A study of ethical principles

Front matter

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

Preface to the Sixth Edition ix

may make the volume more acceptable to those teachers who have done it the honour of adopting it as a textbook.

In the preparation of this edition, and especially of the new chapter on " Moral Progress," the author desires to acknowledge his special obligations to Dr David Irons, of the department of philosophy in this University.

J. S.

COBNBlt TJurVBRSITT,

PEEFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

Advantage has been taken of this opportunity to revise the entire work once more, and to make many minor corrections. There are, however, only two alterations of real importance. These occur (1) in the statement of Butler's theory in terms of Eudsemonism as well as of Rationalism (Part I. ch. iii. § 14), and (2) in the discussion of Freedom, which is identified no longer with contingency or indetermination, but with self-determination. The latter change of view has led to the alteration of certain statements in Part III. ch. i. §§ 3-5, and to the omission of the criticism of Green's view of the relation of the self to the character (§§ 8. 9).

J. S.

Univeesitt op Edinburgh, August 1902.

PEEFACE TO THE NINTH EDITION.

A FURTHER revision has resulted in numerous verbal alterations, but in only one important restatement, that of Mill's position regarding the " proof " of Utilitarianism on pp. 129-130.

J. S.

UNIYERSITT op EDINBtTEQH,

April 1907.

PEEFACE TO THE TENTH EDITION.

It has been found necessary to rewrite the account of Butler's theory, in which the Intuitional element no longer seems to me the most characteristic and important feature, and in which I now find a more adequate statement of the Eudaemonistic view than formerly (Part I. ch. iii. § 14). This change has further necessitated the rewriting of the section on Intuitionism (Part I. ch. ii. § 6 = §§ 6-9 in earlier editions). A few other corrections, of minor importance, have also been made.

J. S.

Contents

UTTBODTTCTIOIT.

Chapter I. The Ethical Problem

PAGE

1. Preliminary definition of ethics. What is morality ? What is

conduct ? Conduct and character .... 3

2. In what sense is ethics practical! Relations of moral theory

and practice ....... 5

8. Relations of moral faith and ethical insight. Imnossibility of

absolute moral scepticism ..... 9

4. Business of ethics to define the good or the moral ideal, by

scrutiny of the various interpretations of it . . . 11

5. Ancient and modern conceptions of the moral ideal compared.

(a) Duty and the Chief Qood ; their logical connection. Personality as moral ideal ...... 14

6. (b) Ancient ideal political, modem individualistic ; the inade-

quacy of each, and their reconciliation in personality . 16

7. Various aspects of the ethical problem : (a) the good ; (6) the

right ; (c) moral law ; {d) conscience ; (e) virtue ; (/) duty ;

{g) pleasure ; (A) altruism ; (i) BeU-sacrifice . . .18

Chapter II. The Method Of Ethics

1. Natural and normative sciences. Ethics a science of the latter

2. Its method scientific, not metaphysical . . . .31

3. Two misunderstandings of the term ' normative science ' .35 xii Contents

CHAPTEK III.

THE PSTOHOLOGICAL BASIS.

1. Necessity of psychological basis ; an inadequate view of human

life rests upon an inadequate view of human nature . . 38

2. Voluntary activity presupposes involuntary ; various forms of

the latter ....... 40

3. Voluntary activity, how distinguished from involuntary ; volition

as control of impulsive and instinctive tendencies ; contrast of animal and human life ...... 42

4. The process of voUtion : its various elements, (a) pause ; (5)

deliberation ; (c) choice. Attention. Apperception . . 45

5. Nature and character. - Kffort. Second nature . . .49

6. Limitations of volition : (a) economy ; (i) continuity ; (c) fixity

of character ....... 53

7. Intellectual elements in volition : (a) conception ; (6) memory ;

(c) imagination .,.,.,. 59

8. Will and feeling. Is pleasure the object of choice ? . .63

PAET I.

THE MORAL IDEAL.

Types of Ethioai Theoet: Hedonism, Rationalism, Eud^monism 79

CHAPTER I.

HEDONISM, OR IHK ETHICS OF SENSIBILITY. I. — Development of the Theory.

