The philosophical basis of theism; an examination of the personality of man to ascertain his capacity to know and serve God, and the validity of the principles underlying the defence of theism

Front matter

CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY •

Cornell University Library BD555 .H31

Philosophical basis of theism an examin oiin

Preface

When I began to give instruction in systematic theology, the discussions in the class-room were continually forcing us back to preliminary philosophical questions, pertaining to the reality, processes and limits of human knowledge, and to the constitution of man as a personal being. I thus found it would facilitate our M'ork to treg,t these questions together in a course of preliminary lectures on the Philosophical Basis of Theism. Students in successive classes have found these lectures and discussions helpful both in their studies of Apologetics, Theodicy and the Philosophy of Religion and in the clear- and intelligent apprehension of the Christian truth and life. Many of them, from year to year, have assured me that they had been greatly helped by them and have expressed their earnest desire for their publication. From these annual lectures and discussions this volume has grown up. I publish it, partly because, with the volume before us as a text book to refer to, I shall have more time for examining with my classes the subjects which belong more distinctively to systematic theology ; and also with the hope that discussions, which have already been helpful to many young men, may be of service to others who are striving to solve the great theological and religious problems of our times.

Yah Divinity School, Jwne 23, 1883.

Contents

CHAPTEE I.

INTRODUCTORY.

§ 1. Design of the Book 1

Chapter II. Knowledge And Agnosticism

? 3. What KNOWLEDGE IS. — Implies subject, object and knowledge. Is always the inteUectnal equivalent of reality. Is a primitive act, incapable of definition. Known in the act of knowing .... 10

■g 4. Agnosticism. — Partial agnosticism involves complete 10-11

g 5. Reality of Knowledge.^I. A primitive datum of consciousness. I.Man's knowledge of himself and his environment. Objection that this is not a demonstration answered. 2. Knowledge of first principles. 3. Knowledge of God. 4. The Ego, the World, and God. 5. In what sense from experience. — II. Agnosticism not tenable. Denies the trustworthiness of human intelligence. Contradicts universal consciousness. Not defensible by argument. Is self-contradictory — Hegel's maxim. Continuous equipoise of thought impossible. — III. Any theory of knowledge involving agnosticism is false > . 11-20

I 6. Knowledge and Fallibility. — Objection stated. — I. Answer that it involves agnosticism. — II. Assumes as fact what is contrary to universal experience. — III. The rational ground for persistent belief. — IV. A nucleus of knowledge within a zone of probability. — V. A great mass of knowledge persists. Changes in the progress of physical science. Changes in the progress of philosophy. Changes in the progress of

religious belief, , 20-26

vii viii CONTENTS.

§ 7. Criteria op Primitive Knowledge.— I. Self-evidence.— II. Impossibility of thinking tlie contrary. Applicable both to Rational and Preseutative Intuition. Primitive belief not the result of mental impotence. The unthinkable distinguished from the inconceivable. Objection that God is unknowable because inconceivable. — III. Persistence. — IV. Consistency with all knowledge. Use in science and all reflective thought. Applied to test primitive knowledge 26-31

§ 8. Knowing, Feeling and Willing. — I. Are distinct, not separate. — II. True philosophy must recognize the distinctness and the inseparableness. 1. Present tendency to overlook the inseparableness. Exemplified in Theology. 2. Errors from overlooking their distinctness. In what sense feeling is said to be a kind of knowing. Feeling and willing not ultimate criteria.— III. In what sense feeling and willing test and verify knowledge. 1. In rebutting Spencerian agnosticism. 2. In implying objective reality. 3. In finding scope for realizing the highest ends. 4. The action of the individual and of mankind tests what is true. — IV. Errors of skepticism and materialism from overlooking the relations of knowing, feeling and willing. 1. Final causes.. 2. Wrong conception of love of truth. 3. Eight moral character favorable to the investigation of truth. 4. Explains the fact that knowledge is advanced by the growth or development of the man 31-43

Chapter III. The Acts And Peocesses Op Knowing

9. Classification. — Intellect, Sensibility and Will. Intuition, Representa-

tion, Eeflection. — I. Faculties. — II. The Mind active in knowing. — III, Element of intelligence contributed by the mind. — IV. How acts of knowledge are distinguished 44-45

