Greece and the allies, 1914-1922

Front matter

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Preface

THE late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent revival of all the mis-statements which, during the War, flowed from ignorance or malice, render the publication of this book particularly opportune.

Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and presents for the first time to the British public a complete and coherent view of the complicated circumstances that made Greece, during the War, the battle-ground of rival interests and intrigues, from which have grown the present troubles.

In this book we get a clear account of the Uttle-understood relations between the Greek and the Serb ; of the attitude of Greece towards the Central Powers and the Entente ; of the deaUngs between Greece and the Entente and the complications that ensued therefrom. Mr. Abbott traces the evil to its source — the hidden pull of British versus French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the open antagonism between M. Venizelos and King Constantine.

All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least interesting is the last.

The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of the Allied countries, with some few good exceptions, has been one of the most tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case. Its efiect on the state of Europe during and since the War is remarkable. If King Constantine's advice had been followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would probably have been shortened by a very considerable period, Bulgaria and Rumania could have been kept out of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and collapse would not have taken place ; for, instead of having Turkey to assist Biilgaria, the AlUed forces would have been between and separating these two countries.

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In this case King Constantine would not have been exiled from his country, and consequently he would not have permitted the Greek Army to be sent to Asia Minor, which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the country was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an overseas colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk.

It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King's policy was fully endorsed by the only competent authorities who had a full knowledge of the subject, which was a purely military one. These were the late Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame, British Military Attache in Athens ; but the advice tendered by these three officers was disregarded in favour of that given by the civilians, M. Venizelos and the Allied Ministers.

Mr. Abbott's book will do much to enlighten a misled public as to the history of Greece during the last nine years, and many documents which have not hitherto been before the public are quoted by him from the official originals, to prove the case.

For the sake of truth and justice, which used to floru-ish in Great Britain, I hope that this book will be read by everyone who has the welfare of the British Empire at heart.

Mark Kerr

4 October, 1922

Author's Preface

AS this work goes to press, the British Empire , finds /"^ itself forced to vindicate its position in the East : a position purchased at the cost of much blood and treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the conclusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection of France.

In the following pages the reader will find the sequence of events which have inevitably led up to this crisis : an account of transactions hitherto obscured and distorted by every species of misrepresentation and every known artifice for manipulating pubUc opinion.

The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit an ephemeral situation. It embodies the fruit of investigations laboriously carried on through six years. A slight account of the earlier events appeared as far back as the winter of 1916 in a book entitled, Turkey, Greece, and the Great Powers : that was my first effort to place the subject in its true perspective. The results were interesting. I was honoured by the reproaches of several private and by the reprobation of several pubUc critics ; some correspondents favoured me with their anonymous scurrility, and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance. On the other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a maelstrom of passion, retained their respect for facts.

I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal. Two of my contributions saw the light ; the third was suppressed by the Authorities. Its suppression furnished material for a debate in Parliament : " This is a cleverly written article," said Mr. John Dillon, " and I cannot find in it a single word which justifies suppression. All that one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the Government do not Uke to be known, not that they injure the miUtary situation in the least, but that they show that the Government, in the opinion of the writer, riiade certain very bad blunders." The Home Secretary's answer was viii GREECE AND THE ALLIES

typical of departmental dialectics : " It is inconceivable to me," he declared, " that the Government would venture to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, ' This is our view. Publish it. If you do not, you will suffer.' " What the Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of the National Weekly was : " This is not our view. Publish it not. If you do, you wiU suffer."

With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was too intent on the evolution of the world drama to follow the daily development of war-time prohibitions, I next essayed to present to the public through the medium of a book the truth which had been banned from the columns of a magazine. The manuscript of that work, much fingered by the printer, now Ues before me, and together with it a letter from the publisher stating that the Authorities had forbidden its pubhcation on pain of proceedings " under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm Regulations."

And so it came about that not until now has it been possible for the voice of facts to refute the fables dictated by interest and accepted by credulity. The delay had its advantages : it gave the story, through the natural progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it would have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy on every point by a fresh visit to Greece and by reference to sources previously inaccessible, such as the Greek State Papers and the self-reveahng publications of persons directly concerned in the transactions here related.

