scepticism; Historical Survey 320

VI. Thf Answer to Scepticism 324

VII. Objectivity of the Moral Law 33°

Chapter XII The Ethical Interpretation Of Freedom

I. Statement of the Problem 33S

II. Kantian Dualism 338

III. The Natural History of Indeterminism 339

IV. Points of Agreement Between Determinists and Indeterminists 343 V. The Mechanism of Choice 34S

VI. The Nature of the Self. 349

Vn. Unity of Efficient and Final Causation 351

Vin. Indeterminism at Variance with Practice 353

IX. Freedom Consistent with Determinism 356

X. Objections to Determinism Answered 360

XI. Fatalism and Determinism 363

XII. Further Objections Answered 365

XIII. Responsibility and Punishment 369

XIV. The Determinist's Athtude towards Life 374

Chapter XIII

I. The Scientific Temper in the Study of Religion 377

II. Distinction Between Morality and Religion 380

ni. The Nature of Religion 382

IV. The Interaction of Morality and Religion 390

V. Non-Ethical, EthicaI, and Anti-Ethical Elements of Religion . . 396

VI. The Problem of Evil 405

VII. Dualistic and Pluralistic Solutions . . 406

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

VIII. Monistic Solutions 410

DC. Evn, No Illusion .* 416

X. The Future of Reugion 421

XI. The World-denying and the World-affirming Spirit 425

Xn. True and False Optimism 428,

Chapter I The Scope And Aim Of Ethics

I. The Field of Ethics

What is the field of ethics? What are the special facts which it undertakes to examine and explain? This is naturally the first inquiry raised by one entering upon the study of the problems of morality. The question may be answered in a preliminary way by the statement that the field of eth ics is the field of conduct. But as all conduct is not commonly regarded as of moral significance, that portion of conduct with which ethics deals must be more exactly defined. First of all, ethical conduct may be distinguished from such activity as is seen in the processes of nature. To these we ascribe no moral quality. It is true that we call them good or bad according as they serve or oppose our interests, but it is obvious that these terms are not used here in their moral sense. It is, however, a striking fact that in the earlier stages of civilization men often treated the objects of nature as if they were morally responsible, and even inflicted legal punishments upon them. The Athenians had a special tribimal for the trial of inanimate thiags, and Plato in the Laws recognizes that a kind of guilt may attach to them. Even in modern civilization traces of the same idea have continued in legal codes to a very recent date.^ Such primitive animism is still seen in the anger with which children, and occasionally older persons, treat the inanimate

' Cf. Westennarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, pp. 260-264.

CHAPTER I THE SCOPE AND AIM OF ETHICS

I. The Field of Ethics

What is the field of ethics? What are the special facts which it undertakes to examine and explain? This is naturally the first inquiry raised by one entering upon the study of the problems of morality. The question may be answered in a preliminary way by the statement that the field of ethicsjs the field of conduct. But as all conduct is not commonly regarded as of moral significance, that portion of conduct with which ethics deals must be more exactly defined. First of all, ethical conduct may be distinguished from such activity as is seen in the processes of nature. To these we ascribe no moral quality. It is true that we call them good or bad according as they serve or oppose our interests, but it is obvious that these terms are not used here in their moral sense. It is, however, a striking fact that in the earlier stages of civilization men often treated the objects of nature as if they were morally responsible, and even inflicted legal punishments upon them. The Athenians had a special tribunal for the trial of inanimate things, and Plato in the Laws recognizes that a kind of guilt may attach to them. Even in modern civiUzation traces of the same idea have continued in legal codes to a very recent date.' Such primitive animism is still seen in the anger with which children, and occasionally older persons, treat the inanimate

• Cf. Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, pp. 260-264.

objects which have caused them pain or injury. Reflection, however, unhesitatingly excludes all activity of unconscious objects from the field of moral conduct.

There is also general agreement that the actions of animals are not properly moral. The mediaeval practice of punishing animals, in the same manner in which human beings were punished for like offenses, has passed away as men have come to a clearer understanding of the differences between human and brute intelligence. Animals are believed to exhibit the germs of moral feeling, and their behavior doubtless throws some Hght upon certain problems in the evolution of conduct. But we know so Uttle of the processes of animal consciousness, and those that bear resemblance to moral feeling in man are so rudimentary, that we are justified in excluding animal conduct from our investigation. The field of conduct to be examined is, therefore, at once narrowed to human conduct.

Not all human action, however, is of moral import, and the eHmination of activities which are not significant for morality must be carried further. There are large classes of involuntary activities which are excluded from the sphere of moral judgment. These vary from unconscious reflex and automatic actions, Hke the beating of the heart or the movements of the eyeUds, to conscious motor responses to external stimuli, as when one withdraws the hand from contact with a hot iron or starts at a sudden flash of light. Similarly the action of an epileptic in a fit, or of a patient imder the influence of an anaesthetic, is no part of moral conduct. What is here excluded from the sphere of morality indicates by implication what is to be included within that sphere. Only

fc)luntary action, action that is willed, is properly subject to oral judgment. But a still further requirement seems to be made in order that conduct may be judged as morally good or bad; it must be not merely voluntary, but intelligently so. Intellectual disability commonly excludes even voluntary action from the field of moral conduct. Children under a certain age, idiots, and the insane, are not held, in modem civilized communities, to be fully responsible. The history of jurisprudence, which in an important way reflects the moral sentiment of different peoples and periods, shows great diversity of opinion concerning the limits of responsibility as affected by intellectual disability.^

This is strikingly exhibited in the treatment of the insane. Among some peoples, the ancient Egyptians for example, these unfortunates were freed from responsibility for their acts, and even treated with a measure of religious veneration, whereas among other peoples they have been pimished for misdemeanors or crimes with the greatest severity. The passing of the belief in possession by demons, and the recognition of insanity as pathological, have done away, among the more enhghtened nations, with both of these extremes, and have placed the mentally diseased in the class of the morally irresponsible. The nicer questions that arise concerning degrees of responsibility imder intellectual disability cannot here be discussed. Nor can we consider the still more difl&cult questions of the possible limitation of responsibility in cases of drunkenness and of temporary loss of mental balance due to other causes. The final conclusion reached is that ethical conduct is limited to the purposive, or willed, acts of normal and intelligent human beings.

But are all such acts of moral significance, or are some morally indifferent? At first glance it would seem that there is a relatively large class of indifferent acts, and this is certainly the popular view. It is also held by many students of morality. Herbert Spencer, while recognizing that "conduct with which morality is not concerned, passes into conduct which is moral or immoral, by small degrees and in countless ways," at the same time says that "from hour to

' See Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, Chap. X.

hour most of the things we do are not to be judged as either good or bad in respect of either ends or means." ' In opposition to such a view it has been held that no conduct is strictly indifferent.^ The attitude which one takes towards this problem will depend to a large extent upon the general theory of conduct which one finally accepts. A detailed discussion of the question hardly belongs to the initial step in ethical inquiry. But the difficulties which beset the limitation of morality to a narrow circle of rare or unusual acts can be appreciated at this point without undue refinement of analysis. To make the ordinary business of the day or hour morally indifferent is at once to remove the larger part of human activities from the field of morals. Very little reflection is needed to show that by far the greater part of these activities are related to ends from which they derive a clear moral value. Eating and drinking, amusement and recreation, expenditure and saving, work well-done or illdone — these can all be seen to be of vital concern for morality. Carlyle's description of the slovenly carpenter at work upon his house, breaking "the whole decalogue at every stroke of his hammer," hardly exaggerates the immorality of careless work. It is clear, too, that no general group or class of acts can be regarded as indifferent, because all general types of action are intimately related to habits which are full of meaning for morality. No single act, however trivial, can be declared to be indifferent in the absence of a knowledge of the particular circumstances in which it finds its setting. While, for example, it is usually morally indifferent which chair m the drawing-room one chooses to occupy, even this choice may bear such relation to the comfort or pleasure of others, or possibly to one's own protection from a draught of cold air, that it is no longer indifferent. If we begin with the choices which are most momentous in their effect upon

' Data of Ethics, p. 6.

' Cf. Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 195 ff .

human life, and descend through all grades of importance to those which are trivial, we shall find it exceedingly hard to draw a sharp line at any point and say, "Here all moral significance ceases; here morality is at an end, and a non-moral taste, fancy, or whim, may determine action." Every act is potentially moral or immoral. In practice, however, the moral significance of oiir more trivial acts is largely disregarded, and theory follows of necessity the same course, fixing attention chiefly upon those parts of conduct which exhibit clear and indisputable moral value.

When we think of an act as expressing the purpose of a moral being, we pass from its outer to its inner side, from the external activity to the internal character that prompts and directs it. Conduct and character are only different aspects of the same fact, the two poles of the sphere of moral life. Conduct expresses character and in turn forms it. Character is a habit of will, the consciously organized system of one's desires and activities. This unity of conduct and character hes embedded in the life-history of the very words "ethics" and "morals." Ethics takes its name from the adjective derived from the Greek noun ^^os, which came frequently to have the meaning of character. An alhed form, idoi, denoted habitual action, manners, or customs. Similarly the word "moral" is derived from the Latin mores (customs, habits, character) through the adjective form moralis, a word introduced into the language by Cicero as an equivalent for the corresponding Greek adjective. In these etymologies ^ is seen the intimate relationship existing between conduct and character, between what one does and what one is.

It is clear, then, that whereas it is customary to define ethics in terms of conduct, this usage does not neglect character, but necessarily includes it. It may be added that character is to be distinguished from native disposition or

' C£. the German Sitie and its derivatives.

temperament, which represents the active tendencies, aptitudes, or tastes of the individual, apart from the modifications efifected by the play of external forces and the growth of an inner, organizing intelligence. Such original endowment is in many ways profoundly significant for the acquired character, but it is the material out of which the character is fashioned, not the character itself.

II. Ethics a Science or Value Acts that are consciously purposive, or willed, have another very important aspect; they are directed towards ends. In this fact lies their meaning. The same is true even at the lower level of instinctive action. By unreflecting instinct the animal is guided to its appointed goal. But in man there supervenes upon this blind procedure the consciousness of ends, the debate over competing interests, and the possibility of error and long wandering in the search for his true goal. If we consider for a moment the immediate ends that we pursue from hour to hour, they appear almost numberless, so varied are human desires and interests. It is clear, however, that they are not equally important; some are less, others more, comprehensive and significant. The lesser ends are constantly referred to the greater, and become means in relation to them. There is, indeed, a hierarchy of ends in which can be seen an ascending gradatioii from the least to the most important. We count "the life more than meat, and the body than raiment." And we also recognize that even bodily life itself may be preserved at a price which we should be unwilling to pay.

Now the principle which determines the subordination of one end to another is always that of value. Estimates of value fix for us the place of each element in a system of human ends. And a system of human ends, too, necessarily implies a view of the interests of life as a whole, unified by the idea of value. Whether we consider the material factors of life such as wealth and bodily well-being, or the more ideal interests of science, art, and religion, or even the accepted principles of right conduct, like truthfulness, justice, and benevolence, each factor wiU be found to take its place at last in a system of ends according to the estimate of its worth. Here, in the idea of value, the appreciation of good, we have reached the most imiversal and significant element in conduct, the very nerve of moral thought and action.

The idea of value is, therefore, the basal conception of ethics. No other term, such as duty, law, or right, is final for thought; each logically demands the idea of value as the foimdation upon which it finally rests. One may ask, when facing some apparent claim of moraUty, "Why is this^y duty, why must I obey this law, or why regard this course of action as right?" The answer to any of these questions consists in showing that the requirements of duty, law, and right tend in each case to promote human welfare, to yield what men do actually find to be of value. If, as we here maintain, the idea of value occupies the primary position in moral thought and action, the definition of ethics should be constructed aroimd this idea as a center. The task of science in any field may be described as the attempted imificatiorl of knowledge within that field. By the aid of a central concept science seeks to organize all its observed facts into -a harmonious system. In accordance with this view of science, ethics attempts to unify the facts of conduct by means of the idea of value.

If a more formal definition is desired, it may be said that ethics is the science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a whole. Ethics might be called the science of c ompara tive valuesLecause every moral choice is a selection of a greater or a less value, positive or negative, according to the nature of the choice as good or bad, better or worse. Fearing to impair the absolute authority of morality, thinkers have often been unwilling to recognize the relative character of human values. But as we shall later see, the absoluteness of morality Ues not so much in the values themselves as in the unconditional claim which relative values may have when they become objects of choice. Moral values are further regarded as elements in a totality of attainable value, an ideal system of worths; so that the final unity sought must comprehend all forms of value, not merely as they are successively experienced from moment to moment, but as elements in a completed span of life. Thus ethics is concerned with nothing less than the whole business of living.

The effort to secure a harmony of all values in the life of action is one of the features which distinguish ethics from the other sciences of value. The primacy of ethics consists in its right to settle the conflicting claims which various values may make upon us. Every science of value is of course supreme in its own sphere. Economics, for example, is the final authority in questions of market value, as is aesthetics in matters of beauty, and logic in matters of truth. But when values from these various spheres are found to be in conflict one with another, or when the limitations of practical life forbid — and they always do forbid — the equal realization of all valuable ends, the decision between them must be the task of ethical judgment. The ethical standard of value has in such decisions final authority.

Without prejudice to the definition just given, it may be admitted that no single definition of ethics can be made so complete and exact as to exclude all others. Of several definitions each may express some aspect of the subject with especial success. At best, any definition must at the outset appear largely formal, a mere skeleton that is to take on the substance of Hfe from the entire discussion. But the idea of value which has here been made the central element of the definition is confidently believed to be the most significant, both for theory and for practice, of any that can be selected.

It helps to maintain a close relationship with other sciences of value, and to keep the discussion of necessarily abstract pirinciples in fruitful contact with the concrete choices of daily life.

III. The Relation of Ethics to Philosophy

Ethics has been defined as a science. It is, however, commonly classified as one of the departments of philosophy, and many thinkers have insisted that the problems of himian conduct are so bound up with the ultimate explanation of the universe in which moraHty has developed that ethical questions cannot be rightly studied independently of metaphysical theory. While the issues involved are too complex to be treated at length in an introductory chapter, a brief consideration of the question may shed some light upon the relation of ethics to general philosophical theory.

First of all, the distinction between science and philosophy is too sharply drawn. This is partly due to our imfortunate English terminology, which suggests that what is philosophical is not scientific, and that what is scientific cannot be philosophical. The misleading implication of such terminology is strengthened by the imfortunate tendency of many writers to limit science to the field of physical phenomena, and to ignore those sciences which deal with man as a conscious spiritual being. ^ Philosophers are also doubtless partly responsible for this unfortunate situation. They have often given to the world, xmder the name of knowledge, speculations that are not merely hypothetical, but highly questionable, without recognition of the fact that such "knowledge" has not the same status as the verified and verifiable results of science. But such an attitude is no less false to philosophy than to science. Surely philosophical