10. Intuition or Primitive Knowledge.— I. Definition.— II. Presenta-

tive Intuition and Eational. 1. Presentative intuition defined. Includes sense-perception and self-consciousness. 2. Eational Intuition defined. 3. Intuition is primitive knowledge. 4. Intuition the common name of both. — III. The mind considered as capable of Rational intuition is the Reason 45-47

11. Representative Knowledge.— Definition: representation and memory.

Self-evident knowledge in memory. Relation to other knowledge. Theories of Huxley and Mill. Physiological iJxplauation 47-48

i 12. knowledge by Eeflection or Thought. — I. Definition. 1. Prerequisite that the object and regulative principles be given. 2. Presented indeterminate. Not minima visibilia. Nebulous matter of intuition. 3. Apprehension, Diflerentiation, Integration. — II. These three the processes of all human thinking. — III. Thought merely discovers.— IV. Subsidiary objects of Thought 48-54

' 13. Thought Distinguished bv_ its Objects. — I. Abstract or Formal. — II. Concrete or realistic. — III. Creative or Imagination. 1. Fancy its lower form. 2. Its higher form, creates ideals. 3. Leads in every sphere of intellectual activity. — IV. Science advanced chiefly by concrete thought. 1. Formal thought inadequate because it stops in words.

CONTENTS. ix

2. Inadequate for synthetio processes and judgments. 3. The three axioms of formal logic insufficient. 4. Leibnitz' Sufficient Season. Prof. Bowen's three principles. 6. Principles underlying concrete thought. 6. These last principles at the basis of all scientific thought. 7. All science empirical, philosophical and theological, advanced chiefly by concrete thought 54-6t

J 14. Induction and the Newtonian Method. — I. Simple or Baconian Induction. 1. Extends linowledge beyond observation. 2. The principle on which it rests. Known by rational intuition. Indefinite statements of the principle. The uniformity of Nature defined. 3. Distinguished from erroneous conceptions of it. 4. This brings no discredit on Induction. 5. Induction and Hume's objection to miracles. — II. The hypothetical, or Newtonian Method. 1. Difiers from induction in data, methods and results. 2. Illustrated from common life; the lost camel. 3. The hypothesis created by imagination. 4. Aided by previous linowledge, habits of observation, analogy. 5. Verification : two requisites ; a third way sometimes. 6. The intuitive principle on which it rests. 7. Importance and general use of this method. 8. Now called induction; improperly so. 9. Neither method peculiar to physical science. 10. Anticipations ■. . . 61-72

? 15. Relation of Reflective Thought to Intuition. — I. Reflection gives no elemental material for thought. 1. True only when intuition includes presentative and rational. 2. True only of primitive or elemental realities. — II. Within these limits knowledge enlarged by thought. — III. Can discover the unlinown only by the Isnown. — IV. Reflective knowledge always preceded by spontaneous knowledge. 1. In what sense faith precedes knowledge. Not peculiarly applicable to religious knowledge. 2. No Faith-faculty as the distinctive organ of religious belief. 3. Various meanings of faith. 4. Belief of Testimony. — V. Reflection and experience become spontaneous in common sense. . . 72-81

f 16. Relation of Reflective Thought to Univebsal Reason.— The universe is grounded in and the manifestation of Reason. — -I. This the ultimate ground of knowledge by inference and by induction. — II. Only by this can thought solve its ultimate problem. 1. Thought culminates in finding the unity of the manifold. 2. Must be the unity of rational system. 3. Possible only in recognizing a personal God. — III. Primary motive of scientific investigation. Kant's three questions of philosophy.81-85

I 17. Probability. — I. Assent according to degree of evidence. — II. When the improbability is slight, it is unnoticed. — III. Assent on probable evidence a guide to conduct. — IV. No peculiar significance in application to religious belief. 85-87

Chapter IV

WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH PRESENTATIVE INTUITION, g 18. What is Known Through Sense-Perception 88-91

? 19. What is Known Through Self-Consciousness.— I. Object, subject and knowledge known simultaneously. Essential in every act of knowing. Object and subject are two realities known in one intellectual act.

;: CONTENTS.