I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will convey some new information respecting these transactions even to those who are best acquainted with their general course. If they find nothing attractive in the style of the book, they may find perhaps something useful, something that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter of it. For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914 is ancient history. Unless one studies the record of Allied action in Greece from the very beginning, he cannot approach with any clear understanding the present crisis — a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but at bottom a conflict between French and British poUcies affecting the vital interests of the British Empire.

G. F. A.

5 October, 1922

Besides information acquired at first hand, my material is mainly drawn from the following sources :

Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time.

White Book, published by the Government of M. Venizelos under the title, " Diplomatika Engrapha, 1913- 1917," 2nd edition, Athens, 1920.

Orations, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917, by M. Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis, and Kafandaris, and his opponents, MM. Stratos and RalUs. The Greek text (" Agoreuseis, etc.," Athens, 1917) and the English translation (" A Report of Speeches, etc," London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of M. Stratos only in summary. The French translation {" Discours, etc., Traduction de M. Lion Maccas, autorisee par le Gouvernement Grec," Paris, 1917) curiously omits both the Opposition speeches.

Skouloudis's Apantesis, 1917 ; Apologia, 1919 ; Semeioseis, 1921. The first of these publications is the ex- Premier's Reply to statements made in the Greek Chamber by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917 ; the second is his Defence ; the third is a collection of Notes concerning transactions in which he took part. All three are of the highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis Administration from November, 1915, to June, 1916.

Journal Officiel, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full report of the Secret Committee of the French Chamber which sat from 16 June to 22 June, 1916.

Next in importance, though not inferior in historic interest, come some personal narratives, of which I have also availed myself, by leading French actors in the drama :

Du Fournet : " Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914- 1916." By Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920.

Sarrail: " Hon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918." By General Sarrail, Paris, 1920.

Regnault : " La Conquete d'Athfenes, Juin-Juillet, 1917." By General Regnault, Paris, 1920.

Deville : " L'Entente, la Grece et la Bulgarie. Notes d'histoire et souvenirs." By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919. The author was French Minister at Athens till August, 1915, and the portions of his work which deal with his own experiences are worth consulting.

Jonnart : " M. Jonnart en Grece et 1' abdication de Constantin." By Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918. Though not written by the High Commissioner himself, this account may be regarded as a semi-official record of his mission.

The only English pubUcations of equal value, though of much more limited bearing upon the subject of this work, which have appeared so far are :

The Dardanelles Commission Reports (Cd. 8490 ; Cd. 8502 ; Cmd. 371), and the Life of Lord Kitchener, by Sir George Arthur, Vol. Ill, London, 1920.

Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these events have also been made by several unofficial narratives, to which the reader is referred for details on particular episodes. The absence of reference to certain other narratives is deliberate.

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1914-1922

Introduction

INGENIOUS scholars, surveying life from afar, are apt to interpret historical events as the outcome of impersonal forces which shape the course of nations imknown to themselves. This is an impressive theory, but it will not bear close scrutiny. Human nature everywhere responds to the influence of personality. In Greece this response is more marked than an5Avhere else. No people in the world has been so completely dominated by personal figures and suffered so grievously from their feuds, ever since the day when strife first parted Atreides, king of men, and god-hke Achilles.

The outbreak of the European War found Greece under the sway of King Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios Venizelos ; and her history during that troubled era inevitably centres round these two personalities.

By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912 and 1913, King Constantine had more than effaced the memory of his defeat in 1897. His victories ministered to the national lust for power and formed an earnest of the glory that was yet to come to Greece. Henceforth a halo of mihtary romance — a, thing especially dear to the hearts of men — shone about the head of Constantine ; and his grateful country bestowed upon him the title of

Stratelaies. In town mansions and village huts men's mouths were filled with his praise : one dwelt on his dauntless courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his sympathetic recognition of the claims of the common soldier, whose hardships he shared, and for whose Ufe he evinced a far greater solicitude than for his own.