1. (A) Pure Hedonism, or Cyrenaioism . . , .83

2. (B) Modified Hedonism : (a) Ancient, or Epicureanism . . 88

3. (6) Modern Hedonism, or Utilitarianism. Its chief variations

from Ancient: (1) optimistic v. pessimistic; (2) altruistic v. egoistic ; (3) qualitative v. quantitative . . .94

4. (c) Evolutional Utilitarianism ..... 101

5. (d) Rational UtiUtarianism ..... 108

II. — Oritical Estimate of Hedonism.

6. (a) Its psychological inadequacy ..... 112

7. (6) Failure of sensibility to provide the principle of its own dis-

tribution. (1) Within the individual life. (2) Between the individual and society . . . . . .122

8. (e) The hedonistic account of duty ..... 136

9. (d) Its extemalism and Intellectualism ; virtue = prudence . 139

Contents

Xlll

10. (e) Its inadequate interpretation of character

11. (/) The final metaphysical alternative . •

12. The merit and demerit of Hedonism

141 144 146

CHAPTER II.

RATIONALISM, OK THE ETHICS OS REASON.

1. The Rationalistic point of view. The two forms of ethical

Rationalism — extreme and moderate. Its sources . . 151

2. {A) Extreme Rationalism, (a) Ancient : (a) Cynicism. (j3)

Stoicism. How it differs from Cynicism : (1) idealistic v. naturalistic ; (2) cosmopolitan v. individualistic ; (3) the Stoic melancholy ...... 154

3. (6) Modern : (a) Christian asceticism .... 161

4. (^) Kantian transcendentalism . . , , . 163

5. Criticism of extreme Rationalism. (1) Its condemnation of

sensibility ; (2) its resulting formalism and (3) egoism ; (4) self-sacrifice ; (5) its source in metaphysical dualism. Transition to moderate Rationalism .... 164

6. (B) Moderate Rationalism, or Intuitionism. (1) Its earlier,

English or " philosophical " form ; (2) its later, Scottish or " dogmatic " form ; (3) Sidgwick's revival of " philosophical " Intuitionism ....... 170

7. The ethical service of Rationalism ; its defects . . .178

8. Transition to Eudsemonism ..... 179

CHAPTEE III.

EUDiBMONISM, OR THE ETHICS OF PERSONALITT.

1. The ethical dualism. Its theoretical expression

2. Its practical expression .... 8. Attempts at reconciliation

4. The solution of Christianity

5. The ethical problem : the meaning of self-realisation

6. Definition of personality : the individual and the person

7. The rational or personal self : its intellectual and ethical func

tions compared

8. The sentient or individual self .

9. " Be a person " .

10. " Die to live." Meaning of self-sacrifice

11. Pleasure and happiness .

12. Egoism and altruism

13. The ethical significance of law : the meaning of duty. Animal

innocence and " knowledge of good and evil," Various forms of law. Its absoluteness and permanence

182 185 186 188 191 198

195 197 199 200 203 204

XIV

Contents

14. ExpreBsions of Eudsemonism : (a) in philosophy. Plato and

Aristotle. Butler ...... 212

PAET II.

THE MOKAIi LirE.

Intkoductokt. Virtues and Duties. Tee Unity of the Mobal

CHAPTER I.

THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE.

I, — Temperance, or Self-discipline.

1. Its fundamental importance ..... 247

2. Its negative aspect ...... 249

3. Relation of negative to positive aspect .... 251

4. Its positive aspect ...... 252

II. — Culture, vr Self-development.

5. Its fundamental importance ....

6. Meaning of culture .....

7. The place of physical culture ....

8. The individual nature of self -development

9. Necessity of transcending our individuality. The ideal life

10. IJangers of moral idealism ....

11. Ethical supremacy of the moral ideal .

12. Culture and philanthropy ....

13. SeU-reverence. The dignity and solitude of personality

CHAPTER II.

THE SOCIAL LIFE.

I. — The Social Virtues : Justice and Benevolence.

1. The relation of the social to the individual life .

2. Social virtue — its nature and its limit .

3. Its two aspects, negative and positive: justice and benevolence,

Their mutual relations and respective spheres

4. Benevolence, or ideal justice ....

5. Benevolence and culture : self-sacrifice and self-realisation

275 278

282 285

Contents xv

II. — The social organisation of life : the eMcal basis and functions of the State.

6. The social organisation of life : society and the State . . 287

7. Is the State an end-in-itself « . . . . .293

8. The ethical basis of the State ..... 295

9. The limit of State action . . . . .300

10. The ethical functions of the State : (a) Justice . . 302

12. The permanence of the State . . . • . 318

Note. The Theory of Punishment . . . -320

CHAPTEE III.