Implicit or virtual consciousness. Formulas expressing direct and in- Terse knowledge. — II. Knowledge of our own mental operations. Comte's objection. Answer. — III. The mind has knowledge of itself. 1. The error that the operations may be known, not the mind. 2. Error that we are more certain of the operations of the mind. 3, Error that mind is a series of states of consciousness, 4. Hind conscious of self only in its operations. — IV. Individuality and identity known in consciousness.— ^V. Rationality and Freedom known in consciousness. Attributes of Personality. Knowledge of personality positive not negative. Can know others as persons. Knowledge of self as person prerequisite to knowing God 91-99

i 20. Kant's Thing in Itself.— Statement of his doctrine. — ^I. Phenomenalism his fundamental error. — II. Error of presenting noumeuou and phenomenon in an antithesis and reciprocally exclusive. Origin of two incompatible types of thought. — III. Misinterprets and contradicts consciousness.— IV. Not a noumenon or necessary idea of reason. 1. Is an attempt to conceive of substance without properties. 2. The postulation contrary to reason. 3. Assumes creation in thought of an element not given in intuition. — V. Discredits Eeason by making its ideas fictitious. — VI. Involves absurdity. No knowledge if a mind knowing. Knowledge of the unknowable the condition of knowing. Implies a faculty above reason to criticise it. The only way in which Reason can be discredited. — VII. Issues in agnosticism 99-109

I 21. Relativity of Knowledge. — I. Objection stated. First form. Seoond form. Third form. — II. Answer to Third form. 1. Answered by J? 18, 19, 20. 2. The statement of the objection implies knowledge of reality. 3. Involves absurdity. 4. Issues in agnosticism. . . . 109-113

Chapter V. What Is Known Through Rational Intuition

i 22. Univeesal Principles not Pakticulae Realities 114-115

g 23. Rise and Development in Consciotisness. — I. Are constituent elements of reason. — II. Appear in consciousness on occasion in experience.— III. Regulate thought and action before they are recognized in thought. — IV. Not innate ideas. Dr. Buchner's mistake. ., . . 115-117

§ 24. Significance as Regulative. — I. Significant only as applied to beings. Distinguished from Mysticism. — II. Do not guarantee correctness of judgment. Objection that tlie ancients believed antipodes impossible. Objection by Helmholz. — III. Determine the possible and the impossible. 1. What is possible to thought. 2. What is possible for will-power to effect. 3. What is possible in nature 117-121

? 25. Validity op Rational Intuitions. — I. Sustain all the criteria of primitive knowledge. — II. Indispensable in Reasoning.— III. Verified in experience. In common sense. In physical science. Exemplified in Mathematics. Prof. Clifford's objection. This verification continually going on. — IV. Essential to interpret sense-perception. — V. Objection that not universally believed. 1. Unknown to infants and savages. 2.

CONTENTS. xi

Not necessarily believed by the cultivated; J. S. Mill's objection. Inane objections. — VI. Objection that they are self-contradictory; 1. Kant's Antinomies explained; Prof. Clifford's use of them. Hamilton's use of them. Hansel's use of them. 2. If the objector's assertion is true the objection is fatal; but it is the only objection. The objection itself appeals to the authority of reason. 3. The antinomies rightly understood are not contradictions but complemental truths; examples. 4. The true argument from tlie antinomies. Kant's explanation of it ; aad why inadequate. 5. H. Spencer's Antinomy and agnosticism. 6. Kant's admission as to his phenomenalism. — VII. Objection that rational intuitions arise from the experience of the individual by association of ideas. Statement of Mill. Statement of Diderot. 1. Individual experience inadequate to account for them. 2. If thus arising, they would be inveterate prejudices. 3. Falls into subjective idealism and agnosticism. 4. Has been found inadequate and is abandoned. — VIII. Objection that they are the result of the experience of the race in its evolution. 1. Admits they are now constitutional and a priori to the individual. 2 Admits they are valid and give real knowledge. 3. If so, their origin is of minor consequence. 4. Evolution does not account for them. 5. Objection that evolution reaches back of the primitive man. 6. Laws of thought not in continuous flux. — IX. Objection that rational intuitions are subjective and illusive. 1. Is a specific application of the theory of relativity of knowledge. 2. Incompatible with the theory of ancestral experience. 3. Without rational intuitions knowledge is disintegrated into subjective impressions. 4. Reason is everywhere and always the same. — X. The validity of rational intuitions involves the existence of supreme and absolute Reason. 1. Truth has no significance except as a mind is its subject. 2. These principles not peculiar to an individual. 3. They have reality only as truths of absolute Reason. 4. Reason in man the same as in God. 5. Christian Theism explains and confirms them by the truth that man is in the image of God. 6. Objection ; this is anthropomorphism. 7. Objection; this involves Pantheism. — XI. The only reasonable explanation is that the intuitive principles are truths of Reason. Failure of the three empirical positions exhaiists the resources of empiricism. — XII. Three conditions of the possibility of science. — XIII. Atheism rests on some theory involving agnosticism. . . 121-151

CHAPTEE VI.

THE ULTIMATE REALITIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

I 26. Meaning of Ultimate Realities.— Categories : Aristotle's use of the

word and Kant's 152

27. Matter and Form.— Plato's " Ideas."— Kant's error as to forms and

categories. The true position 152-153

28. Classification. — The two classes and their subdivisions, and why.

Aristotle's classification of categories. Knowledge begins as knowledge of particular beings ; issues in knowledge of the Absolute Being. 153-154 xii CONTENTS.

Chapter VII

ULTIMATE REALITIES PRIMARILY KNOWN IN PERCEPTIVE INTUI- TION; BEING AND ITS MODES OF EXISTENCE.

? 29. Being. — I. Known in perceptive intuition and cannot be defined otherwise.— II. Is a particular or determinate being. — III. In perceptive intuition known as existing in various modes ; in rational intuition known by reason in its true significance and reality. — IV. Known in its whole reality as substance and quality. The Greek usage. Does everything flow? substance, persistence, existence. Not essential to being that it be eternal, self-existent, etc. Synthesis of being and phenomenon. — V. Being is fundamental ; all other realities pertain to being. Aristotle's genera of Being. The concrete determinate Being is the unit of knowledge 155-158

i 30. Modes of Existence. — I. Power. Power in motion ; intellectual power ; will-power. Quality. Substance and cause. Power hypostasized. James Mill's denial of power. Cause : agent, transitive, reactive, free. Object or recipient. — II. One and many. 1. Individuality and identity ; origin of the ideas. Does not imply simplicity. In what sense indivisible. Belief in existence after death from belief of personal individuality and identity, not from shadows and dreams. 2. The individual and other beings. Knowledge of the outward object. Things and persons. 3. Number; origin of the idea. — III. Extension in spaee. Origin of the idea. Not a subjective form of sense but a form of things. The fourth dimension of space. — IV. Duration in time. — V. Quantity. — VI. Difierence and relation 158-167

g 31. Inferences. — I. Knowledge ontological in its beginning. Critical point against agnosticism. — II. Knowledge begins as knowledge of personal beings and impersonal. Mansel's objection. Excludes materialism and idealism. Kant's phenomenalism. J. G.Fichte's. attempt to avoid it by knowledge of self. Hegel's attempt to avoid it. His near approach to the true philosophy and his failure. These failures prove that knowledge must begin ontological if it ever becomes so. — III. Knowledge begins as knowledge of determinate being. 1. Excludes the error that being ia primarily in the genus or the universal. 2. Being is not the one only substance of pantheism. 3. Finite persons and things are real beings. — IV. Being is not an attribute but the subject of attributes. Not the sum total of all attributes. Affirmation of being not the weakest of affirmations. Attributes common to all beings. — V. Determinateness of being is not limitation. Omnis determinatio negatio est. The fallacy of agnostics and pantheists in reasoning from this maxim. God determinate but not limited. — VI. Origin and necessity in perceptive intuition of the distinction of science into physical and metaphysical. 167-179

Chapter VIII. The True: The First Ultimate Idea Of Reason

g 32. The Five Ultimate Ideas of Reason.— Meaning. Noumena. The Five Realities of rational Intuition named and defined. Rational Intuition does not give knowledge of being 180-182

CONTENTS. xiii

33. The Tetje: The Fibst Norm or Standard of Reason.— I. Definition.— II. Are principles of things as well as of thought. Are archetypal in Absolute Beason ; Plato's Ideas. Rational beings know the supreme reason 182-184

CHAPTEE IX.