But it was not only as a leader of armies that King Constantine appealed to the hearts of his countr5rmen. They loved to explain to strangers the reason of the name Koumbaros or " Gossip," by which they commonly called him. It was not so much, they would say, that he had stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during the campaigns, but rather that his relations with the rank and file of the people at large were marked by the intimate interest of a personal companion.

In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince bom to lead a democratic people. With his tall, virile figure, and a handsome face in which strength and dignity were happily blended with simpUcity, he had a manner of address which was very engaging : his words, few, simple, soldier-like, produced a wonderful effect ; they were the words of one who meant and felt what he said : they went straight to the hearer's heart because they came straight from the speaker's.

Quahties of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos to impose himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and to make his name current in the Chancelleries of the world.

Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had risen through a series of political convulsions to high notabihty in his native island ; and in 1909 a similar convulsion in Greece — ^brought about not without his collaboration — opened to him a wider sphere of activity. The moment was singularly opportune.

The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mismanagement of their affairs had been quickened by the Turkish Revolution into something hke despair. Bulgaria had exploited that upheaval by annexing Eastern Rumelia : Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the risk, if the Young Turks' experiment succeeded, of seeing the fulfil-

GKEECE~ASin'HE ALLIES 3

ment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever. A group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan leader translated the popular feeling into action : a revolt against the reign of venality and futility which had for so many years paralyzed every effort, which had sometimes sacrificed and always subordinated the interests of the nation to the interests of faction, and now left Greece a prey to Biilgarian and Ottoman ambition. The old pohticians who were the cause of the ill obviously could not effect a cure. A new man was needed — a. man free from the deadening influences of a corrupt past — a man daring enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough to push on with inexorable purpose to the goal.

During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had been a capable organizer of administrative departments no less than a clever manipulator of seditious movements. But he had mainly distinguished himself as a rebel against authority. And it was in the temper of a rebel that he came to Athens. Obstacles, however, external as well as internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible. With the quick adaptability of his natiu^e, he turned into a guardian of estabUshed institutions : the foe of revolution and friend of reform. Supported by the Crown, he was able to lift his voice f or a " Revisionist " above the angry sea of a multitude clamouring for a " Constituent Assembly."

All that was healthy in the pohtical world ralUed to the new man ; and the new man did not disappoint the faith placed in him. Through the next two years he stood in every eye as the embodiment of constructive statesmanship. His Government had strength enough in the coimtry to dispense with " graft." The result was a thorough overhauling of the State machinery. Self-distrust founded on past failures vanished. Greece seemed like an invalid healed and ready to face the future. It was a n:iiraculous change for a nation whose pohtical Hfe hitherto had exhibited two traits seldom found combined : the levity of childhood and the indolence of age.

For this miracle the chief credit undoubtedly belonged to M. Venizelos. He had brought to the task a brain better endowed than any associated with it. His initiative was indefatigable ; his decision quick. Unlike most of his countrymen, he did not content himself with ideas without works. His subtlety in thinking did not serve him as a substitute for action. To these talents he added an eloquence of the kind which, to a Greek multitude, is irresistible, and a certain gift which does not always go with high intelligence, but, when it does, is worth all the arts of the most profound poUtician and accomphshed orator put together. He understood, as it were instinctively, the character of every man he met, and dealt with him accordingly. This tact, coupled with a smile full of sweetness ahd apparent frankness, gave to his vivid personality a charm which only those could appraise who experienced it.

Abroad the progress of M. Venizelos excited almost as much interest as it did in Greece. The Greeks are extraordinarily sensitive to foreign opinion : a single good word in a Western newspaper raises a politician in public esteem more than a whole volume of home-made panegyric. M. Venizelos had not neglected this branch of his business ; and from the outset every foreign journalist and diplomatist who came his way was made to feel his fascination : so that, even before leaving his native shores, the Cretan had become in the European firmament a star of the third or fourth magnitude. Reasons other than personal contributed to enhst Western opinion in his favour. Owing to her geographical situation, Greece depends for the fulfilment of her national aspirations and for her very existence on the Powers which command the Mediterranean. A fact so patent had never escaped the perception of any Greek poUtician. But no Greek poHtician had ever kept this fact more steadily in view, or put this obvious truth into more vehement language than M. Venizelos : "To tie Greece to the apron-strings of the Sea Powers," was his maxim. And the times were such that those Powers needed a Greek statesman whom they could trust to apply that maxim unflinchingly.