MOEAt PROGRESS.

1. The nature of moral progress ..... 325

2. The law of moral progress : the discovery of the individual . 331

3. Aspects of the law of moral progress : (as) Transition from an

external to an internal view ..... 340

4. (&) Subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues . . 345

5. (c) Wider scope of virtue ..... 350 Conclusion . ..... 355

Part III. Metaphysical Implications Of Morality

Inteoduotobt. 1. Ethics akd Metaphysics. 2. The Theee

Peoblems op the Metaphysio of Ethics . . . 361

CHAPTEE I.

THE PROBLEM OE ERBEDOM.

1. Statement of the problem ... . 368

2. The ' moral method ' . . . . . .372

3. The ' reconciling project ' . , . . 375

4. Definition of moral freedom : its limitations . . . 378

5. The resulting metaphysical problem. The problem of freedom

is the problem of personality. The alternative solutions —

the empirical and the transcendental . . . 380

6. The transcendental solution ..... 383

7. Difficulties of the transcendental solution : (a) Psychological

difficulty offered by the presentational theory of will . 386 xvi Contents

8. (J) Metaphysical difficulty of Transcendentalism itself. (1) In

Kantianism, an empty and unreal freedom . , . 394

9. (2) In Hegelianism, a new determinism . . . 397 lO. Resulting conception of freedom .... 401

CHAPTER II.

THE PROBLEM OF GOD.

1. The necessity of the theological question . . . 404

2. Agnosticism and Positivism ..... 407

4. Man and nature ....... 415

5. The modern statement of the problem .... 420

6. Its ancient statement ...... 422

7. The Christian solution ...... 427

8. The ideal and the real . . . . . .428

9. The personality of God . . . . . .433

10. Objections to anthropomorphism : (a) from the standpoint of

natural evolution ...... 436

11. (5) From the standpoint of dialectical evolution . . 440

12. Intellectualism and moralism : reason and will . . . 449

Chapter III. The Peoblbm Of Immoktalitt

1. The alternatives of thought ..... 455

2. Immortality as the implication of morality . , . 456

3. Personal immortality ...... 461

Introduction

CHAPTEE I.

THE ETHICAL PEOBLEM.

1. Ethics is the science of morality or conduct. A preliminary notion of what is meant by these terms will serve to bring out the nature of the inquiry on which we are entering.

Morality is described by Locke as " the proper science and business of mankind in general." In the same spirit Aristotle says that the task of ethics is the investigation of the peculiar and characteristic function of man — the activity (ivipyHo), with its corresponding excellence (apsTTJ), of man as man. And " can we suppose," he asks, " that, while a carpenter and a cobbler each has a function and a business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by nature ? " ^ Morality might in this sense be called the universal and characteristic element in human activity, its human element par excellence, as distinguished from its particular, technical, and accidental elements. Not that the moral is a smaller and sacred sphere within the wider spheres of secular interests and activities. It is rather the all-inclusive sphere of human life, the universal form which embraces the most varied contents. It is that in presence of which all differences of age and country, rank and occupation, disappear, and the man himself stands forth in all the unique and intense significance of his human nature. Morality 1 Nio. Eth., i. 7 (11).

is the great leveller ; life, no less than death, makes all men equal. We may be so lost in the minute details and distracting shows of daily life that we cannot see the grand uniformity in outline of our human nature and our human task ; here, as elsewhere, we are apt to lose the wood in the trees. But at times this uniformity is brought home to us with startling clearness, and we discover, beneath the utmost diversity of worldly circumstance and outward calling, our common nature and our common duty. The delineation of this, the proper business of mankind in general, is the endeavour of ethical science.