THE EIGHT, OR LAW: THE SECOND ULTIMATE REALITY OF REASON.

g 34. General Significance op Right or Law. — Definition of Law. — I. Law to intellectual and physical power. 1. Determine what it is possible for power to effect. Laws of thought. Laws of Physical Power. 2. Definition of Right. 3. Law of nature as commonly used, distinguished from Rational Law. 4. Some so called laws of nature are laws of reason.— II. Principles of Reason are laws to Will. 1. Declare what the will ought to do. 2. Right denotes conformity of action of will with law. 3. Truth as Law to will is moral law. — III. Common characteristics of Law to thought, force, and will 185-187

§ 35. Ethical Significance of Right and Law. — I. Origin. — II. Significance of Ethical Terms. 1. Ought, Obligation, Duty. 2. Right 3. Law. 4. Authority. 5. Government. Moral Law distinguished from statute law. — IIL Ethical principles are of the highest certainty . 187-190

I 36. Moral Law Universal, Immutable, Imperative.— I. Because it ia truth of Reason known as law to action. - II. Implies tlie existence of God, the Absolute Reason. — III. Falsehood and absurdity the intellectual basis of wrong doing. — IV. Law requires conformity to the constitution of things. — V. Transgression must issue in failure and loss. — VI. Enforced by penalty. — ^VII. Answer to the objection that intuitive ethics is void of significance 190-193

I 37. Intuitive Ethics Distinguished from False Theories.— I. Theories of association of ideas. — II. Theories attempting to derive the idea of right from happiness. — III. That moral distinctions originate in the feelings.— IV. Hutcheson's theory of the Moral Sense. — V. That moral distinctions rest on the will of God. — VI. That truth and law are eternal in the nature of things independent of God . . 193-203

g 38. The Formal Principle of the Law and the Real.- I. The formal principle of the Law.— II. The Real Principle. — III. The significance and necessity of the formal principle. 1. Gives the distinctively ethical ideas. 2. Declares the real principle to be law. 3. Gives the aspect of virtue as obedience to law or doing duty. 4. Gives the aspect of virtue as harmony of the will with reason. 5. Recognizes virtue as harmony with God and the constitution of the universe. — IV. Significance and necessity of the real principle. Without it no knowledge what the law requires. Without it duty, if known, would be done without love. So done it is debasing as a blind obedience. The will consents to the formal principle only in the act of love 203-207

g 39. Evidence THAT THE real principle of the law is the law op love. I. So declared by Christ. — II. The rational ground is that man exists in a xiv CONTENTS.

rational system. In such a system selfishness is absurd. — III. Knowledge of the moral system being presupposed the knowledge of the law of love is by rational intuition. 1. Arises on occasion in experience in a particular case and is operative before it is recognized or formulated. 2. The application varies with the conception of the system. 3. Its full Christian meaning presupposes the idea of a universal moral system under one God. 4. Sin and evil in self-isolation. — IV. Man's subjection to the law of love indicated in his constitutional sensibilities. Egoistic and altruistic sensibilities. — V. Verified in experience. 1. The solidarity of mankind a fact known in experience. 2. That obedience to law of love promotes the highest good is verified by experience. 3. The theory that the good is attained in selfishness logically issues in pessimism. VI. Confirmed by the common consent of mankind. 1. Practically recognized when not formulated. 2. Acknowledged by thinkers whose principles it contradicts. 3. Attested by deniers of Christianity. 4. Confirmed by scholarly investigation of religion, philosophy and literture. — VII. Objections: 1. No agreement in moral sentiments. Agree in principle differ as to its application. The same act of different significance in different cases. 2. Savage tribes destitute of moral ideas. If so, undeveloped ; children of larger growth. No evidence suflieient to establish it. Testimony of Anthropologists 207-226

Chapter X. The Perfect: Third Ultimate Reality Or Idea Of Reason

g 40. Origin and Significance of thb Idea. — Implies a rational standard.

Is the Norm for the realization of all creations of mind 227

J 41. Ideals. — I. Definition. Distinguished from a conceit of fancy. — II. The material given in experience, the creation guided by Reason; a creation not a copy. — III. Nearer to perfection than the object. Truth to nature. — IV. Possible only by virtue of reason. — V. Practical importance of ideals 227-230

J 42. Beauty as known by the Reason, or Principles op Esthetics. — I. Beauty defined. 1. Is perfection revealed. 2. Revealed in some concrete object. 3. Revealed in a finite object. 4. Objects are beautiful in different degrees. — II. Beauty the outshining of truth. — III. Bpauty distinguished by-the modes of existence in which it is revealed. — IV. All beauty is spiritual beauty. 1. Reveals a spiritual ideal. 2. True of beauty of nature as well as of beauty of art. Nature a medium for the expression of spiritual ideals. 3. Beauty of the human form analogous to thaj; of natural objects. 4. Higher type of beauty of the human form. 5. The Cosmos beautiful as the expression of a pervasive spiritual presence. 6. Admission of Evolutionists compared with the rational philosophy.— V. Beauty has objective reality. — VI. Beauty manifested only to rational beings. In what sense the mind creates the beauty which it perceives. — VII. Universal standard of beauty. 1. Authority : Goethe, Plato, Geo. Eliot. 2. Inferred from principles already stated. Analogous recognition of the universal reason in all science. Unity of speculative, ethical, and sesthetical philosophy. 3. Models. 4. Objections. — VIII. Sublimity. — IX. The ugly. — X. ^Esthetic emotion consequent on intellectual idea 230-243

CONTENTS. :, XT

J 43. .aLsTiiETic Emotions. — I. Distinguished from other feelings, natural or rational. — II. Prompts to share with others. — III. The mind is in the attitude of a seer; emotion in view of the expressiveness of things. IV. Emotions with which lesthetio emotions are often improperlyconfounded. 1. Wonder. 2. Certain merely agreeable sensations. 3. Pleasure of excitement. — V. Emotions of sublimity. — VI. Emotions

awakened by the ugly. 243-248

§ 44. jEsthbtic CuLinsE 248-250

I 45. .Esthetics and Theism 250-251

g 46. ERRONEOtrs Theories. — I. Variety of them. Burke's. — II. Theory of

Association. — III. Theory of Prof A. Bain 251-255

CHAPTEE XI.

THE GOOD : THE EOUETH ULTIMATE REALITY KNOWN THROUGH THE REASON.

i 47. The Question Stated. — I. Definition of terms : happiness, well-being.

II. Occasion of the rise of the idea of good and evil.— III. Necessity of a criterion. — IV. Two answers as to what is the good and its criterion. 1. Hedonism; good is enjoyment measured by quantity. 2. Good is worth estimated by rational standard. — V. The empirical and rational elements. — VI. The greatest good and the true good 256-258

g 48. Hedonism is False. — Various ethical theories more or less Hedonistic. I. Necessary outcome of Sensationalism ; incompatible witli Rationalism.— II. False maxim that the ultimate motive is the desire of happiness. 1. Every desire has its specific object. 2. Motives are many, not merely one. 3. Any one passion may gain ascendency. 4. Incompatible with, free-will. 5. Incompatible with subjectivity of happiness.

III. False maxim that all pleasures are of the same kind. 1. Enjoyments discriminated : by their sources ; by their tendencies. 2. Enjoyments not essentially good and may be evil. 3. Enjoyments distinguished as to essential worth. 4. Common sense rejects the Hedonistic maxim. — IV. Hedonism gives no test to discriminate superior good from inferior, as to degree, — V. Incompatible with distinction

of right and wrong 258-266

g 49. The Good Estimated by Reason.— I. The rational standard defined.— II. The rational idea is that of worthiness or worth. — III. Presupposes the ideas of the true, the right, the perfect. — ^IV. Distinction of good from evU, eternal and immutable. — V. Error of Ethics confounding the good and the right. — VI. The question as to the true good distinguished from that as to the highest good, — VII- Worth estimated by reason distinguished from value in political economy. — VIII. Good is the object acquired, not the object served. Teleology 266-271

g 60. In what the Good Rationally Estimated Consists.- I. In what the essential good consists. 1. Personal perfection. Inference from the foregoing. Begins in right moral character. Right choice the essential germ of character is good in itself Development of all the powers to perfection. Realized only by action in love. No absolute perfection to the finite but progressive. 2. Harmony with himself, with God, and xvi e CONTENTS

the constitution of things. 3. The happiness necessarily resulting. 4. These three distinguishable but inseparable. 5. Stoicism excluding happiness is false. False ethics resulting. Objections of Hedonism are against this error. Hedonism excludes the rational element of good ; Christian Ethics recognizes both elements. — II. Kelative good. — III. The evil. Essential. Relative. — IV. A man's good is in his own power. 271-281

§ 51. Meeit and Demerit. — I. Definition. — II. He thatmerits true good attains it. 1. Because reason is supreme in the universe. 2. Every right act receives immediate reward. 3. Answer to objection from the inequalities of this life. 4. The true good is the highest good 281-283

f 52. The Feelings Peetaining to the Idea of the Good. — I. The feelings presuppose the idea. — II. Subdivisions : 1. Self-respect. 2. Prudential. The two are called self-love 283-284

i 53. Peactical Importance in the Conduct oi' Life 284r-285

Chapter XII. Fifth Ultimate Idea Op Eeason

1 54. The Absolute. — I. Definition. — II. Known by rational intuition arising

in the eflfort to complete the process of thought in any line of investigation. In the back-ground of human consciousness and at the basis of knowledge. Opens a new sphere of reality. — III. What the absolute is, is known not a priori, but only in its accounting for man and nature. The absolute is the All-conditioning. Kant's objection. Significance if explained as the registeted experience of the race transmitted by heredity 286-288

2 55. The Pseudo-absolute. — I. The Pseudo-absolute ; some forms originate in

attempting to develop the idea a priori; others from developing it empirically ; the sum total of all things mistaken for the Absolute ; also the largest logical concept. — II. Current objections founded on false ideas of the Absolute. 1. The Absolute is "pure being" " the thing in itself," "out of all relations." 2. Objections founded on the false idea of the Absolute as " the ALL," or sum total of all things. 3. Agnostic objection that personality is incompatible with the absolute 289-291

g 66. Personality of the Absolute.— I. The Absolute may be a person. —

II. The Absolute must be a person 291-292

CHAPTER Xni.

THREE GRADES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.

? 57. Definition of Science 293-294

g 58. The Three Grades Defined — I. First Grade: Empirical Science. Its two divisions. — II. The Second Grade : Noetic or Rationalistic science. Why called Noetic. Three divisions of it. 1. Mathematics. J. S. Mill that Mathematical axioms learned by experience. 2. Logic. 3. Philosophy. Subdivisions : Speculative, Ethical, .Ilsthetic, Teleological. —

III. Third Grade: Theology. — IV. Must pass through all three in the complete knowledge of any being. — V. Knowledge in each grade is science. Appropriation of "science" to natural science only. . , . 294-301

CONTENTS. xvii

? 59. Proof of the Doctrine.— I. From the constitution of the mind. 1. " Why it begins as Empirical science. 2. Why two spheres of mind and matter opened in perceptive intuition. 3. Rational intuition necessitates noetic and theological. — II. Common recognition in history of thought. III. Reciprocal dependence. ..." 301-304

2 60. Harmony of the three. — I. Science in a lower grade, depends on the principles of the higher. I. Empirical science depends on rational intuitions. 2. Noetic science depends on Theology. 3. Theology contains its principles in itself. — II. Science in a, higher grade depends on the lower for content. 1. Noetic science depends on empirical for content. Also for discipline in empirical methods. 2. Theology depends on noetic and empirical science. Cannot develop the idea of the absolute a priori. Misrepresentation of Theological method. 3. Source of contents of Empirical.— III. Science in a lower grade raises questions for science in a higher grade to answer. 1. Empirical. 2. Noetic. Theology ultimate.— IV. Also depends on the higher grade, to complete the unity of thought and things. — V. Scientific thought legitimately culminates in Theology. — VI. Science in a higher grade stimulates inquiry in the lower. — VII. Claim that empirical natural science alone is science. — VIII. Science in the three grades must be in harmony with itself. 304-319