With the recovery of Greece s5mchronized, not by chance, the doom of Turkey : a sentence in which all the members of the Entente, starting from different points and pursuing different objects, concurred. The executioners were, naturally, the Balkan States. Russia began the work by bringing about an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia ; England completed it by bringing Greece into the League. There ensued a local, which, in accordance with the old diplomatic prophecy, was soon to lead to the universal conflagration. Organized as she was, Greece succeeded better than anyone expected ; and the national gratitude — ^the exuberant gratitude of a Southern people — went out to the two men directly responsible for that success : to King Constantine, whose brilUant generalship beat the enemy hosts ; and to M. Venizelos, whose able statesmanship had prepared the field. Poets and pamphleteers vied with each other in expatiating on the wonders they had performed, to the honour and advantage of their country. In this ecstasy of popular adoration the spirit of the soldier and the spirit of the lawyer seemed to have met.

But the union was illusive and transient. Between these two men, so strangely flung together by destiny, there existed no link of sympathy ; and propinquity only forced the growth of their mutual antagonism. The seeds of discord had already borne fruit upon the common ground of their Balkan exploits. Immediately after the defeat of Turkey a quarrel over the spoils arose among the victors. King Constantine, bearing in mind Bulgaria's longcherished dream of hegemony, and persuaded that no sacrifices made by Greece and Servia could do more than defer a rupture, urged a Grseco-Servian alhance against their truculent partner. He looked at the matter from a purely Greek standpoint and was anxious to secure the maximum of profit for his country. M. Venizelos, on the other hand, aware that the Western Powers, and particularly England, wanted a permanent Balkan coahtion as a barrier against Germany in the East, and anxious to retain those Powers' favour, was prepared to concede much for the sake of averting a rupture. Not until the Bulgars betrayed their intentions by actual aggressions in Macedonia did he withdraw his opposition to the alUance with Servia, which ushered in the Second Balkan War and led to the Peace of Bucharest. He 5delded to the pressure of the circumstances brought to bear upon him ; but the encounter represented no more than the prehminary crossing of swords between two strong antagonists.

Chapter I

FROM the moment when the rupture between Austria and Servia, in July, 1914, came to disturb the peace, Greece deUberately adopted an attitude of neutrality, with the proviso that she would go to Servia's assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter. Such an attitude was considered to be in accordance with the Grseco-Servian AUiance. For, although thfe Military Convention accompanying the Treaty contained a vague stipulation for mutual support in case of war between one of the aUied States and " a third Power," the Treaty itself had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria.^

In the opinion of M. Venizelos, her pact did not oblige Greece to go to Servia's assistance against Austria, but at most to mobilize 40,000 men.^ Treaty obligations apart, neutrality was also imposed by practical considerations. It was to the interest of Greece — a. matter of self-preservation — ^not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia calculated to upset the Balkan balance of power estabUshed by the Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined, in concert with Rumania, to oppose such an attack with all her might. But as to Austria, M. Venizelos had to consider whether Greece could or could not offer her ally effective aid, and after consideration he decided that she

^ See Art. i of the Military Convention. As this article originally stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the

I" case of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria." It was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without objections on the part of Greek military men, into a " case of war between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco- Servian Treaty of Alliance." But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite the " third Power " phrase in the Military Convention. All the documents are to be found in the White Book, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6.