Conduct, according to Matthew Arnold, is three-fourths of life, the other fourth being the province of the intellectual and aesthetic as distinguished from the moral life. But when truly conceived, as expressive of character, conduct is the whole of life. As there is no action which may not be regarded as, directly or indirectly, an exponent of character, so there is no most secret thought or impulse of the mind but manifests itself in the life of conduct. Nor can the intellectual and emotional life be separated from the volitional or moral. If, indeed, with Spencer, we extend the term ' conduct ' so as to cover merely mechanical as well as reflex organic movements, then we must limit the sphere of ethics to " conduct as the expression of character." But, in the sense indicated, the conduct of life may be taken as synonymous with morality. Such conduct embraces the Hfe of intellect and emotion, as well as that which is, in a narrower sense, called practice — the life of overt activity. Man's life is one, in its most diverse phases ; one full moral tide runs through til em all.

But we must analyse conduct a little more closely. Spencer defines it as the adjustment of acts to ends ; and we may say it is equivalent to purposive activity, or, more strictly, in conformity with what has just been said, con-

The Ethical Problem B

eciously purposive activity. It is the element of purpose, the choice of ends and of the means towards their accomplishment, that constitutes conduct ; and it is this inner side of conduct that we are to study. Now, choice is an act of will. Since, however, each choice is not an isolated act of will, but the several choices constitute a continuous and connected series, and all together form, and in turn result from, a certain settled habit or trend of will, a certain type of character, we may say that conduct is the expression of character in activity. Activity which is not thus expressive is not conduct ; and since a win that wills nothing is a chimera, and a will which has not acquired some tendency in its choice of activities is no less chimerical, we may add that there is no character without conduct.

Conduct, therefore, points to character, or settled habit of will. But will is here no mere faculty, it is a man's ' proper self.' The will is the self in action ; and in order to act, the self must also feel and know. Only thus can it act as a self. The question of ethics, accordingly, may be stated in either of two forms : (1) What is man's chief end ? or (2) What is the true, normal, or typical form of human selfhood ? (1) Man has a choice of ends : what is that end which is so worthy of his choice that all else is to be chosen merely as the means towards its fulfilment ? What, among the possible objects of human choice, is, in the last analysis and for its own sake, worth choosing ? And (2) since, in the last analysis, the object of his choice is a certain type of selfhood, this question resolves itself into the other : Which, among the possible selves, is the true or ideal self ? Into what universal human form shall he mould all the particular activities of his life ?

2. The ethical question both practical and theoretical.— To man his own nature, like his world, is at first a chaos, to be reduced to cosmos. As he must subdue to the order and system of a world of objects the varied mass of sensible presentations that crowd in upon him at every moment of his waking life, so must he subdue to the order and system of a rational life the mass of clamant and conflicting forces that seek to master him — those impulses, passions, appetites, affections that seem each to claim him for itself. The latter question is, like the former, first a practical and then a theoretical question; in the one case, as in the other, "knowledge is power." The first business of thought about the world — the business of ordinary thought — is to make the world orderly enough to be a world in which we can live. Its second business is to understand the world for the sake of understanding it, and the outcome of this is the deeper scientific and philosophic unity of things. So the first business of thought about the life of man is to establish a certain unity and system in actual human practice. Its second business is to understand that life for the sake of understanding it, and the outcome of this is the deeper ethical theory of life.

Ethics is accordingly often called practical, as opposed to theoretical philosophy, or metaphysics. The description is correct, if it is meant that ethics is the philosophy or theory of practice ; it is indeed only another way of saying what we have just said. It suggests, however, the question of the relations of moral theory and practice. Life or practice always precedes its theory or explanation; we are men before we are moralists. The moral life, though it implies an intellectual element from the first, is, in its beginnings, and for long, a matter of instinct, of tradition, of authority. Moral progress, whether in the individual or in the race, may be largely accounted for as a blind struggle of moral ideals, hardly realised to he ideals, in which the fittest survive. Human experience is a continuous and keen scrutiny of these ideals ; history is a grand contest of moral forces, in which the strongest are the victors. The conceptions of good and evil, virtue

Tke Ethical Problem 7

and vice, duty and desert, which guide the life, not merely of the child but of the mass of mfckind, are largely accepted, like intellectual notions, in blind and unquestioning faith. But moral, like intellectual, manhood implies emancipation from such a merely instinctive life ; moral maturity brings with it reflection upon the meaning of life. The good man, like the wise man, puts away childish things ; as a rational being, he must seek to reduce his life, like his world, to system. The words of the oracle inevitably make themselves heard,: yvojflt atavTov; man must know himself, come to terms with himself. The contradictions and rivalries of ethical codes, the varying canons of moral criticism, the apparent chaos of moral practice, force upon him the need of a moral theory. This demand for a rationale of morality, for principles which shall give his life coherence, marks the transition from the practical to the theoretical standpoint, from life itself to its theoretic understanding.

Just when this transition is made, just when morality passes from the instinctive to the reflective stage, whether in the life of the race or' of the individual, it is impossible to say. For, after all, practice implies theory. While a clear and adequate theory can be expected only after long crude practice, yet every life implies a certain plan, some conception, however vague and ill-defined, of what life means.' No life is altogether haphazard or ' from hand to mouth.' Only the animal lives from moment to moment ; even the child-man and the vicious man " look before and after," if they do not, like the good man, "see life steadily and see it whole." Every action implies a purpose, that is, a thought of something to be done, and therefore worth doing. The individual action does not stand alone, it connects itself with others, and these again with others, in the past and in the future ; nor can we stop at any point in the progress or in the

' Cf. Professor Dewey's excellent article on " Moral Theory and Practice," in Iviemational Jowmal of Ethics, vol. i. p. 186.

regress. In every action there is implied a view, narrowei or larger, of life as a v?hole, some conception of its total scope and meaning for the man. The individual act ia never a res completa, a separate and independent whole : to complete it, you must always view it in the totality of its relations, in the entire context of the life of which it is a part. A man does not, in general, make up his mind afresh about each particular action, or consider it on its own merits ; he refers it to its place in the general scheme or plan of life which he has adopted at some time in the past. But such a scheme or plan of life is already an implicit theory of life. It is impossible, therefore, to make an absolute distinction between the loose moral reflection of ordinary life, and that deeper and more systematic reflection which is entitled to the name of moral science. An intermediate stage of ' proverbial morality ' would, in any case, have to be distingushed — the Book of Wisdom of the race. If every one is a metaphysician, every one is, still more inevitably, a moralist. Ethical science is only a deeper, more strenuous, and more systematic reflection upon life, a thinking of it out to greater clearness and coherence, a more persistent effort to " see life steadily and see it whole." The reflection of the ordinary man, even in the 'proverbial' form, is unsystematic and discontinuous; the system of man's life, the principles on which it may be reduced to system, remain for the more patient and theoretical inquiry of moral science.

On the other hand, as it is impossible to separate practice from theory, so it is impossible to separate theory from practice. As Aristotle insisted, the abiding interest of the moralist is practical, as well as theoretical. Wisdom has its natural outflow in goodness, as proverbial morality has always declared ; the head guides the hand, the intellect the will. This inseparable connection of theory and practice was profoundly understood by the Greek philosophers, with whom the Socratic maxim that

" virtue is knowledge " was always a guiding idea, as well as by the Hebrews, for whom ' wisdoiS ' and ' goodness,' ' folly ' and ' sin,' were synonymous terms. It is also faraUiar to us from the teachings of Christianity, whose Founder is regarded as at once the Truth and the life, and for which ' life eternal ' is ' to know '_Jihe Father and the Son.^ A larger and deeper conception of the meaning of life inevitably brings with it a larger and deeper life. Intellectual superficiality is a main source of moral evil ; folly and vice are largely synonymous. Accordingly, the first step towards moral reformation is to rouse reflection in a man or people ; to give them a new insight into the significance of moral alternative. The claims of morality will not be satisfied until the rigour of these claims is understood. All moral awakening is primarily an intellectual awakening, a repentance or change of mind (jxiTavoia). Moral insight is the necessary condition of moral life, and the philosophy which deepens such insight is at once theoretical and practical, in its interest and in its value. By fixing our attention upon the ideal, ethics tends to raise the level of the actual. The very intellectual effort is itself morally elevating ; such a turn of the attention is fuU of meaning for character. A moral truth does not remain a merely intellectual apprehension ; it rouses the emotions, and demands expression, through them, in action or in life.

3. Moral faith and ethical insight. — Ethics is the effort to convert into rational insight that faith in a moral ideal or absolute human good which is at the root of all moral life. That such a moral faith is always present in morality, and is the source of all moral inspiration, hardly needs to be proved. Moral, like intellectual, scepticism can only be relative and partial

' St John's central conception of ' Light ' similarly emphnsiBes the unity of the intellectual and the moral life.

If absolute intellectual scepticism means ' speechlessness," or cessation from thought, absolute moral scepticism means death, or cessation from activity. Life, like thought, is the constant refutation of scepticism. As the continued effort to think is the refutation of intellectual scepticism, the continued effort to live is the refutation of

, moral scepticism. We live by faith. The effort to live, the perseverare in esse suo, implies, in a rational or reflective being, the conviction that life is worth living, that there are objects in life, that there is some supreme object or sovereign good for man. Such a faith may be a blind illusion, as pessimism declares; but it is none the less actual and inevitable. The ordinary man, it is true, does not realise that he has this faith, except in so far as he reflects upon his life. His plan of life is largely implicit ; he estimates the goods of life by reference to a silently guiding idea of the Good. To press the Socratic question, Good for what ? and thus to substitute for a blind unthinking faith the insight of reason, is to pass from ordinary to reflective thought. That life is worth living, is the postulate of life itself; why it is worth

1 living, is the question of ethics as a science.

Now when this ethical question is urged, there is at once revealed a seemingly chaotic variety of goods, which refuse to be reduced to any common denominator. ' One man's meat is another man's poison.' If the metaphysician is tempted to ask despairingly, in view of the conflict of intellectual opinion. What is Truth ? the moralist is no less tempted, in face of a similar conflict of moral opinion, to ask, What is Good ? What appears good to me is my good, what appears good to you is yours ; there is apparently no moral criterion. Here, at any rate, we seem to be reduced to absolute subjectivity. Each man appears to be his own measure of Good, and no common measure seems possible. Yet the scientific thinker cannot, any more than the ordinary man, escape from faith in an absolute Good. Like the ordinary man, he may have his difficulties in defining it, and may waver between different theories of its form and content. But any and every theory of it implies the faith that there is such a thing. This moral faith is the matter constantly given to the moralist that he may endue it with scientific form. He cannot destroy the matter, he can only seek to form it J his task is the progressive conversion of ordinary moral faith, of the moral common-sense of mankind, into rational insight It is his to explain, not to explain away, this moral faith or common-sense. That there is an absolute or ideal good is the assumption of every ethical theory — an assumption which simply means that, here as everywhere, the universe is rational Ethics seeks to verify this assumption or to reduce it to knowledge, by exhibiting its rationality. Variety of opinion as to what the Good is, is always confined within the limits of a perfect unanimity of conviction that there is an absolute Good. Even the utilitarian, insisting though he does on the relativity of all moral distinctions, on the merely consequential and extrinsic nature of goodness, yet recognises in happiness a good which is absolute. Similarly, the evolutionist, with his wellbeing or welfare, sees in life, no less than the perfectionist or the theologian, " one grand far-off divine event" To lose sight of this, ] to surrender the conviction of an absolute human Good, I would be fatal to all ethical inquiry. Its spur and impulse would be gone. But ethics, like metaphysics, is a tree which, though every bough it has ever borne may "be cut away, will always spring up afresh ; for its roots are deep in the soil of human life. As the faith in a supreme Good must remain as long as life lasts, the scientific effort to convert that faith into the rational insight of ethical theory must also continue.

4. The business of ethics, then, is to scrutinise the various ideals which, in the life of the individual and of the race, are found competing for the mastery. Life itself is such a scrutiny; human history is one long process of testing, and the fittest or the best ideals survive. But the scrutiny of history is largely, though by no means entirely, unconscious. The scrutiny of science is conscious and explicit. Ethics, as moral reflection, institutes a systematic examination of human ideals, and seeks to correlate them with the true or absolute ideal of humanity. The accidental and the imperfect in them must be gradually eliminated, until, as the reward of long and patient search, the absolute Good at last shines through. As logic or the theory of thought seeks, beneath the apparent unreason and accident of everyday thought and fact, a common reason and a common truth, so does ethics seek, beneath the apparent contradictions of human life, a supreme and universal Good — the norm and criterion of aU actual goodness.