2 See Art. 5 of the Military Convention.

should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men, for such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobiUzation and precipitate complications. For the rest, the attitude of Greece in face of Servia's war with Austria, M. Venizelos pointed out, corresponded absolutely with the attitude which Servia had taken up in face of Greece's recent crisis with Turkey. ^ On that occasion Greece had obtained from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being that the casus fosderis would arise only in the event of Bulgarian intervention.^

Accordingly, when the Servian Government asked if it could count on armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs under M. Venizelos, answered that the Greek Government was convinced that it fuUy performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting, until Bulgaria moved, a pohcy of most benevolent neutrahty. The co-operation of Greece in the war with Austria, far from helping, would harm Servia ; by becoming a belligerent Greece could only offer her ally forces negligible compared with the enemy's, while she would inevitably expose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could obtain war material, to an Austrian attack ; and, moreover, she would weaken her army which, in the common interest, ought to be kept intact as a check on Bulgaria.'

A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to keep out of the conflict, and to intervene in concert with Rumania only should Bulgaria by intervening against Servia jeopardize the status quo established by the Bucharest Treaty — in which case the action of Greece would have a purely Balkan character — ^was made to the Greek Ministers abroad after a Council held in the Royal Palace under the presidency of the King.*

This policy brought King Constantine into sharp collision with one of the Central Powers, whose conceptions in regard to the Balkans had not yet been harmonized. Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek Government's declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to compromise

1 White Book, Nos. 19, 20, 22.

2 White Book, Nos. 11, 13, 14. ^ White Book, No. 23.

* Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nlsh. (No. 23,800.)

the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria, the Austrian Government, on its part„promised to abstain from manifesting any solidarity with Bulgaria in the event of a Graeco-Bulgarian war.i Not so Berlin.

The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate the course which Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he invited King Constantine to join Germany, backing the invitation with every appeal to sentiment and interest he could think of. The memory of his father, who had been assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour the Servian assassins ; never would Greece have a better opportunity of emancipating herself, imder the protection of the Central Powers, from the tutelage which Russia aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula ; if, contrary to the Kaiser's expectations, Greece took the other side, she would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from Italy, Bulgaria and Turkey, and by the same token all personal relations between him and Constantine would be broken for ever. He ended with the words : "I have spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision without delay and with the same absolute frankness."

He had nothing to complain of on that score. King Constantine on 2 August rephed that, while it was not the policy of Greece to take an active part in the Austro- Servian conflict, it was equally impossible for her " to make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to fall upon them, since they are our alUes. It seems to me that the interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality and the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans such as it has been created by the Treaty of Bucharest." He went on to add that Greece was determined, in concert with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing herself at the expense of Servia ; if that happened, the balance in the Balkans would be upset and it would bring about the very Russian tutelage which the Kaiser feared. " This way of thinking," he concluded, " is shared by the whole of my people."

What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed up in one word on the margin, " Rubbish." This, however, was not meant for his brother-in-law's ears. To him he

1 Ibid.

used less terse language. On 4 August he informed King Constantine through the Greek Minister in Berlin that an alUance had that day been concluded between Germany and Turkey, that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly ranging themselves on Germany's side, and that the German men-of-war in the Mediterranean were going to join the Turkish fleet in order to act together. Thus all the Balkan States were siding with Germany in the struggle against Slavism. Would Greece alone stand out ? His Imperial Majesty appealed to King Constantine as a comrade, as a German Field Marshal of whom the German Army was proud, as a brother-in-law ; he reminded him that it was thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain Cavalla ; he begged him to mobilize his army, place himself by the Kaiser's side and march hand in hand against the common enemy — Slavism. He made this urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King of Greece would respond to it. If not, all would be over between the two countries — this being a slightly attenuated version of another marginal note : " I will treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once." King Constantine's answer was tactful but final : His personal sympathies and his pohtical opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser's side. But alas ! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely out of the question. Greece could not under any conceivable circumstances side against the Entente : the Mediterranean was at the mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could destroy the Greek marine, both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and wipe Greece off the map. Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was the only policy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled under the guise of an " assurance not to touch his friends among my neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our local Balkan interests."^

1 Part of the correspondence is to be found in Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausiruch, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter Schtlking ; part in the White Book, Nos. 24 and 26. As much acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was sent. Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval